1. Two sentences, each of six months’ imprisonment, passed simultaneously under Section 35 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 and directed to run concurrently cannot, in our opinion, be held to be, in the aggregate, a single sentence of one year’s imprisonment. The word “aggregate” in Sub-section (3) of the section connotes the combined effect of the different sentences passed and, if two concurrent sentences could properly be said to be aggregated in the sense of being merged together, the result of the so-called aggregation would, we think, be a single sentence of six months’ imprisonment. The intention which is to be gathered from, for example, Section 411 of the Code, is that a person who is to suffer by being imprisoned for more than a certain period shall have the privilege of an appeal. If he is, in fact, to be imprisoned for a shorter period, whether under one or two sentences, we do not understand how the privilege can, or why it should, be extended to him.
2. This appeal is, therefore, incompetent and dismissed accordingly.