ORDER
S.J. Mukhopadhaya, J.
1. The appellant was in the services of the Bihar State Electricity Board, Patna, now Jharkhand State Electricity Board, Ranchi (hereinafter to be referred as ‘JSEB’). His age was assessed by the Medical Board between 55-57 years (56 years) as on 3rd November, 1999 vide report dated 3rd November, 1999. It was informed to the appellant by letter dated 1st April, 2000. On the basis of the said assessment of age, the appellant was ordered to superannuate. The letter dated 1st April, 2000, communicating the said assessment of the appellant’s age, was challenged by the appellant in the writ application. But the learned Single Judge refused to interfere with the same, on the ground that the appellant appeared before the Medical Board without any objection and did not challenged the order of assessment of his age for about three years.
2. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the order, assessing the age of the appellant was communicated to him vide letter dated 1st April, 2000 and there was no laches on his part in approaching this Court, There is, thus, no delay of three years, as observed by the learned Single Judge. He further submitted that in any case, the date of birth, as recorded in the service book, can not be changed without giving a notice, but the respondents never informed the appellant that they are intending to alter the date of birth of the appellant to his disadvantage on the basis of the said assessment of the Board and surprisingly, the appellant was made to superannuate prematurely on the basis of the said arbitrary alteration in the date of birth.
3. To ascertain the position, the Court called for the original service book of the appellant. From perusal of the same, it appears that after appointment of the appellant, when the service book was prepared, his date of birth was recorded as “18th March, 1945” (Eighteenth March nineteen hundred forty five). After assessment made by the Medical Board, without notice to the appellant, his date of birth was changed to 3rd November, 1943 by the Electrical Executive Engineer, Electric Supply Division, Deoghar on 29th March, 2000 i.e. prior to the impugned letter dated 1st April, 2000. The respondent first changed the date of birth in the service book without notice to the appellant and without obtaining his thumb impression/signature arid then communicated him the said alteration in the date of birth/age and then made him to superannuate on the basis of said changed date of birth, after filing of the writ petition.
4. Learned Counsel for the respondents referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. S.C. Chadha, reported in (2004) 3 SCC 394 and submitted that the appellant can not request to correct the date of birth at the fag end of his service career.
5. In this case, the situation is converse and, as such, the principle, laid down by the Supreme Court in S.C. Chadha case (supra) has no application. In the present case, the appellant never sought for correction of his date of birth, recorded in his service book (18th March, 1.945). It is the respondent-employer, who changed the date of birth in the service book on the basis of the assessment of the Medical Board as 3rd November. 1943. It has not been made clear as to how the respondents came to a definite determination of the appellant’s date of birth as 3rd November, 1943, if assumed date of birth has been assessed by the Medical Board, giving benefits of two years to the appellant. It was not made clear as to how 55 years of age was not accepted.
6. Whether the employer can change the date of birth, as recorded in the service book at the fag end of service career of an employee, if the date of birth, recorded in the service book continued for such a long period, accepted by the employer, without any objection by the employer, has been much debated. In the case of State of Orissa v. Dr. (Mrs.) Binapani Dei, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1269 similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court. While the Supreme Court observed that enquiry by the High Court was permissible only under exceptional circumstances, held as follows :
…We think that such enquiry and decision were contrary to the basic concept of justice and can not have any value. It is true that the order is administrative in character, but even the administrative order which involves civil consequences, as already stated, must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice after informing the first respondent of the case of the State, the evidence in support thereto and after giving an opportunity to the first respondent of being heard and meeting or explaining the evidence. No such steps were admittedly taken, the High Court was, in our judgment, right in setting aside the order of State.
7. The case of the appellant being covered by the decision in the case of Binapani Dei (supra), his date of birth having been changed by the respondents without prior notice to him, the altered date of birth can not be used to get the appellant retired from service of the Board. The changed date of birth in the service book of the appellant is, thus, declared illegal. The impugned order dated 29th November, 2004, passed by the learned Single Judge is hereby set aside. The appellant stands reinstated from the date, he was made to retire from his service, but he stands retired on attaining the age of superannuation i.e. with effect from 31st March, 2005. The case is remitted with a direction to the respondents to provide the appellant all the consequential benefits, such as, arrears of salary and the arrears on proper fixation of pay, pension, gratuity, leave encashment etc. which the respondents will pay within three months from the date of receipt/ production of a copy of this order. The appeal is, thus, allowed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
N.N. Tiwari, J.
8. I agree.