JUDGMENT
B. P. Singh, C. J.
1. The sole question, which arises for consideration in this revision application, is : Whether, to an application made to the Collector under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) for a reference to the Court, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 will apply? The answer to this question depends on whether the Collector, while making, or refusing to make, a reference under Section 18(1) of the Act, acts as a Court, and not as a mere Statutory Authority. Having regard to the weight of authorities on this question, it cannot be disputed that the Collector, acting under Section 18 of the Act, is not a Court, but the question arises for consideration in view of an amendment of Section 18 of the Act by Maharashtra Act No. XXXVIII of 1964, whereby Sub-section (3) of Section 18 has been added. The moot question, therefore, is as to whether the provision of Sub-section (3) makes any difference.
2. The facts of the case may be briefly noticed :
(a) As per the Development Plan, the land belonging to the Petitioner was reserved for development of 80 feet wide road. The Ichalkaranji Municipal Council decided to acquire the said land for widening of the road, and ultimately issued Notification on 20th July, 1990 under Section 126 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 read with Section 6 of the Act, whereby the said land was declared to be acquired. The Notification was published in the Official Gazette and newspapers on 30th August, 1990 and 1st September, 1990. The Award was published by the Land Acquisition Officer on 31st January, 1991, and the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Kolhapur, by his notice dated 13th March, 1991, called upon the Petitioner to receive compensation. The Petitioner received the notice on 18th March, 1991, but accepted the compensation under protest. He, thereafter, applied for a certified copy of the award on 2nd April. 1991, which he received on 19th September, 1991. It appears that, thereafter, on 5th October. 1991, he filed an Application under Section 18(1} of the Act. requiring the Collector to refer the matter to a Court for determination of the compensation amount payable to the Petitioner. By his communication and order dated 5th October, 1991, the Land Acquisition Officer informed the Petitioner that such a reference could not be made, since his application was barred by limitation. Later on the 19th August, 1992, the papers submitted by the Petitioner, along with court-fees, etc., were returned to the Petitioner. The Petitioner, thereafter, moved the instant Revision Application in which his contention is that the time required to obtain the certified copy of the award should be excluded by applying the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
(b) A learned Judge of this Court before whom the Revision Application was placed for hearing, noticing the conflict of judicial opinion, referred the matter to be decided by a Larger Bench of this Court. This Revisloh Application was directed to be placed for hearing along with other matters involving the same question which had been referred to a Larger Bench. In those matters, however, this Court found that the question did not arise for consideration, since the Collector had dismissed the applications for condonation of delay on merit, and not on the ground of limitation.
3. Section 18 of the Act provides that any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. Proviso to subsection (2) mandates that such an application shall be made within six weeks from the date of the Collector’s Award if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his Award. In other cases, the application must be made within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 12, Sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the Collector’s Award, whichever period shall first expire.
The Maharashtra Legislature, by enacting the Land Acquisition (Maharashtra Extension and Amendment) Act XXXVIII of 1964, added the following Sub-section (3) in Section 18 :-
“(3) Any order made by the Collector on an application under this section shall be subject to revision by the High Court, as if the Collector were a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.”
By the same Maharashtra Act XXXVIII of 1964, the definition of the expression ‘Court’ in Section 3(d) of the Limitation Act was also amended. Under Section 3(d), as it stood before its amendment, the expression ‘Court’ was to mean the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, unless the appropriate Government had appointed a Special Judicial Officer within any specified local limits to perform the functions of the Court under the Act. At the end of Section 3(d) after its amendment as under :-
The expression ‘Court’ (except in Sub-section (3) of Section 18) means a Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction, unless the appropriate Government has appointed (as it hereby empowered to do) a Special Judicial Officer within any specified local limits to perform the functions of the Court under this Act.”
It is obvious that this amendment was necessitated on account of the amendment of Section 18 of the Act by adding Sub-section (3) thereto.
4. A learned Judge of this Court in Ramesh Shankar Wankhede v. State of Maharashtra, held that under the amended Section 18, the Collector deals with an application made under that section as a Court governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that is why an application for revision to the High Court has been provided against the order made by the Collector on such an application. Thus, when dealing with an applica-
tion for reference under Section 18 of the Act, the Land Acquisition Officer is considered to be a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. it also appears that a Division Bench of this Court in Ramu Dhondi Todkar v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, held that the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to the proceeding under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The said judgment, however, has not considered the question with reference to the relevant provision of the Act or any other statute or any case law on the point, as noticed by a subsequent Full Bench decision.
5. In Prabhakar Vasudev Gadgil v. P. Y. Deshpande, a Division Bench of this Court considered the same question, since a learned Judge of this Court doubted the correctness of the view taken in Ramesh Shankar Wankhede. The Division Bench, noticing the decisions of the Apex Court in Athani Municipality v. Labour Court, Hubli,; Nityanand v. L. I. C. of India,; Kerala State Electricity Board v. T. P. Kunhulumma,, held that an application to be governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 need not be an application under the Code of Civil Procedure but may be an application under any Act, provided that the application was made to a Court. It was not contended that the Collector exercising powers under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act without its Maharashtra amendment could be regarded as a Court in order that the provisions of the Limitation Act could be applicable to him. Noticing the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohammed Hasanuddin v. State of Maharashtra, it held that merely because the Collector, while making an Award under Section 11 or in serving a notice on the owner of the land under Section 12, acts as an agent of the Government, it does not necessarily imply that while making a reference to the Court under Section 18, he acts in the capacity of an agent of the Government. Section 18(1) entrusts to the Collector his statutory duty of making a reference on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down therein. The Collector, acting under Section 18, therefore, is nothing but a statutory authorised exercising his own powers under the section, and cannot be regarded as a Court attracting the provisions of the Limitation Act. After considering the amendment introduced by Maharashtra Act XXXVIII of 1964, and noticing the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 18, the Division Bench, disagreeing with the reason contained in the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Ramesh Shankar Wankhede, held that the Maharashtra amendment did not have the effect of converting a functionary, who is essentially a Statutory Authority with restricted powers under Section 18, into a Court governed by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. It was not correct to say that Sub-section (3) inserted by the Maharashtra amendment in Section 18 of the Act converted a Collector into a Court governed by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. The
language of Sub-section (3) did not warrant such an inference, because it merely provided that an order made by the Collector on an application under Section 18 shall be subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. In order to make clear the extent of the powers of revision to be exercised by the High Court, it had been further provided that the Collector should be regarded as a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Their Lordships were of the view that there was nothing in Sub-section (3) of Section 18 which would remotely indicate that the Collector is to be regarded as a Court governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure for all purposes. The Division Bench recorded its conclusion in the following words :-
“Considering the language of Sub-section (3) introduced by the Maharashtra amendment in Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, we see merely an intention on the part of the Legislature to provide a remedy of revisional application to the High Court against any order passed by the Collector in the discharge of his statutory duty under Sub-section (1) and we are also of the opinion that while the Collector so discharges his statutory duty he is not a Court under the Civil Procedure Code attracting the provisions of the Limitation Act. The view taken in Ramesh Wankhede’s case is, therefore, overruled.”
6. The same question again arose for consideration before a learned Single Judge of this Court, and noticing the apparent conflict of opinion in Prabhakar Vasudev Gadgli and Ramu Dhondi Todkar, two decisions both rendered by Division Benches of this Court, he referred the matter to a Larger Bench. The matter came up for consideration before a Full Bench in Bhupal Premchand Shah and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra,. The Full Bench, noticing the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Kerola State Electricity Board, observed that the provisions of the Limitation Act would apply to an application under any law for the time being in force, provided the application is made to a Court. Their Lordships also observed that if the provisions of Section 18 of the Act were to be construed sans Sub-section (3) thereof, it must be held that in view of the weight of the authorities referred to in Prabhakar Vasudev Gadgil, that the Collector functioning under those provisions is not a Court, whether subordinate to the High Court or otherwise. A reference, in this connection, was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohammed Hasanuddin. The Full Bench, therefore, posed a question as to whether the provisions of Sub-section (3) are to be regarded to have made any difference and to have made the Collector, even if not otherwise a Court, a ‘Court’ for the purpose of Section 18. as amended by the Maharashtra Act. The learned Chief Justice, who spoke for the Court, observed :-
“We have noted that while adding Sub-section (3) to Section 18, the Maharashtra Act No. 38 of 1964 has also amended the definition of the expression ‘Court’ in Section 3(d) of the Land Acquisition Act. Under Section 3(d), as it stood before this amendment, the expression ‘Court’ was to mean generally a principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction. The Collector under the Land Acquisition Act cannot obviously be such a Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction to which a reference is to be made by the Collector. But the Amendment Act has taken care to provide that the expression ‘Court’ in Section 18(3) shall not be
governed by the aforesaid definition and that definition would apply to ‘Court’, “except in Sub-section (3) of Section 18″. The result, therefore, is that the definition of the expression ‘Court’ as used in Section 3(d) of the Land Acquisition Act is in no way decisive or determinative of the connotation of the expression ‘Court’ as used in Section 18(3) and we will have to construe the expression ‘Court’ in Section 18(3) without being in any way trammelled by the said,definition.”
The Full Bench, noticing the judgment of the Division Bench in Prabhakar Vasudev Gadgil, and of a learned Single Judge in Ramesh Wankhede, preferred the view of the learned Single Judge that even though the Collector or a Land Acquisition Officer, while dealing with the matter of compensation, may not be a Court governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Prpcedure, yet, by virtue of these provisions, when he is dealing with the application for reference under Section 18, he deals with that application as a Court governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was observed ;
“The provisions of Section 18, Sub-section (3), make it unmistakably clear that in respect of an order made by the Collector on an application under Section 18(1), the Collector shall be deemed to be a Court subordinate to the High Court. It is difficult to understand that if the concerned Legislature has thought it fit to make the Collector a Court in respect of the order under Section 18(1), which would obviously be the product of the process to be undertaken by the Collector under Section 18(1), read with Section 19, then why in respect of the process itself giving rise tp the order, the Collector shall not also be deemed to be .acting as such Court. If under the provisions of Section 18(3) of the Land Acquisition Act, the Collector is a Court in respect of an order made by the Collector on an application under Section 18, it will be evidently logical also to hold that while entertaining and disposing of such an application resulting in such an order, the Collector is to be regarded as a Court. If the intention of the Legislature was to treat the Collector as Court only for the limited purpose of ‘revision to High Cpurt’, then it was sufficient, to enact Sub-section (3) of Section 18 as follows:-‘Any order made by the Collector on an application under this Section shall be subject to revision by the High Court.’
“Further part of Sub-section (3) providing for deeming provision is not therefore for the said limited purpose, but in order to put beyond doubt or clarify that the Collector is Court while dealing with application for reference under Section 18(1). We are inclined to hold that if in respect of the product the Collector is deemed to be a Court, then the Collector must also be deemed to be such a Court in respect of the process undertaken to yield the product. And once we hold that the Collector is a Court at least for the purpose of application under Section 18(1), the provisions of the Limitation Act would obviously apply to such an application for reference. It may be noted that any rate, and even Otherwise, the provisions of the Limitation Act are obviously attracted vis-a-vis the .order of the Collector because the revision application against such order would obviously have to be filed within the period prescribed under Article 131 of the Limitation Act.”
7. It was, therefore, held that the Collector, while dealing with an application for reference under Section 18(1), shall be deemed to be a Court because of the provision of Section 18(3), and once it is held that the Collector is to be deemed to be a Court in respect of an application under
Section 18(1). the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall obviously apply thereto as a result of the operation of the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. The Full Bench, therefore, held that the Division Bench decision in Prabhakar Vasudev Gadgil did not correctly lay down the law.
8. The same question later arose for consideration by the Supreme Court in Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) and Anr v. Sham Mantlal Chandulal and Ors.,. The Supreme Court was no doubt, dealing with an acquisition of land within the State of Gujarat under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. However, Sub-section (3) of Section 18, introduced by Maharashtra Act XXXVIII of 1964 was noticed, and has been extracted in the judgment. From a perusal of the judgment of the Supreme Court, it appears that Their Lordships proceeded on the assumption that the amendment brought about by the Maharashtra Act also applied to the Land Acquisition Act in its application to the State of Gujarat. Whether this assumption is correct or not is not of any significance so far as this Court is concerned because that question does not arise for consideration in this Petition. The fact remains that the Supreme Court laid down the law after considering the provisions of Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act as amended by Maharashtra Act XXXVIII of 1964 by adding Sub-section (3) to Section 18. In the appeal before the Supreme Court as well, the Respondents had applied for a certified copy of the Award, and claimed that in calculating the period of limitation, the time taken in obtaining the certified copy ought to be excluded, and this on the basis that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applied. The Supreme Court, after noticing Sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Act, which was inserted by a local amendment, noticed the decision on the subject. It observed that in Mohammed Hasanuddin the Apex Court had held that the Collector is required, under Section 18 to make a reference on the fulfilment of certain conditions. The power to make a reference under Section 18 is circumscribed by the conditions laid down therein, and one such condition is a condition regarding limitation to be found in the proviso. The Collector acts as a Statutory Authority. If the application is not made within time, the Collector will not have the power to make reference. It was observed :
“It would thus be clear that one of the conditions precedent to make a valid reference to the Court is that the application under Section 18(1) shall be in writing and made within six weeks from the date of the award when the applicant was present either in person or throught counsel, at the time of making of the award by the Collector under Clause (a) of proviso to Sub-section (2). The Collector, when he makes the reference, acts as a Statutory Authority.”
Apart from other decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Court, Their Lordships noticed the Division Bench decision of this Court in Prabhakar Vasudev Gadgil, and observed :
“In Prabhakar Vasudeu Gadgil v. P. Y. Deshpande, the question similar to the one presently under consideration had directly arisen. Section 5 of the Limitation Act was applied for condonation of the delay in seeking to make a reference under Section 18. It was contended that by operation of Sub-section (3) as also applicable to States of Maharashtra and Gujarat, the
Collector is a Court which is amenable to revislonal jurisdiction under Section 115 of the C.P.C. and that, therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply. The Division Bench negatived the contention and held that the Collector is not a Court under C.P.C. attracting the provisions of the Limitation Act. The contra view taken by that Court was held to be not a good law and accordingly the same was overruled. The same question had arisen in Kerala where there is no specific local provision like Section 18(3), locally amended by Maharashtra and Gujarat. Contention was raised that by operation of Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, Section 5 stands attracted since there is no express exclusion of the limitation under the Act. Therefore, the delay was condonable. The Division Bench negatived the contention and held that the Collector is not a Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 29 did not apply. Same is the view of the A. P. High Court in Special Dy. Collector Land Acquisition v. K. Kodandaramacharlu,.
9. It would, thus, appear that the judgment of the Supreme Court was rendered after noticing the amendment to Section 18 of the Act adding subsection (3) thereto, and after noticing with approval the judgment of this Court rendered by a Division Bench in Prabhakar Vasudev Gadgil, which overruled the earlier Single Judge judgment in Ramesh Shankar Wankhede. Their Lordships held :
“18. Though hard it may be, in view of the specific limitation provided under proviso to Section 18(2) of the Act, we are of the considered view that Sub-section (2) of Section 29 cannot be applied to the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 18. The Collector/L.A.O., therefore, is not a Court when he acts as a Statutory Authority under Section 18(1). Therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied for extension of the period of limitation prescribed under proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 18. The High Court, therefore, was not right in its finding that the Collector is a Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
“19. Accordingly, we hold that the applications are barred by limitation and the Collector has no power to extend time for making an application under Section* 18(1) for reference to the Court.”
10. Later, the same question arose for consideration by a Division Bench of this Court in Laxmibai Narayan Patil and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr., The Division Bench of this Court, following the judgment of the Supreme Court in Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) v. Shah Manilal Chandulal held that the Land Acquisition Officer was justified in rejecting the application for reference under Section 18(1) of the Act. as it had been made beyond the period of limitation prescribed for that purpose.
11. It was submitted before us on behalf of the respondents that in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) v. Shah Mantlal Chandulal, the question is no longer res integra, and we are bound by the judgment of the Supreme Court. We must therefore, hold that the Collector, dealing with an application for reference under Section 18(1) of the Act, acts as a Statutory Authority, and not as a Court, notwithstanding the provision of Sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Act, which was inserted by local amendment by Maharashtra Act XXXVIII
of 1964. On the other hand, it is contended by the Petitioner that the Supreme Court did not noticed the Full Bench decision of this Court in Bhupal Premchand Shah, which had overruled the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Prabhakar Vasudev Cadgll. It is submitted that this Full Bench decision held the field, so far as the State of Maharashtra is concerned, when the Supreme Court rendered its judgment in Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition), and since the judgment of the Full Bench was not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court judgment should not be read so as to overrule the view taken by a Full Bench of this Court in Bhupal Premchand Shah. It was also submitted that the Maharashtra amendment did not apply to the State of Gujarat, and, therefore, it was not necessary for Their Lordships of the Supreme Court to consider the amendment to Section 18 brought about by Maharashtra Act XXXVIII of 1964 by addition of Sub-section (3) to Section 18. It was also submitted that Sub-section (3) of Section 18 did not directly fall for consideration in the case before the Supreme Court, and, therefore, any observation made in regard thereto must be considered as obiter.
12. We are of the view that the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) v. Shah Manilal Chandulal (supra) is binding upon us, and authoritatively lays down the law. While laying down the law, the Supreme Court has considered the provisions of the Act, including Sub-section (3) of Section 18, which was added to Section 18 by Maharashtra Amendment Act No. XXXVIII of 1964. The question as to whether Sub-section (3) of Section 18 applied to an acquisition made within the State of Gujarat under the Act is not of any significance so far as this Court is concerned, and does not, in any way, affect the binding force of the Judgment. The said amendment undoubtedly applies to the State of Maharashtra. The Supreme Court having considered the relevant provisions of the Act, including Section 18(3) added by local amendment, and having laid down the law, that must be considered to be the law of the land binding upon us.
13. It was faintly urged that the judgment of the Full Bench not having been brought to the notice of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court should not be understood to have expressed any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the Full Bench decision. This submission, to our mind, is not tenable. Even a judgment rendered by a Full Bench of the High Court does not operate as a binding precedent so far as the Supreme Court is concerned, and obviously, the per incuriam Rule can have no application in such cases. The Supreme Court having laid down the law after carefully appreciating the provisions of the Act, including Section 18(3) thereof added by a local amendment, and approvingly noticed the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Prabhakar Vasudev Gadgll, we must hold that the law as laid down in the aforesaid judgment has been approved by the Supreme Court, and the law declared to the contrary in the Full Bench Judgment of this Court in Bhapal Premchand Shah is no longer good law. The position would have been different if the Supreme Court had not noticed and considered the provision of Sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Act as introduced in the Act in its application to the State of Maharashtra. The Supreme Court having done so, and having authoritatively pronounced the law, we are bound by the decision of the Supreme Court, and this
Revision Application must, therefore, be decided in the light of the law as declared by the Supreme Court. We must, therefore, hold that Sub-section (3) of Section 18 notwithstanding, the Collector under Section 18(1) of the Act performs a statutory function, and does not act as a Court. The dichotomy of the Collector and the Court cannot be lost sight of. Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Act cannot be applied to the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 18. The Collector is not a Court when he acts as a Statutory Authority under Section 18(1). and, therefore. Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied for extension of the period of limitation prescribed under the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 18.
14. In the circumstances, we find no merit in the Civil Revision Application, and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.