Delhi High Court High Court

Susan Leigh Beer vs India Tourism Development … on 3 March, 2011

Delhi High Court
Susan Leigh Beer vs India Tourism Development … on 3 March, 2011
Author: Badar Durrez Ahmed
           THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

%                                 Judgment delivered on: 03.03.2011

+                          CS(OS) 1298/1982

SUSAN LEIGH BEER                                              ... Plaintiff

                                   - versus -

INDIA TOURISM DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION LTD                                               ... Defendant

Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Plaintiff         : Mr Madan Bhatia, Sr Advocate with Mr Anup
                            Kumar Sinha
For the Defendant         : Mr K. T. S. Tulsi, Sr Advocate with Mr Amitabh
                            Marwah, Mr R. S. Mathur and Ms Evneet Uppal

CORAM:-
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMED

     1.

Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to
see the judgment? YES

2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? YES

3. Whether the judgment should be reported in Digest? YES

BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J

1. The plaintiff has prayed for a decree of ` 2,00,00,000/- (rupees

two crores) by way of damages as also interest at the rate of 18% p.a.

on the said amount from the date of presentation of the plaint till actual

payment. The plaintiff has made the said claim on the basis of an

incident which happened on 05.05.1978 in the swimming pool of

Akbar Hotel which was managed and maintained by the defendant —

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 1 of 64
India Tourism Development Corporation Limited. The plaintiff, who

was staying in the said hotel along with her parents and brother, was

injured in the said swimming pool as a result of which she became a

quadriplegic. According to the plaintiff, the injury which had been

caused to her was on account of the negligence on the part of the

defendant in the maintenance of the swimming pool. Insofar as the

defendant is concerned, while the fact that the plaintiff received the

injury on 05.05.1978 in the said swimming pool is not denied, it has

been contended that the injury was a result of the plaintiff’s own

negligence and the defendant cannot be held liable for the same.

2. Briefly put, the case hinges upon three facets. The first being that

according to the plaintiff the injury was caused when she jumped into

the swimming pool at the shallow end and her feet slipped on the tiled

floor of the swimming pool. As a result, she hit her head on the vertical

wall of the swimming pool and incurred the injury which led to her

becoming a quadriplegic. On the other hand, the defendant contends

that the plaintiff received the injury as a result of diving at the shallow

end and not as a result of jumping. Consequently, no negligence could

be attributed to the defendant. The second facet, which is connected

with the first, is the issue as to whether the tiles of the floor of the

swimming pool were slippery because of algae formation? It is the

plaintiff’s case that they were and, therefore, there was clear negligence

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 2 of 64
on the part of the defendant inasmuch as the swimming pool had not

been properly maintained and kept safe for the residents of the hotel.

The defendant, on the other hand, contended that the swimming pool

was properly maintained and that, in any event, the injury which

resulted was because of the plaintiff diving into the pool and not

because of her jumping as suggested by the plaintiff. The third facet is

that, in case there is a finding in favour of the plaintiff that the injury

caused to her was because of the defendant’s negligence, the quantum

of compensation is to be determined. These are the broad parameters

of this case.

Averments in the Plaint:

3. In the plaint, it is alleged that in May, 1978, the plaintiff was on

vacation in India along with her parents and stayed in Akbar hotel

situated at New Delhi which was being run and managed by the

defendant. On 05.05.1978, during her stay in the hotel, the plaintiff

went to the swimming pool at about 5:15 pm for a swim. It is stated

that the plaintiff was an experienced swimmer, having been a

Queensland (Australia) underage champion and was also a member of

the Queensland Women’s Water Polo Team for a number of years. It is

averred that in the beginning of 1978, the plaintiff had also been invited

to join the Australian Women’s Water Polo Team and was expected to

travel to Germany with the Australian Team in August, 1979.

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 3 of 64

4. On the fateful day, that is, on 05.05.1978, at about 5:15 pm, the

plaintiff jumped into the swimming pool from the shallow end,

opposite the diving board. According to the plaint, the plaintiff had

reason to believe that the bottom of the pool was not slippery and had

been kept clean of all slimy material which otherwise accumulates if

the pool is not properly cleaned. According to the plaintiff, it is an

implied representation by the owner of the swimming pool that the

floor of the pool is not slippery and is safe for persons using the pool to

stand on the floor of the pool without slipping. According to the

plaintiff, the defendant had been extremely negligent in covering the

floor of the pool with glazed tiles which were very slippery and also in

not cleaning and maintaining the floor sufficiently, resulting in the

growth and accumulation of slime on the tiles. Because of this, as soon

as the plaintiff jumped into the water and her feet touched the floor of

the pool, they slipped, resulting in loss of control by the plaintiff and

the plaintiff fell backwards and her head hit against the wall of the

pool.

5. It is further averred that as a result of the aforesaid fall, the

plaintiff suffered serious head and back injuries and was unable to

swim out of the pool. The plaintiff’s father and brother sensing that the

plaintiff had been injured and on noticing blood in the water,

immediately swam to the plaintiff’s assistance and lifted her out of the

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 4 of 64
pool carefully. Subsequently, the plaintiff was removed by ambulance

to the Holy Family Hospital, Okhla, New Delhi where she was treated

by Dr Arjun Sehgal and Professor Ramamurthi, who had come from

Madras. As per the plaint, the said Dr Sehgal diagnosed that the

plaintiff had suffered a head injury with fracture dislocation of the

cervical dorsal column causing paralysis of the four limbs and loss of

sphincter control. It is stated that Dr Sehgal later advised that the

plaintiff should be transported to her home in Brisbane, Australia.

After a prolonged hospitalization in Delhi, accompanied by a

neurosurgeon and another doctor, the plaintiff was flown to Australia.

From 16.06.1978 to 27.10.1978 the plaintiff remained admitted in the

Spinal Unit of Princess Alexandra Hospital, Brisbane and from

13.11.1978 to 18.11.1978 in the Spinal Unit of Royal North Shore

Hospital, Sydney, Australia. It is further stated in the plaint that despite

sustained medical treatment, the plaintiff has not been able to recover

from the spinal injuries which are of a permanent character and have

physically incapacitated the plaintiff for the rest of her life. She is now

permanently confined to a wheel chair, being a quadriplegic.

6. It is alleged in the plaint that apart from the physical agony and

mental anguish which the plaintiff underwent during her treatment, the

plaintiff also suffered emotional and psychological pain which will live

with her as long as she lives. According to the plaintiff, she had a very

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 5 of 64
bright and fruitful future ahead of her but the same was cut-short by the

said permanent disability suffered by the plaintiff on account of utter

negligence and carelessness of the defendant, its employees, servants

and agents. It is alleged that the defendant was under a duty to keep its

swimming pool safe for the purposes of swimming. According to the

plaintiff, the incident speaks for itself and the plaintiff is entitled to the

benefit of the maxim of res ipsa loquitur. The sum of ` 2 crores which

has been claimed by the plaintiff by way of damages has been

computed as under:-

 i)      Expenses incurred by the plaintiff on
         medical treatment and care in India
         and Australia                              -        `   20,00,000.00

 ii)     Damages on account of physical pain,
         mental anguish and psychological
         anguish and loss of education              -        `   50,00,000.00

 iii)    Damages on account of loss of              -    `   1,30,00,000.00
         earnings for the rest of her life
                                           Total    -    `   2,00,00,000.00



Consequently, a decree of    `   2 crores along with interest at the rate of

18% p.a. from the date of presentation of the plaint till realization has

been prayed for by the plaintiff.

Averments in the Written Statement:

7. A preliminary objection was taken by the defendant that the

plaint was not filed by a duly authorized person. According to the

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 6 of 64
defendant, the plaint has been signed and verified by Mr Geoffrey Beer

as the alleged attorney of Ms Susan Leigh Beer but the alleged power

of attorney has neither been filed with the plaint nor is there any list of

documents / reliance filed with the plaint making a reference to the

same.

8. The defendant also took the plea that the suit is liable to be

dismissed for non-joinder of a necessary party. According to the

defendant, while it is admitted that the defendant had been running a

five-star hotel known as Akbar Hotel, the defendant was only a lessee

from the New Delhi Municipal Committee, which is the owner of the

building and the premises including the swimming pool. According to

the defendant the NDMC was, therefore, a necessary party. Since the

plaintiff had not impleaded the NDMC as a party to the suit, the same

was liable to be rejected for non-joinder of a necessary party.

9. As per the written statement, Mr Geoffrey Beer and the plaintiff

stayed at the hotel as alleged. However, it is further stated that the

guests registered at the hotel could use the swimming pool entirely at

their risk and responsibility and that there was no express or implied

obligation on the part of the hotel in this behalf. According to the

defendant, the hotel merely permits the guests to swim if they so

choose at their absolute volition without any charge for the same or

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 7 of 64
consideration whatsoever. It was even contended that, therefore,

merely because a guest may choose to swim at the swimming pool, it

cannot create a contract or fall within the ambit of any contractual

relationship in this regard and no question of any breach of contract

arose at all. It was stated that any guest, who uses the swimming pool,

does so on an ―as is‖ basis. It is further stated that insofar as the

children of guests are concerned, the parents are entirely responsible for

the safety of the children in the pool and that even otherwise, according

to the rules, the defendant does not accept any responsibility for any

accident. It was also contended that as regards the construction of the

swimming pool, the same had been done by the NDMC and that it

conformed to the well accepted and well recognized standards.

10. The defendant further stated that the plaintiff did not observe the

rules with regard to the use of the swimming pool and was herself

wholly negligent and, in any event, no claim would lie against ITDC.

11. The defendant further stated in the written statement that the

plaintiff should not have jumped into the pool from the shallow end and

that swimmers have necessarily to use the diving board and dive into

the deep end of the swimming pool. According to the defendant, the

jumping or diving at the shallow side by the plaintiff was wholly

wrong, negligent and contrary to the well accepted norms of swimming

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 8 of 64
and in violation of the laid down rules. It was further alleged that there

are fixed stairs built into the swimming pool for going into the

swimming pool and obviously the plaintiff did not enter the swimming

pool through the stairs, which was a wholly negligent act on her part.

According to the defendant, the plaintiff had been negligent in jumping

into the pool from the shallow end even assuming, without admitting

that she had jumped into the pool as alleged by her. The defendant

stated that the incident happened otherwise than what was alleged. The

defendant denied that the bottom of the pool was slippery and also

denied that the plaintiff slipped in the swimming pool as alleged. It

was also contended that the plaintiff had not even jumped into the

swimming pool as alleged by her. The defendant stated that the

swimming pool was cleaned according to the well recognized standards

and on the date of the incident also the swimming pool had been

cleaned. Accordingly, it was not slippery. The defendant stated that as

a matter of fact, the injury to the plaintiff could not have been suffered

as a result of the plaintiff jumping and slipping in the swimming pool

as alleged.

12. The defendant stated that swimming pools with glazed tiles are

well accepted. It was again denied that the tiles covering the floor of

the pool at the said hotel were slippery as alleged or otherwise and that

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 9 of 64
the defendant did not keep the floor of the pool clean or did not

properly maintain the same.

13. In the written statement it is further stated that as a matter of fact,

the plaintiff and her brother were playing in and around the swimming

pool and all of a sudden the accident happened. The defendant denied

the averments and allegations in the plaint to the effect that her feet had

touched the floor of the pool and that they slipped resulting in the loss

of control of the plaintiff and that her head hit against the wall of the

pool. It was further averred in the written statement that the injury

caused to the plaintiff did not permit her to remember correctly

anything of what had actually happened. According to the defendant,

even the parents and brother of the plaintiff could not describe the

accident when the defendant made enquiries in this behalf from them

after the accident and before they left the hotel. The defendant further

stated that there was a lifeguard in attendance who had immediately

gone to rescue the plaintiff after seeing the sudden accident and that the

pool was well marked indicating the depth of water at different places.

The plaintiff was entirely responsible for the incident.

14. In paragraph 11 of the written statement, it is admitted that the

plaintiff, after having suffered the injury, did not swim out of the pool.

However, it is stated that it was an employee of the defendant, who was

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 10 of 64
the attendant at the swimming pool, who was responsible for bringing

the plaintiff out of the water. As per the written statement, the parents

of the plaintiff were not close to the pool but were at a distance relaxing

in the chairs. The plaintiff’s brother, however, was close to the pool

but he was dazed at that point of time and could not say as to what

happened. The defendant denied that the parents of the plaintiff had

seen the incident or that they had rescued the plaintiff as alleged in the

plaint.

15. Interestingly, in the written statement the defendant has denied

that the plaintiff had suffered any spinal injuries or any injuries of a

permanent character. It was denied that the plaintiff was in any way

physically incapacitated.

16. The insensitivity of the defendant is disclosed by the following

averment in the written statement:-

―It is clear that the injuries whatever they were, did not
affect the mobility of the plaintiff which is evident also
from the fact that she had been found fit to travel soon after
the accident and she could have travelled even earlier than
she did.‖

17. The defendant has also stated that it had a daily routine for

cleaning of the swimming pool according to standard procedure and

processes, before the swimming pool is opened for use every day.

Thus, according to the defendant, there was neither any chance at all of

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 11 of 64
the swimming pool being slippery or unsafe nor was it slippery or

unsafe. According to the defendant, it had provided the help and

assistance of a lifeguard, notified the conditions subject to which the

pool could be used as licencees, displayed information regarding

different depths of the water at different places by markings in bold

English letters. The defendant stated that the incident was the result of

violations of the conditions for use of the pool on the part of the

plaintiff and because of the utter negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

The defendant denied that the principle of res ipsa loquitur would

apply. The defendant also denied that any damages or losses, as

claimed, were caused to the plaintiff. Consequently, the defendant

contended that the suit be dismissed with costs.

Issues:

18. On the basis of the averments made in the plaint and the written

statement, the following nine issues were framed:-

1. Whether the suit has been filed by duly authorized person?

2. Whether New Delhi Municipal Committee was owner of the
building of Akbar Hotel and was a necessary party?

3. Whether the tiles covering the floor of the swimming pool
were slippery?

4. Whether the floor of the swimming pool was not clean and
had not been properly maintained, resulting in the growth
and accumulation of slime on the tiles?

5. Whether the plaintiff suffered injuries on account of the
nature and condition of the bottom of the pool and due to

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 12 of 64
negligence of the hotel? If so, what injuries were suffered
by her?

6. Whether the plaintiff was required to observe any rules in
the use of swimming pool and she did not observe the said
rules and was herself negligent for the injuries suffered, if
any?

7. Whether the swimming in the pool was at the risk and
responsibility of the plaintiff (the guest) and there was no
obligation on the hotel in this behalf?

8. Whether the defendant was in legal duty to keep the
swimming pool safe for swimming of guests and the
plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of the maxim res ipsa
loquitur?

9. To what amount, if any, the plaintiff is entitled?

As many as 22 witnesses have been examined on behalf of the

plaintiff. Of these the most important are PW1 (the plaintiff herself),

PW2 Mr G.L. Beer (the plaintiff’s father), PW4 Dr J. A. Smith

(Neurosurgeon– expert witness), PW8 Mr G. L. McDonald (expert

witness), PW14 Mr K. R. Dobson (expert witness), PW18 Mr L. I. Sly

(expert witness), PW19 Mrs P. J. Beer (the plaintiff’s mother) and

PW22 Dr Arjun Dass Sehgal (the doctor who initially treated the

plaintiff at Holy Family Hospital). It appears that there is some error in

the assigning of numbers to these witnesses. The error is that Mrs P. J.

Beer, who is shown at serial No. 19 of the list of witnesses, has been

assigned the number ‗PW19′. However, Dr Arjun Dass Sehgal, who is

shown at serial No. 22 of the list of witnesses, has also been assigned

the number ‗PW19′. Therefore, for the purposes of this suit, I would

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 13 of 64
treat Mrs P. J. Beer as PW19 and Dr Arjun Dass Sehgal as PW22. This

anomaly has probably appeared because 21 witnesses were examined in

Australia and one witness, that is, Dr Arjun Dass Sehgal was examined

in Delhi. The defendant examined two witnesses, namely, DW1 Dr G.

G. Manshramani and DW2 Balram Verma (the lifeguard at Akbar

Hotel).

Issue No. 1:

19. It has been contended by the defendant that the suit has not been

filed by a duly authorized person. It is an admitted position that the

plaint was filed on 21.01.1982 and the same purports to have been filed

by the plaintiff through her attorney (Geoffrey Beer), who was

appointed as the attorney by the plaintiff by virtue of a power of

attorney dated 15.01.1982. The said Geoffrey Beer is the plaintiff’s

father. He had signed and verified the plaint in New Delhi on

21.01.1982 claiming to be the attorney of the plaintiff as per the said

power of attorney dated 15.01.1982.

20. According to the defendant, the power of attorney dated

15.01.1982 did not accompany the plaint and that it was filed for the

first time on 15.11.1991, after almost 10 years. It was also contended

that the said power of attorney cannot be regarded as valid or authentic

as it is allegedly not executed in the presence of a notary nor has it been

authenticated by a notary. It was also contended that the plaintiff,

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 14 of 64
despite ample opportunity, failed to get the power of attorney duly

proved and exhibited. Consequently, it has been argued that Mr G. L.

Beer cannot be regarded as an authorized agent under Order 3 Rule 2

CPC and, therefore, the suit was not properly verified, signed or

instituted and, therefore, the same is liable to be dismissed on this

ground.

21. On behalf of the plaintiff, it was urged that the suit had been

instituted by a duly authorized person. The plaintiff had authorized her

father Mr G. L. Beer by virtue of the said power of attorney dated

15.01.1982 and even otherwise to institute the suit as also to sign and

verify the plaint on her behalf. It is clear that the plaintiff had become

virtually immovable because she had become a quadriplegic on account

of the said incident. It was, therefore, extremely difficult, if not

impossible, for her to travel to New Delhi from Australia to present the

plaint. It is in these circumstances that the plaintiff had authorized her

father Mr G. L. Beer to sign, verify and file the plaint. She had also

executed a power of attorney dated 15.01.1982. It was also contended

on behalf of the plaintiff that, in any event, the plaintiff has clearly

testified that she had authorized Mr G. L. Beer to institute the present

suit. Thus, in any event, there was a clear ratification on her part. The

learned counsel for the plaintiff also placed reliance on the judgment of

the Supreme Court in the case of United Bank of India v. Naresh

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 15 of 64
Kumar: 1996 (6) SCC 660 wherein it was, inter alia, held that

ratification can be proved later and that a mere irregularity in procedure

should not defeat a substantive right of an individual.

22. The present suit was instituted as an indigent person’s application

being IPA 1/1982. The order passed in IPA 1/1982 on 22.01.1982

clearly records that the application was presented by the father who

held a power of attorney from the applicant who was stated to be

paralyzed and was in Australia. By virtue of the said order dated

22.01.1982, the applicant (the plaintiff herein) was exempted from

presentation of the application in person and the father of the applicant

(plaintiff) was allowed to do the same. It was also directed as under:-

―Let the authorized agent and father of the plaintiff be
examined.‖

Thereafter, on 22.01.1982 itself, the statement of Mr Geoffrey Beer

(the plaintiff’s father) was recorded on solemn affirmation and was,

inter alia, to the following effect:-

―plaintiff is my daughter. I hold power of attorney from the
plaintiff in my favour to file the present petition. She does
not own any immovable property…………… She is
completely paralyzed and unable to work. She is, therefore,
unemployed. She has no source of income other than the
pension given to her by Australian Government…….. She is
unable to pay the court fees on the claim………… I am
fully aware of the matter in controversy in this suit. The
claim is correct and well-founded. I am able to answer all
material questions.‖

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 16 of 64
Subsequently, by an order dated 24.09.1982, IPA 1/1982 was directed

to be numbered and registered as a suit. From this, it is clear that the

plaintiff’s father Mr G. L. Beer had appeared before this Court on

22.01.1982 and had categorically stated that he held a power of

attorney from the applicant. The plaint also indicated that it had been

signed by Mr G. L. Beer as the attorney of the plaintiff on the basis of a

power of attorney dated 15.01.1982.

23. The plaintiff came to the witness box as PW1 and, in response to

the question as to whether she felt she was going to recover after the

treatment at Melbourne in 1980-1981, she answered:-

―I think at the end of this treatment I realized that I was not
going to recover any more mobility or sensation and we
decided by that time to commence this court action for
compensation.‖

A further question was put to her as to whether in 1981 she decided to

file this action herself. She answered in the affirmative. She also

stated that the suit was filed at her instance in early 1982 and that she

had authorized her father to file the suit. She also stated that she had

executed a power of attorney in his favour for this purpose. As there

was some controversy before the court examiner in Australia with

regard to whether the power of attorney should be marked as an exhibit

or simply marked, the said examiner marked the document both as

Exhibit PW1/17 and as Mark ‗A’. Of course, the plaintiff PW1

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 17 of 64
admitted her signature on the said document of power of attorney. In

her testimony, the plaintiff (PW1) also stated that whatever has been

stated in the plaint is correct.

24. I also noticed from the record that an application (IA

12075/1991) had been filed for placing the power of attorney of the

plaintiff in favour of her father on the record of the case. Along with

the application was an affidavit of one Mr Mohan Lal, who was the

clerk of Mr Madan Bhatia, who was the Advocate on behalf of the

plaintiff. In the said affidavit dated 15.01.1991, it is stated that the

plaintiff’s father Mr G. L. Beer had handed over the power of attorney

in his favour for being filed in this Court when the suit had been filed.

It is further stated that he had been informed that when the evidence

was being recorded in Brisbane, Australia it was discovered that the

said power of attorney was not on the record of the case. When the

counsel for the plaintiff returned to India, the said clerk checked the

personal files lying in the office of the said counsel and discovered that

the power of attorney was in those files. The said clerk further stated

that the said power of attorney had not been filed on account of

inadvertence and because of an accidental slip. On the said application

No. 12075/1991, this Court, by an order dated 25.11.1991, directed that

the power of attorney executed by the plaintiff in favour of her father,

which had been filed along with the application, be kept on record.

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 18 of 64

25. From the above, it is clear that in the plaint itself it has been

stated that the same was being signed, verified and instituted by Mr G.

L. Beer on behalf of his daughter on the basis of the power of attorney

dated 15.01.1982. Inadvertently, that power of attorney had not been

filed along with the plaint and was subsequently filed on 25.11.1991 by

virtue of an application being IA 12075/1991 which was allowed and

the power of attorney was taken on record. Apart from this, the plaintiff

has clearly testified that the contents of the plaint were correct and that

the same had been instituted by her father on her instructions. There is,

thus, a clear ratification on her part. It is not a case where a person has

instituted a suit representing himself to be an authorized agent and

where the principal has refuted the claim. Mr G. L. Beer, undoubtedly,

verified and filed the plaint as an agent of the plaintiff. This fact has

been confirmed by the plaintiff herself. The Supreme Court in the case

of United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar (supra) clearly held that the

procedural defects which do not go to the root of the matter should not

be permitted to defeat a just cause and that there is sufficient power in

the Courts, under the Code of Civil Procedure, to ensure that injustice

is not done to any party who has a just cause. The Supreme Court

further observed that as far as possible a substantive right should not be

allowed to be defeated on account of a procedural irregularity which is

curable. In the case before the Supreme Court, the issue arose with

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 19 of 64
regard to the authority of a person to sign the pleadings on behalf of a

company. The Court observed that a person may be expressly

authorized to sign pleadings on behalf of a company, for example by

the Board of Directors passing a resolution to that effect or by a power

of attorney being executed in favour of any individual. It was

specifically observed that even in the absence of such a resolution or a

power of attorney, in cases where pleadings have been signed by one of

its officers, a Corporation could ratify the said action of its officer in

signing the pleadings and that such ratification could be expressed or

implied. It was further held that the Court could, on the basis of the

evidence on record, after taking into account all the circumstances of

the case, especially with regard to the conduct of the trial, come to the

conclusion that the corporation had ratified the act of signing of the

pleading by its officer. In the present case, I find that it has come in

evidence that the plaintiff had decided to commence the action for

compensation when her treatment ended and she realized that she

would not recover any further. She had clearly stated that she had

asked her father to institute the present suit and had even authorized

him by executing the power of attorney dated 15.01.1982. The present

suit had been instituted by her father as her authorized attorney. Even

if I do not go into the matter of admissibility of the document of power

of attorney, the action of the plaintiff’s father in signing, verifying and

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 20 of 64
filing the plaint stands fully ratified by the plaintiff. Therefore, the

only conclusion that can be arrived at is that the suit had been filed by a

duly authorized person and this issue is accordingly decided in favour

of the plaintiff and against the defendant.

Issue No. 2:

26. This issue, although framed, was not pressed by the learned

counsel for the defendant at the time of hearing and, therefore, the same

is not being dealt with.

Issue Nos. 3-8:

27. These issues are being discussed together as they are all

inextricably linked with each other. Essentially these issues require the

Court to determine the following:-

(1) Nature of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff (issue No.5);

(2) Cause of the injury; whether caused by jumping as alleged

by the plaintiff or diving as propounded by the defendant

(issue No.5);

(3) It is obvious that if the cause of injuries is diving, the

plaintiff’s case falls to the ground. In case the injuries have

been caused by jumping into the pool, the plaintiff has to

further establish:-

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 21 of 64

(i) that the tiles at the floor of the swimming pool
were slippery, as they were not properly
maintained (issue Nos. 3, 4 & 8); and

(ii) that the plaintiff was herself not negligent
(issues 6 & 7)

Nature of injuries:

28. With regard to the nature of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff,

the testimony of PW22 Dr Arjun Dass Sehgal, who treated the plaintiff,

is most material. According to Dr Sehgal, the plaintiff’s X-ray showed

that there was a fracture of cervical-7 vertebra. She also had a lacerated

wound on the top of her head going to the left of the midline.

According to him, she suffered a compression fracture of the cervical

seventh vertebra. According to him, that was a flexion injury. He

further stated that the plaintiff had a permanent disability and because

of the injury, her legs, bowel and bladder were paralyzed. She had

permanent disability and she had no sensation of pain or touch or

temperature below the cervical column. He stated that the plaintiff was

admitted on 05.05.1978 and was transferred to Australia on 13.06.1978

and that he had accompanied the plaintiff to Australia. He further

stated that the X-rays were taken on his advice and they are exhibited

as Exhibits PW1/7 to PW1/16.

29. PW4 Dr J. A. Smith, who specialized in neurosurgery, stated that

the plaintiff had consulted her. He stated that he had seen the X-rays of

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 22 of 64
her spinal injury and had also examined her. He categorically stated

that after seeing the plaintiff and seeing her X-rays, there was no

possibility of a recovery from the spinal injury which she had

sustained. He stated that her injury was permanent. In fact, he had

given a report which has been marked as Exhibit PW4/1. He re-

affirmed what he stated in the said report. Dr Smith stated that a

compression injury would be different from a flexion injury of the

cervical spine. But, he clarified that one would have to define the ways

in which the injuries are to be described. According to him, if one

considers a flexion injury then there was some degree of compression

occurring in that type of injury and that a degree of compression is

usually in the anterior portions of the vertebral bodies. Thus, according

to the said witness, it cannot always be said that ―it is this sort of injury

or that sort of injury‖. However, Dr Smith stated that it is a matter of

describing what one sees on the X-rays in relation to what happened

clinically. He stated that he tried to clarify by stating that if the present

case was a true vertical compression injury, then one might expect that

the features would be that of a burst fracture. And, according to Dr

Smith, the present case is not one of burst fracture.

30. Exhibit PW2/33 indicates the external injury to be a contusion

lacerated wound about 1 inch long in the left parietal area just along the

mid line. Exhibit PW19/1 which is the admission and discharge report

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 23 of 64
at Holy Family Hospital, New Delhi, indicates the diagnosis of the

plaintiff to be ―Quadriplegia ‫ ح‬# C6-7‖. Exhibit PW19/3, which is the

case summary and discharge record at Holy Family Hospital, indicates

the investigation to reveal that the plaintiff’s injury caused

―quadriplegia ‫ ح‬# cervical spine‖. The X-rays were shown to indicate a

fracture in the cervical spine at C6-7. There was no fracture in the skull.

The X-ray report which forms part of Exhibit PW19/3 indicates ―no

fracture shown in skull, fracture C6 & 7 with slight ant. sliding of C7

under C6‖.

31. From the above evidence, it is abundantly clear that the nature of

the injuries were such which resulted in the fracture of the 6th and 7th

cervical vertebrae with slight anterior sliding of the 7th vertebra under

the 6th vertebra. This resulted in the plaintiff becoming a quadriplegic.

32. At this juncture, it would be relevant to examine the testimony of

the plaintiff, who was examined as PW1. She stated that she

represented her school in swimming every year of her high school life.

She attended the Queensland State Championship for under-10s in the

butterfly stroke and she was a member of many State teams for water

polo as well. She also represented the under-18 team and the open

women’s team of her State. She had travelled to Tasmania and to New

Zealand and on those occasions her team had won the gold medal. She

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 24 of 64
had also been invited into the Australian team to tour the United States

but she had previously been committed to travel to New Zealand so she

chose to travel to New Zealand. She stated that she was a member of

the Queensland team and was a co-captain of the team which travelled

to New Zealand.

33. The plaintiff further stated in her testimony that she had gone to

take a swim on 05.05.1978 in the swimming pool at Akbar Hotel at

about 5 O’clock. According to her, it had been a hot day and they had

gone down to the pool; her father, mother, her younger brother and

herself. When they got to the pool side area, her father, brother and

mother went ahead to get into the pool and she stopped at the edge of

the pool to take off her robe and her sandals. Thereafter, she stated that

she remembered that her hair got tangled in the strap of her swimming

costume. She took time to fix that up and to untangle it. Then she

walked over to the shallow end of the pool and she jumped into the

pool. She stated that when she jumped in the pool she felt that her feet

touched the bottom of the pool and immediately they slid forward

throwing her backwards against the side of the pool. She felt her head

strike the side of the pool. Then her brother and father came over and

supported her in the pool and they, with the help of another person,

whom she did not know, lifted her on to the side of the pool. She stated

that she remembered that her father was being very careful in lifting her

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 25 of 64
and he supported her very gently but very strongly and her head was

very stable in the lifting. She stated that when her feet touched the

bottom of the pool, she found it to be very slippery and immediately

both her feet slid forward. She stated that her body was tingling at that

time, right from her shoulders down to her feet. And, then her body

started to go numb. She stated that she also had a small cut on the back

of her head where it struck the side of the pool and there was a bit of

blood in the water of the pool. She stated that while they were waiting

for the ambulance, they transported her on a stretcher-like thing to the

manager’s room where they waited for about two hours. Thereafter,

she was transported to Holy Family Hospital in the said ambulance.

Dr Arjun Sehgal was present at Holy Family Hospital and he took

charge of the case. He arranged to have the X-rays taken etc.

34. This part of her testimony has gone unchallenged. From the

above evidence, it is clear that the plaintiff has been able to establish

that she had gone to take a swim along with her family members in the

swimming pool at Akbar Hotel at about 5 pm on 05.05.1978. That

when she jumped into the pool from the shallow end, her feet, on

touching the floor of the pool, slid forward as the same was slippery.

Because of this, her head hit the side of the swimming pool.

Consequent thereupon, she suffered the injuries to her cervical spine

and the lacerated injury on her head. The injury caused to the cervical

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 26 of 64
spine and particularly the 6th and 7th vertebra, as indicated above,

resulted in her ultimately becoming a quadriplegic, i.e., not having any

sensation below her neck. In layman’s language, she was paralyzed

neck downwards. It is also clear from the testimony of PW4 Dr J. A.

Smith that there was no chance of her recovery and the injury sustained

by her was for life.

35. Thus the nature of the injuries stand determined.

Cause of injuries:

36. It is now to be seen, what is the exact cause of the injuries. The

plaintiff’s version has already been referred to above. According to

her, she jumped from the shallow end of the pool and her feet touched

the bottom of the pool. The floor of the pool was very slippery as a

result of which her feet slid forward and her head struck the side of the

pool. In the course of cross-examination, she was asked as to whether

she entered the pool from the same side as her parents. She answered

by stating that her mother entered the pool using the ladder and that her

father entered from the same side as her and she thought her brother

went around to the right side of the pool. When she was asked as to

how she knew that she had entered the pool from the shallow end, she

answered, because it looked shallow. The counsel for the defendant

remarked and questioned — ―It looked shallow. And, how many

different pools would you have done swimming by then?‖ The answer

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 27 of 64
given by the plaintiff was that she would have swam in many hundreds

of pools in her life. Then she was asked a question as to what is the

difference between a jump and a dive? She answered that a dive is

when you dive into the water and when you have your hands out ahead

to break the impact of the water on your face or on your head and a

jump is when you jump feet first into the pool. The counsel for the

defendant questioned the plaintiff that the place of the head injury

could not have been caused by striking against the wall of the pool. To

this, the plaintiff answered that she was injured in the way that she

remembered and the way that she had deposed earlier. She jumped in

and her feet slipped on the bottom of the pool and she fell back striking

her head against the side of the pool. She further stated that whether it

was actually the edge of the pool or side of the pool, she was not in a

position to say with certainty, because it happened in a fraction of a

second. The counsel for the defendant also put it to her that she could

have only sustained the injury if she had struck her head against the

bottom of the pool. To this, her pointed answer was ―my head was

nowhere near the bottom of the pool. I jumped in feet first‖.

37. A different situation was put to the plaintiff by the learned

counsel for the defendant. He questioned that with regard to the

likelihood of the injury having been received on the face, after one

dives into the pool, was it not possible that on account of some

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 28 of 64
misjudgment, when one is about to strike the bottom of the pool, in

order to save one’s face, one would turn one’s head towards the water

to push oneself upwards. The plaintiff answered that that is not

possible at all. If such a thing were to happen, she would have merely

used her hands to push her head away from the bottom of the pool.

Then, the learned defence counsel suggested that ―if your hands are

unable to stop then to save your face you would turn your head towards

the bottom of the pool‖. To this, also, the plaintiff replied that she

could not imagine any circumstance where she would turn her head

towards the bottom of the pool. She stated that she would have lifted

her head away from the bottom of the pool and that would be a natural

reaction– ―to turn your head away rather than towards something

being hit‖.

38. From the above, it is clear that the effort of the defendant’s

counsel was to propound an alternate theory for the cause of the

plaintiff’s injury. The first alternative was that the plaintiff took a dive

in the shallow end of the pool and hit her head on the bottom of the

pool. The second alternative propounded was that the plaintiff took a

dive in the shallow end of the pool and seeing that she had

miscalculated her dive as she was fast approaching the bottom of the

pool, she turned her head and thereby got injured on the back of her

head. Both these alternative hypotheses were clearly rejected by the

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 29 of 64
plaintiff, who stood firm with her initial statement that she sustained

the injury when she jumped into the pool from the shallow end and the

floor of the pool being slippery, her feet slid forward and her head hit

the side wall of the pool.

39. PW2 Mr G. L. Beer stated in his examination-in-chief that he had

represented his school in swimming. As a soldier in World War II, he

was the backstroke champion of the 2nd 9th Regiment. He also stated to

be a backstroke champion of the Fourth Brigade of the AAF and that he

was a member of the Scuba Association and that he was a diver. Mr G.

L. Beer stated that the angle at which one would dive from the edge of

a pool, not from a racing block but from the edge of the pool, would be

15 degrees. On being asked the question as to when somebody was to

dive into the pool from the shallow end of the pool, what would be the

angle of the dive, Mr G. L. Beer answered–15 degrees. He further

stated that from the starting blocks since they are higher than the edge

of the pool, the angle of the dive would be close to 30 degrees.

40. With regard to the manner in which the incident took place, PW2

Mr G. L. Beer stated that his son entered the pool just before his wife

and himself. His wife entered through the ladder because she did not

like immersing quickly. He walked past the ladder and as he had an

injured knee at that time and was on a crutch, he sat on the edge of the

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 30 of 64
pool and then slipped into the water so as to avoid any jar to his knee,

which would be caused by jumping in. He stated that the plaintiff

entered the pool after them. He said that she removed her gown and

sandals while his wife and he swam to the centre of the pool and their

son was possibly half way from the centre of the pool. He stated that

they watched the plaintiff walk down the edge of the path where she

had draped her gown and sandals. She came straight from the bottom

of the path at the shallow section and jumped into the water from the

edge of the pool. The water was about 2′ 6” deep at that point. He

then saw her slip backwards and disappear under the water. He

believed that she may have struck her head. Then, he stated that his

wife was obviously also watching because she called out ―Sue’s hurt‖.

He then immediately swam where the plaintiff was. His son Nicholas

had also obviously seen the incident and he reached the plaintiff before

him (Mr G. L. Beer). The said witness positively stated that he saw the

plaintiff slipping backwards. He stated that although he did not see her

head striking against anything, but she disappeared under the water and

he feared that she struck her head under the wave trap.

41. He further stated that when he reached the place where the

plaintiff was, his son Nicholas was supporting her. She was on her

back, face upwards and she had a small cut on the top of her head

which he estimated was between half and three quarters of an inch

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 31 of 64
long. He stated that there was a little bit of blood coming out of the cut

and it is then that he realized that she had struck her head on the edge

of the pool.

42. PW2 Mr G. L. Beer further stated that the plaintiff was quite

conscious, but dazed and he went around the other side of her. His son

Nicholas was on that side. He asked a bystander to help him lift her

from the pool. With great care they lifted her and slid her over the edge

of the pool. He stated that he was conscious that his foot slipped on the

glazed tiles on the floor of the pool. He knelt beside her and she said

―Oh no please‖. He asked her to gently move her toes and fingers and

found to his horror that she could not move them. He then asked a

bystander to get the manager of the hotel and a doctor. It is further

stated by the said witness that after some time two men arrived, one

with a portmanteau and he turned out to be Dr Chowdrah and the other,

he presumed, was the manager of the hotel. The said witness was

angered by the fact that the said doctor merely said that the plaintiff

was suffering from concussion and that she should be taken to the

hospital for the night in the hotel car. He demanded that an ambulance

be called with a specialist doctor. The manger suggested that the

plaintiff be lifted but the witness Mr G. L. Beer absolutely refused to

allow her to be moved. However, they gently moved her on to a lylo

because it was very hot at the pool side. According to this witness the

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 32 of 64
ambulance took about two hours to arrive which was an incredibly long

time. Thereafter, she was taken to Holy Family Hospital. A doctor

was attending, whose name was later found to be Dr Arjun Sehgal. He

required X-rays to be taken. The doctor told him that her daughter had

suffered a spinal injury and she was paralyzed from the chin down.

43. From the testimony of PW2 Mr G. L. Beer also it is apparent that

the plaintiff suffered the injury in the manner indicated by her, that is,

when she jumped into the pool in the shallow end, her feet slipped on

the floor of the pool and slid forward and in the process she hit the

back/ top of her head on the side of the pool which ultimately resulted

in the fracture of her cervical column around the 6th /7th cervical

vertebra. This is what caused her to be paralyzed from chin down.

44. PW19 Mrs P. J. Beer, the plaintiff’s mother also indicated the

manner in which the incident took place on 05.05.1978. She said that

approximately at 5 pm the four of them went to the pool. They had

come down in the elevator and walked from the ramp to the pool.

According to her, the plaintiff stopped to take off her robe and her

sandals. Her son Nicholas went on ahead a little further near the ladder

and dived into the pool. Her husband and she followed. Her husband

sat on the side of the pool because he had bad knee injury and slowly

slipped into the water and swam to the centre of the pool. She climbed

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 33 of 64
down the ladder. She stated that when she swam to the centre of the

pool her husband was there and her son was a little further closer to the

edge. She turned around to see if the plaintiff was following her and

saw her at the edge of the pool. She jumped into the water, slipped and

hit her head. She disappeared under the water then she surfaced again

and was lying on her back. She stated that her feet slipped in the pool

and she slipped backwards and she called to her husband ―Sue has been

hurt‖. She stated that her son had seen the accident and was already

swimming towards her and then her husband also swam towards her.

She swam back to the ladder to get out of the pool as quickly as

possible. Her son Nicholas was supporting the plaintiff when her

husband arrived and he helped to support her. A stranger came along,

whom they did not see before or after, who helped in lifting the

plaintiff out of the pool very-very carefully. She stated that thereafter

the manager of the hotel and a doctor arrived. The doctor said that she

had a concussion and that there was no serious injury to the top of her

head and he suggested that she be put in a car and taken to a hospital

for observation overnight. She was distressed and she was sitting

beside her daughter at the pool and the cement was very hot because it

was an extremely hot day. She tried to sprinkle water over the plaintiff

so that she did not burn on the concrete. She enquired from the

plaintiff as to whether she was alright and the plaintiff stated ―my

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 34 of 64
hands and my legs are going numb. They are tingling and going

numb‖. Mrs P. J. Beer further stated that the hotel manager suggested

that the plaintiff be taken to hospital in a hotel car but her husband

objected very strongly and said that she must go in an ambulance.

45. From the testimony of the plaintiff’s mother PW19 Mrs P. J. Beer

also, the plaintiff’s version of the manner in which she suffered the

injury is fully corroborated. Although, all the three witnesses namely,

the plaintiff, her father Mr G. L. Beer and her mother Mrs P. J. Beer

were subjected to lengthy cross-examination, nothing has been elicited

from these witnesses in the course of such cross-examination so as to

cast any doubt on their testimonies with regard to the exact manner in

which the incident occurred.

It may be noted that in the written statement, the defendant did

not plead that the plaintiff had dived into the pool. Yet, in the course of

cross-examining the witnesses and in the course of arguments, it was

strongly urged on behalf of the defendant that the plaintiff did not jump

into the pool from the shallow end but dived into the pool. It is an

established principle that unless a fact is pleaded, no amount of

evidence led in respect of that alleged fact can cure the defect. The

plaintiff’s case that she jumped into the pool at the shallow end and that

her feet slipped on the slippery floor of the pool as a result of which she

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 35 of 64
hit her head and sustained injuries is fully supported by the medical

evidence on record. Both PW4 Dr J.A. Smith and PW22 Dr Arjun

Dass Sehgal have opined that the injury caused to the plaintiff was

largely a flexion injury and not a compression injury, which would

have resulted in a burst fracture. These opinions are clearly in

corroboration of the testimonies of the plaintiff, her father Mr G. L.

Beer and her mother Mrs P. J. Beer. It has come in evidence that a

flexion injury of the kind suffered by the plaintiff could not have been

caused by the head hitting the floor of the pool as a result of a vertical

or near vertical dive. In that eventuality the injury would have been a

burst fracture or a serious compression injury. It would not have been a

flexion injury. In the present case the evidence indicates that the injury

was a flexion injury caused by the sudden forward hinging of the head

on account of the head hitting the wall of the swimming pool. This

injury is entirely consistent with the plaintiff’s case and is completely

contraindicated if the version of the defendant, of the plaintiff diving

into the pool and thereafter hitting the head on the floor of the pool, is

to be accepted. Clearly, the cause of injury was as narrated by the

plaintiff, that is, by jumping into the pool and not as suggested by the

learned counsel for the defendant, that is, by diving. The counsel for

the defendant was at pains to cross-examine the doctors and

particularly PW4 Dr J. A. Smith and PW22 Dr Arjun Dass Sehgal with

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 36 of 64
regard to the injury caused to the plaintiff being a compression injury

or a flexion injury. According to the defendant, the plaintiff suffered a

burst fracture and a compression injury which was consistent with the

plaintiff having dived into the pool and hit her head on the floor of the

pool. On the other hand, the plaintiff’s case was that she had suffered a

flexion injury where the head hinges forward with great force.

46. I have already set out what PW4 Dr J. A. Smith stated in his

testimony. He categorically stated that the injury caused to the plaintiff

was not a burst fracture which is indicative of a compression injury.

According to PW4 Dr J. A Smith, a burst fracture would be caused

when a weight falls on the body or the body with weight falls to the

ground in a vertical position. He stated that when a body strikes the

object in an inclined angle and not at a 90 degree angle, it would cause

a combination of flexion along with compression. The said witness

stated that the injury in the present case was certainly one of flexion.

He, however, clarified that when we know what happens to the anterior

part of the vertebrae in a flexion injury then, there is a degree of

compression occurring there. He, however, reiterated that the fracture

in the instant case was a flexion fracture. The injury in the present case

was described by the said witness as one where the head moves

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 37 of 64
forward and the chin almost touches the chest. This is what is known

as forward hinging.

47. As mentioned above, both Dr J. A. Smith and Dr Arjun Dass

Sehgal were subjected to extensive cross-examination on the point as to

whether the injury was a flexion injury or a compression injury. From

the testimonies of both these witnesses, it is apparent that they have not

been shaken from their stand that the injury was a flexion injury caused

by forward hinging of the head. In such a situation, the hypothesis of

the plaintiff having dived into the pool is clearly contraindicated.

48. In an attempt to support the hypothesis that the plaintiff dived

into the pool, the defendant also produced DW2 Mr Balram Verma in

the witness box. DW2 Mr Balram Verma was stated to have been

posted at Akbar Hotel as a lifeguard. According to him, he had joined

ITDC on 10.03.1978. Mr Verma stated that on 05.05.1978 he was

present at the swimming pool in his lifeguard gear and the manager was

sitting with him. One elderly man accompanied by two children, one

of whom was a boy and the other was a girl, came to the pool, in a

playful mood and they kept their towels near the very first umbrella on

the pool. The boy and the girl were playing the game of catching each

other. While doing so, the girl suddenly took a vertical dive in the

shallow portion of the swimming pool. According to this witness, he

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 38 of 64
immediately ran on seeing this incident and the other guests also

shouted. The other guests, who were from Aeroflot, also helped him in

holding the girl. According to him, he placed the girl on the floor on

the edge of the pool and he found that there was a bump on the middle

of the head of that girl and it had become reddish. He stated that he

obtained ice and bandage from his office where first-aid articles were

kept and then he applied ice and bandage on the head of that girl. He

stated that he as well as the girl’s father asked her to shake her leg but

she was not able to move her leg and she started weeping.

49. If this witness is to be believed, the plaintiff took a vertical dive

in the shallow portion of the swimming pool. In his cross-examination,

he was asked as to what was the distance between the wall of the pool

and the place on the floor where the girl struck her head. His answer

was — ―two feet‖. I am straightaway inclined to agree with Mr Madan

Bhatia, the learned senior counsel who appeared on behalf of the

plaintiff, that this would be a virtual impossibility. From the edge of a

pool at the shallow end where the water was only 2′ 6” to 2′ 9” deep, it

would be impossible for any person to take a vertical dive and hit his or

her head within two feet of the wall. According to the evidence on

record, the plaintiff was about 5′ 6” in height. If she was standing on

the edge of the pool in a stationary position, she would probably have

to jump six feet into the air to enable her body to turn so that it could

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 39 of 64
make a vertical impact with the water in the pool. This could not have

been done and in fact was not done as no witness has testified to this.

Apart from that, Mr Verma stated that the girl and boy were running

and they were playing the game of catching each other and it was then

that she took a vertical dive in the shallow portion of the swimming

pool. When a person is in motion, it would be impossible for that

person to have hit his head on the floor of the swimming pool within

two feet of the edge. The momentum would take that person much

ahead. Therefore, the theory propounded by this witness is only to be

stated to be rejected.

50. This witness cannot be believed also because he stated that there

was a bump in the middle of the head of the girl and it had become

reddish. There is no such evidence. Apart from this, he stated that he

had bandaged the head of the girl. There is no corroborative evidence

of this either. He stated that the father of the girl had not entered the

swimming pool and he was near the counter. But, in the written

statement in paragraph 11, it is stated that the parents were at a distance

relaxing in the chairs. Again, this witness states that the plaintiff’s

father was accompanied only by his son and daughter (the plaintiff). In

fact, it was suggested to the witness that Mr Beer was accompanied not

only by his one son and one daughter but also his wife. The witness

stated that this was wrong and he was accompanied only by his son and

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 40 of 64
daughter. This statement also contradicts what is stated in the written

statement where it is admitted that the parents were at a distance

relaxing in the chairs. This witness has also stated that the girl had

stretched her hands while diving into the pool. But, again, there is no

injury caused to the hands of the plaintiff. The testimony of this

witness cannot be believed for two reasons. The first being that he is

unreliable and is not telling the truth and the second being that his

version of the incident is practicably not possible.

51. This leaves me to discuss the testimony of DW1 Dr G.G.

Manshramani. This witness has tried to assist the defendant by stating

that the external injury caused to the plaintiff on the head could never

have been caused when a person falls backwards. This witness has

apparently contradicted himself at various places in the course of his

cross-examination. For example, a question was put to him that when a

person dives into the pool and his head hits the bottom of the pool but

his head does not hinge forward, would there still be force of flexion?

He answered–yes. Then a question was put to him what force is

flexion? He answered–when the head hinges forward? So this

witness says in answer to the first question that even when the head

does not hinge forward, there will still be force of flexion and in answer

to the second question, he says that the force of flexion is there when

the head hinges forward. The witness was then asked that if a person

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 41 of 64
jumps into the pool, slips and falls backward and his head hits a wall at

the back with great force, his head may suffer both flexion and

compression injuries? To this, the witness answered–it will mainly

be flexion injury. In other words, even from this witness it has been

elicited in cross-examination that the injury caused by jumping and

slipping and then hitting the head on the wall of the pool would be a

flexion injury.

52. However, this witness, according to me, cannot be relied upon

and is an interested witness. He had accompanied the counsel for the

defendant to Australia and even played a role in helping the learned

counsel for the defendant in cross-examining the plaintiff’s witnesses in

Australia. Furthermore, he is not an expert in the sense that he is not

even a surgeon, what to speak of being a neurosurgeon. He has no

experience with regard to spinal injuries and has admitted to only

having taught neurology as a part of medicine and not as a specialty.

He has admitted that he was engaged by ITDC to go to Brisbane,

Australia and had actively assisted the counsel for the defendant.

53. The learned counsel for the defendant drew my attention to the

medical record of the Holy Family Hospital, New Delhi. He submitted

that Exhibit PW19/2 is the MLC pertaining to the plaintiff. The history

indicated in the MLC reads as under:-

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 42 of 64

―H/o sustained injury when Pt. dived into swimming pool
at about 6:45 pm today………‖

He then referred to Exhibit PW19/3 which is the case summary and

discharge record, which again indicates the alleged history to be that

the patient sustained injury ―after diving into swimming pool‖. Exhibit

PW19/4 is the history sheet of the plaintiff at Holy Family Hospital,

New Delhi. In this document also it is indicated that the ―patient dived

into pool in Akbar Hotel, hit her head on the floor of the pool and

sustained injury over the head…………‖. Exhibit PW19/6, which is

the consultation record of the same hospital, also indicates ―dived in

swimming pool‖. Exhibit PW19/5, which is part of the consultation

record, again refers to ―diving‖. This noting is apparently signed by

Dr A. D. Sehgal. However, Exhibit PW2/34, which is another

document from the hospital record, indicates that the plaintiff ―jumped

into pool‖. From the aforesaid documents barring Exhibit PW2/34, the

learned counsel for the defendant, submitted that it was apparent that it

was a diving incident and not a jumping incident as alleged by the

plaintiff. However, what is important to remember is that the first

document in the series of documents is Exhibit PW19/2, which is the

MLC which was prepared at the hospital. Dr B.B Middha, who

prepared the said MLC, has not been examined as a witness and,

therefore, it cannot be determined as to who told him about the history

of the patient. All the other documents from the hospital record are

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 43 of 64
merely reproductions of what was first recorded in the MLC Exhibit

PW19/2. When the source itself is unclear, these documents would not

be determinative of whether the plaintiff dived into the swimming pool

or jumped into the swimming pool. In fact, Exhibit PW2/34, which is

in Dr Seghal’s hand, records that the plaintiff jumped into the pool. In

cross-examination of Dr Sehgal, this aspect of the matter has not been

questioned. In any event, I agree with the submission made by the

learned counsel for the plaintiff that the exact manner in which the

incident took place, in other words, whether it was the result of a dive

or jump, was not of much consequence to the doctor and they were

concentrating on and were merely concerned in treating the patient.

Even the record of the hospital in Australia, as indicated in Dr Davies’s

report shows the same history as that of having sustained the injury in a

dive. But, that again is merely a reproduction of the hospital record at

Holy Family Hospital. In fact, Dr Davies’s report shows that the injury

is 6‖ long lacerated wound. This is ex facie wrong inasmuch as the

admitted position is that wound on her head was a one inch long

contused lacerated wound. Consequently, not much reliance, if at all,

can be placed on Dr Davies’s report. It is, therefore, clear that the

hospital record referred to above cannot be relied upon to establish as

to whether the plaintiff dived into the pool or jumped into the pool. I

have already indicated that, based upon the testimonies of the plaintiff,

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 44 of 64
PW2 Mr G. L. Beer and PW19 Mrs P. J. Beer as well as the evidence

given by the doctors — PW4 Dr J.A Smith and PW22 Dr Arjun Dass

Sehgal, the manner in which the injury was caused, stands established.

The injury was caused by the fact that the plaintiff’s feet slipped on the

floor of the swimming pool when she jumped into the pool in the

shallow end.

54. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, it has been established on

the part of the plaintiff that the cause of injury was the fact that the

plaintiff jumped into the pool at the shallow end and that her feet slid

forward on account of the bottom of the pool being slippery. This

resulted in her head hitting the side of the pool which ultimately

resulted in her becoming a quadriplegic. The theory and hypothesis of

diving into the pool which had been put forward by the learned counsel

for the defendant, both in the course of cross-examination of the

plaintiff’s witnesses as well as by the defendant’s witnesses and in the

course of arguments before this Court, is clearly not established. It is

not established on account of the evidence on record nor is it

established on account of probabilities. The plaintiff, admittedly, was

an expert swimmer. She would not have dived into the pool vertically

downwards at the shallow end knowing the water to be only 2-1/2 to 3

feet deep. In any case, even if she had dived into the pool, she could

have avoided impact on her head by pushing away with her hands

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 45 of 64
which are normally extended in the case of a dive. There is evidence of

her swimming coach to indicate that she was well trained in all

swimming manoeuvres which include diving and if she were to dive,

she would have adopted the correct posture, namely, with the hands

extended ahead to protect from the impact of the water. All these

factors clearly establish that the assertion made by the plaintiff with

regard to the manner in which the injury was caused, stands established

and the hypothesis propounded by the defendant stands disproved.

Were the tiles slippery and the pool not properly maintained?

55. The plaintiff’s case is that glazed tiles were used in the

swimming pool. This fact has not been denied by the defendant. The

plaintiff’s case further is that not only were glazed tiles used in the

swimming pool but that those tiles had become slippery on account of

slime accumulating thereon as a result of algae growth because the pool

was not properly maintained by the defendant. The defendant, however,

has denied that the pool was not properly maintained. The defendant

also denied that the tiles were slippery.

56. Certain photographs of the pool were taken after some months

and they have been placed on record. Those photographs were taken in

the winter months when the pool was not operational and there was no

water in it. There is no doubt that those photographs do indicate

accumulation of dirt in the grouting which could possibly include algae

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 46 of 64
also. But, these photographs cannot be used by the plaintiff inasmuch

as they do not pertain to the period when the pool was operational, that

is, during the summer months. The incident took place on 05.05.1978

when the pool was fully operational. The question of the pool floor

being slippery on account of poor maintenance has to be examined

keeping this in mind.

57. PW14 K. R. Dobson has been brought to the witness box by the

plaintiff as an expert on swimming pool maintenance. The said witness

has a Bachelor of Applied Sciences degree in Applied Chemistry from

the Queensland Institute of Technology. He is also a member of the

Royal Australian Chemical Institute and a member of Clean Air

Society of Australia. In his role as Chief Chemist of the Department of

Chemical Engineering at the University, he stated that he acts as a

consultant for the university in a number of enquiries for the past 13

years or so. He stated that in connection with problems that people

meet in maintaining swimming pools, he has been consulted.

According to him, the more common occurrence in maintenance of the

swimming pool is algal growth or growth of organisms in the pool. He

stated that his main area of specialization was the manner in which

certain chemicals affect algal growth in pools. According to him, algal

growth would occur in almost all pools at some level. He stated that

there are a number of techniques for maintenance of pools and the most

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 47 of 64
common technique is that of the maintenance of levels of hypochloride

or chlorine. He further submitted that for proper maintenance of a

pool, the growth of the algal material is not per se checked but what is

checked are the levels of chemicals which are maintained in the pool to

keep the algal level at bay.

58. PW14 Mr K. R. Dobson submitted that there are three aspects

which are associated with the maintenance of a pool to keep algal

growth at bay. The first is the measurement and maintenance of

chlorine levels in the pool. The second is filtration of water. Most

swimming pools have a pump and a filter associated with it to filter out

any growth or particles that may be present in the water. The third is

brushing of the surface of the pool. It is at the surfaces where algal

growth occurs.

59. The said witness further stated that it was possible for algal

growth to occur in a pool even though the water might be clear. He

stated that in the early stages of algal growth, when the algae are first

starting to grow on the surface of the pool, the water will still appear

clear whilst the algae are growing. Those parameters are usually met if

the chlorine levels drop to a low level. This can either happen because

of allowing the chlorine levels to drop, or in some cases in warm

climates there is a cycle in the levels of chlorine associated with the

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 48 of 64
maintenance of the pool. He further stated that this might also happen

on account of inadequate brushing of the surface of the pool.

Mr Dobson reiterated that the three issues associated with the

maintenance of the swimming pool are maintenance of chlorine level,

filtration and brushing. The correct maintenance of a swimming pool

incorporates the combination of all three of those techniques and failure

to observe the correct maintenance procedures in all those three areas

could lead to problems with algal growth.

60. He also submitted that chlorine chemistry is complex and that

one of the parameters affecting the maintenance of levels of chlorine in

a swimming pool, is temperature. The higher the temperature the faster

chlorine will be consumed. He stated that at temperatures greater than

25°C, it would be strongly advisable that chlorine levels be checked

twice daily. The witness further stated that the most common colour of

algae is green. Though, in various cases the colour can be darker

almost to a black colour and the intensity of the colour can vary with

the strain of algal growth that is present and the severity of the growth.

Importantly, he stated that in many cases in the early stages of algal

growth, it may not be in fact visible through the water. He also stated

that, as a rule, at the shallow end algal growth will generally occur

before it will in the deeper end.

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 49 of 64

61. The testimony of Mr Lindsay Ian Sly also indicates that the algal

growth takes place because of sunlight. Mr G. L. McDonald stated that

ceramic tiles were inherently prone to accidents as they are slippery and

growth of algae would increase the possibility of slipping. He also

stated that usually glazed tiles are not used for Olympic size pools.

62. From the above evidence, it is apparent that glazed tiles are

inherently slippery and this would be further accentuated by the

presence of algal material. The growth of algae in the swimming pool

occurs first in the shallow end and later at the deep end. The growth of

algae is controlled by proper pool maintenance procedures. The

procedures include: (i) maintaining a proper chlorine level; (ii)

filtration of water; and (iii) brushing of the pool surface. If there is any

deficiency in any of the three measures, then growth of algae would

result particularly in swimming pools which are exposed to bright

sunlight such as in India in the month of May. It is also indicated that

in the initial stages when there is growth of algae in the swimming

pool, it may not even be visible and the water may be clear but the

surface of the swimming pool which includes the tiles on the floor

would become slippery. Mr K. R. Dobson stated that initially it is the

grouting area which is first affected by the algal growth. It is important

to remember that Mr Dobson said that in temperatures which exceed

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 50 of 64
25°C, the chlorine level should be checked at least twice a day because

chlorine gets consumed much faster in higher temperatures.

63. All these factors coupled with the testimony of the plaintiff and

that of her father Mr G.L. Beer and her mother Mrs P.J. Beer, point in

the direction of the tiles in the floor of the swimming pool being

slippery on account of improper maintenance of the swimming pool.

This could, of course, be countered by the defendant by leading

evidence to establish and show that the pool was properly maintained.

64. The witness produced on behalf of the defendant to testify as to

the maintenance of the pool was DW2 Mr Balram Verma. I have

already indicated above that this witness is not reliable. However,

assuming that what he says is correct, let me examine as to whether his

testimony reveals that the pool was properly maintained. DW2

Mr Balram Verma stated that he was appointed as a lifeguard at Akbar

Hotel and he holds a degree in physical education. He stated that the

duty of a lifeguard at Akbar Hotel was first to see on arrival at the pool

that the pool was clean. Thereafter, his duty was to sit there to ensure

that the life of any guest swimming in the pool was not at risk. He

stated that the procedure for cleaning of the pool is that in the evening

bleaching powder and alum are put into the water which makes the dust

settle at the bottom of the pool. Next day, in the morning, the brush

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 51 of 64
which is attached to the suction cleans the dust on the bottom of the

pool and the dirty water is pumped out of the pool. The housemen also

mop the entire area around the swimming pool starting from the change

room before any guest is allowed to enter the swimming pool. He

stated that the board at the swimming pool displays ―pool closed‖ in the

morning and the same is removed only after the cleaning has been done

and after he has checked the pool. He further stated that the engineer of

the hotel had given him strips of paper in order to check the chemicals

in the water of the pool. The strip of paper had a number of colours on

its upper part and lower part. After dipping the same into the water of

the pool, he used to match the colour of the strip with the colours

shown on the upper part of the strip. In case the colour of the paper

strip dipped into the water of the pool matched the colour at serial No.

7 or 8 of the upper part of the strip, it implied that the water had been

properly chlorinated. However, this witness in his cross-examination

does not appear to know anything about algae. When he was asked as

to under what circumstances algae get deposited on the floor of the

swimming pool, he stated that he did not know. With regard to the

photographs which were shown to him, which clearly indicate algae

growth and deposits, the said witness stated that the photographs were

taken when the pool had been closed and in winter time.

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 52 of 64

65. This witness, I have already indicated, cannot be believed. In

any event, he does not have any specialized knowledge with regard to

management of algal growth in the swimming pool. The fact of the

matter is that there is evidence to indicate that the floor of the

swimming pool was slippery and it is because of that the plaintiff

suffered the injury. The floor of the swimming pool would not have

been slippery had the pool been properly maintained. It is at this

juncture that the principle of res ipsa loquitur can also be employed.

That is a rule of evidence which is employed when there is otherwise

no direct material on a particular aspect of the matter. Since the floor

of the swimming pool was not examined on the date of the incident

itself and samples were not taken on that date, there is no direct

evidence to indicate that there was algal growth in the pool or that there

was other slimy material on the floor of the pool. It is in circumstances

such as this that the principle of res ipsa loquitur is applied as a rule of

evidence, because the things speak for themselves. Res ipsa loquitur is

a Latin phrase which is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary in the

following words: ―The thing speaks for itself.‖ The doctrine of res ipsa

loquitur is described in detail in a decision of this Court in Klaus

Mittelbachert v East India Hotels Ltd : 65 (1997) DLT 428, which

reads as under:-

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 53 of 64

―Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur a plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case of negligence where (1)
it is not possible for him to prove precisely what was
the relevant act or omission which set in train the
events leading to the accident, and (2) on the
evidence as it stands at the relevant time it is more
likely than not that the effective cause of the accident
was some act or omission of the defendant or of
someone for whom the defendant is responsible,
which act or omission constitutes a failure to take
proper care for the plaintiff’s safety. There must be
reasonable evidence of negligence. However, where
the thing which causes the accident is shown to be
under the management of the defendant or his
employees, and the accident is such as in the ordinary
course of things does not happen if those who have
the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by
the defendant, that the accident arose from want of
care. Three conditions must be satisfied to attract
applicability of res ipsa loquitur: (i) the accident
must be of a kind which does not ordinarily occur in
the absence of someone’s negligence; (ii) it must be
caused by an agency or instrumentality within the
exclusive control of the defendant; (iii) it must not
have been due to any voluntary action or contribution
on the part of the plaintiff. (See Ratanlal & Dhirajlal
on Law of Torts , edited by Justice G.P. Singh, 22nd
edition 1992, pp 499-501 and the Law of Negligence
by Dr Chakraborti, 1996 edition, pp 191-192.)‖

In the light of the aforesaid decision, it needs to be examined as to

whether the above conditions apply to the present case. First of all, it

has to be determined as to whether the accident is of a kind which does

not ordinarily occur in the absence of someone’s negligence. It is

common knowledge that people and most particularly younger persons

jump into the swimming pool. Unless and until there is some

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 54 of 64
negligence, the injury of the kind indicated in the present case would

not ordinarily occur. When one jumps into the swimming pool in the

shallow end, one does not expect that on the feet reaching the floor of

the swimming pool, the same would slip on account of the floor being

slippery. Ordinarily, when one jumps into the swimming pool, at the

shallow end, the feet do hit the floor of the pool but they remain firmly

grounded. The incident of the kind involved in the present case could

only occur on account of the slippery floor. This takes me to the

second aspect and that is that the accident must have been caused by an

agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant.

The defendant was entirely responsible for the maintenance and

operation of the same and therefore this condition is also satisfied. The

third condition is that the accident must not have been caused by any

voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff. Here,

again, I find that there was no contributory negligence on the part of the

plaintiff. The plaintiff merely jumped into the swimming pool in the

shallow end as she may have done on hundreds of occasions being a

person more than accustomed to swimming and one who spent many

hundreds of hours in and around the swimming pool.

66. It is, therefore, clear that all the three conditions necessary for

application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur stand satisfied.

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 55 of 64

67. Once this happens, the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the

evidence of negligence. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v

Subhagwanti & Ors: AIR 1966 SC 1750, the Supreme Court described

the shifting of the burden, relying on Halsbury’s Laws of England,

2nd Ed., Vol. 23, as under:-

―An exception to the general rule that the burden of
proof of the alleged negligence is in the first instance
on the plaintiff occurs wherever the facts already
established are such that the proper and natural
inference immediately arising from them is that the
injury complained of was caused by the defendant’s
negligence, or where the event charged as negligence
‗tells its own story’ of negligence on the part of the
defendant, the story so told being clear and
unambiguous. To these cases the maxim res ipsa
loquitur applies. Where the doctrine applies, a
presumption of fault is raised against the defendant,
which if he is to succeed in his defence, must be
overcome by contrary evidence, the burden on the
defendant being to show how the act complained of
could reasonably happen without negligence on his
part.‖

The defendant has not provided any plausible explanation as to how the

plaintiff could have suffered the injury that she did. Consequently, the

defendant has failed to meet its burden of proof in showing as to how

the plaintiff came to be injured without their negligence. Such burden

not having been discharged, by employing the doctrine of res ipsa

loquitur, it is clear that it was on account of the defendant’s negligence

that the floor of the swimming pool was slippery on account of which

the injury was sustained by the plaintiff.

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 56 of 64

68. In view of the foregoing discussion, issues No. 3-8 are decided in

favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant.

Issue No. 9:

69. This issue is concerned with the computation of the damages to

which the plaintiff is entitled. The plaintiff has claimed a decree in the

sum of ` 2,00,00,000/- (rupees two crores) along with interest at the

rate of 18% per annum on the said amount from the date of presentation

of the plaint till its realization in favour of the plaintiff and against the

defendant. The said amount of ` 2,00,00,000/- has been claimed by the

plaintiff on the following basis:-

 i)      Expenses incurred by the plaintiff on
         medical treatment and care in India
         and Australia                               -       `   20,00,000.00

 ii)     Damages on account of physical pain,
         mental anguish and psychological
         anguish and loss of education               -       `   50,00,000.00

 iii)    Damages on account of loss of               -   `   1,30,00,000.00
         earnings for the rest of her life
                                           Total     -   `   2,00,00,000.00



Insofar as the expenses incurred on the medical treatment and care in

India and Australia are concerned, certain bills and receipts have been

produced in evidence. They are as follows:-

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 57 of 64

 Sl. No.       Exhibit             Detail             Amount
              No.                                    AUD /`
   1.         PW18/2    Medical       aids     and   $ 814.50
                        equipment supplied to
                        plaintiff          through
                        Queensland Department of
                        Health- to be reimbursed
   2.         PW18/1             - Do -              $ 1011.50


   3.         PW2/3     Dr B. N Chopra                 ` 60/-


   4.         PW2/4     Dr B. Ramamurthi             ` 4250/-


   5.         PW2/8     Holy Family Hospital No.     ` 4042.50
                        53121
   6.         PW2/10             - Do -              ` 2847.25

                            Receipt No. 53627
   7.         PW2/11             - Do -              ` 2459.60

                           Receipt No. 53907
   8.         PW2/12             - Do -               ` 2285

                           Receipt dated 13.6.78
   9.         PW2/14             - Do -               ` 90.50


   10.        PW2/16       Receipt dated 22.08.78     ` 2925


   11.        PW2/17       Receipt dated 22.08.78     ` 2925


   12.        PW2/19       Dr Arjun Sehgal           ` 10500


   13.        PW2/20       Dr Arjun Sehgal           ` 12000


   14.        PW2/22       Dr Arjun Sehgal           ` 13916




CS(OS) 1298/1982                                       Page 58 of 64
    15.        PW2/24      Dr (Mrs) Sehgal                     ` 8000


   16.        PW2/25     Ticket (Airline charges)             ` 7134


   17.        PW2/26   Chemist bill dated 3.6.78              ` 39.20


   18.        PW2/27   Medical equipment dated                 ` 435
                       7.6.78
   19.        PW2/28   Hired refrigerator for                  ` 340
                       hospital room on 10.5.78
   20.        PW2/29   Accommodation and                      $ 57.80
                       meals for Dr Arjun Sehgal
                       in Brisbane
   21.        PW2/30   Ambulance service on                     $ 50
                       21.7.78
   22.        PW2/31             - Do -                         $ 50


   23.        PW2/32   Ambulance service on                     $ 30
                       26.6.78
   24.        PW2/35   Various receipts for             $ 3500 (approx.)
                       physiotherapy and
                       Chiropractor charges in
                       1978 and 1979.
                       TOTAL in Indian rupees          ` 125000 (approx.)
                       [after converting AUD           [` 74249.05 +
                       into INR at the exchange        $ 5513.80 (=` 49,624.2)
                       rate of 1 AUD = ` 9             = ` 123873.25]
                       (approx.) in 1982



The total of which comes to approximately       `   1,25,000/-. It may be

noted that the amounts paid in Australian Dollars have been converted

to Indian rupees at the exchange rate of ` 9 (approximately) = 1

Australian Dollar (AUD), which is the equivalent exchange rate

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 59 of 64
prevalent in 1982. It may also be pointed out that the payment for

Australian Dollars have been made during the year 1979-1984 and,

therefore, the rate as applicable in the year 1982 has been taken as an

average. However, the amount claimed in the plaint under the head of

expenses incurred for medical treatment and care in India and Australia

is to the extent of ` 20,00,000/- (rupees twenty lacs). I may also note

that PW1 (S. L. Beer) as well as PW2 (Mr G. L. Beer) have deposed

with regard to the expenses incurred by them. PW2 Mr G. L. Beer has

stated that he incurred medical expenses of Holy Family Hospital as

well as of Dr Sehgal and the attendant charges. He stated that Dr

Sehgal’s air fare to and fro Australia was also paid by him and he had

to incur the additional expense of seats in Thai International Airways

because of the stretcher on which his daughter (the plaintiff) was to be

transported from New Delhi to Australia. There were other expenses

attached to the transfer in Sydney and their stay there as well as

ambulance transport. Expenses were incurred on account of visiting

English Neurosurgeon, Dr Wilson and other expenses for doctor /

Chiropractor in Brisbane. He also had to make several alterations to his

house, such as alteration to the toilet, widening of doorways, placing of

protective covers over sections of carpet because of the wheelchair

which was used by his daughter. He also had to incur the expense of

building all the physiotherapy equipment and of prosthetic appliances.

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 60 of 64
He also had to establish a specialized carport and had to construct

ramps so that the plaintiff could enter and exit the car. Because of the

treatment, which his daughter was receiving, he had to maintain

himself and his son in Brisbane and his wife and daughter in

Melbourne. He stated that the expenditure incurred by him up to 1982,

when he filed the suit, on medical expenditure under various heads and

other expenditure for the care of the plaintiff would amount to

approximately Australian Dollars 1,50,000. Thus, according to the

testimony of PW2 (Mr G. L. Beer), an amount of approximately

` 13,50,000/- (as per the said exchange rate of ` 9 = 1 AUD) was

incurred under the head of expenses incurred for medical treatment and

care in India and Australia. However, I find that the amount mentioned

in the bills and receipts, which have been exhibited, is only `1,25,000/-.

Considering the fact that not all bills and receipts may have been kept, I

feel that the expenditure incurred under the head medical treatment and

care in India and Australia ought to be assessed at about ` 5,00,000/-

(rupees five lacs) instead of what is claimed in the plaint.

70. With regard to the quantification of damages on account of

physical pain, mental anguish and psychological anguish as well as loss

of education, I feel that the figure of ` 50,00,000/- (rupees fifty lacs),

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 61 of 64
which has been quantified and claimed by the plaintiff, is a reasonable

figure and, therefore, the same ought to be allowed.

71. I am left with quantifying the damages on account of loss of

earnings for the rest of her life. It has come in the evidence of both the

plaintiff as PW1 and her father Mr G. L. Beer (PW2) that under normal

circumstances, the plaintiff would have entered the workforce at the

age of about 21 years. However, because of the incident, her education

was derailed, which she was able to complete much later and that she

started work at the age of 26 years. Thus, there was a clear loss of

income for five years between the ages 21 and 26. Apart from this, the

plaintiff has deposed that on the date of her deposition in 1991 she was

earning about Australian Dollars 30,000 per annum. It has also come

in evidence that had she not suffered the severe handicap of being a

quadriplegic, her income would have been between Australian Dollars

45,000 to 50,000 per annum. It has also been stated in her deposition

that because of the fact that she was a quadriplegic, her work life

would, in all likelihood, not extend beyond the age of 45 years whereas,

normally, she would have worked up to the age of 65 years. Exhibit

PW6/1 is a life expectancy certificate which indicates that in Australia

a female born on 24.01.1961 would be expected to live up to the age of

approximately 80 years. This means that once she retires from work,

she would have to spend many years on pension alone which would,

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 62 of 64
according to her testimony, not be sufficient to enable her to live

independently because as per her testimony, she would also require

somebody to provide house-keeping services as well have a live-in

attendant to see to her day-to-day needs. Consequently, the figure of

` 1,30,00,000/- was claimed as damages on account of loss of earnings

for the rest of her life.

72. Assuming that on an average the plaintiff would earn 45,000

Australian Dollars per annum throughout her period of employment,

her total earnings, under normal circumstances, would have been

45,000 x 44 = 19,80,000 Australian Dollars. The period of 44 years

has been taken on the assumption that she would start work at the age

of 21 years and continue to work, under normal circumstances, till the

age of 65 years. She has stated that she was earning 30,000 Australian

Dollars and that she has been working since the age of 26 years and

would be expected to continue to work till she attained the age of 45

years. Thus, during these 19 years, she would have earned 19 x 30,000

= 5,70,000 Australian Dollars. Consequently, the loss of earnings

would be 14,10,000 Australian Dollars (19,80,000 – 5,70,000). The

said amount converted into Indian rupees at the exchange rate of ` 9 = 1

AUD as prevalent in 1982 would amount to ` 1,26,90,000/- (rounded

off to ` 1,27,00,000/-). This amount very closely matches the amount

of damages of ` 1,30,00,000/- (rupees one crore thirty lacs) which the

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 63 of 64
plaintiff has claimed in the present suit. In the result, the plaintiff is

entitled to – (i) ` 5,00,000/- (rupees five lacs) on account of expenses

incurred towards medical treatment and care in India and Australia; (ii)

` 50,00,000/- (rupees fifty lacs) towards damages on account of

physical pain, mental anguish and psychological anguish and loss of

education; and (iii) ` 1,27,00,000/- (rupees one crore twenty seven lacs)

on account of damages for loss of earnings for the rest of her life. The

total sum of which comes to ` 1,82,00,000/- (rupees one crore eighty

two lacs) as on the date of the filing of the suit.

73. Thus, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree in the sum of

` 1,82,00,000/- (rupees one crore eighty two lacs) along with simple

interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum w.e.f 22.01.1982 till the

date of the decree and future simple interest on the said amount at the

rate of 10% per annum till its realization. It is decreed accordingly.

The formal decree be drawn up at the earliest.

BADAR DURREZ AHMED
(JUDGE)
MARCH 03, 2011
SR

CS(OS) 1298/1982 Page 64 of 64