Sushila Devi D/O Ramsingh vs Maharajsingh Devisingh on 22 September, 1989

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Madhya Pradesh High Court
Sushila Devi D/O Ramsingh vs Maharajsingh Devisingh on 22 September, 1989
Equivalent citations: 1990 (0) MPLJ 445
Author: R Lahoti
Bench: R Lahoti

JUDGMENT

R.C. Lahoti, J.

1. “While the Rent Control Legislation has given a number of facilities to the tenants it should not be construed so as to destroy the limited relief which it seeks to give the landlord also. For instance one of the grounds for eviction which is contained in almost all the Rent Control Acts in the country is the question of landlord’s bona fide personal necessity. The concept of bona fide necessity should be meaningfully construed so as to make the relief granted to the landlord real and practical”. Kewal Singh v. Lajwanti, AIR 1980 SC 161. In context with Delhi Rent Control Act, the Apex Court observed – ‘this is a beneficial legislation, beneficial to both the landlord and the tenant. It protects the tenant against unreasonable eviction and exorbitant rent. It also ensures certain limited rights to the landlord to recover possession on stated contingencies.’ Ganpat Ram v. Gayatri Devi, AIR 1987 SC 2016. ‘Tenants in all cases are not the weaker sections. There are those who are weak both among the landlords as well as the tenants’. Prabhakaran Nair v. State of T. N., AIR 1987 SC 2117. Only this much by way of prologue.

2. The plaintiff-landlord, whose suit for ejectment of the defendant-tenant from the suit premises, residential one, was decreed by the trial Court but dismissed by the lower Appellate Court, has come up in appeal.

3. A brief resume of the relevant facts: The landlord-plaintiff-appellant is admittedly a bedini (country prostitute) by caste and profession. She owns the suit house having purchased the same from one Ramsingh under the registered deed of sale dated 21-12-1974. The tenant-defendant-respondent has been holding the house at a monthly rent of Rs. 22/- since 3-5-1973 from the ex-landlord under a written rent note. The case of the plaintiff is that she bona fide needs the suit accommodation for the residence of herself and her two sons, namely, Pooransingh and Anoopsingh, both studying in College and Higher Secondary School respectively. It was also alleged that she wanted to reconstruct the house which could not be done unless the premises were vacated. The defendant in his written statement denied the case of the plaintiff and’ submitted that the plaintiff was in possession of other alternative accommodation, hence her need was not genuine and that the requirement of illegitimate sons could not be considered.

4. The trial Court decreed the suit. On appeal, the decree has been reversed by holding that the plaintiff was a country-prostitute and her sons were illegitimate, whose requirement bore no relevance under the law. The Lower Appellate Court relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Guljar Singh v. Motasingh, AIR 1965 SC 608 in holding that the illegitimate sons could not be considered to be ‘members of the family’ of the landlord. It was also held that the plaintiff could not seek ejectment on the ground of need for reconstruction because she could not satisfy the requirements of section 12(7) of the Act. It was also held that the plaintiff was possessed of other accommodation, enough to satisfy her requirements.

5. Three questions arise for determination in this appeal: –

i) Whether the Lower Appellate Court has rightly constructed the meaning of the term ‘member of the family’ so as to exclude illegitimate sons of a bedini – country pros.?

ii) Whether the Lower Appellate Court has rightly held the plaintiff to be in possession of other alternative accommodation sufficient to satisfy her requirement?

iii) Whether the plaintiff could have been denied a decree for ejectment on the ground of non-satisfaction of the requirements of section 12(7) of the Act?

6. Let us first find out the factual floor as laid by the pleadings of the parties and the evidence adduced in the case. The plaintiff Mst. Sushiladevi has five sons of whom one is married. They all live together with the plaintiff. The sale deed, under which the plaintiff purchased the suit accommodation, is a registered document and has been duly proved as required by law. Presently, she is residing in a house owned by her father and her paternal aunt (father’s sister), one Mst. Vaijanti, also a bedini, Ramsingh has expired and his rights have devolved upon three sisters of which the plaintiff is one. That is to say the house in which the plaintiff is residing for the present, is owned jointly by her paternal aunt and two sisters. She would have only 1/6th share in the title to the house. The purchase deed of that house has been exhibited (Ex.P.4) which stands in the joint name of Ramsingh and Mst. Vaijanti as purchasers. The plaintiff (P.W.4) and her son Pooransingh (P.W.5) have deposed that they wished to reside in their own house which was inhabitated by defendant. It is not disputed nor challenged in the cross-examination that the plaintiff has five sons out of whom one is married. The name of the father of the sons of the plaintiff was refused to be disclosed by the plaintiff though she was asked for the same in the cross-examination.

7. The major part of the argument of the learned counsel for the parties has been confined to the issue whether illegitimate sons of a prostitute can be included within the meaning of the term ‘members of the family’. The learned counsel for the respondent has before this Court once again forcefully placed reliance on Guljar Singh v. Mota Singh (supra).

8. The term ‘member of family’ has been defined in section 2(e) of the Act as under: –

“2(e) ‘member of the family’ in case of any person means the spouse, son, unmarried daughter, father, grandfather, mother, grandmother, brother unmarried sister, paternal uncle, paternal uncle’s wife or widow, or brother’s son or unmarried daughter living jointly with or any other relation dependant on him”.

The definition does not qualify the word ‘son’ as occurring therein, by the word legitimate. The question to be examined would be whether to assign the term a restricted meaning so as to include only legitimate son therein or to assign a wider meaning so as to include illegitimate son too, if facts of a case may warrant assigning of such a wider sense.

9. In Guljar Singh (supra) the problem posed before the Apex Court was of interpreting the phrase ‘son or daughter of such female’, as occurring in section 15(2)(b) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 (as amended by Act No. 10 of 1960). Their Lordships held that the phrase includes only legitimate son or legitimate daughter of the female vendor and does not include illegitimate son or daughter; in the absence of an express provision to the contrary the normal rule of construction of the words ‘child’, ‘son’ or ‘daughter’ occurring in a statute is to include only legitimate children i.e. born out of a wedlock; there is no such provision in section 15; in construing these words it is not open to the Court to travel beyond the statute or to resort to the line of heirs as in an intestate succession under the Hindu Succession Act or, to any other system of Common Law or statute applicable to the vendor.

10. However, both the Lower Appellate Court and the learned counsel for the appellant have omitted to read Guljar Singh fully. Their Lordships have proceeded to add: –

“No doubt, there might be express provision in the statute itself to give these words a more extended meaning as to include also illegitimate children and section 3(j) of the Hindu Succession Act (ACT XXX of 1956) furnishes a good illustration of such a provision. It might even be that without an express provision in that regard the context might indicate that the words were used in a more comprehensive sense as indicating merely a blood relationship apart from the question of legitimacy.

11. To find out consensus of judicial opinion, a few other cases may be noticed. I have chosen to confine myself to such cases only as were under the Rent Control Law.

12. In Baldev Sahai Bangia v. R. C. Bhasin, AIR 1982 SC 1091, Their Lordships held that a conspectus of the connotation of the term family emerging from a reference to several dictionaries clearly shows that “the word ‘family’ has to be given not a restricted but a wider meaning”. Therein Webster’s Third New International Dictionary was cited with approval which defined ‘family’ as including all persons related by blood or marriage.

13. In Dr. Mrs. Sushilabai v. Santosh Kumar and Ors., 1957 MPLJ 593, this Court quoted observations of an English decision that: –

“The material decisions limit membership of the same ‘family’ to three relationships; first, that of children; secondly, those constituted by way of legitimate marriage, like that between a husband and wife; and thirdly, relationship whereby one person becomes in loco parentis to another”

14. In Muhammad and Ors. v. Sinnanalu Ammo, 1977 (2) RCJ 652, the Kerala High Court held that the expression ‘family” (undefined by the Act) was elastic and that its ambit had to be determined in all the circumstances of the case having regard to the habits, ideas and socio-economic milieu of the parties.

15. In Pandurang Narayan Mantri v. Anant Shankarrao Samel, AIR 1982 Bom. 115 several decisions were considered and thereafter Sharad Manohar, J. proceeded to sum up the concept of family as under: –

“The concept is not a rigid one it is and it has always been an elastic one. Its content varies with reference to both time and place, historically as well as geographically. In the Indian Society the concept quite often embraces relations quite substantially remote from the peter families.”

“In India the concept of family is of even wider signification. The variations in the contents of the concept are denoted by various qualifications. Thus we have concept of joint family, coparcenary and family simpliciter. Out of these, the concept of family is of the widest amplitude.”

16. In Govind Dass and Ors. v. Kuldip Singh, AIR 1971 Delhi 151, A.D. B. observed: –

“What constitutes a family in in a given set of circumstances or in a particular society depends upon the habits and ideas of persons constituting that society and the religious and socio-religious customs of the community to which such persons may belong.

17. In Makhanlall Bose v. Smt. Sushama Rani Basu, AIR 1953 Cal. 164, the D. B. was dealing with a case under the Partition Act, 1893 and observed that the word ‘family’ appearing in section 4 should be given a liberal interpretation. It was held:-

“The word ‘family’ is to be held to include not merely body of persons who originate from a common ancestor, but also a group of persons related by blood and living in one house or under one head of management.”

18. In Guljar Singh (supra), the decision relied on by the tenant, the Apex Court left open the meaning to be gathered even by implication from the context in which the term son or daughter was used. Their Lordships have nowhere laid down it as a matter of law that in no case the son would include an illegitimate son. The word son or daughter, if unqualified, is capable of being construed in a comprehensive sense so as to include a mere relationship by blood apart from the question of legitimacy. The conspectus of judicial opinion too permits a liberal interpretation of term ‘family’ so as to include a mere relationship by blood and living with togetherness. In the given set of circumstances, habits, ideas, customs relating to the persons constituting the community in question are weighty factors. In case of a community where the institution of marriage is recognised, an illegitimate child may or may not constitute a member of family with reference to a male or female head and I deliberately abstain from expressing any general opinion on that point as such a wide question is not arising for determination and also because it cannot be answered divorced from the facts of an individual case. In so far as a prostitute is concerned, marriages are not commonly performed in the very nature of the profession led by her, and her illegitimate children mast be held to be members of her family as related to her by blood. Such an interpretation would be consistent with habits, ideas and customs relating to the plaintiff’s community and would accord with its socio-economic-milieu. That only would attach meaningfulness to the construction and advance the objective of the law. If any other construction were to be placed then a landlord, if a prostitute would never be able to seek ejectment for the need of herself or for her members of the family even if her family goes on increasing.

19. Illegitimate offspring of a prostitute is recognised by personal law also. Though prostitution, according to the Hindu Law, entails degradation and loss of caste, it does not sever the tie which connects the prostitute to her kindred by blood. The sons of a dancing woman, though by different fathers, are entitled to succeed to each other (see Hindu Law by Mulla, 15th Edn., 1986, para 164, pp. 213-214).

20. The up-shot of the above discussion is that the word son, occurring in section 2(e) of the Act, when used in context with member of familv of a prostitute would include her illegitimate son as well. Hence in this case the illegitimate sons of the plaintiff-landlord a country prostitute would be included within the term ‘member of the family’ and their requirement would be relevant for the purpose of section 12(1 )(e) of the Act.

21. The plaintiff should have been held not possessed of an alternative accommodation suitable for her residence, on the facts found. The house wherein she is presently residing, does not exclusively belong to her. She has only 1/6 title therein. She wishes to occupy her own house along with her own family members. The need cannot be said to be non-genuine and it is no answer to her requirement that she can carry on well in a house which is also owned by her co-owners of 5/6th share.

22. The suit house is partly constructed and partly in the shape of an open land. The plaintiff wishes to reconstruct the whole house so as to extend the accommodation and thereby make provision for her big family. In spite of reconstruction the entire house is going to be occupied by the landlord herself. Though, the plaintiff has proved the sanctioned plan of proposed construction and has also stated that she has an amount of Rs. 5,000/- available with her to finance the reconstruction, it is not at all necessary for the plaintiff to have proved the requirements contemplated by section 12(7) of the Act. Where the case pleaded by the landlord is that in spite of reconstruction or material alterations, the premises are going to be occupied by the landlord to satisfy bona fide requirement of her occupation, the case would be governed by section 12(1)(e) and not section 12(1)(h) of the Act (see Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta v. Indradaman Ammtlal Sheth, AIR 1964 SC 1976 and Masood Ahmad v. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Kanpur and ors., AIR 1972 SC 631). Accordingly, section 12(7) of the Act would be totally irrelevant,

23. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the Lower Appellate Court are set aside. The judgment and decree of the trial Court are restored. The plaintiff-appellant shall be entitled to her costs throughout. Counsel’s fee Rs. 100/.

24. However, looking to the paucity of accommodation and the fact that a sudden order of ejectment may put the tenant to an insoluble problem it is directed that the decree for ejectment shall not be available for execution until 31-10-1989, and thereafter until 30-6-1990 provided that on or before 31-10-1989, the tenant-respondent files an undertaking on affidavit before the executing Court in the following terms: –

1) That on or before 30-6-1990, he shall handover vacant and peaceful possession of the accommodation to the plaintiff;

2) That he shall not part with possession of the premises in favour of anyone else nor damage the premises in any manner whatsoever;

3) That on or before 31-10-1989 he shall deposit the entire amount of arrears of rent calculated at the rate of Rs. 22/- P.M. along with costs for the period expiring 31-10-1989;

4) That he shall continue to pay to the landlord or deposit for payment to her amount on account of rent falling due month by month from 1-11-1989 and thereafter, by the 15th day of each succeeding month.

On failure to file the undertaking, the decree shall be available for execution soon after 31-10-1989.

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