PETITIONER:
SYED ASADULLAH KAZMI
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE, ALLAHABAD AND OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT23/07/1981
BENCH:
PATHAK, R.S.
BENCH:
PATHAK, R.S.
KOSHAL, A.D.
CITATION:
1981 AIR 1724 1982 SCR (1) 77
1981 SCC (3) 483 1981 SCALE (3)1092
CITATOR INFO :
D 1988 SC 30 (5)
ACT:
Landlord and tenant-Prescribed authority allowing the
landlord to recover his building tenanted, but the appellate
authority modifying the order of part recovery only and the
said order becomes final due to successive failures in
appeal by the tenant including in the Supreme Court-Any
application to re-open the issue due to the subsequent event
i.e. the death of the landlord is not maintainable.
HEADNOTE:
In February 1965, Bungalow No. 16-D, Beli Road (now 26
B.K. Banerjee Road), Allahabad was allotted to the
appellant. On an application made in April 1975 the
prescribed authority allowed, on 24th May, 1976, the
application directing the release of the bungalow to the
landlord. On appeal the appellate authority by its order
dated 25th March, 1977 modified the order by releasing only
a portion of the building and by permitting the appellant to
continue in the remaining portion with a direction to the
prescribed authority to divide the bungalow accordingly. The
said order dated 25th March, 1977 became final, since the
writ petition challenging the said order was dismissed. On
the death of the landlord the appellant filed a fresh
application before the prescribed authority not to proceed
with the partition scheme. Since the prescribed authority
refused to take note of this subsequent event, the issue has
come up before this Court by way of special leave.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
^
HELD: 1. The order dated 25th March, 1977 of the
appellate authority releasing a portion of the premises in
favour of the third respondent and leaving the remaining
portion in the tenancy of the appellant acquired finality
when the proceedings taken against it by the appellant
failed. The prescribed authority was bound to give effect to
that final order and was not acting outside its jurisdiction
or contrary to law. [79 C-D]
2. It is true that subsequent events must be taken into
account by a statutory authority or court when considering
proceeding arising out of a landlord's petition for
ejectment of a tenant on the ground of the landlord's
personal need. But in the present case the order for release
of a portion of the accommodation acquired finality before
the death of the landlord and the controversy concluded by
it could not be reopened now. [79 E-F]
3. The present appeal being limited to the question
which arose before the prescribed authority on the
application of the appellant after the proceedings for
release had acquired finality, it is not open even to the
Supreme Court, to reopen the proceeding for release. [79 G-
H]
78
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1440 of
1979.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated the 15th November, 1978 of the Allahabad High Court in
Civil Misc. Writ No. 8736 of 1978.
R.K. Garg, Manoj Swarup and Miss Lalita Kohli for the
Appellant.
Yogeshwar Prasad, and Mrs Rani Chhabra, for the
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
PATHAK, J. The appeal by special leave is directed
against a judgment of the Allahabad High Court dismissing a
tenant’s writ petition arising out of proceedings
consequential upon an order of ejectment.
The bungalow, 16-D, Beli Road, Allahabad, was owned by
Raj Kumar Sinha, father of the third respondent, Kailash
Shanker Sinha. In February 1965, the bungalow was allotted
to the appellant, Syed Asadullah Kazmi, and he was
accordingly treated as the tenant of the premises. At the
time, Raj Kumar Sinha, with his family, including the third
respondent, occupied another house at 14-D, Beli Road,
Allahabad. In October 1973, the third respondent applied for
the release of the bungalow 16-D, Beli Road, Allahabad, now
described as 26, B.K. Banerjee Road, Allahabad. The attempt
failed. A fresh application was made in April, 1975. It was
allowed by the Prescribed Authority on 24th May, 1976 after
overruling an objection filed by the appellant. The
appellant appealed and the appellate authority by its order
dated 25th March, 1977 modified the order of the Prescribed
Authority inasmuch as a portion only of the building was
released in favour of the third respondent and the appellant
was permitted to continue in the remaining portion, and the
Prescribed Authority was directed to divide the bungalow
accordingly. The appellant filed a writ petition in the High
Court against the order of the Appellate Authority, but the
writ petition was dismissed. Against its dismissal he
applied in this Court for special leave to appeal and on 3rd
January, 1978, that petition was also dismissed.
To give effect to the direction of the Appellate
Authority, the Prescribed Authority meanwhile initiated
proceedings for demar-
79
cation of the premises and a partition scheme was prepared.
During the preparation of the partition scheme, Raj Kumar
Sinha, the third respondent’s father, died. On 22nd
September, 1978, the appellant filed an application before
the Prescribed Authority bringing the fact of this death to
its notice and praying that the partition scheme should not
be prepared. The Prescribed Authority rejected the
application. Appeal by the appellant was dismissed by the
Appellate Authority on the ground that the order dated 25th
March, 1977 directing a division of the premises had become
final and the controversy could not be re-opened. The
appellant then filed a writ petition before the High Court,
and the High Court has maintained the view taken by the
Appellate Authority and dismissed the writ petition by its
judgment dated 25th November, 1978.
We are of opinion that the High Court is right.
Plainly, the order dated 25th March, 1977 of the Appellate
Authority releasing a portion of the premises in favour of
the third respondent and leaving the remaining portion in
the tenancy of the appellant acquired finality when the
proceeding taken against it by the appellant failed. The
order having become final, the Prescribed Authority was
bound to give effect to it. In doing so, the Prescribed
Authority was not acting outside its jurisdiction or
contrary to law. The application moved by the appellant
before the Prescribed Authority requesting it to take into
account the death of Raj Kumar Sinha was misconceived,
because it did not lie with the Prescribed Authority to
reopen proceedings which had been taken to the highest Court
and had become final. It is true that subsequent events must
be taken into account by a statutory authority or court when
considering proceedings arising out of landlord’s petition
for ejectment of a tenant on the ground of the landlord’s
personal need. But in the present case, the order for
release of a portion of the accommodation required finality
before the death of Raj Kumar Sinha and the controversy
concluded by it could not be reopened,
The appellant has vehemently urged that being the
highest court of the land it is open to us to reopen the
proceeding for release initiated by the third respondent. We
do not think we can. The present appeal is limited to the
question which arose before the Prescribed Authority on the
application of the appellant after the proceedings for
release had acquired finality and we must be confined to the
consideration of that question alone. We cannot reopen that
which has become final after this court dismissed the
special leave petition of the appellant. We may point out
that we have been referred to s. 24 of the U.P. Urban
80
Building Act, 1972 in support of the contention that the
Prescribed Authority retains control over ejectment
proceedings, but we are not impressed by that contention.
The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
S. R. Appeal dismissed.
81
