ORDER
A.K. Rajan, J.
1.
This writ petition is filed against the award
passed by the Labour Court in I.D. No.213/90. The petitioner
before this court was the workman in the second respondent
society, namely, Pollachi Co-operative House Construction
Society. The workman joined the service on 25.10.7 6. On
19.5.89 he submitted his resignation. It was handed over to
the Secretary in person. Subsequently on 29.5.89 he sent a
letter withdrawing the resignation letter. After this
withdrawal letter was given, a communication was received from
the second respondent dated 11.10.89, which was received on
13.10.89 by the petitioner herein stating that his resignation
letter was accepted already. Therefore, the petitioner herein
raised an industrial dispute before the Labour Court. Before
the Labour Court he submitted that on 11.10.89 he submitted
another application requesting the management to permit him to
join duty. On the same day the management wrote a letter
informing him that his resignation
has been accepted and he has been relieved with effect from
19.5.89 itself. Then he stated that the management has failed
to understand the involuntary nature of resignation. It was
made under coercion and due to compulsion. Further he has
stated that he sent a lawyer’s notice on 5.3.90. He also
stated that at the time of joining duty the management took
resignation letter from him without date and now the facts are
twisted. After recording the evidence of workman and the
management witness the Labour Court dismissed the industrial
dispute holding that the petitioner even earlier, twice, gave
resignation letters and they were withdrawn subsequently and
the management gave him employment on humanitarian grounds.
The workman cannot expect the management to act in the same
manner for the third time. It was also held that the
resignation letter was accepted on the very same day in his
presence and he was immediately relieved from duties.
Therefore, the Labour Court has come to the conclusion that
the petitioner is not entitled for employment. Aggrieved
against this order the present writ petition has been filed.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued
that this is a contract of employment and according to the
contract of employment, resignation brings the employment to
an end and therefore, such a termination of employment can be
done only in accordance with the rules and as per the rules
applicable to him, 15 days notice is necessary for either
party to bring the contract to an end. Therefore, the letter
of resignation will come into effect only on the completion of
15 days. Therefore, the counsel submitted that when the
letter of resignation was given on 19.5.89, it can come into
effect after the completion of 1 4 days and that even before
the completion of 14 days. On 29.5.89 itself the petitioner
sent a letter withdrawing his letter of resignation.
Therefore, there cannot be a termination of service before the
expiry of 14 days. Therefore, the petitioner is deemed not to
have resigned and he is deemed to be continuing in service.
Therefore, the order of the Labour Court is illegal and it is
liable to be set aside. In support of his argument the
learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in Sudha Nagaraj, K. v. Chief Manager, Andhra
Bank (1997-III-LLJ 301) and G.M., B.H.E.L. Ltd. v. Rajita
Suryakanta (1999-II-LLJ 549) where the Andhra Pradesh High
Court has held that when the resignation letter was tendered
in writing, it has to be accepted only in writing and the
acceptance of resignation cannot be communicated orally. In
the present case there was no letter of acceptance of
resignation and therefore, the learned counsel submitted that
the resignation of the workman has not become effective and he
is deemed to be continuing the service. He further relied
upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Punjab National Bank
v. Shri P.K. Mittal (1989-I-L.L.J. 368) wherein the Supreme
Court held that acceptance of resignation before the expiry of
the notice period will not be effective and the resignation
alleged to have been accepted immediately is not valid. The
judgment of the Supreme Court is based on the facts of the
particular case. In that case the resignation letter itself
contained a condition. In that letter of resignation the
employee had added that the date of receipt of letter should
be treated as the date of commencement of notice period so
that inclusive of the same his resignation will be effective
from 30.6.86. In that case since the resignation was accepted
on 7.2.86, the Supreme Court held that it was without
jurisdiction. Therefore, it is the case where acceptance was
against the terms contained in the very letter of resignation.
In the same case, the Supreme Court in paragraph 6 holds that
the employee may choose to resign with immediate effect or
with a notice of less than three months if the bank agrees to
the same. Therefore, the preposition that was laid down in
that case by the Supreme Court is that when the letter of
resignation fixes the date from which it has to come into
force, any acceptance prior to that date is not valid. At the
same time the notice period can be waived by either of the
parties if both of them agrees for the same. Therefore, this
decision of the Supreme Court is not of any help to the
petitioner.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied
upon another decision of the Patna High Court in Managing
Committee, S.G.A.S.High School v. State
where the Patna High Court held that under section 5 of the
Indian Contract Act which provides that a proposal may be
revoked at any time before the communication of its acceptance
is complete as against the proposer, and as provided under
section 4, the communication of acceptance of the proposal is
complete as against the proposer when it is put in course of
transmission to him so as to be out of the power of the
acceptor. Therefore, relying upon this decision, the learned
counsel contended that the acceptance shall be in writing.
The counsel also relied upon the decision in Janardan Misra v.
State for the same preposition in
paragraph 9 of that judgment. This only holds that
resignation can be withdrawn before it was accepted. The word
“communicate” does not mean communication in writing. This
judgment cannot be understood merely because a letter of
acceptance is transmitted before acceptance, to mean that
acceptance shall only be in writing and that acceptance should
be communicated in writing. The learned counsel also relied
upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Power Finance Corpn.
Ltd. v. P. K.Bhatia (1997 (2) LLN 5) wherein the Supreme
Court has held that the conditional letter of resignation will
not be effective unless the condition is fulfilled. In that
case in the letter of resignation itself there was a condition
that the relieving order should be handed over to him
immediately and the ex gratia payable be informed to him and
his dues be paid immediately. Since the order accepting the
voluntary retirement was a conditional one, the conditions
ought to have been complied with. Before the conditions could
be complied with, the appellant withdrew the scheme.
Consequently, the order accepting voluntary retirement did not
become effective. Therefore, this decision also cannot apply
to the facts of the present case. Learned counsel also relied
upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Central Bank of
India v. J.N.Nagpal (2001(6) Scale 381). In that case the
employee tendered his resignation on 2.4.88 but it was dated
1.7.88, to be effective from 1.10.88. The employee withdrew
his resignation on 2.7.88, but the employer accepted the
resignation on 6.9.88 itself. On the facts of the case the
Supreme Court held that acceptance of resignation is not valid
because the resignation was to take effect only from 1.1 0.88.
Since the resignation was withdrawn on 2.7.88 itself, the
acceptance of resignation on 6.9.88 was held invalid. Though
the counsel for the petitioner strenuously argued relying upon
these judgments, these decisions do not come to the help of
the petitioner in any manner since the facts of the case are
different.
4. Learned counsel for the respondent
referred to the evidence adduced before the lower court both
by the petitioner as well as the management. The petitioner
himself has admitted that on 19.5.89 he gave the resignation
letter. He has not stated under what circumstances the
resignation letter was given. That letter was given
voluntarily without coercion by any person. It was given to
the Secretary of the society. The Secretary of the society
accepted it relieving him from the duties. He does not known
when the endorsement was made in that letter. He did not come
to work after the resignation letter was handed over. Further
he states that once the employee was relieved it means that
resignation letter has been accepted. But he says that it
cannot be said that it is an official acceptance. The
management witness also says that immediately on receipt of
the letter of resignation he made an endorsement on the letter
itself accepting the resignation and he was relieved and in
his place another person was put in charge. Since that person
also did not attend he performed that work. He also says that
there is no rule in the bye-laws of the society prescribing
the number of days required for accepting any resignation
letter. From his evidence it is seen that the employee gave
the letter of resignation voluntarily and it was accepted
immediately and the acceptance was communicated to him orally
on the same day and the employee also understood it that his
resignation has been accepted and therefore, he did not turn
to duty from that date onwards. Only after ten days he sent a
letter withdrawing the resignation. Though the letter of
accepting resignation was not communicated to him earlier, the
employee was made to understand immediately that his
resignation has been accepted and he was relieved. Therefore,
the communication that is required is the communication to the
person concerned in the manner in which the employee
understands that communication. The communication need not be
in writing.
5. Counsel for the petitioner strenuously
contended that in the case of employer and employee
relationship, the master and servant relationship exists and
in such a situation acceptance can only be in writing to bring
the termination of contract valid. In other words, the
argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is the
contract cannot be brought into existence or terminated except
in writing. This argument is not accepted because the
contract under the Indian Contract Act can be brought into
existence orally. Offer can be made orally and acceptance
also can be made orally. Once the offer is accepted, there is
a contract. Similarly, once the offer of resignation has been
accepted, then also the termination of service is complete.
Therefore, the Labour Court has rightly concluded that the
resignation was accepted and that was valid and therefore,
dismissed the industrial dispute. The award of Labour Court
is perfectly valid and I find no reason to interfere with that
order. The writ petition is dismissed. No costs.