PETITIONER: T. V. R. SUBBU CHETTY'S FAMILY CHARITIES Vs. RESPONDENT: M. RAGHAVA MUDALIAR AND OTHERS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/01/1961 BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. WANCHOO, K.N. GUPTA, K.C. DAS CITATION: 1961 AIR 797 1961 SCR (3) 624 CITATOR INFO : F 1971 SC1041 (6) RF 1972 SC2069 (7,22) RF 1976 SC 807 (41,42) ACT: Hindu Law--Alienation by widow--Reversioner's suit to set aside alienation--Ratification of alienation by reversioner. HEADNOTE: M, a Hindu, died leaving his mother, widow, sisters and sisters' son and daughters. There were disputes between the mother and the widow which were settled at the instance of certain arbitrators. Under this settlement a portion of one of the houses was given to a sister of M, another portion to R son of another sister and his sister and a third portion to the daughter of the third sister. Certain properties , which had been agreed to be sold under the settlement were sold to the appellant by the mother and the widow. After the death of the mother and the widow R filed a suit as the next reversioner of M for recovery of the properties sold on the ground that the alienation was without necessity and was not binding on him. The appellant contended (i) that R was precluded from disputing the settlement between the mother and the widow as he had received a benefit under it and had ratified it by his conduct and (ii) that the transfer was for legal necessity. Held, that the transfer was not binding on R and he was entitled to avoid it. The settlement between the mother and the widow was also not binding on R. If a person having full knowledge of his rights as a possible reversioner enters into a transaction which settles his claim as well as the claim of the opponents at the relevant time, he cannot be permitted to go back on that arrangement when reversion actually falls open. But the mere fact that the reversioner has received some benefit under the transaction or has not challenged its validity when it took place cannot bar his rights as a reversioner. It will always be a question of fact as to whether the conduct of the reversioner on which the plea of ratification is based does in law amount to ratification properly so called. In the present case the settlement was not in the nature of a family arrangement; at that time R was a minor and was not a party to any of the said transactions. There was no conduct of R which could amount to ratification of the settlement or of the alienation. At the time when he accepted the gift he could not know about his rights as a possible reversioner. Further, there was no legal necessity for the transfer. Sahu Madho Das v. Pandit Mukand Ram [1955] 2 S.C.R. 22, Dhiyan Singh v. Jugal Kishore, [1952] S.C.R. 478, Kanhai Lal v. Brij Lal (1918) L.R. 45 I.A. 118. Rangasami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden (1918) L.R. 46 I.A. 72 and Ramgouda Annagouda v. Bhausakeb (1927) L.R. 54 I.A. 396, referred to 625 JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 204/1956.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated February 23, 1951,
of the Madras High Court in O. S. Appeal No. 13/1948.
R. Keshva Aiyangar and M. S. K. Aiyangar, for the
appellant.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and Naunit Lal, for .respondent
No. 1.
B. K. B. Naidu, for respondent No. 6.
1961. January 27. The Judgment of the Court was delivered
by
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal arises out of a suit filed by
the respondent M. Raghava Mudaliar who claims to be the
reversioner of Madhava Ramanuja Mudaliar. In his suit the
respondent alleges that after the death of Madhava Ramanuja
Mudaliar which took place on March 22, 1893, his property
came into the possession of his widow Manickammal. Sub-
sequently the said Manickammal and Rengammal, the widowed
mother of the deceased Madhava Ramanuja Mudaliar alienated
the properties without any legal necessity. According to
the respondent the said alienation was not binding on him
and so he was entitled to recover possession of the said
property free of any encumbrance or charge. Manickammal
died on October 18, 1941, whereas Rengammal died in June,
1921. On the death of the widow Manickammal reversion fell
open and that has given a cause of action to the respondent
for his present suit.
Madhava Ramanuja Mudaliar died issueless and was survived by
his widow, his widowed mother, his sister Andalammal and the
respondent and his sister Apurupammal who are the children
of Ammakannu Ammal the second sister of Madhava Ramanuja
Mudaliar, and Ethirajammal the daughter of the third sister
of Madhava Ramanuja Mudaliar. To his suit the respondent
impleaded the appellant Andalammal, Krishnasami Mudaliar,
son of the said Apurupammal (defendant 1) and Susila Bai
Ammal daughter of
626
Ethirajammal as defendants 2 to 4. The Udayavar Temple by
the sole trustee Bysani Krishnaiah Chetty was joined as
defendant 5.
After her husband’s death Manickammal obtained letters of
administration to his estate from the High Court at Madras.
It appears that the relations of the widow with her mother-
in-law were embittered, and that led to disputes between
them. These disputes were settled by the two widows in
pursuance of the advice of certain arbitrators who mediated
between them. The settlement thus reached was recorded in
writing on May 27, 1893 (Ex. D-2). It would be relevent to
refer to the main terms of the settlement at this stage.
This settlement set out the properties covered by it as
Serial Nos. 1 to 5. Item No. 1 which was a house in three
blocks was divided between the respondent and his sister
Apurupammal who were to take one share; Ethirajammal who was
to take another share; and Andalammal who was to take the
third share. House No. 62, which, was Serial No. 2, and
houses and shops Nos. 126 and 127 which were shown as Serial
No. 3 were agreed to be sold, and it was settled that out of
the sale proceeds the debts of the deceased Madhava Ramanuja
Mudaliar and his father should be discharged; expenses
incurred in obtaining the letters of administration should
then be deducted along with the expenses of sale, and the
balance should be divided equally between the two widows
subject to a payment of Rs. 1,000/- to the mother-in-law in
lieu of her jewels. The two cawnies of lands which were
Serial No. 4 were agreed to be given to the maternal uncle
of the deceases Madhava Ramanuja Mudaliar, whereas the
moveables which were shown as Serial No. 5 had to be divided
half and half between the two widows. This document con-
tained a clause which provided that ” in case any one of us
contravenes the terms the other party shall not only cancel
this agreement but his title to the estate of Madhava
Ramanuja Mudaliar prior to the agreement shall in no way be
affected subject to. which this agreement has been entered
into. ” The document thus executed was attested by four
attesting witnesses.
627
It appears that soon after this agreement was finalised,
Krishnasamy Mudaliar, defendant 3, objected to its validity
and disputed the right of the widows to deal with the
property in the manner specified in it. He was, however,
persuaded to abandon his objections.’ and a sale deed was
executed by him conveying his reversionary rights to the two
widows for consideration’ on September 10, 1894. By this
document defendant 3 purported to recognise and grant an
absolute title to the two widows in regard to the estate of
the deceased (Ex. D-3). Subsequent to this document the
two widows began to enjoy the properties as agreed between
them.
On February 4, 1895 the two widows sold item No. 1 in
Schedule 11 attached to the plaint, i.e., Nos. 126 and 127,
Anna Pillai Street and Audiappa Naick Street respectively to
Thatha Venkata Raghava Subbu Chetty. The appellant is the
successor in title of the said division in respect of the
said item No. 1 in Schedule II. In the present appeal we
are concerned only with this item.
On May 27, 1895, a composite deed of partition and
administration of property of the deceased was executed by
and between the two widows (Ex. D-5). By this document the
three blocks in the house shown as Serial No. 1 in Ex. D-2
were delivered into the possession of the respective donees.
The maternal uncle of the deceased was given two cawnies of
lands as therein stipulated and the debts of the deceased
were discharged and expenses incurred in respect of the
letters of administration were met. It is under these
circumstances that the respondent filed his present Suit No.
56 of 1946 on the Original Side of the Madras High Court;.
and he claimed that the alienations made by the two widows
were not binding on him and he was entitled to the
possession of the property left by the deceased Madhava
Ramanuja. The schedule attached to the plaint referred to
four items of property, and as we have already pointed out
it is only with item No. 1 out of these four items with
which we are concerned in the present appeal.
628
In regard to the said item the appellant urged that the
agreement between the two widows (Ex. D-2) and the
subsequent composite deed executed in pursuance of it (Ex.
D-5) were in the nature of a family arrangement, and as such
they were binding on the respondent. In was also alleged by
the appellant that the respondent had received benefit under
the said arrangement and by his conduct had ratified it.
The appellant further pleaded that the transfer in favour of
his predecessor was supported by legal necessity.
Incidentally a plea of surrender was also raised by the
appellant.
Mr. Justice Kunhiraman, who tried the suit, held that there
was a family arrangement which bound the respondent. He
also observed that the respondent had received benefit under
the said arrangement and was therefore precluded from
challenging its validity. The learned Judge incidentally
made some observations which showed that he was inclined to
uphold the plea of surrender raised by the appellant. In
the result the respondent’s suit was dismissed.
The respondent then took the matter in appeal and succeeded.
The appeal court held that the impugned arrangement cannot
be said to be a bona fide family settlement which would bind
the respondent. Before the appeal court it was conceded
that the plea of surrender raised by the appellant could not
be sustained, and that the contention that the respondent
was bound by the family arrangement could not also be
sustained. It was, however, urged on behalf of the
appellant that the respondent’s conduct precluded him from
disputing the validity of the arrangement but this argument
was rejected by the appeal court; likewise, the contentions
that the transfer in favour of the appellant’s predecessor
was justified by legal necessity also failed. As a result
of these findings the respondent’s appeal was allowed, the
decree passed by the trial court was set aside, and the
claim for possession made by the respondent was decreed.
The respondent’s suit was accordingly directed to go before
the Official Referee for ascertainment of mesne profits
629
claimed by him. It is against this decree that the
appellant has come to this Court in appeal.
The principal point which has been urged before us by Mt% R.
Keshav Aiyangar on behalf of the appellant is that in
substance the respondent has ratified the impugned
transaction, has received benefit under it, and by his
conduct has affirmed it, and so it is not open to him to
challenge its validity and binding character. In support of
this argument he has canvassed for our acceptance the
proposition that if a person with full knowledge of his
rights assents to a transaction which may otherwise be
voidable at his instance and takes benefit under it, he is
subsequently precluded from disputing its validity. In
support of this argument he has relied on a decision of this
Court in Sahu Madho Das v. Pandit Mukand Ram (1). In that
case this Court has held that it is settled law that an
alienation by a widow in exercise of her powers is not
altogether void but only voidable by the reversioners who
may either singly or as a body be precluded from exercising
their right to avoid it either by express ratification or by
acts which treat it as valid or binding. This Court also
observed that it is a principle of general application
underlying many branches of the law that a person who with
full knowledge of his rights has once elected to assent to a
transaction voidable at his instance and has thus elected
not to exercise his right to avoid it, cannot go back on
that election and avoid it at a later stage ; having made
his election he is bound by it. The argument is that though
the respondent may not be a party to the impugned
transaction, if by his conduct it can be said that he has
elected to uphold it and has received benefit under it he
cannot be allowed to go back upon the election. There is of
course no doubt about the correctness of the principle thus
enunciated, but the difficulty in the way of the appellant
arises when the applicability of the said principle is
tested in the light of the relevant material findings in
that case. That is why it is necessary to refer very
briefly to the findings of fact on which the decision in
Sahu
(1) [1955] 2 S.C..R. 22,
630
Madho Das’s case (1) rests. In that case this Court
considered the question as to whether the plaintiff Mukand
Ram had assented to the impugned family arrangement, and
observed that as he was not a party to the arrangement his
assent to the arrangement itself and not to something else
must be clearly established, and also his knowledge of the
facts. Then, having thus posed the question the material
evidence was examined, and it. was-held that the cumulative
effect of the said evidence led to the reasonable inference
that the plaintiff’s assent was to the very arrangement
itself, and his conduct as well as the conduct of his
brother Kanhaiya Lal was consistent only with that
hypothesis; in other words, the examination of the material
evidence justified the inference that Mukand Ram had in fact
elected to assent to the transaction and had received
benefit under it, and so the doctrine of election or
ratification precluded him from disputing the validity of
the said transaction. It is, however, significant that
dealing with the case of the minor sons, who were not
parties either personally or through their guardians, and
who did not claim title either through Pato or her
daughters, this Court expressly observed that so far as they
were concerned what they received were gifts pure and simple
and the only assent that could be inferred from the mere
acceptance of the gifts and nothing more would be assent to
that particular gift and not assent to the gifts similarly
made to others. This observation brings out in bold relief
by contrast the relevant findings in the light of which the
plaintiff was held precluded from disputing the validity of
the impugned transaction.
The appellant has also relied on another decision of this
Court in Dhiyan Singh v. Jugal Kishore (2). In that case it
was held that even if the impugned award was invalid the
plaintiff who disputed its validity was barred from making
that claim by reason of estoppel. Brijlal against whom the
plea of estoppel was effectively raised appeared to have
made a claim to the estate in question in 1884 when the
impugned
(1) [1955] a S.C.R. 22.
(2) [1952] S.C.R. 478.
631
transaction took place,, and it was as a result of this
claim that settlement was reached and the impugned
transaction effected. This Court held that even if the
award which was challenged was invalid Brijlal by his
conduct had precluded himself from raising the contention
against the validity of the award. In , coming to this
conclusion this Court observed that, the case before it was
very similar to the one which the Privy Council had decided
in Kanhai Lal v. Brij Lal (1). When we turn to the Privy
Council decision itself we find that Kanhai Lal, who was
held by the Privy Council to be precluded from challenging
the arrangement to which he was a party, had set up a title
in himself on the strength of an alleged adoption, and when,
having regard to the said title, a settlement was reached
and a compromise arrangement was made, it was held by the
Privy Council that the doctrine of estoppel came into play.
Kanhai Lal, who subsequently became a reversioner according
to the Privy Council, was bound by the previous arrangement
and ” cannot now claim as a reversioner.” These two
decisions also emphasise, the fact that if a person having
full knowledge of his rights as a possible reversioner
enters into a transaction which settlers his claim as well
as the claim of his opponents at the relevant time, he
cannot be permitted to go back on that arrangement when
reversion actually falls open. There are two other decisions
of the Privy Council to which reference may be made. In
Rangaswami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden (2) the Privy
Council had to deal mainly with the question of surrender,
its theory and its essential features. Incidentally it had
also to deal with the case of reversioner who had taken from
an alienee from a Hindu widow a mortgage of a property which
included a part of the property alienated, and the question
raised was whether by reason of the fact that the
reversioner had a mortgage of the said property he was
precluded from challenging the validity of the said
alienation; and the Privy Council held that he was not so
precluded. In dealing with this aspect of the question the
Privy Council
(1) (1919) L.R. 45 I.A. 118.
(2) (1918) L.R. 40 I.A. 72.
632
observed that it is well-settled that though he who may be
termed a presumptive reversionary heir has a title to
challenge an alienation at its inception, he need not do so,
but is entitled to wait till the death of the widow has
affirmed his character, a character which up to that date
might be defeated by birth or by adoption The Privy Council
then examined the nature of the mortgage, the properties
included in it, and observed that the said mortgage
consisted of 2/14ths of the mitta which had come to the
mortgagors in right of their own succession, and the
remaining share had come to them through the impugned deed
of gift. Then it was observed that at the time of the
mortgage the mortgagee did not know whether he would ever be
such a reversioner in fact as would give him a practical
interest to quarrel with the deed of gift; and the Privy
Council asked “why should he not take all that the
mortgagers could give or propose to give. ” ” To hold that
by doing so “, observed the Privy Council, ” he barred
himself from asserting his own title to a part of what was
mortgaged seems to their Lordships a quite unwarrantable
proposition.” This decision shows that the principle of
election or estoppel or ratification must be applied with
due circumspection and the mere fact that the reversioner
has received some benefit under the transaction or has not
challenged the validity of the transaction when it took
place cannot bar his rights as a reversioner when reversion
in his favour falls open.
The last case on which reliance has been placed by the
appellant is the decision of the Privy Council in Ramgouda
Annagouda v. Bhausaheb (1). In this case the widow of the
last male holder had alienated nearly the whole of the
property of her husband by three deeds executed and
registered on the same day. One of the deeds was in favour
of a presumptive reversioner. The Privy Council held that
the three deeds had to be regarded as forming one
transaction entered into by all the persons interested in
the properties, and that after the reversion fell open, the
reversioners who were parties to the said transactions
(1) (1927) L.R. 54 I.A. 396.
633
were precluded from disputing the two alienations by reason
of their conduct. According to the Privy Council the three
deeds in question were inseparably connected together and in
that view Annagouda, the reversioner, who challenged two of
the three transactions, not only consented to the sale to
Shivgouda and the gift to Basappa-which were the two
transactions impeached-but these dispositions formed part of
the same transaction by which he himself acquired a part of
the estate. Thus it may be taken to be well-settled that if
a presumptive reversioner is a party to an arrangement which
may properly be called a family arrangement and takes
benefit under it, he would be precluded from disputing the
validity of the said arrangement when reversion falls open
and he becomes the actual reversioner. The doctrine of
ratification may also be invoked against a presumptive
reversioner who, though not a party to the transaction,
subsequently ratifies it with full knowledge of his rights
by assenting to it and taking benefit under it. It is,
however, clear that mere receipt of benefit under an
arrangement by which a Hindu widow alienates the property of
her deceased husband would not preclude a presumptive
reversioner from disputing the validity of the said
alienation when he becomes the actual reversioner. It must
always be a question of fact as to whether the conduct of
the said reversioner on which the plea of ratification is
based does in law amount to ratification properly so-called.
It is in the light of these principles that we must now
consider the relevant facts in the present appeal.
There can be no doubt that the transaction which took place
on May 27, 1893, as a result of the dispute between the two
widows and with the intervention of the well-wishers of the
family is not a family arrangement as understood under Hindu
Law. This position was conceded before the High Court and
is not disputed before us (Ex. D-2). Similarly, the sale
deed which was executed by defendant 3 in favour of the two
widows is of no assistance because it was obviously a sale
by defendant 3 of his reversionary rights which were then no
better than spes suwessionis and as
634
such this transaction (Ex. D-3) cannot help to validate the
earlier arrangement between the two widows. The composite
document (Ex. D-5) of May 27, 1895, is in substance no more
than an alienation no doubt executed for the purpose of
carrying out the original arrangement between the two
widows. Thus in dealing with the question as to whether the
respondent is precluded from challenging the validity of the
impugned transaction it is necessary to bear in mind that
the original transaction is not a transaction in the nature
of a family arrangement. Besides, he was then a minor and
admittedly he was not a party to any of the said
transactions.
It is, however, urged that the respondent obtained a
certificate or a patta from the Collector in regard to the
property conveyed to him under Ex. D-5, and the argument is
that he has deliberately withheld the said patta because he
apprehended that if produced the patta would go against him.
The explanation given by the respondent for not producing
the patta is attacked as unsatisfactory, and it is urged
that the said explanation cannot possibly conceal his
intention to keep back the document from the Court. In his
cross-examination the respondent stated that the Collector’s
certificate which had been given to him by his grandmother
had been filed by him in Suit No. 495 of 1916 in the City
Civil Court, and he added that his advocate in the said suit
had not returned the document to him. We may assume that
the respondent has not produced the document though it was
in his possession; but we have on the record two documents
which were issued to the other donees, and all that the
appellant is entitled to assume is that a similar document
had been issued in favour of the respondent. In our
opinion, the two documents on the record do not assist the
appellant’s argument that any representation had been made
by the respondent to the Collector before he obtained a
patta in his favour. In fact the issue of the patta is a
routine matter which would necessarily follow on the
execution of the registered sale deed (Ex. D-5). On the
registration of the said document persons who got certain
immoveable properties
635
under it were given the certificates by the Collector in
ordinary course, and so no argument can be built up against
the respondent that the acceptance of the patta amounts to
the ratification of the original transaction of sale.
It is then urged that in Civil Suit No. 495 of 1916 filed in
the City Civil Court at Madras by Apurupammal against tile
respondent and another, the respondent filed the written
statement in which he admitted the validity of the impugned
transaction. It appears that the plaintiff in that suit had
based her claim on the said impugned transaction, and in
respect of the said claim the respondent had alleged in
paragraph 2 of his written statement that he admitted that
in consequence of certain disputes which arose between the
mother and the widow of the deceased Govinda Mudaliar a
compromise settlement was arrived at in pursuance of which
some transfers were effected. This, it is said, amounts to
an admission of the validity of the said transaction (Ex.
D- 15). This argument, however, fails to take notice of the
fact that while referring to the said compromise settlement
the respondent had expressly added that the said compromise
settlement was obviously to take effect only during the life
tenancy of the widow of the deceased Govinda Mudaliar (Ex.
P-3). In other words, taking the statement as a whole, as
we must, the respondent looked upon the said compromise
settlement as an alienation made by the widow and as
intended to take effect during her lifetime and no more. In
other words, far from supporting a plea of ratification
against the respondent this statement strengthens his case
that he took the benefit with the knowledge and under the
belief that the arrangement under which the said benefit
flowed was intended to be operative during the ,Lifetime of
the widow, and as such he had no occasion to challenge its,
validity whilst the widow was alive.
A somewhat similar argument is based on the conduct of the
respondent in relation to Civil Suit No. 1117 of 1921 filed
by Masilamani Mudaly, the sister’s son, and the deceased
Govinda Mudaliar in the Madras High Court (Ex. P.16). To
this suit the
636
respondent was impleaded as defendant 7. In this suit the
said plaintiff had challenged the validity of the
arrangement, and asked for appropriate injunctions against
defendant 6 to the suit, Thuggi Kondiah Chetty, Trustee of
Udayavar Koil, and other defendants from dealing with the
property to the prejudice of the reversionary right of the
plaintiff. It is unnecessary to refer to the pleadings in
the said suit or to specify in detail the reliefs claimed.
The only point which is relevant to consider is that the
reversioner had challenged the arrangement in question. The
respondent by his written statement had purported to support
the plea made by the plaintiff, and had added that he was
not personally aware of any attempt on the part of
defendants 2 to 4 to alienate the properties in respect of
their possession and enjoyment. This suit, however, did not
proceed to a trial as it was dismissed for want of
prosecution, and the argument is that since the respondent
had supported the plaintiff in the said suit it was
necessary that he should have got himself transposed as a
plaintiff, when he found that the original plaintiff was
allowing the suit to be dismissed for non-prosecution. In
our opinion, this argument is far-fetched and cannot
possibly sustain the plea of ratification against the
respondent. If the respondent took possession of the
property under the arrangement with the distinct
understanding that the arrangement was to last only during
the lifetime of the widow, we see no justification for the
assumption that he should have carried on Civil Suit No. 11
17 of 1921 or should in fact have challenged the said
arrangement at all.
The last argument urged in support of the plea of
ratification is based on the oral evidence given by the
respondent in the present case. The respondent was asked
about the quarrels between the mother and the widow of the
deceased Mudaliar, and he said that they were living
together and that there were quarrels between them. Then he
was asked as to whether he got the property under the
impugned arrangement, and he said that his grandmother gave
him the house with the Collector’s certificate and told him
that she
637
was going to die soon and so he may take the house. The
respondent also admitted that since the house was thus
delivered to him and to his sister they were in possession
of it and in enjoyment of its income. The respondent then
stated that he was not aware of the document of 1895 until
1916, and that he came to know about the division between
the two widows( only in 1910. It is urged that this
statement should not be believed, and that the reluctance of
the respondent to disclose the truth should lead to the
inference that he knew all about the impugned transaction
and its effect, and that when he took possession of the
property allotted to him under the said transaction he knew
fully well about his rights and he accepted the benefits
with the object of reifying the whole transaction. In our
opinion there is no ,substance in this argument.
In this connection it is relevant to remember that until Act
II of 1929 was passed a sister’s son, like the respondent,
would have had very few chances of becoming an actual
reversioner; he would have come in the list of bandhus; and
so it would be difficult to assume that at the time when the
respondent accepted the gift of the house he knew about his
rights as a possible reversioner. Besides, the benefit
which he obtained under the impugned transaction could also
in substance have been claimed by him under an earlier
arrangement entered into between Govinda Mudaliar and
Madhava Ramanuja Mudaliar on February 7, 1887 (Ex. D-1).
Having regard to the arrangement disclosed by the said
document the benefit given to the respondent and the other
children of the sisters of the deceased Mudaliar may as well
have been based on the said arrangement, and all that the
transactions of 1893 and 1895 did was to give effect to it
(Exs. D-2 and D-5). Besides, as we have already pointed
out, in 1893 the respondent was a minor, and when subsequent
to 1895 he took possession of the property it does not
appear on evidence that he knew that the intention of the
widows was to treat the property as absolute owners and to
convey absolute titles to the respective donees and
transferee under
638
the said transaction. He also could not have known about
his rights as a possible reversioner. Therefore, in our
opinion, the High Court was right in holding that the
appellant had failed to establish his plea of ,ratification
against the respondent. Indeed, to hold otherwise would be
in the words of the Privy Council a quite unwarrantable
proposition ” (1) (p. 87).
That leaves the question of legal necessity to be
considered. The High Court has held that the impugned
transfer cannot be said to have been justified by legal
necessity; and, in our opinion, the finding of the High
Court on this point is obviously right. In dealing with
this question it may be relevant to recall that the widow of
the deceased Mudaliar had obtained letters of administration
to the estate of the deceased on April 26, 1893, and, as
usual, in issuing the letters limitation had been imposed
upon the widow that she could not deal with or transfer the
property in question without the requisite sanction. There
is some force in the argument urged before us by Mr. Sastri
on behalf of the respondent that it was with a view to avoid
the necessity to obtain the requisite sanction that the
widow of the deceased Mudaliar was persuaded by her mother-
in-law to enter into the impugned transaction under the
guise of a family arrangement. The document itself (Ex. D-
5) does not purport to be justified by legal necessity. In
terms it purports to give effect to the original arrangement
of 1893 (Ex. D-2); and if the said arrangement is not valid
as a family arrangement the subsequent transfer would also
be invalid. Besides, out of a total consideration of about
Rs. 10,000/- the amount of Rs. 776/- can be taken to
represent the debts due by the deceased Mudaliar; the rest
of the items of consideration cannot be treated as
constituting a legal necessity at all. The amount of Rs.
558/- was the expense incurred for executing the document;
similarly the amount of Rs. 409/representing the funeral
expense of the deceased Mudaliar, had apparently been spent
by the widow who wanted to reimburse herself and that cannot
be a legal necessity. The other items of consideration do
(1) (1918) L.R. 46 I.A. 72.
639
not even purport to be for legal necessity. Therefore, in
our opinion, the conclusion is inescapable that the impugned
transfer is not justified by legal necessity.
The result is the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.