ORDER
Venkataraman, J.
1. These three writ petitions have been filed seeking a writ of certiorari quashing the Notification dated 28-11-1992 (marked as Annexure ‘C’ in W.P. 37476 of 1992 and as Annexure ‘B’ in W.Ps. 2105 and 2106 of 1993) passed by the 1st respondent.
2. The three petitioners were nominated as members Committee of the Primary Cooperation Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Ltd., Mudhol (hereinafter referred to as the 2nd respondent-Bank) by the 1st respondent in exercise of its power under Section 29 of the Karanataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in supersession of the earlier nominations. The Government Notification dated 19-9-1992 is at Annexure ‘A’. By means of the notification dated 28-11-1992 the 1st respondent has revoked the nomination made under Annexure ‘A’ and has nominated respondents 4 to 6 members of the Committee of the 2nd respondent-Bank.
3. The petitioners have challenged the validity of the notification dated 28-11-1992 mainly on two grounds. It is first contended that the 1st respondent has acted arbitrarily in revoking the nomination of the petitioners within two months and nominating Respondents 3 to 6 by Annexure-A. The 2nd ground urged by the petitioners is that the impugned notification is passed by the 1st respondent at the instance of the 3rd respondent, who is a member of the Legislative Assembly and between whom and the petitioner in W.P. 37476 of 1992, there is some political grudge.
4. The learned Counsel for the petitioners Sri R. L, Patil, during the course of his arguments conceded that the petitioners have no right to the office of the member of the Committee of the 2nd respondent-Bank and that he also does not challenge the notification on the ground that the petitioners were not heard before passing the impugned notification. He also did not dispute that the nominated member of a committee of the 2nd respondent-Bank holds office as such member only during the pleasure of the State Government and that the State Government is competent to revoke the nomination without notifying the member or hearing him. His main contention was that even an order passed by the Government in exercise of its power under Section 29, revoking a nomination made earlier, is open for judicial review and that it can be quashed if it is found to be arbitrary or mala fide. He has contended that in the present case, there is material to show that the 1st respondent has acted arbitrarily without any reason in nominating respondents 4 to 6 and revoking the petitioners’ nomination within a short period of 3 months and that the order is also tainted with mala fides.
5. The petitioners have produced the earlier notifications issued by the Government nominating members after revoking the earlier notifications in support of their contention that the Government has passed orders in exercise of power under Section 29 of the Act in a whimsical menner.
6. By notification dated 12/17-3-1991
(Annexure D) three persons were nominated to the Committee of the 2nd respondent-Bank. Notification dated 6-9-1991 (An-nexure-E) has been issued revoking the earlier notification and nominating respondent-6 and two others. Notification dated 6-5-1992 (Annexure-F) has been issued revoking the earlier nomination and nominating the petitioner in W.P. 37476 of 1992 and two others. Revoking this nomination and nominating respondents 4 and 6 a notification dated 6-5-1992 (Annexure-G) has been issued. On 19-9-1992 revoking the nominations of Respondents 4 and 6 and nominating the three petitioners, Annexure ‘A’ notification is issued. Thereafter on 28-11-1992 the impugn-ed notification Annexure ‘C’ is issued again nominating respondents 4 to 6.
7. Pointing the frequency with which the Government had nominated members after revoking the earlier notifications and re-nominating the same members whose earlier nominations had been revoked, the learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that this clearly demonstrates that the nominations are made and revoked without any reason and that this amounts to arbitrary exercise of the power by the State. He cited the following authorities to contend that where the Government exercises its power without reason, such action would be arbitrary and is liable to be struck down : (1) S. C. Jaisinghani v. Union of India, , (2) Ramanna Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India, , (3) M/s. Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy etc. v. The State of Jammu and Kashmir, , (4) Asia Foundations & Constructions Ltd., Bombay v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1986 Guj 185 and (5) Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi F,tc. v. State of U.P., .
Jaisinghani’s case deals with service conditions of Income-tax Officers and in the context of the facts of that case the Supreme Court has observed that the absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule of law upon which our whole constitutional system is based; that in a system governed by rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon executive authorities, must be continued within clearly defined limits; that if a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule it is unpredictable and such a decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the rule of law.
In Ramanna’s case the Supreme Court was dealing with a case where a tender had been accepted from a person who did not fulfill the requisite qualifications. In that case the Court has held that as a necessary corollary from the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 that though the State is entitled to refuse to enter into such relationship with any one, yet if it does so, it cannot arbitrarily choose any person it likes for enterting into such relationship and discriminate between persons similarly circumstanced, but it must act in conformity with some standard or principle which meets the test of reasonableness and non-discrimination and any departure from such standard or principle would be invalid unless it can be supported or justified on some rational and non-discriminatory ground.
In Kasturi Lal Lakshmi’s case, the Supreme Court has held that the discretion of Government in granting largess is not unlimited and that the Government action must satisfy test of reasonableness and public interest.
In Asia Foundations’ case, the question that had arisen for consideration was with regard to the power of judicial review of the administrative action in the matter of pre-qualification of the prospective bidders of the Controlling Authority constituted under the Award of the Inter-State River Dispute Tribunal, and the consequential decision of such authority disqualifying the petitioners for being entitled to receive tender documents. Dealing with that question the High Court has held that the rule of law which is implicit in Article 14 postulates that the State action must not be arbitrary and founded on some rational and relevant principle which should not be discriminatory and that the State should not allow itself to be guided by extraneous or irrelevant consideration.
In Shrilekha Vidyarthi’s case the Supreme Court was dealing with an order of the State Government removing all the District Government Counsel en-bloc. The authority of the State to do so in the light of the provisions of Legal Remembrancer’s Manual, was considered by the Supreme Court. The learned Counsel for the petitioners strongly relied on the following passages in the above decision :
“35. It is now too well settled that every State action, in order to survive, must not be susceptible to the vice of arbitrariness which is the crux of Art. 14 of the Constitution and basic to the rule of law, the system which governs us. Arbitrariness is the very negation of the rule of law. Satisfaction of this basic test in every State action is sine qua non to its validity and in this respect, the State cannot claim comparison with a private individual even in the field of contract. This distinction between the State and a private individual in the field of contract has to be borne in the mind.
36. The meaning and true import of arbitrariness is more easily visualized than precisely stated or defined. The question, whether an impugned act is arbitrary or not, is ultimately to be answered on the facts and in the circumstances of a given case. An obvious test to apply is to see whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the im-pungned act and if so, does it satisfy the test of reasonableness. Where a mode is prescribed for doing an act and there is no impediment in following that procedure, performance of the act otherwise and in a manner which does not disclose any discernible principle which is reasonable, may itself attract the vice of arbitrariness. Every State action must be informed by reason and it follows that an act uninformed by reason, is arbitrary. Rule of law contemplates governance by laws and not by humour, whims or caprices of the men to whom the governance is entrusted for the time being. It is true that ‘be you ever so high, the laws are above you’. This is what men in power must remember, always.”
8. In none of the above rulings scope of the power of the Government to appoint or nominate persons to certain offices at its pleasure which is conferred on it by Legislature had arisen for consideration. This question came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in B. S. Siddappa v. State, of Karnataka, 1979 (2) Kant LJ 238. In that case the petitioner had been appointed as Chairman, Karnataka Improvement Board Act, a statutory Board at pleasure of the Government and he was also removed at pleasure. The order of removal was challenged on the ground that it was arbitrary and smacked of political over tones.
This Court referred to the decision in Malloch v. Aberdeen Corporation, 1971 (2) All ER 1278 wherein it had been held that acting at pleasure means that there is no obligation to formulate reasons and held that removal at pleasure is quite distinct from removal for cause and that in the former case there is no obligation to give reasons. In effect where the removal is made at pleasure that action cannot be assailed on the ground that it is arbitrary.
9. In Anjuman-E-Islam v. Karnataka Board of Wakfs, another Bench of this Court has held that doctrine of pleasure is an uncontrolled one unless subject to some other statutory provision.
10. In S. Govindappa v. Chief Secretary to Government of Karnataka, 1992 (2) Kant LJ 296 the questions as to whether an order of termination in exercise of the power of pleasure without stating any reason would be arbitrary and hence violative of Article 14 and as to whether there is scope for judicial review in a case of power exercised under doctrine of pleasure, came up for consideration. In that case the petitioner had strongly relied on the decision in Shrilekha Vidyarth’s case to contend that even where an order is passed in exercise of the pleasure power, there should be reasons and that if there are no reasons for that order, it would be violative of Article 14 as being arbitrary. In that case the Advocate General had contended that the scope of judicial review gets reduced having due regard to the statutory provision concerned and in particular in a case where the tenure of office is subject to the pleasure of the appointing authority. The Court after considering the doctum laid down in Shrilekha Vidyarthi’s case and the submission of the Advocate General has held as hereunder :
“8. After giving careful consideration to the argument addressed by the learned counsel for the appellant relying on the ratio of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Kumari Shrilekha’s case, and the arguments of the learned Advocate General to the effect that the ratio of the said decision is distinguishable and not apposite to the case of termination of tenure of office of a person appointed to an office terminable at pleasure, we are inclined to agree with the argument advanced by the learned Advocate General. It may be that even in the case of the exercise of power under doctrine of pleasure, there would be scope for judicial review if it is alleged and proved in a given case that the power was exercised mala fide, for, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab, , if it is found that a public functionary in exercise of an administrative/ statutory power was actuated by mala fides, such action would be vitiated. In other words, such an action is no action at all in the eye of law…..”
11. In view of the above decisions of this Court, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that even in a case where the Government acts in exercise of the power of pleasure conferred on it by Statute and revokes the nomination or makes a fresh nomination it should be supported by reasons and if not the act would be arbitrary, cannot be sustained.
12. The learned Counsel for the petitioners urged that if it was a case of a single order passed by the Government in exercise of the power under Section 29 of the Act, then it might not have been possible to challenge it on the ground of arbitrariness and that as in this case, a series of orders have been passed by the Government at short intervals, it is open to the Court to strike down the orders on the ground that they are arbitrary.
13. First of all, it is seen that each nomination is made not for any particular period but only till further orders. That apart, the validity of the other orders passed by the Government has not been questioned in these writ petitions. The petitioners have challenged only the order Annexure-C on the ground that it is arbitrary. In fact the petitioners themselves are relying on one of the earlier orders marked as Annexure-A to contend that they are entitled to continue as members of the Committee of the 2nd respondent-Bank. As such we are not required to go into the question whether there was any reason for passing the earlier orders. The impugned notification cannot be invalidated merely because the State Government had exercised its power under Section 29 of the Act at short intervals.
14. In Om Narain Agarwal v. Nagar Palika, Shahjahanpur, the pleasure doctrine came up for consideration before the Supreme Court. In that case two women members had been nominated on the pleasure and subjective satisfaction of the State Government. The Supreme Court has made the following observations on the pleasure doctrine at page 1263 :
“…..The initial nomination of the two women members itself depended on the pleasure and subjective satisfaction of the State Government. If such appointments made initially by nomination are based on political considerations, there can be no violation of any provision of the Constitution in case the Legislature authorised the State Government to terminate such appointment at its pleasure and to nominate new members in their place. The nominated members do not have the will or authority of any Presidents of the Municipal Board behind them as may be present in the case of an elected member. In case of an elected member, the Legislature has provided the grounds in Section 40 of the Act under which the members could be removed. But so far as the nominated members are concerned, the Legislature in its widsom has provided that they shall hold office during the pleasure of the Government. It has not been argued from the side of the respondents that the Legislature had no such power to legislate the fourth proviso. The attack is based on Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution.
II. In our view, such provision neither offends any Article of the Constitution nor the same is against any public polify or democratic norms enshrined in the Constitution. There is also no question of any violation of principles of natural justice in not affording any opportunity to the nominated members before their removal nor the removal under the pleasure doctrine contained in the fourth proviso to Section 9 of the Act puts any sligma on the performance or character of the nominated members. It is done purely on political considerations.”
The above observations of the Supreme Court show that these nominations to Banks, Societies or such other institutions are made purely on political considerations and on the subjective satisfaction of the Government. It is not necessary for the Government to give any reasons for such nominations or revocation of nominations. In the present case, the learned Government Advocate has made available to the Court the file concerned. It is seen that the 6th respondent had been nominated by the notification dated 6-9-1991. On 6-5-1992 that notification was revoked and the petitioner in W.P. 37476/92 and two others were nominated. On 20-6-1992 the respondents 4 to 6 were nominated and the nominations of the petitioner in W.P. 37476/92 was revoked. Again the petitioners got that nomination revoked and an order nominating them was passed on 19-5-1992. Subsequently the petitioners’ nomination was revoked and the nomination of respondents 4 to 6 was again made. It is clear that all these nominations have been made for political considerations. The petitioners have alleged that the impugned notification has been issued at the instance of the 3rd respondent, who is a member of the Legislative Assembly. All the respondents deny that allegation. Their case is that because their nomination under Annexure ‘G’ dated 20-6-1992 which had been challenged before the High Court was upheld by the High Court on 26th August, 1992 the Government on being made aware of that judgment issued annexure ‘C’ renominating them as the members. The records produced by the Government Advocate would show that orders for nominating the respondents 4 to 6 were made when a copy of the judgment of this High Court in W.P. 20420/92 was produced along with a letter by the 3rd respondent. It is seen that the petitioners had got themselves nominated by revoking the nomination of respondents 4 to 6 purely on political considerations. Such being the case it cannot lie in their mouth to challenge the nomination of respondents 4 to 6 which was made subsequently on the ground that it is arbitrary or it is made for political considerations.
15. The learned Counsel for the petitioners drew our attention to the observation made by this Court in Govindappa’s case to the effect that even in the case of exercise of power under doc trine of pleasure there would be scope for judicial review if it is alleged and proved in a given case that the power was exercised mala fide and contended that in the present case the notification is issued mala fide at the instance of the 3rd respondent. The only allegation in the writ petitions is that the impugned notification is issued at the instance of the 3rd respondent. No mala fides are alleged against the Government. There is a vague allegation that there is grudge between the petitioners in W.P. 37476/92 and the 3rd respondent on political grounds. The alleged illwill between the petitioners and the 3rd respondent is not clearly spelt out. The 3rd respondent has denied this allegation, There is no material to show that the 3rd respondent has got the notification issued for mala fide reasons. From the records it would appear that the main ground on which the respondents 4 to 6 were sought to be renominated was because of the judgment of this Court upholding their nomination which had been made earlier. On the material on record, we cannot hold that the impugned notification is vitiated by mala fides.
16. After considering the material on record and the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners, we do not find any merit to these writ petitions. Hence these writ petitions are dismissed.
16. Petition dismissed.