JUDGMENT
Tapen Sen, J.
1. The petitioner (M/s. Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Limited) has filed the instant writ application challenging the Award dated 3.1.2000 (pronounced on 9.9.2000) in Reference Case No. 7 of 1991 (Annexure 1) which has been passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur, whereby and where-under, he held that the correct date of birth of the concerned workman is 1.3.1937 and, therefore, this termination by way of superannuation was wrong and unjustified. He, accordingly, set aside the said Award and directed the management to pay all back wages together with consequential benefits treating him to be in service till 28.2.1997.
2. The case, briefly stated, is that the concerned workman was employed from 28.2.1961 as a Welder in the Automobile Division of the Company and at the time of his employment, he had stated and declared his date of birth as 1.3.1937. According to him, he was sent for medical check up before joining and the Chief Medical Officer examined him on 25.2.1961 and estimated his date of birth as 24 years. The concerned workman also made out a case that at the time of filing up of his personal data in the form prescribed in the year 1962, he had produced his School Leaving Certificate and had declared his date of birth as 1.3.1937. According to him, his superannuation, therefore, should have been after he attained the age of 60 years as per the certified standing order and, accordingly, he should have been superannuated on 28.2.1997. His further case was that for the first time by letter dated 9/10.2.1988 he was informed that he was going to be 60 years of age and would, accordingly, superannuate on and from 24.2.1989. He protested and stated that there is some manipulation and alteration in his service book and that his superannuation was illegal, arbitrary etc.
3. Mr. V.P. Singh, learned Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioner has argued and has attacked the impugned Award (Annexure 1) by submitting that what would be the correct date of birth of a person could not have been a subject matter of an industrial dispute. Moreover the Union could not have espoused the cause because he was not even their member. He has further submitted that the demand that was raised on 20.2.1989 itself had made a request that the concerned workman should be allowed to be in service till 28.2.1996 but the award allowed him to remain in service for one more year i.e. till 28.2.1997 and, therefore, to that extent, the award is mechanical. In support of his contention that such a dispute could not have been a subject matter of an industrial dispute, Mr. V.P. Singh has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of The Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. K.S. Wadke and Ors., AIR 1975 SC 2238. According to him. Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) defines “industrial dispute” which means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any persons.
4. According to him, a declaration of a correct date of birth is clearly out of the purview of industrial adjudication and it could only have formed the subject matter of any other forum including taking recourse to the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, but definitely not under the provisions as provided under Section 10 of the Act. It is in that context that Mr. V.P. Singh has relied upon the aforementioned judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and submits that clear guidelines have been given by the said Apex Court as to what would be and/or would not be industrial disputes. Since the dispute was not an industrial dispute, therefore, the only remedy for the workman lay before the civil Court. He further submits that superannuation is a natural phenomenon and it takes effect when the concerned person reaches a particular age by efflux of time. Consequently, after having reached the age of superannuation, the concerned workman/concerned person cannot turn around and create a dispute with regard to his superannuation or create a controversy by terming the same to be illegal or arbitrary.
5. In the backdrop of the rival contentions of the parties and their respective submissions, the only relevant document which is necessary to be taken into consideration is Ext. M/1 which has been dealt with in Paragraphs 19 and 20 of the award and which is the Employment-cum-Medical Card.
6. Before dealing with the same, it is to be borne in mind that it is the admitted case of the parties that at the time of appointment, the concerned workman had given a declaration in respect of his age and this was duly entered upon in the aforementioned Employment-cum-Medical Card. While the workman declared his age to be 24 years as on 28.2.1961 (meaning thereby the date of birth is 24.2.1937) the management on the other hand, has pleaded that he declared himself to be 32 years on that day (meaning thereby, his date of birth is 24.2.1929). However, from Paragraph 19 of the award, it appears that while examining the aforementioned Ext. M/1, the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur found the following details thereon :–
(A) In column ‘K’, some forgery had been committed by erasing the previous writings;
(B) Upon perusal of Ext. M/1, it was clear that on 24.2.1961, the workman had stated his age to be 24 years; and
(C) The Chief Medical Officer had estimated his age as 25 years as on 28.2.1961. The figure “5” had been erased (though it was still visible) and the figure “2” had been prefixed by the figure “3V
7. In the background of the aforesaid examination of that document, the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the opinion with regard to the medical report in respect of Column ‘K’ regarding estimated age could not be safely relied upon. However, in Paragraph 20 while examining the said Ext. M/1, he has definitely come to a finding that it is clear that on 24.2.1961 the workman had declared his age to be 24 years. That part of Ext. M/1 had not been tampered with.
8. In the background of tampering, the argument of Mr. V.P. Singh to the effect that such a dispute was not an industrial dispute, cannot be accepted. To add to this is the own evidence of the Management Witness No. 7, namely, G. Appa Rao, who has stated in paragraph 8 of his cross-examination that no copy of the medical report is ever given to any workman. In other words, this medical report is always in the custody of the management. If, during the custody of the management, such an Important piece of evidence gets tampered with and which acts to the prejudice of a person concerned and if that person disputes it, then such a dispute will surely be an industrial dispute or a difference between the employer and the workman which is connected with his employment.
9. The other argument in relation to superannuation being a natural phenomenon would certainly have held good if this vitally important document was as clean as a translucent sheet of class. Unfortunately it lay tampered and/or mutilated during the custody of the management themselves. When, therefore, his declaration of 24 years as 24.2.196,1 was changed and made to appear as 32 years as on that date, it certainly became a dispute concerning his employment because by reason of the alterations made, the management desired his ouster much prior to the date on which the natural phenomenon of superannuation would have taken effect.
10. In that view of the matter, this Court rejects the argument of Mr. V,P. Singh, learned Senior Advocate to the effect that the dispute itself was not maintainable and that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter.
11. The other argument to the effect that the Labour Court has granted the petitioner a year more contrary to the demand cannot also be accepted. It is true that while raising the demand, the General Secretary of the Engineering Mazdoor Panchayat demanded that the concerned workman should be allowed to be in service till 28.2.1996, but as against the aforementioned demand, the Labour Court has directed the management to treat him to be in service till 28.2.1997.
12. In the opinion of this Court, the Labour Court has neither acted mechanically nor has acted arbitrarily nor is there any perversity with the award. It is a well known concept of law which now stands fortified by the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills v. Ex. Workman, AIR 1967 SC 469, that in order to find out the exact nature of dispute, the Labour Court/Tribunal must look to the pleadings of the parties because otherwise; since the reference is so cryptic in nature, that it is impossible to cull out the various points about which the parties are at variance with each other. Such is the proposition enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Paragraph 18 of the judgment referred to
above. That being the position, the Tribunal was absolutely justified in making the concerned workman entitled to remain in service till 28.2.1997 after he took into consideration his declaration to be 24 years of age as on 24.2.1961. If that position stared on the face of the Tribunal from Ext. M/1 (see Paragraph 20 of the award), then syllogistically, if the figure “24” is subtracted from “1961” then on mathematical calculation, the result is “1937”. Add 60 years to 1937 and again, mathematically, the figure “1997” would be reached.
13. For the foregoing reasons, therefore, this Court is of the opinion that neither there is any perversity nor any illegality in the impugned award. Moreover, the writ Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India under the scope bf judicial review, will not substitute its judgment for an award especially when the same is rendered on appreciation of facts and evidences. Since this Court has held that there is no perversity nor any illegality in the award, this Court finds no reason to interfere with the same.
14. In the result, this writ application
has no merit. It is, accordingly, dismissed.
However, there shall be no order as to
costs.