JUDGMENT
S.S. Sandhawalia, C.J.
1. The two questions of law, referred by the Commercial Taxes Tribunal, Bihar, Patna, which fall for consideration by the Full Bench, have been formulated in the following terms :
I. Whether the services rendered at the petitioner’s canteen, in compliance of the provisions of the Factories Act and the Mines Act, involved any element of sale?
II. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the petitioner was a dealer in respect of the canteen sale and liable to sales tax ?
2. Perhaps, at the very outset it may be noticed that this reference to the larger Bench has been necessitated by a pointed doubt about the correctness of the ratio of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Bihar Burn and Company Ltd. (Tax Case No. 58 of 1966 decided on 20th December, 1967), as also in Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited State of Orissa [1975] 35 STC 195.
3. The Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited was incorporated by its Memorandum and Articles to carry on business in iron and steel and is admittedly engaged in the manufacture of iron and steel products at its works at Jamshedpur, which is registered under the Factories Act. The petitioner-company also owns, amongst others, a mine at Noamundi, which is registered, under the Mines Act. In compliance with the statutory obligations under the Factories Act and also under the Mines Act the petitioner-company maintains, for the factory at Jamshedpur and for the Noamundi mines, canteens, both at Jamshedpur and Noamundi, for the facility of the concerned employees. These canteens are run on no profit no loss basis and indeed, with subsidies required to be provided under the law, thus eliminating any chance or consideration of making any profit therefrom.
4. The Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Jamshedpur, however, assessed sales tax on the sale proceeds of the aforesaid canteens for the assessment year 1962-63 by an order dated the 27th of September, 1966. The petitioner-company appealed, but the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Bihar, Patna, by his order dated the 29th January, 1975, rejected the petitioner’s appeal, with regard to the canteen sales. The petitioner then preferred a revision before the Commercial Taxes Tribunal, Bihar (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal), which also met the same fate by its order dated the 21st of March, 1978. Thereafter, having failed to secure a reference of certain questions of law from the Tribunal, the petitioner approached this Court for a mandamus to state a case and refer certain questions of law for its decision. The prayer of the assessee-petitioner was accepted by this Court, and the Tribunal was directed to state the case under Section 33 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and refer the aforesaid two questions of law for its opinion.
5. This case originally came up before a Division Bench, and the learned counsel for the assessee-petitioner pointedly challenged the correctness of the ratio in Commissioner of Commercial Taxes Burn and Company Limited (Tax Case No. 58 of 1966 decided on 20th December, 1967-Patna High Court) and Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. State of Orissa [1975] 35 STC 195, on the basis of a host of authorities taking a contrary view. The learned Judges, constituting the Division Bench, apparently finding merit in the said challenge, have referred the case for consideration by a larger Bench.
6. Before coming to the core of the somewhat controversial issues involved in question No. II, it seems apt to clear the decks of the relatively simpler problem under the first question. Mr. K. D. Chatterjee, learned counsel for the petitioner, very fairly did not seriously press this issue at all. It, therefore, suffices to record that earlier there did exist some precedential controversy on the point, whether a compulsory sale mandated by statute adequately involved an element of sale and was consequently excisable to tax or not. This seems to be now finally settled by a seven-Judge Bench in Vishnu Agencies (Private) Limited Commercial Tax Officer AIR 1978 SC 449. Therein, after an admirably remarkable discussion of principle and precedent, it was concluded as under :
This resume of cases, long as it is, may yet bear highlighting the true principle underlying the decisions of this Court which have taken the view that a transaction which is effected in compliance with the obligatory terms of a statute may nevertheless be a sale in the eye of a law.
And, finally-
The conclusion which therefore emerges is that the transactions between the appellant, Messrs. Vishnu Agencies (Private) Ltd., and the allottees are sales within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941. For the same reasons, transactions between the growers and procuring agents as also those between the rice millers on the one hand and the wholesalers or retailers on the other are sales within the meaning of Section 2(n) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957. The turnover is accordingly exigible to sales tax or purchase tax as the case may be.
7. In view of the above, the answer to question No. I must now be rendered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
8. That, however, does not in any way resolve the main issue, because the battle lines were joined primarily around question No. II, Mr. Chatterjee had contended with force and ability that despite the answer to question No. I, in order to come within the ambit of a dealer, there must first be a business, and yet again one that is run with the profit-motive or at least have an element of commercial character. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner-company that both these basic elements being lacking, the liability of sales tax could not be foisted under the statute, as it stood at the time of the assessment. On behalf of the respondents, this stand was sought to be repulsed on every flank.
9. In order to appraise the rival stand and contentions, it must be noticed at the very threshold that the issue herein has to be examined in the light of the definition in Section 2(f) of the Act, as it stood unamended in the year 1962-63. It is common ground that subsequently, the Legislature made amendments in the statute, in order to effectuate its purpose of fictionally extending the concept of business irrespective of the profit-motive.’ Different considerations would obviously apply in the light of the aforesaid amendments, but, as I have already pointed out, we are called upon to consider the matter at the pre-amendment stage and de hors the subsequent changes in the law. Since some argument was also raised before us on the basis of the definition of “dealer” under Section 2(c) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 it is apt to quote the relevant provisions of Section 2(f) of the 1959 Act and Section 2(c) of the 1947 Act for facility of comparison :
1959 Act 1947 Act "(f) 'dealer' means any person "(c) 'dealer' means any person who sells any goods whether for com- who carries on the business of selling mission, remuneration or otherwise or supplying goods in Bihar, whether and includes any undivided Hindu for commission, remuneration or family, firm, company or corporation, otherwise and includes any firm or any department of Government, and a Hindu joint family and any society, any society, club or association which club or association which sells or sells goods to its members : supplies goods to its members; Explanation.-(1) A factor, a broker, Explanation.-The manager or a commission agent, a del credere agent, agent of a dealer who resides outside an auctioneer or any other mercantile Bihar and who carries on the business agent, by whatever name called and of selling or supplying goods in whether of the same description as Bihar shall, in respect of such hereinbefore mentioned or not, who business, be deemed to be a dealer sells goods, as aforesaid, shall be for the purposes of this Act." deemed to be a dealer for the purpose of this Act. (2) The manager or agent of a dealer who resides outside Bihar and who sells goods in Bihar shall, in respect of such business, be deemed to be a dealer for the purpose of this Act."
10. Now it seems to follow from the ordinary dictionary meaning of the word “dealer” as also from the plain language of Section 2(f) of the Act that there must be some sustained business activity in which such a seller engages himself. Plainly enough, a person does not become a dealer by an isolated transaction of sale, barring of course the exception, where, by a legal fiction, the statute may declare him to be so. On larger principle, the concept of being a dealer cannot be divorced from a course of business, trade or some commercial activity or some activity of a commercial character. In this context one must notice the plausible submission of Mr. Chatterjee, when he pointed out that the law in this field now does not make any sharp distinction between levy of sale and purchase tax. If, therefore, an isolated transaction (in the absence of any sustained business activity) was to bring one within the ambit of a “dealer” then every ordinary purchaser of goods, even for home consumption like food, clothings, etc., would come within the ambit of a dealer and thus exigible to purchase tax. This would obviously lead to anomalous and absurd results and any construction which tends to such a result must, therefore, be avoided. Therefore, on principle and the language of Section 2(f), it seems to follow that in order to be a “dealer” the person must be engaged in a business or a sustained commercial activity. This view seems to be equally well-supported by authoritative precedent. In Director of Supplies and Disposals, Calcutta v. Member, Board of Revenue, West Ben gal [1967] 20 STC 398 (SC) it was assumed to be axiomatic in the following words :
As pointed out by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Abdul Bakshi and Brothers [1964] 15 STC 644 (SC) a person to be a dealer must be engaged in the business of buying or selling or supplying goods.
Later, in Joint Director of Food, Visakhapatnam v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1976] 38 STC 329 (SC) Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for the Court observed :
We may hasten to mention that the ordinary concept of business has the element of gain or profit, whose absence negatives the character of the activity as business in Section 2(b) of the Central Act. A person becomes a dealer only if he carries on business and the Central Government can be designated as ‘dealer’ only if there is profit-motive.
11. Once it is held that to be a “dealer” one must be engaged in a business or sustained commercial activity, what next falls for consideration is the true premise which underlies a business or commercial activity. It seems well-settled that barring statutory exceptions or a legal fiction, any business necessarily connotes a profit-motive. That one may not achieve that purpose and object and may actually run into loss is not the determining factor. But the profit-motive and activity for gain seems to lie at the heart of the concept of business itself. The course of business must be a sustained activity, like a trade, or must have an element commercial in character. Though this is manifest on principle, it seems equally well-settled by binding authority. In State of Gujarat v. Raipur Manufacturing Company Ltd. [1967] 19 STC 1 (SC), J. C. Shah, J., speaking for the Court, observed :
The expression ‘business’ though extensively used in taxing statutes, is a word of indefinite import. In taxing statutes, it is used in the sense of an occupation, or profession which occupies the time, attention and labour of a person, normally with the object of making profit. To regard an activity as business there must be a course of dealings, either actually continued or contemplated to be continued with a profit-motive, and not for sport or pleasure. Whether a person carries on business in a particular commodity must depend upon the volume, frequency, continuity and regularity of transactions of purchase and sale in a class of goods and the transactions must ordinarily be entered into with a profit-motive. By the use of the expression ‘profit-motive’ it is not intended that profit must in fact be earned. Nor does the expression cover a mere desire to make some monetary gain out of a transaction or even a series of transactions. It predicates a motive which pervades the whole series of transactions effected by the person in the course of his activity. In actual practice, the profit-motive may be easily discernible in some transactions: in others it would have to be inferred from a review of the circumstances, attendant upon the transaction.
The aforesaid enunciation, which derives its source from earlier authorities, has been subsequently consistently followed and has not been departed from.
12. Now, once the basic concepts are settled that in order to be a “dealer” the person must be engaged in a business and such business must be for a profit-motive, the core question is, whether the Tata Iron and Steel Company is a dealer in the business of running canteens as a seller or purveyor of foodstuffs?
13. In order to answer the aforesaid question, three basically -admitted premises call for pointed notice. Firstly, Section 46 of the Factories Act, 1948 and the Bihar Factories Rules framed thereunder make it obligatory for the petitioner-company (which, admittedly, employs more than 250 workers), to provide and maintain a canteen for the use of its workers. The statute does not leave any option to the petitioner-company to run the canteens and indeed there are penal provisions for enforcing this obligation. Similarly, under the corresponding provisions of the Mines Act, 1952 and the Rules framed thereunder, with regard to the mines run by the petitioner-company, it is similarly obligatory to maintain a canteen for the mine workers. It is thus plain that the company is not voluntarily and of its own volition engaging in the business of sale of foodstuffs to its workers, but is doing so by the strict mandate of the law.
14. Secondly, it is the common case that these canteens are not being run with any profit-motive or gain. Indeed, the statutory provisions make it obligatory that such canteens must be provided on a non-profit basis. Far from making a profit, the law further requires the subsidising of those canteens and the firm averments on this point are that consequently, in the end, the canteens are and would inevitably run on a loss. The profit-motive herein is thus totally absent.
15. Thirdly, it calls for somewhat pointed notice that the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the company do not even remotely authorise it to indulge in the business of running canteens or to be a purveyor of foodstuffs. That being so, it is plain that in a way, the company is prohibited and barred from carrying on this activity as its business. It is well-settled ever since The Ashbury Railway Carnage and Iron Company (Limited) v. Riche 33 LT 451 that if the purpose and object does not find a place in the Memorandum and Articles of Association of a company, then, even the consent of the shareholders cannot legitimise the carrying on of a business not authorised by its charter.
The Tribunal in its revisional order itself categorically rejected the farfetched stand of the respondent-State that the Memorandum and Articles of Association authorised or enjoined such a business in the following words :
In putting such a construction on this provision of the Memorandum of Association, I am inclined to think, he is trying to stretch its scope a little too wide. The Memorandum, read as a whole, can hardly admit of such interpretation on this point. So, on the facts as they stand, their running of the canteens has to be taken as being in compliance of the aforesaid statutory requirements.
Once it is so held, it is incongruous to say that a business, in terms prohibited by the Memorandum and Articles, and in any case not authorised by it, would become the business of a company for the purpose of making it a dealer therefor. To discharge a statutory obligation or a binding mandate of the law is not a business. It is only a compliance with the law in deference to the sanction provided for its infraction. Therefore, conforming to the statutory obligation does not make the subject or the complier, as if he is voluntarily entering or carrying on such a business. Indeed, he is merely bowing down to the dictates of the law.
16. On the aforesaid three premises what would call for notice is that to come within the ambit of Section 2(f) of the Act, one must be obviously a dealer in that particular field of business. Merely because of the compulsion or mandate of the law, a limited company is obliged to undertake an activity admittedly on a non-profit basis (and on a loss) and indeed even beyond the scope of the authorisation under its Memorandum and Articles of Association, would not make such a company a dealer in such compelled activity. To give a homely example in the present case, the Tata Iron and Steel Company is, of course, a dealer in the business of steel and iron, but, it would not become a dealer in the business of purveying foodstuffs, merely because the law enjoins it to run a canteen for its employees and it is complying with the statutory provisions. Consequently, on principle and the language of the statute, it seems to follow that the petitioner-company is not carrying on the bxisiness of running canteens and therefore, it cannot possibly be a dealer in such a business within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Act.
17. Now, as this issue appears to me as covered by the binding precedent of the final Court, it seems unnecessary to advert to the numerous judgments of other High Courts. Specifically, it may be noticed that with regard to canteen’s case there are two decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Thirumagal Mills Limited [1972] 29 STC 290 (SC), a spinning mill had utilised amounts by sale of articles of food in its canteen, which was run for its employees as also of foodgrains and groceries sold in the fair-price shop. The High Court found that the assessee-company was not carrying on business of running canteens or fair-price shops, and on appeal by the State of Tamil Nadu, their Lordships affirmed the judgment of the High Court on the basis of the unamended provisions of Section 2(d) and 2(g) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, to hold that the assessees were not liable to sales tax. Again, in State of Tamil Nadu v. Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Limited [1973] 31 STC 426 (SC), the question was the levy of sales tax with regard to the supply of tea and edibles to the workmen of the company for a canteen established by it under the Factories Act. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s view that such tax was not leviable on the unamended provisions of the Madras General Sales Tax Act. It is plain that these cases are on all fours with regard to the issues before us. By way of very close analogy, a reference may also be instructively made to State of Gujarat v. Vivekanand Mills [1967] 19 STC 103 (SC), State of Gujarat v. Raipur Manufacturing Company Ltd. [1967] 19 STC 1 (SC) and Director of Supplies and Disposals v. Member, Board of Revenue, West Bengal [1967] 20 STC 398 (SC).
18. One must now turn to the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Bihar v. Burn and Company Limited (Tax Case No. 58 of 1966 decided on 20th December, 1967) which had necessitated this reference to the Full Bench. A perusal of the brief judgment makes it plain that the issue before us was not at all presented from its various angles before the Bench. Though the question, undoubtedly, was with regard to the canteen sales maintained by Messrs? Burn and Company Limited, the only question raised and considered was, whether a compulsory sale is exigible to tax. It bears repetition that at that stage, in 1967, there seemed to be some controversy on this aspect. Relying on the then recent judgment in Indian Steel and Wire Products Limited v. State of Madras AIR 1968 SC 478 it was held that the compulsory sale amounted to sale and thereafter it was summarily concluded that canteen sales would be exigible to tax. Though, in fairness, it must be noticed that the real ratio of the case that compulsory sales have an element of sale is unexceptionable, in view of the Vishnu Agencies (Private) Limited’s case AIR 1978 SC 449 the conclusion that canteen sales run under the obligations of Section 46 of the Factories Act are necessarily taxable is plainly untenable. For the detailed reasons above, if Burn and Company’s case (Tax Case No. 58 of 1966 decided on 20th December, 1967-Patna High Court) is construed as a warrant for its consequential result, and as an authority for the proposition that sales in running of compulsory canteens are liable to sales tax on the unamended provisions of Section 2(f) of the Act, then the same is not good law and the judgment is hereby overruled.
19. In fairness to Mr. Rameshwar Prasad, one must notice his pointed reliance on Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited v. State of Orissa [1975] 35 STC 195. That judgment undoubtedly goes to his aid and as the name of the case indicates, pertains to the present petitioner-company itself. However, with the greatest respects to the learned Judges, I am unable to subscribe to the view they have arrived at and with deference, record a note of dissent therefrom. It is evident from paragraph 12 of the report itself that their view runs counter to the weight of precedent within the country and they chose to dissent from as many as 9 judgments of the Madras, Mysore and Calcutta High Courts. The judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Thirumagal Mills Limited [1972] 29 STC 290 (SC) was sought to be distinguished, but, apparently, judgments in State of Tamil Nadu v. Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Limited [1973] 31 STC 426 (SC), State of Gujarat v. Vivekanand Mills [1967] 19 STC 103 (SC) and Director of Supplies and Disposals v. Member, Board of Revenue, West Bengal [1967] 20 STC 398 (SC) were not brought to their Lordships’ notice. The view thus seems to run counter to those binding precedents of the Supreme Court.
20. This apart, with respect, I am unable to agree with what has been said more or less as a dictum without detailed reasonings that the running of canteen is an integral part of the business of mining and quarrying. It deserves recalling that Rule 64 of the Mines Rules requires the running of a canteen in a mine only wherein more than 250 persons are ordinarily employed and that also if the Chief Inspector of Factories or an Inspector of Factories so requires. It is thus plain that in mines employing less than 250 persons, and even in cases where the Chief Inspector or an Inspector of Factories does not so require, there is no obligation to provide a canteen. Can it be said that in such a case, the business of mining and quarrying cannot be carried on without a canteen provided by the employer ? It is elementary that an integral part is one, which, if taken away, would jeopardise the whole.. Could it possibly be said that the running of a canteen installed for mining workers or for those of a steel mill, if stopped entirely would halt the working of the steel mill or the mining operations ? The answer would be plainly in the negative. It is common ground that canteens are being run under a statutory mandate and obligation and not as an integral part of the business. If it was so, there would, perhaps, be no need for any statutory mandate. With deep deference, I am unable to agree that running of canteen is an integral part of the steel mill process or of mining and quarrying. Apart from principle, the view of the Orissa High Court would tend to run counter to the basic grist of the long line of precedent of the final Court, which have held that the mere beneficient amenity of a canteen or a fair-price shop is not an integral part of the business of the concern which is obliged to run them under the statute, and therefore, they are not “dealers” with regard to such sales in canteens and fair-price shops, and consequently, not exigible to sales tax.
21. The argument of Mr. Prasad, rested on the Orissa judgment, that herein also the canteens be treated as the integral part of the business of running the steel mills as also of the mines, must, therefore, fail and is hereby rejected.
22. In this very context, the reliance of Mr. Prasad on Shri Narakesari Prakashan Limited v. Employees’ State Insurance Corporation AIR 1984 SC 1916 seems to be equally vain. Therein, an observation appears that the editorial and administrative staff of a printing press, publishing a newspaper, virtually constituted an integral part of the newspaper press and they were employed in connection with the work done at the printing press. Clearly enough, the relationship of the editorial and administrative staff of a newspaper organisation and its printing press has not the remotest analogy to maintaining of a canteen for the workers of a steel mill or a mine.
23. Somewhat vainly, Mr. Prasad, appearing for the respondents, has attempted to place reliance on State of Tamil Nadu v. Binny Limited, Madras AIR 1980 SC 2038. This is obviously distinguishable, because the issue therein turns specifically on the language of Section 2(d)(i) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act after its amendment in 1964. This provision expressly introduced the concept of any transaction in connection with or incidental or ancillary to such trade, commerce, manufacture, adventure or concern. Admittedly, there is no such provision at all in our Act, even remotely analogous to such a provision, and no question of any ancillary or incidental transactions arises herein.
24. In vain and virtually in a desperate attempt to distinguish and escape the observations in State of Tamil Nadu v. Thirumagal Mills Limited [1972] 29 STC 290 (SC), Director of Supplies and Disposals v. Member, Board of Revenue, West Bengal [1967] 20 STC 398 (SC), State of Gujarat v. Raipur Manufacturing Company Limited [1967] 19 STC 1 (SC) and State of Gujarat v. Vivekanand Mills [1967] 19 STC 103 (SC), Mr. Prasad had contended that in all these cases the definition of “dealer” in terms referred to a person, who “carries on the business” of selling or buying, etc. It was his stand that Section 2(f) of the Act does not now employ the terminology “carries on the business” any longer. It was submitted that this change was .designedly brought about by the Legislature to omit the words “carries on the business”, which formed part of Section 2(c) of the earlier 1947 Act, and now defining “dealer” under Section 2(f) of the Act as any person who sells any goods. The substance of the submission herein was that Section 2(f) deliberately excluded the concept of the carrying on of the business with regard to a dealer.
25. The aforesaid submission, whilst it may bring some credit to the ingenuity of the learned counsel, is nevertheless fallacious and untenable. I am unable to accept the stand that the absence of the words “carries on the business” from the definition of the word “dealer” in Section 2(f) was intended to introduce any radical concept of a person being a dealer without a business as such. The true scope and object of this amendment and the answer to the learned counsel’s stand is exhaustively rendered in the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar v. Basta Colla Colliery Company Limited [1968] 21 STC 454. Therein it was observed :
An amending Act is a new but a partial legislation. The main scheme of the original enactment will ordinarily control the meaning of the amending provisions. Any repugnancy in the amending statute will yield to the essential and central stream in the original Act.
And again the conclusion :
For all these reasons I am of the view that the amended definition of ‘dealer’ means any person who sells or supplies any goods in connection with his business. Any casual sale of another kind of goods will not make the seller a ‘dealer’. In the present case the sale of machineries was not in the course of the assessee’s business. Admittedly they were casual sales. The assessee was not liable to pay sales tax in that respect. This disposes of the reference in favour of the assessee.
26. It is unnecessary to say more than that I would unhesitatingly agree with the aforesaid line of reasoning. Indeed, to say that there is a dealer without a business is in essence a contradiction in terms, and such a result can only be achieved by a clear statutory mandate or legal fiction expressly created. That the Act of 1959 did not divorce the concept of a “dealer” from “business” is evident by reference to Sections 24, 26, 27 and 37, which repeatedly refer to a dealer and his business. There is thus a statutory association of the business and the dealer which seems to pervade the Act as a twin concept.
27. That, without the statutory amendment of the definition of “business”, by excluding the profit-motive, the earlier basic concept of a dealer having a business with a view to gain must hold the field seems to be evident from State of Tamil Nadu v. Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Limited [1973] 31 STC 426 (SC). As already noticed, it was a case, inter alia, of sales in canteens and expressly dealt with two assessments, one before the amendment in the Madras General Sales Tax Act and the other after the amendment in the relevant Act. Whilst the Government’s appeal before the amendment was summarily rejected in favour of the assessee, holding that they were not liable to sales tax, the same succeeded with regard to the assessment subsequent to the amendment. It is thus patent that the statutory amendment was the watershed and it was vain to argue that these amendments were merely clarificatory or declaratory of the existing law. Similarly, in State of Tamil Nadu v. Thirumagal Mills Limited [1972] 29 STC 290 (SC) it has been held that under the pre-amendment law in Madras, the running of a fair-price shop and a canteen business were not exigible to tax. The strongest case is State of Gujarat v. Vivekanand Mills [1967] 19 STC 103 (SC), where, even the sale of a consignment of Californian cotton purchased for use in the textile mill, which had been rendered surplus, was held to be not exigible to sales tax, because the textile mill could not be held to be a dealer for carrying on a business in the sale of cotton. This was under the unamended provisions of the Bombay Sales Tax Act. Similarly, in State of Gujarat v. Raipur Manufacturing Company Limited [1967] 19 STC 1 (SC), the sale of surplus coal by a textile factory and 21 items of discarded and unserviceable goods were held to be not done in course of the business, and therefore, not liable to sales tax. As I have said earlier, it is unnecessary to multiply authorities, because there is a best of High Court judgments taking a similar view.
28. To finally conclude, the answer to question No. II is rendered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue, whilst holding that the petitioner was not a dealer under Section 2(f) of the Act in respect of the canteen sales, and consequently not liable to sales tax.
Uday Sinha, J.
I agree.
Nazir Ahmad, J.
I agree.