JUDGMENT
Imtiyaz Murtaza, J.
1. This appeal has been filed by the appellants against the judgment and order dated 25.4.1991 passed by First Additional District and Sessions Judge, Jaunpur in S.T. No. 125 of 1985 convicting the appellants under Sections 302/149 I.P.C. and sentencing to undergo imprisonment for life, under Section 324/149 I.P.C. and to undergo one and half year R.I., and under Section 323/149 I.P.C, to undergo one year’s R.I. The appellants Thakur Din, Sarju, Subhash Chandra, Sri Ram, Kedar Yadav, Hari alias Hari Ram Yadav and Ramesh Chandra have been further convicted under Section 147 I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo one year’s R.I. and the appellants Babu Ram and Sahbu alias Sahab Din have been further convicted under Section 148 I.P.C and sentenced to undergo R.I. for one and half years. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently.
2. It would appear that in the case in hand, in all 12 accused faced trial and the trial court recorded conviction against nine accused and rendered verdict of acquittal against three accused persons.
3. The occurrence is alleged to have taken place on 22.8.1984 at about 9 p.m. in the field situated in the outskirts of village Junedpur. The village Junedpur lies at a distance of 3 miles from Police Station. The First Information Report of the incident on the basis of written report authored by First Informant namely, Jai Narain Yadav son of Sahab Din alias Dahpel Yadav resident of village Junedpur within the circle of P.S. Sarpatha Jaunpur was lodged on 23.8.1984 at 2.30 a.m. In the F.I.R. the First Informant attributed the causative factor to hostility of accused persons which was traced to a recent election of Gram Pradhan in which father of the complainant also contested the election and as a sequel thereto, it was further alleged, they bore animus against the appellants. On the day of occurrence, it is alleged, Phool Chand deceased and one Shiv Shanker Tiwari equipped with torches left for their fields where Sahabdeen was already present and was monitoring flow of water in his field. At the time of incident, Sahabdeen was watering his field while Shiv Shanker Tiwari, Phool Chand and the complainant were sitting on the Mendh of the field. At about 9 p.m. the accused persons armed with Lathi and Ballam, were seen coming towards them upon which the complainant and others flashed their respective torches as a consequence of which, the accused persons, it is further alleged, assaulted them exhorting to kill all present at the scene of occurrence to give quietus to the running feud between them. It is further alleged that upon hue and cry raised by the complainant and others, the other co-villagers in and around the field were attracted and rushed to their rescue. The accused persons noticing the co-villagers converging to the place of occurrence, escaped from the scene threatening them with dire consequences if any one of them mustered courage to inform the police.
4. As stated supra, report was lodged on 23.8.1984 at 2.30 a.m. and the Head Moharrir prepared the chik report Ext ka 7. Copy of G.D. is Ext ka 8. The investigation was conducted by Babu Lal Sharma, Station officer who recorded the statements of Jai Narain, Phool chand Yadav and Shiv Shanker Tiwari. All the injured were removed to Primary Health Centre Suitha Kalan from the police station and they were medically examined by the Doctor at 3.30 a.m. Shiv Shanker Tiwari sustained one abrasion and two contusion, Jai Narain Yadav sustained one injury i.e. swelling, Phool Chand Yadav suffered as many as 12 injuries, Sarjoo Yadav one of the accused is shown to have suffered two injuries i.e. one lacerated wound and the other contusion. Subsequently, Phool Chand Yadav succumbed to his injuries at the P.H.C. and in consequence, the case which was initially registered under Section 147, 148, 149, 307 and 323 I.P.C. was altered to offence under Section 147, 148, 149, 302 and 323 I.P.C.
5. The Investigating officer took into custody the accused Sarjoo Yadav. Thereafter, he conducted inquest on the dead body (Ext Ka 11), After completing other formalities, the dead-body was sent for autopsy. The autopsy was conducted on the dead body on 24.8.84 at 11.30 a.m. The doctor who conducted post mortem noticed as many as 18 anti-mortem injuries on the body of the deceased. The death was opined to be due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of anti mortem injuries specifically injury No. 6, 15 and 18. Thereafter, the Investigating officer recorded the statements of witnesses of inquest and also recorded the statement of the Doctor at the P.H.C. who examined the injured. The Investigating officer also visited the place of occurrence where he seized blood stained earth and simple earth.
6. All the accused persons abjured the guilt canvassing that they have been falsely implicated in the case due to election rivalry and also that the village was faction ridden.
7. Considering the evidence on record, the trial court recorded a finding of conviction and sentence as aforestated against nine accused and that of acquittal against accused Baldev Shiv Kumar and Ram Kumar.. It would appear from a perusal of the record that prosecution examined six witnesses in support of its case. On the other hand, the case of defence was one of denial and false implication. Sarjoo accused appellant claimed in his statement that he was assaulted by Phool Chand and some of the co-villagers who were then working in nearby area were attracted upon hearing his shrieks and they screened him from further assault and in the process, Phool Chand suffered injuries.
8. We have heard Sri P.N. Misra, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants and Sri K.N. Bajpai learned A.G.A. representing the State.
9. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellants canvassed the validity of the findings recorded by the trial court by raising several points including that the appellants were falsely nominated in the case on account of animosity and factions in the village. It was next canvassed that the prosecution has not come with clean hands inasmuch as the materials facts bearing on the incident have been suppressed and in this connection, it was urged that this occurrence took place in pitched darkness and there being no proper source of light, it is urged, it was difficult to identify the real culprits attended with further submission that it foments doubt about the veracity of the prosecution case. He further pointed to injuries sustained by Sarjoo Yadav urging that the same have not been explained by the prosecution and therefore, proceeds the submission, the Sessions Judge erroneously brought home the guilt to the appellants and wrongly convicted all the appellants for offences under Section 302 with the aid of Section 149 I.P.C. The learned Counsel further adverted attention of the Court to the fact that injuries sustained by all the injured excepting the injuries suffered by deceased, were all simple in nature and therefore, it is further submitted, that the appellants could, if at all, be liable to be convicted under Section 304 I.P.C. read with Section 149 I.P.C. and by no reckoning, they could be said to have committed offence under Section 302 I.P.C. He also submitted that appellants Sahabdin and Babu Ram were attributed to be carrying Ballam and the blow issuing from the said weapons could result in simple injury. The learned Counsel also impeached the testimonies of the witnesses urging that on the basis of the same evidence, the Sessions Judge recorded acquittal of Baldeo, Shiv Kumar and Ram Kumar. It was also urged that Sessions Judge erroneously treated statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. as dying declaration. Lastly it was canvassed that Hari alias Hari Ram was illegally sentenced by the learned Sessions Judge notwithstanding the fact that he was a juvenile on the date of occurrence.
10. Per contra, learned A.G.A. contended that the time and place of the occurrence has not been impeached by the defence. He also emphasised the creditworthiness of the ocular witnesses further urging that the presence of the witnesses on the scene of occurrence is borne out from the injuries sustained by the injured witnesses which receives reinforcement from the medical evidence. Lastly, it has been contended that the appellants were rightly convicted by the Sessions Judge for offences under Section 302 I.P.C. read with Section 149 I.P.C. attended with further submissions that the appellants formed unlawful assembly and they were animated by common object to commit murder.
11. Before delving into the merits of the points raised across the bar, it would be useful to analytically scan the evidence of the ocular witnesses in the instant case.
12. Jai Narain who has been examined in the instant case as P.W. 1 is the first informant. He deposed that Sharda Sahay Canal lies at a distance of about 500-600 steps from his house and his field also lies abutting the canal aforesaid. He further deposed that prior to occurrence, his father contested election for the office of Pradhan, which led to bad blood between the parties. Besides the election rivalry, both the parties were also enmeshed in a criminal case. It was deposed that on the day of occurrence at about 9 p.m. he, his uncle Phool Chand and Shiv Shanker Tiwari were watching the flow of water from the canal to their field and they were carrying torches in their hands. His father Sahabdin alias Dehpel was in the field. At that time Sahadin and Babu Ram armed with spear (Ballam) and other accused persons possessing Lathi came and started assaulting Phool Chand. Seeing Phool Chand being assaulted, he and Shiv Shanker Tiwari came nearer to Phool Chand upon which Kedar dealt a Lathi blow on him and Babu Ram inflicted injury on Shiv Shanker by wielding Lathi. Phool Chand, it is further deposed, fell down in the field. It is further deposed that the P.W.I, screamed for help and on hearing his screams, his father who was having torch in his hand and other co-villagers witnessed the occurrence and they intervened. It is further deposed that the culprits were identified through the flashing of torches. He further deposed that after inflicting injuries, the accused persons escaped southward. He further deposed that a cot was brought from the house and injured Phool Chand and Shiv Shanker were taken to police station on a tractor where statement of Phool Chand was recorded by the Sub Inspector and thereafter, the injured persons were removed to P.H.C. for treatment. Lastly, he stated in his deposition that in the course of occurrence, Phool Chand snatched Danda from Sarjoo and dealt a blow on Sarjoo, which resulted in injuries to Sarjoo. It is also deposed that Phool Chand succumbed to his injuries at Primary Health Centre
13. The next witness examined is Shiv Shanker Tiwari P.W.2. This witness also suffered injury in the course of occurrence. He deposed that he, Phool Chand and Jai Narain had gone to their respective fields for irrigating the standing crop. It is further deposed that while he and the aforesaid Phool Chand and Jai Narain were sitting watching the flow of water, accused persons namely Sahab Din, Kedar Yadav, Babu Ram, Ramesh, Hari, Thakur Din Sarju, Shree Ram Subhash Baldeo, Shiv Kumar, were seen coming towards them out of whom Sahab Din and Babu Ram were armed with Ballam and the remaining accused persons had Lathies in their hands. He further deposed that Kedar, one of the accused, dealt a Lathi blow on Jai Narain and he fled away. In the meantime Phool Chand arrived and accused persons assaulted him and Phool Chand. He precisely pointed out in his statement that he was assaulted by Lathi while Phool Chand was attacked with Lathi and Ballam. In the meantime, Sahabdin was attracted to the scene of occurrence and he raised alarm which attracted several co-villagers upon which the accused persons fled away from the scene of occurrence. He also deposed that the injured were taken to Primary Health Centre Suitha Kala where he and Phool Chand were examined by the Doctor. He further deposed that Phool Chand succumbed to his injuries at the P.H.C. He also deposed that the Investigating officer recorded his statement.
14. P.W. 3 examined in the case is Dr. Shree Dhar posted at P.H.C. He had examined the injured. According to the Doctor, the injuries inflicted on the injured persons could be caused on 22.8.1984 at 9 p.m.
l5. P.W. 4 is Dr. R.K. Singh who conducted autopsy on the dead body of the deceased namely Phool Chand. While conducting autopsy, the Doctor noted down following ante-mortem injuries on the person of the deceased.
1. Lacerated wound 8 cm x .5 cm x scalp and bone of skull on the top of the left side of the head, 11 cm above the (paper torn).
2. Lacerated wound 1.5 cm x .5 cm x scalp on the top of the posterior aspect of the head, 12 cm above and backward from the right ear.
3. Lacerated wound on the top of the head towards posterior aspect of skull in between injury No. 1 and 2, .4 cm x .5 cm x scalp 2 cm behind the injury No. 1.
4. Lacerated wound 1 cm x .5 cm x scalp on the right side of the forehead 1.5 cm above the right eyebrow.
5. Lacerated wound 3 cm x.5 cm x scalp on the left side of the forehead just above the left eyebrow.
6. Traumatic swelling with contusion 18 cm x 8 cm on the front aspect of the chest, left side and front aspect of the left shoulder joint and left arm front aspect. There is fracture of the upper 1/3 of the numerous of the left arm and depressed fracture of 2nd, 3rd and 4th ribs on the left side of the chest left lung is lacerated and torn in the middle portion.
7. Abraded contusion 15 cm x 7 cm alongwith the posterior aspect of the left arm 6 cm below the injury No. 6.
8. Incised wound 3 cm x 0.5 cm x skin from above downwards on the front aspect of the lower portion of the left forearm just above the left wrist joint.
9. Stab wound 1 cm x 0.25 x skin on the dorsum of the left hand near the root of the index finger of the left hand.
10. Stab wound 1 cm x 0.25 x skin on the dorsum of the left hand, near the root of the middle finger of the left hand.
11. Contusion 18 cm x 6 cm along the outer aspect of the left thing 2 cm above the knee joint.
12. Incised wound 1.5 cm x 0.25 cm x skin from the above downwards on the front of the left leg 12 cm above the ankle joint.
13. Traumatic swelling .1 cm x 5 cm along the front aspect of the left leg 15 cm below the left knee.
14. Incised wound from above downwards 1 cm x 0.5 cm on the outer aspect of the right forearm 7 cms right elbow joint.
15. Contusion 15 cm x 2.5 cm on the front of the right side of the chest, 9 cm below the right sterno clavicular joint. There is fracture of 3rd rib in the right side of the chest and right lung is acerated.
16. Contused area 15 cm x 7 cm on the front of the right arm on right shoulder joint.
17. Contused area with multiple contusions on the upper part of the back. Both across the both shoulder blades in area 18 cm x 10 cm.
18. Contused area with multiple contusions on the both side of the back in lower part 25 cm x 12 cm, 9 cm below the injury No. 17 liver and right kidney is lacerated corresponding to this ante mortem injury.
16. In the internal examination of Thorax the Doctor noted depressed fracture of 2nd, 3rd and 4th ribs on the left side and 3rd rib on the right side corresponding to ante mortem injury No. (6) and (15). Both lungs were lacerated and teared. A pool of blood about 4 ounce chest cavity was present. Liver was lacerated corresponding to injury No. 18. Right kidney was lacerated corresponding to injury No. 18. A pool of blood about 6 ounces was present in abdominal cavity. In the opinion of the Doctor , the cause of death was due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of ante mortem injuries, specially injury Nos. 6, 15 and 18.
17. Elaborate arguments have been advanced and we shall take up the points urged on behalf of the appellants one by one. The first submission advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the occurrence took place at about 9 p.m. in the dark condition and therefore, it was next to impossible for the witnesses to have identified all the accused persons without there being sufficient source of light. In this connection, we would like to revert to the contents of the First Information Report. It clearly finds mention in the F.I.R. that Informant alongwith uncle Phool Chand, Shiv Shanker Tiwari and his father had gone to their field for irrigating the standing crop alongwith torches. It further finds mention that the Informant and others noticing certain persons, flashed their torches upon which the accused persons exhorted and attacked them with their respective weapons. It would further appear that the Investigating officer had prepared memos of torches of Shiv Shanker Tiwari, Jai Narain Ex Ka 19 and found them in working condition. The evidence of all the witnesses is consistent that they identified the assailants in the torchlight. It bears no dispute that the accused persons and complainant side have their domicile in one and the same village and they are well known to each other. When accused and deceased are well known to each other, identification by witnesses since they were seeing him from close quarters, is possible. It is settled position in law that if persons are known to each other from the manner of walk, talking and peculiar features of gait, identification is possible. By this reckoning, the court below rightly held that the witnesses could have easily identified the accused persons. In connection with the above, we feel called to notice the decision of the Apex court in Kalika Tewari v. State of Bihar , in which Apex Court substantially held as under:
The visibility capacity of urban people who are acclimatized to fluorescent lights or incandescent lamps is not the standard to be applied to villagers whose optical potency is attuned to country made lamps. Their visibility is conditioned to such lights and hence it would be quit possible for them to identify the men and matters in such lights.
18. Yet another aspect worthy of consideration is that according to the prosecution case, accused persons who were armed with Lathi and spears, mounted attack resulting in death of Phool Chand Yadav and injuries to Shiv Shanker Tiwari and Jai Narain Yadav. The deceased is shown to have suffered multiple injuries and considering the injuries sustained by him, it is inferable that the accused persons endured at the scene of occurrence for sometime and they also must have come in close contact with the witnesses. By this reckoning, it cannot be denied that the witnesses had enough opportunity to identify the accused persons. In the above perspective, the submission of the learned Counsel has no substance.
19. The next argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellants is that origin of the incident has been suppressed by the prosecution and further that the injuries sustained by one of the accused have not been explained. There is no denying of the fact that the appellant Sarju sustained injuries and he was medically examined at the P.H.C. Dr. Shridhar Misra P.W. 3 has proved the injury report Ex Kha 1. It is also undeniable that in the First Information Report, the injuries sustained by Sarju have not been explained but it has come in the statement of the deceased recorded by the Investigating officer that he had snatched the Lathi from Sarju and wielded the same in defence and in the process, Sarju sustained injuries. This fact also finds mention in the statement of P.W. 1, which clearly manifests that Phool Chand had wrested Lathi from the hands of Sarju and wielded the same in his defence. It is well enunciated in law that the First Information Report cannot be treated as encyclopedia containing all precise details.
20. In this Connection, few decisions bearing on the point may be noticed. In Suchcha Singh v. State of Punjab , the Apex court held that the non-explanation of injuries by the prosecution will not affect the prosecution case where injuries sustained by the accused are minor and superficial or where the evidence is so clear and cogent, so independent and disinterested, so probable, consistent and creditworthy that it outweighs the effect of the omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries. In Hare Krishna Singh v. State of Bihar , the Apex Court quipped that “the prosecution has to prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts. If the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution are believed by the court in proof of the guilt of the accused beyond any reasonable doubt, the question of the obligation of the prosecution to explain the injuries sustained by the accused will not arise. When the prosecution comes with a definite case that the offence has been committed by the accused and proves its case beyond any reasonable doubt, it becomes hardly necessary for the prosecution to again explain how and in what circumstances injuries have been inflicted on the person of the accused.” It was further quipped by the Apex Court to the effect that “Thus it is not the law or invariable rule that whenever the accused sustains an injury in the same occurrence, the prosecution has to explain the injuries failure of which will mean that the prosecution has suppressed the truth and also the origin and genesis of the occurrence.”
21. Every decision has got to be read in the light of the facts of that case. Reverting to the facts of the present case, it brooks no dispute that though First Information Report does not explain the injuries, the same would be borne out from the statement of the deceased recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C.(Ext.Ka9), by the Investigating officer in which it is clearly stated by the deceased that he snatched the Lathi from Sarju and wielded the same in defence and in the process Sarju had sustained injuries. In this perspective, the submission cannot be said to be loaded with substance that injuries on the person of Sarju have not been explained by the prosecution.
22. It has been next argued by learned Counsel for the appellants that the trial court has already recorded acquittal of accused persons namely Baldeo, Shiv Kumar and Ram Kumar on the basis of the self same evidence and therefore, the same cannot be made basis for recording conviction against remaining accused persons. From a close scrutiny of the finding recorded by the Sessions Judge, it would transpire that the Sessions Judge based his finding of acquittal considering that Baldeo and Ram Kumar had stood witnesses in case crime No. 90 of 1983 against the deceased Phool Chand and Sahab Din. In so far as Shiv Kumar accused is concerned, it has been found by the Sessions Judge that he happened to be the brother of Ram Kumar. In this perspective, the submission of the learned Counsel does not inspire confidence.
In Syed Ibrahim v. State of A.P. (2007) 1 SCC (Crl.) 34, the Apex Court held that “It is the duty of the Court to separate the grain from chaff. Where chaff can be separated from the grain, it would be open to the court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient or to be not wholly credible.”
It cannot be said as a rule of universal application that when a portion of the prosecution evidence is discarded as unworthy of credence, there cannot be any conviction. It is always open to a court to distinguish the case of the accused who had been acquitted from those who have been convicted. The Sessions Judge in his wisdom rightly acquitted only those accused against whom the prosecution witnesses could have criminal propensities and proclivities. The precise details of enmity prior to holding of election are that one Ram Kumar had instituted a case against Phool Chand and Sahab Din in the year 1983 in which Baldeo and Shiv Kumar were cited as witnesses. It is in this backdrop that all the three accused were extended the benefit of doubt.
23. The learned Counsel also canvassed the acceptability of dying declaration. According to learned Counsel, the statement of the deceased recorded by the Investigating officer under Section 161 Cr.P.C. cannot be exalted to the status of a dying declaration. In order to enforce his arguments, learned Counsel referred us to the decision of the Apex Court in Balak Ram v. State of U.P. 1974 SCC (Crl.) 837 and urged that in the said Court the Apex Court rejected the dying declaration because the same was not recorded by the Investigating officer in observance of Rule 115 of the U.P. Police Regulation inasmuch as the Regulation expressly enjoins the Investigating officer to record a dying declaration if at all in the presence of two respectable witnesses and after obtaining the signature or mark of the declarant at the foot of the declaration. It is further submitted that the condition of the injured was not such as could be said to be coherent and in the circumstances a long statement narrating all the facts gives rise to a nagging doubt about the veracity of the statement. In this connection, it would suffice to say that the Sessions Judge has not made it the basis of conviction. He merely quipped that the statement of a dying man recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. can also be treated as a dying declaration in certain conditions. The general principle on which evidence is admitted is that they are declarations made in extremity. The Apex Court in the case of Laljit Singh v. State of U.P. reported in 2000 SCC(Crl.)1501 treated the statement’ of deceased recorded by police under Section 161 Cr.P.C. as a dying declaration. It clearly transpires from the record that the deceased alongwith other injured persons were brought to the Police Station where statement of deceased was recorded and thereafter all the injured persons were removed to P.H.C. for treatment where doctor present at the P.H.C. examined them medically. In his statement, P.W. 3 namely Dr. Shreedhar Misra has stated that the deceased alongwith other injured persons was brought to P.H.C. at 3.30 a.m. He was prescribed medicine and he breathed his last at 4.30 p.m. The learned Sessions Judge has recorded a categorical finding that the deceased breathed his last after several hours of the occurrence and therefore, there is no valid reason for the presumption that the deceased was not in a fit state of mind to give dying declaration. It is further observed in the judgment by the learned Sessions Judge that the statement is not to be acted upon as the sole basis for conviction and it has merely to be treated as species of evidence. In view of the above discussions and the principles governing the dying declaration, the submission of the learned Counsel cannot be said to be fringed with any substance.
24. The next argument advanced by learned Counsel for the appellant that appellant Hari alias Hari Ram Yadav was a juvenile at the time of occurrence. He further submitted that the statement of Hari Ram Yadav under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded on 3.2.1990 in which he gave his age as 20 years and by this reckoning, it is further submitted, the occurrence having taken place on 22.8.19984, he was less than 16 years of age and by this reckoning, proceeds the submission, the learned Sessions Judge has erroneously convicted the appellant To prop up the above submission, the learned Counsel placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Gopi Nath Ghosh v. State of West Bengal 1984 SCC (Crl.) 478. In the said decision, the Apex court has relied upon the age of the appellant as mentioned in the statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. In the self same decision, the Apex Court held In paragraph 11 that the report of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge is self-evident attended with further observation that it is unquestionably established on unassailable evidence that on August 19, 1974, the date of the offence appellant was aged between 16-17 years and therefore, he was a juvenile delinquent.
Coming back to the facts of the present case, it would appear that age has been mentioned by Hari alias Hari Ram Yadav in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and no supporting evidence has been adduced nor any submission was made before the trial court. In connection with the above submission, decision of the Apex Court in Ravinder Singh Gorkhi v. State Of U.P. (2006)2 SCC (Crl.) 632 may be, noticed In which the Apex Court noticed various decisions including the case of Gopi Nath Ghosh. The substance of what has been held In the said decision is excerpted below.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that until the age of a person Is required to be determined In a manner laid down under a statute, different standard of proof should not be adopted. It is no doubt true that the court must strike a balance. In case of a dispute, the court may appreciate the evidence having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. It would be a duty of the court of law to accord the benefit to a juvenile provided he is one. To give the same benefit to a person who In fact is not a juvenile may cause injustice to the victim. In this case, the appellant had never been serious in projecting his plea that he on the date of commission of the offence was a minor. He made such statement for the first time while he was examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
(Emphasis supplied).
There is no denying of the fact that the appellant disclosed his age for the first time in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and there is nothing on record to manifest that he applied to the Court to be treated as a juvenile at any stage and therefore, there being no evidence in support of his age, he cannot be held to be a juvenile at the time of occurrence.
25. Next argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellants is that accused shared no common object to kill the deceased nor did they know that murder of Phool Chand was likely to be committed. The enmity if any was with Sahab din alias Dehpel which had its genesis in the election held for the office of Gram Pradhan. The learned Counsel referred to the statement of accused Sarju the text of which was that it was Phool Chand who had dealt a Lathi blow on him and his screams attracted certain co villagers belonging to Harijan community and they inflicted Lathi injury on the deceased in order to prevent further assault on him and therefore, it is argued, it cannot be said that all the accused persons were liable for committing murder of Phool Chand with the aid of Section 149 I.P.C. The next submission strenuously urged is that in any case Saheb Din and Babu Ram were armed with Ballam and looking to the injuries sustained by the deceased, it cannot be urged that the murder of Phool Chand was committed in prosecution of the common object by the accused persons. To bolster up his submissions, the learned Counsel placed credence on certain decisions namely, Chandra Pal alias Ram Pal v. State of Haryana 2004 Cr. L.J. 285, Nododi Jayaraman v. State of Tamil Nadu 1992 ACC 479, Moti v. State 1967 ACC 140 ; State of U.P. v. Kallu 1985, ACC 235 and Shambhu Nath Singh v. State of Bihar .
26. In Shambhu Nath Singh (supra), the Apex Court held that Section 149 I.P.C. is declaratory of the vicarious liability of the members of an unlawful assembly for acts done in prosecution of the common objection of the assembly or for such offences their objects and the knowledge possessed by each member of what is likely to be committed in prosecution of their common object may vary not only accordance to the information at his command but also according to the extent to which he shares the commonality of object and as a consequence of this the effect of Section 149 I.P.C. may be different on different members of the same unlawful assembly.
27. In connection with the above submissions, we feel called to “advert to certain facts all over again having bearing on the question at Issue. The undisputed facts are that at the time of occurrence First Informant, Phool Chand deceased and Shiv Shanker Tiwari were perched on the Mendh of the field watching flow of water in their respective fields while Saheb Deen was present in his field monitoring the flow of water in the field. The aforesaid injured witnesses noticed certain persons coming towards them and they flashed their respective torches upon which accused persons challenged the deceased and other ocular witnesses exhorting that they should be killed today. Sahab Din alias Dehpel who was present in the field escaped unhurt. Both the witnesses namely P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 clearly stated in their deposition that Sahab Din and Babu Ram accused were armed with Ballam while other accused persons had lathies in their hands. All the accused persons are attributed to have attacked deceased Phool Chand. It has been further stated that as soon as he and Shiv Shanker Tiwari got closer to Phool Chand and tried to prevent further attack on him, accused Kedar wielded Lathi on him while Shiv Shanker was attacked with Lathi by Babu Ram accused. It thus transpires that at one stage all the accused persons joined and participated in the attack and it is thus clear that all of them were animated by a common object. There was also a point of time in which all the appellants took part in the assault simultaneously and by this reckoning, it leaves no manner of doubt that the appellants had become members of an unlawful assembly when they joined to assault the deceased. The settled position in law is that the common object could develop eo instanti.
28. The counsel for the appellant submitted that the accused had no common object to kill the deceased nor they knew that murder of Phool Chand was likely to be committed. The main enmity of the appellants was with Sahabdeen alias of Phool Chand was likely to be committed. The main enmity of the appellants was with Sahabdeen alias Dehpel on account of election for the office of Pradhan. The counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the statement of accused Sarju who stated that it was Phool Chand who first assaulted him with Lathi. It is further stated that hearing his alarm a few Harijans arrived there to save him and they assaulted Phool Chand with Lathi. It was submitted that occurrence started on account of assault made by Phool Chand upon Sarju, therefore, it cannot be said that all the accused persons were liable for committing murder of Phool Chand with the aid of Section 149 I.P.C. It was further vehemently submitted that in any case Saheb Deen and Babu Ram were armed with Ballam and looking to the injuries sustained by the deceased it cannot be said that they also shared common object of committing murder of Phool Chand.
29. All the decisions cited by the counsels for the parties are about the applicability of Section 149 I.P.C. which postulates for vicarious liability. The pivotal question is the applicability of Section 149 IPC. The said provision has its foundation on constructive liability which is the sine qua’ :; non for its operation. The emphasis is on the common object and not on common intention. Mere presence in an unlawful assembly cannot render a person liable unless there was a common object and he was actuated by that; common object and that object is one of those set out in Section 141. Where common object of an unlawful assembly is not proved, the accused persons cannot be convicted with the help of Section 149. The crucial question to determine is whether the assembly consisted of five or more persons and whether the said persons entertained one or more of the common objects, as specified in Section 141. It cannot be laid down as a general proposition of law that unless an overt act Is proved against a person, who is alleged to be a member of unlawful assembly, it cannot be said that he is a member of such an assembly. The only thing required is that he should have understood that the assembly was unlawful and was likely to commit any of the acts which fall within the purview of Section 141. The word “object” means the purpose or design and, in order to make it “common”, it must be shared by all. In other words, the object should be common to the persons, who compose the assembly, that is to say, they should all be aware of it and concur in it. A common object may be formed by express agreement after mutual consultation, but that is by no means necessary. It may be formed at any stage by all or a few members of the assembly and the other members may just join and adopt it. Once formed, it need not continue to be the same. It may be modified or altered or abandoned at any stage. The expression “in prosecution of common object” as appearing in Section 149 has to be strictly construed as equivalent to “in order to attain the common , object”. It must be immediately connected with the common object by virtue of the nature of the object. There; must be community of object and the object may exist only up to a particular stage, and not thereafter. Members of an unlawful assembly may have community of object up to a certain point beyond which they may differ in their objects and the knowledge, possessed by each member of what is likely to be committed in prosecution of their common object may vary not only according to the information at his command, but also according to the extent to which he shares the community of object, and as a consequence of this the effect of Section 149 IPC may be different on different members of the same assembly. In the case of Sunil Kumar v. State of Rajasthan , the Apex Court had observed “The “common object” of an assembly is to be ascertained from the acts and language of the members composing it, and from a consideration, of all the surrounding circumstances. It may be gathered from the course of conduct adopted by the members of the assembly. What the common object of the unlawful assembly is at a particular stage of the incident is essentially a question of fact to be determined, keeping in view the nature of the assembly, the arms carried by the members, and the behaviour of the members at or near the scene of the incident It was further observed that An object is entertained in the human mind, and it being merely a mental attitude, no direct evidence can be available and, like intention, has generally to be gathered from the act which the person commits and the result therefrom. Though no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down under the circumstances from which the common object can be culled out it may reasonably be collected from the nature of the assembly, arms it carries and behaviour at the time of or before or after the occurrence.
30. In the case of Munivel v. State of T.N. , The Apex Court has held that ” the common object may be commission of one offence while there may be likelihood of commission of yet another offence, the knowledge whereof is capable of being safely attributable to the members of unlawful assembly. Whether a member of such unlawful assembly was aware as regards likelihood of commission of another offence or not would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Background of the incident, the motive the nature of the assembly, the nature of the arms carried by the members of the assembly, their common object and the behaviour of the members soon before, at or after the actual commission of the crime would be relevant factors for drawing an inference in that behalf.”
The testimonies of P.W. 1 Jai Narain and P.W. 2 Shiv Shanker Tewari are eloquent of the fact that all the accused came in the night to their field carrying Lathi and Ballam and after exhorting that they should be killed today so that the dispute may be settled/finished (Aaj jan se mar diya jaye taki jhanjhat khatam ho jaye), the accused assaulted the deceased and also the witnesses who also sustained injuries. The postmortem report of the deceased clearly indicates that he was mercilessly battered causing extensive internal damage. The only inference that can be drawn is that the deceased was assaulted with intention to kill him.
31. The submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants is that Sahab Deen and Babu Ram were said to be armed with Ballam but they did not cause any serious injury to the deceased, therefore, proceeds the submission, it cannot be said that they also shared common object to kill the deceased. The submission does not commend to us for acceptance inasmuch as the accused have been convicted by taking aid of Section 149 of the Penal Code. Section 149 of the Penal Code postulates assembly of five or more persons having a common object i.e. one of those named in Section 141 of the Penal Code and then doing of the act as the members of unlawful assembly in prosecution of that object. The basis of constructive guilt under Section 149 is mere membership of an unlawful assembly, irrespective of the fact whether he has actually committed the criminal act or not. In the case of Ravindra Mahto v. State of Jharkhand the Apex Court has held that “under Section 149, if the accused is a member of unlawful assembly, the common object of which is to commit a certain crime, and if such a crime is committed by one or more of the members of that assembly, every person who happens to be a member of that assembly would be liable for the commission of the crime by reason of being a member of it irrespective of the fact whether he has actually committed the criminal act or not.” The participation of Sahab Deen and Babu Ram also receives reinforcement from the post mortem report, which indicates that injuries No. 8,9 and 11 were caused by pointed object.
32. The learned Counsel for the appellants switched over to next submission urging that the act of the appellants would be punishable under Section 304 I.P.C. and not under Section 302 I.P.C. This submission also does not commend to us for acceptance considering that the post mortem report shows that deceased sustained 18 ante mortem injuries; In the internal examination of the deceased the doctor noted depressed fracture of 2nd, 3rd and 4th ribs on the left side and 3rd rib on the right side, corresponding to ante mortem injuries No. 6 and 15. Both lungs were lacerated and teared. Liver was lacerated, right kidney was lacerated corresponding to injury No. 18. It is also important to note that injury Nos. 15,16 and 17 were result of several blows. Injury No. 15 was contusion. Injury No. 16 contused area of 15 cm. x 7 cm. on the front of right arm on right shoulder joint. Injury No. 17 was contused area with multiple contusions on the upper part of back. Injury No. 18 was contused area with multiple contusions on the both sides of back. It shows that the deceased was mercilessly battered and thus irresistible conclusion that follows is that the deceased was assaulted by the appellants with an intention to be killed inasmuch as the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The submission of the learned Counsel that only offence under Section 304 I.P.C. is made out against the appellant cannot be said to be loaded with any substance.
33. The Apex Court in the case of Pulicheria Nagaraju alias Nagaraja Reddy v. State of A.P. 2007 (1) JIC 731 has held that “therefore, the court should proceed to decide the pivotal question of intention, with care and caution, as that will decide whether the case falls under Section 302 or 304, part I, or 304 Part II. Many petty or insignificant matters plucking of a fruit, straying of cattle, quarrel of children, utterance of a rude word or even an objectionable glance may lead to altercations and group clashes culminating in deaths. Usual motives like revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be totally absent in such cases. There may be no intention. There may be no premeditation. Infact, there may not even be criminality. At the other end of the spectrum, there may be cases of murder where the accused attempts to avoid the penalty for murder by attempting to put forth a case that there was no intention to cause death. It is for the Courts to ensure that the cases of murder punishable under Section 302 are not converted into offences punishable under Section 304 Part I/II or cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, are treated as murder punishable under Section 302. The intention to cause death can be gathered generally from a combination of a few or several of the following among other, circumstances: (i) nature of the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of force employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any premeditation; (vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows. The above list of circumstances is of course, not exhaustive and there may be several other special circumstances with reference to individual cases, which may throw light on the question of intention. Be that as it may. ”
34. Considering the above decisions and also from the discussions of facts on record, the irresistible conclusion is that in this case all the appellants carrying Lathi and Ballam came to the field of informant and after exhorting to kill all the accused, started assaulting the deceased and witnesses. There was previous enmity between the parties. From the injuries suffered by Phool Chand which are numerous and have resulted in serious internal damages and his consequent death, the intention to cause death or at all events intention of causing bodily injury is writ large considering they were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. By this reckoning, the irresistible conclusion is that the case is made out for offence punishable under Section 302 I.P.C.
35. We have carefully scanned the testimonies of P.W. 1 Jai Narain and P.W. 2 Shiv Shanker Tewari. The upshot of above discussion is that these witnesses who are also injured witnesses have given account of the occurrence in a very truthful and natural manner and their version of the occurrence inspires confidence and by this reckoning, their presence at the time of occurrence cannot be doubted. They were subjected to grueling cross-examination but nothing could be elicited in order to discredit their testimonies. It is established beyond an iota of doubt that all the assailants carrying weapons reached the place of occurrence which happened to be the field of informant and after challenging them, started assaulting them with their respective weapons. The witnesses who tried to intervene were also assaulted. All the accused were found to have formed an unlawful assembly and they came together carrying weapons and in prosecution of common object, started assaulting the deceased and after committing the crime they all went away together. At no point of time anyone of them disassociated’ himself from the unlawful assembly. The eyewitness account finds corroboration from the medical evidence as well. The time and place of the occurrence is not challenged. The first: information report is also lodged promptly. The prompt lodging of the report eliminates the chances of embellishment. The Sessions Judge has rightly recorded the findings of conviction and we have no reason to dissent with the finding recorded by the sessions Judge.
36. In view of the above, the appeal is dismissed. The conviction and sentences of the appellants awarded by the trial court is upheld. The appellants are on bail. The C.J.M. Jaunpur is directed to take the appellants into custody forthwith for serving out the sentences as awarded by the trial court and affirmed by this Court.
37. Office is directed to communicate this order to the court concerned for necessary compliance within one month.