JUDGMENT
Lingaraja Rath, J.
1. The judgment of the learned Single Judge directing the appellants to pay enhanced rent of Rs. 30,000/- per month for the premises occupied by the 2nd appellant with effect from 10-11-1988 is assailed before us on the submission of a direction to pay enhanced rent to be properly the subject matter before a Civil Court to be urged, and should not be directed under the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
2. Mr. R.N. Reddy, learned Counsel for the appellants, has strenuously contended before us that the relationship between the parties being contractual, a variation in the terms of payment is outside the purview of the Court in its extra ordinary jurisdiction.
3. Admittedly the 2nd appellant has been occupying the premises of the respondent No. 1 since 1981 under a sub-lease from one Ch. Nageswar Rao. It is the case of the respondent No. l,who came in Writ Petition No. 16805 of 1990 before this Court, that the sub-lease expired on 13-11-1984 after which the respondent No. 1 took symbolic possession of the premises. The original rent paid was Rs. 11,000/-, but a letter was addressed by Ch. Nageswara Rao to the 2nd appellant to increase it to Rs. 15,400/- per month. A copy of the letter was filed as material paper by the appellants with out its date, but it is submitted by Mr. R.N. Reddy before us that the letter was of 19-9-1984, a fact we are inclined to accept in view of the intrinsic evidence available from two other letters of 18-12-1984 and 1-2-1985 respectively, one addressed by appellant No. 2 to the C.P.W.D. and the order from the 2nd appellant to Sri Ch. Nageswara Rao, both of which papers of rent being made, the 2nd appellant referred the matter to the C.P.W.D. for verification and recommendation of the fair rent to be fixed, On 8-10-1988 respondent No. 1 addressed a letter to the 2nd appellant demanding Rs. 30,000/- for the premises. This letter was delivered to the 2nd appellant on 8-11-1988. The C.P.W.D. fixed the fair rent at Rs. 30,000/- by its certificate issued on 10-11-1988, but the enhanced rent was not paid. Writ petition No. 16805 of 1990 was filed to direct the appellants to pay the rent. The learned Single Judge negativing the plea advanced against the maintainability of the writ petition directed for payment of rent which is being assailed before us.
4. Mr. R.N. Reddy submits before us, while urging about the nonmaintainability of the Writ Petition, that as per the directions of mis Court rent of Rs. 15,400/- is being paid to respondent No. 1 from 1-12-1984 and that order should be maintained directing the parties to go before the Civil Court for fixation of the fair rent and that until such fixation is made they are agreeable to continue to pay at the rate of Rs. 15,400/- per month. It is also submitted that the arrears of the rent have been already paid at the same rate.
5. Undoubtedly a contractual obligation is ipso facto not enforceable through the Writ Jurisdiction only because one of the parties to the contract is State or is State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. But, while it is so yet all actions of the State inasmuch as they are administrative in nature are liable to be tested on the anvil of Rule of Law and with the tests of fair play, good conscience and equity applied. This is so since unlike a private citizen a State is expected to act fairly in all its actions and not prompted by discriminatory or arbitrary considerations. Dealing with the question, one of us (Lingaraja Rath, J.,) observed in Raja Mohapatra v. Board of Secondary Education, . as follows:-
“… Buthowever the decision of all such bodies either rendered in a quasi- judicial proceedings or taken administratively is subject to the same limitations to which the decisions of other quasi-judicial or administrative authorities are subject to, and if circumstances exist which made the decision vulnerable in law, the Court would have a duty to intervene to safeguard the continued guarantee of the rule of law.”
The position of law is rather too well settled, for which the authorities need not be reiterated, that even in suitable cases where the action of the State Bodies, though arising out of contractual obligations, falls short of adherence to the Principles of natural justice or compliance with fair play, equity and good conscience or lack of arbitrariness or discriminatory treatment, this Court would consider it a duty to interfere in order to maintain the balance of the citizens’ right of equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. The question of interference or non-interference by the higher Court is more a matter of propriety than a case of lack of jurisdiction, a principle of self-imposed limitation with the unanimity of the judicial opinion of not being made where the questions to be resolved involve determination of disputed questions of farts.
6. It is conceded by Mr. R.N. Reddy and indeed it is so, that the appellants are State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The premises it is occupying is about 15600 sq.ft. Respondent No. 1 even in 1984 launched the claim for higher rent. The 2nd appellant, without negotiating the rent, referred the matter to the C .P. W .D. and even called upon the 1 st respondent to file, along with the site p>lan etc., an undertaking that he shall accept the rent as fixed by the C.P.W.D. or the demanded rent, whichever is less. This would undoubtedly show the 2nd appellant as having given out and held out to the 1st respondent that he shall abide by the recommendations of the C.P.W.D., but that if the demanded rent is less, the respondent No. 1 should accept such amount. In November, 1988 the respondent No. 1 made the demand of Rs. 30,000/-, though the letter was dated 8th October, 1988. It cannot be said that as respondent No. 1 made the demand of Rs. 15,400/- in 1984, the same should also hold good in 1988. The argument advanced before us that the fixation of rent by the C.P.W.D. is only recommendatory in nature and not binding upon the ajppellants does not inspire us as the appellants through their own actions have led respondent No. 1 to believe that the matter has been referred to the C.P.W.D. and that the rent fixed by it would be payable if it is less than the demanded rent. It can be imagined that respondent No. 1 did not take any action between 1984 to 1990 to go before a Court of law for redressal of his grievances as he was under the impression that the appellants would abide by the commitment held out and pay the enhanced rent.
7. The learned Counsel for the appellants has produced before us the book “Schedule of Administrative and Financial Powers” of the office of the Central Provident Fund Commissioner, in which it is shown under the heading ‘Contingent and Miscellaneous Expenditure’ as Against Serial No. 119, that for the purpose of hiring of accommodation for the Headquarters, Regional and other officers, the financial limit of the Central Provident Fund Commissioner is Rs. 50,000/-, of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner-I (RO) is Rs. 7,500/- and of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner-II (RO/SRO) the limit is Rs. 5,000/-. The entry stipulates that in all cases of such hiring where the C.P.W.D. operates, it shall invariably be consulted as to the reasonableness of the rent. Consultation with the C.P.W.D. is not an empty formality as is. given out before us, a fact which is belied by the very conduct of the appellants in calling upon respondent No. 1 to furnish an undertaking to abide by the fixation of rent by the C.P.W.D.
8. The learned Single Judge held that there being no disputed questions of fact in the case and as the appellants are State, it was not desirable to drive respondent No. 1 to seek common remedy in the Civil Court expending not only huge money, but also involving abnormal delay. We agree with the view taken and cannot appreciate the conduct of a statutory body or statutory authority, like the appellants, of using a citizen’s property but not taking prompt steps to itself finalise the issue and, instead, taking shelter behind technicalities of law and driving them to Courts of law to get the desired relief. The State is expected as not to behave itself as an ordinary litigant, but is to invoke the judicial process and, more particularly that of the higher Courts only when questions of genuine general importance or statutory significance arise.
9. But, however, since the relief allowed in the Writ Petition was from 10-11-1988 at the rate of Rs. 30,000/-, we direct that the enhanced amount of Rs. 15,000/- (sic. Rs. 15,400/-) i.e., 4,400/- above Rs. 11,000/-, paid from 1-12-1984 under the interim directions of this Court will be available to be adjusted as against the rent payable from 10-11-1988 at the rate of Rs. 30,000/-.
10. In the result, the appeal has no merit and is dismissed with costs throughout. Hearing fee Rs. 1,000/- (Rupees one thousand only).