ORDER
Linga Raja Rath, J.
1. These cases, in which arguments have been advanced with great persistence by counsel on either side, essentially relate to one interesting question; where the Section 4 (1) Notification issued under the Land Acquisition Act, 1989 (for short “the Act”) is quashed by the High Court or the Supreme Court at the instance of some of the land owners, whether it is permissible for the other landholders whose lands are covered by the same notification but who have participated in the enquiry Under Section 5-A of the Act and at all other stages and in respect of whom awards have been passed and cases are pending before the civil Court for higher compensation can come before the High Court invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India after lapse of number of years to seek quashing of the acquisition proceedings in respect of their lands and restoration of possession of the land on the ground that the Section 4 (1) Notification has been quashed.
2. An enumeration of the facts, in brief, is necessary to project the analysis of the question raised, though we would have to refer in greater detail to the facts of each case later on.
3. A notification was published Under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act on 4-8-1977 purporting to acquire lands in Ameerpet in the city of Hyderabad for the public purpose of developing schemes of residential and commercial complexes by the Hyderabad Urban Development Authority (HUDA). The notification included the lands of the respondents in the Writ Appeals and the Petitioners in the Civil Revision Petitions and the Writ Petition. In the enquiries Under Section s 5-A, 9, etc., the respective land-holders participated and the matter went to the civil Court on references made Under Section s 18 or 30 of the Act. While the references were pending, decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeals Nos. 5839 to 5842 of 1983 came on 30-9-1985, quashing the notification Under Section 4 (1) of the Act at the instance of the four land-holders, whose land had been acquired by the same notification. The Supreme Court in effect confirmed the Full Bench decision of this Court decided on2-3-1983. The notification was found by the High Court to be invalid as it had not been published simultaneously at the site and it was found invalid by the Apex Court as the substance of the notification had not been published within forty days of the issue of Section 4 (1) Notification as was required to be done under the Andhra Pradesh Amendment to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Act 9 of 1983, enacted with retrospective effect from 12-9-1975. After the Judgment was delivered, some attempts were made by some of the previous landholder parties to move the Municipal Corporation to grant permission to them for construction oh the lands, which being ultimately refused, gave rise to Writ Petition No. 14570 /1993. In some other case, a memo was filed in the civil Court on behalf of the Land Acquisition Official to close the land acquisition cases in view of the Judgment of the Apex Court. But later on, another memo having been filed to confine the closure of the land acquisition cases only to the four land holders who had gone to the High Court and the Supreme Court and order having been accordingly passed, Writ Petition No. 14394/86, C.R.P.Nos. 4035 and 4036 of 1989, and Writ Petition No. 892/91 were filed.
4. Mr. N. Subba Reddy, learned counsel, appears for the appellants in Writ Appeal No. 811 of 1994, and Mr. P. Srinivas, learned counsel, appears for the appellant in Writ Appeal No. 1505 of 1989 and for the respondents in the C.R.Ps.
5. The substance of the argument advanced on behalf of the appellants in the writ appeals as also the respondents in the revision petitions and the writ petition is the same, that is, the plea of the High Court and the Supreme Court declaring the Section 4(1) Notification as invalid is available only to the respective land-holders who had assailed the notification. In respect of those lands the Collector has also issued a subsequent notification Under Section 4(1) on 22-4-1987. But the other land-holders, who had participated in the land acquisition proceedings throughout and had not raised the objection of the invalidity of the notice because of non-publication of it within forty days of the issue of the Section 4(1) notification at any time, are not entitled to seek the relief as claimed in the Writ Petition Nos. 14570/93 and 14394/86 as also in the C.R.P.Nos. 4035 and 4036 of 1989. Besides, it is also contended that the petitions are liable to be thrown out because of gross delay and laches in approaching the Court.
6. Resisting such contentions, it has been argued on behalf of the respondents that the invalidity of Section 4 (1) notification makes the notification void ab initio on which no proceedings could have ensued and that the proceedings that commenced were still-born on which no effect can be based. The respondents have all along continued in possession of the lands though a paper transaction was shown of having taken possession and that as the proceedings are void, the respondents have the constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India to hold their lands unless they are deprived of it by any authorised process in accordance with law, but that they cannot be deprived of their lands in pursuance of a void proceeding pursuant to Section 4 (1) notification issued on 4-8-1977.
7. To appreciate the respective contentions raised, it is necessary to traverse the history of the different decision, of this Court and the Apex Court bearing on the question.
8. Prior to the Andhra Pradesh Amendment Act 9 of 1983, the provisions of Section 4 of the Act stipulated publication of the substance of the notification at the site. Several decisions of this Court and other High Courts of which Chevuru Suryanaryana Reddy and Ors. v. Govt. of A.P. and Anr., (Expressly overruled by ) was a Division Bench decision of this Court have interpreted Section 4 (1) of the Act as requiring simultaneous publication of the notification and of its substance at the site, the infraction of which made the notification invalid. In the Full Bench decision K. Yadaiah and Ors. v. Govt. A.P. and Ors., 1983 (1) ALT 233 (F.B.) (Impliedly overruled by ) which arose out of the impugned notification Under Section 4(1) on the Act, the decision of the Division Bench was affirmed, holding that any notification, the substance of which has not been published simultaneously at the site, would render the notification and the proceedings invalid. After the decision of the Full Bench, the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was amended by the Andhra Pradesh Amendment Act 9 of 1983, stipulating that the publication of the substance of the notification is to to be made at the site within forty days of the date of the notification. The decision of the Full Bench was assailed in Civil Appeals Nos. 5839 to 5842 of 1983. But before the Civil Appeals were decided, the Supreme Court held in Deepak Pahwa, etc., v. Governor of Delhi and Ors., that Section 4 (1) notification in terms did not require simultaneous publication of the substance of the notification at the site along with the issuance of Section 4 (1) notification and all that was necessary was, that such publication shall be made within a reasonable time so as to not to break the continuity of the action. Thus, the decision of the Supreme Court expressly over-ruled the Division Bench decision of this Court in Chevuru Suryanarayana Reddy and Ors. v. Govt of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. (1 supra). In view of such decision, the Full Bench decision in K. Yadaiah and Ors. v. Govt. of A.P., 1983 (1) ALT 233 (F.B.) (Impliedly overruled by ) stood impliedly over-ruled. Thereafter, the Civil Appeals Nos.5839 to 5842 of 1983 were decided by the Supreme Court on 30-9-1985 in the Land Acquisition Officer, Hyderabad Urban Development Authority, Hyderabad v. Mohd. Amri Khan and Ors., 1986 (1) APLJ 14 (SC) explaining Deepak Pahwa’s case, and following it, it was held, so far as the Andhra Pradesh Amendment Act 9 of 1983 was concerned, that it was valid. The Court explained that while Deepak Pahrva’s case, had said that there should not be unreasonable delay between Section 4 (1) Notification and the publication of its substance at the site, the Andhra Pradesh Amendment Act 9 of 1983 had only purported to fix the time limit by which the notification should be published at the site and fixed the outer limit, and hence, unless the substance of the notification is published at the site within forty days, the notification is invalid. It is after this decision that the cause of action for the present cases arose.
9. Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was further amended by the Central Amendment Act 68 of 1984 by virtually recasting the Section, to read as follows:
“Whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose or for a company, a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette and in two daily news papers circulating in that locality of which at least one shall be in the regional language and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of the publication of the notification.”
10. There have been two other Full Bench decisions which are necessary to be noticed as being relevant. Shaik Kannam Saheb and Ors. v. The District Collector, Khammam and Ors., (F.B.). was a case in which the question before the Court was, whether publication of notification at the site within 40 days was still necessary evenafter the Central Amendment Act 68 of 1984. The Court held in the negative clarifying that no such publication was any longer necessary and any notice, if had not been so published yet would not render the land acquisition proceeding invalid, if the provisions of the Central Amendment Act 68/84 had been followed. The Court noticed Deepak Pahwas’s case (3 supra) and held that the purpose of Section 4(1) notification is to enable the persons interested to file objections in the enquiry Under Section 5-A of the Act (unless it is dispensed with) and that the decision of the Supreme Court in Deepak Pahwa’s case (3 supra) had made this abundantly clear.
11. Another Full Bench decision of this Court of which the Judgment is reported in Special Deputy Collector, L.A., Visakhapatnam Urban Development Authority v. M.J. Swamy, (F.B.). considered the question of the consequences of non-publication of the substance of Section 4(1) notification within 40 days. The question that fell for consideration before the Full Bench was, whether a fresh notification Under Section 4 (1) can be issued without withdrawing or cancelling the earlier notification which stood vitiated by the failure to publish the substance of it in the locality within the stipulated time. The State in that case having issued a fresh notification without formally withdrawing the earlier one such objection was taken by the land-holders. The Court held that non-publication of the substance of the notification at the locality within 40 days was a fatal infirmity in the notification, thereby invalidating the notification. ‘Invalidity in law’ or ‘bad in law’ are synonymous to cover a, void act or order and the notification which becomes so void does not exist in Law for any purpose, and the invalidity is so grave that the notification cannot be said to be legally existing on the expiry of 40 days. As the notification becomes a dead letter, the Collector can start further consequential proceedings for acquisition of land treating the notification to have abated. Taking such view, it was held that it was not necessary for formal cancellation of an invalid or inoperative notification to have been issued and that the Collector can straight away issue a notification afresh without formally cancelling or withdrawing the earlier one. It was urged before the Court on the authority of State of Mysore v. V.K-Kangan, ., where the Court had declined to quash the notification Under Section 4 (1) on the ground of failure to give public notice as there had been unreasonable lapse of time in filing the writ petition, that by implication the Supreme Court had recognised the validity of the notification despite the non-compliance with the statutory requirement of public notice. The Full Bench distinguishingly pointed out that the relief to be granted by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India rests on different principles and that the decision of the Supreme Court does not have bearing on the question whether the competent authority under the Land Acquisition Act can Ignore a void and inoperative notification and proceed to issue a fresh notification in its place. It is on the basis of this Full Bench Decision, the substance of the argument on behalf of the respondents is built up that the entire land acquisition proceedings have abated because of the invalid and void notification and that they are entitled to restoration of possession of the land.
12. Since the entire structure of the argument on behalf of the respondents is built up on the premises that the notification dated 4-8-1977 is void rendering all the proceedings taken up in pursuance thereof also void and still-born, the question has to be examined at a greater depth.
12-A. It is to be noticed that while the decision Land Acquisition Officer, HUDA. Hyderabad v. Mohd. Amri Khan and Ors. (4 supra) held the notification to be invalid, it is the Full Bench in Special Deputy Collector, LA., V.U.D.A., Visakhapatnam v. M.J. Swamy (6 supra) that declared the invalidity as void and the notification as being of no consequence of whatsoever. The question as to when the violation of a mandatory statutory provision makes an order a nullity was examined by the Supreme Court at length in a decision of recent origin in Krishan Lal v. State of J and K, The Court referred to series of earlier decisions including that of Privy Council in Vellayan Chettiar v. Govt. of the Province of Madras (AIR 1947 PC 197), view, of reputed authors on administrative law and interpretation of statutes and answered the question “As to when violation of a mandatory provision makes an order a nullity” saying that the issue”….. has been the subject matter of various decisions of this Court as well as of Courts beyond the seven seas.” The Court pointed out that a defective notice Under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not per se render the suit requiring issue of such notice as a precondition for institution of the same bad in the eye of law, since such a defect can be waived, as had been pointed out in AIR 1947 PC 197, for the reason that the protection Under Section 80 of C.P.C. is one only given to the person concerned, but who, if in a particular case do not require the protection, he can lawfully waive his right. Dhirendra Nath Gorai v. Shudir Chandra Ghosh was referred to point out that an act done in breach of a mandatory provision is not per force a nullity as if a Judgment-Debtor despite having received the notice of proclamation of sale did not object to the non-compliance of the required provision, he must be deemed to have waived his right conferred by that provision. It was pointed out that a mandatory provision can be waived if the same be aimed to safeguard the interest of an individual and has not been conceived in the public interest The Court noticed of the reiteration of the view in Lachoo Mai v. Radhey Shyam saying that where no question of policy, much less public policy is involved, the benefit or advantage could always be waived. The still more clinching case of Indira Bai v. Nand Kishore was referred to, which was a case in connection with the Section 8 of the Rajasthan Pre-emption Act, 1996 requiring a vendor to serve notice on persons having right of preemption at a condition of validity of transfer. The condition was held as amenable to waiver and it was pointed out that the nature of the interest created by the aforesaid section was a right of the party alone and not of the public as such, and that being so, it is capable of being abnegated, as such a right cannot be said to involve any interest of community or public welfare so as to be in mischief of public policy. The Court went on to refer to different texts and interpretation of Statutes by Maxwell, Crawford, Craies, Francis Bennion enunciating the principle of a right being capable of being waived when it is for the benefit of an individual in his private capacity. The maxim of Law ‘QUILIBET POTEST RENUNCIARE JURI PRO SE INTRODUCTO’ meaning ‘an individual may renounce a law made for his special benefit, ‘was extracted from Maxwell’s ‘The Interpretation of Statues’. While the views of Craies in his “Statute Law” took that if the object of a statute is “not one of general Policy, or if the thing which is being done will benefit only a particular person or class of persons, then the conditions prescribed by the statute are not considered as being indispensable “was noted, the opinion of Crawford in his “Interpretation of Laws”, while quoting the aforesaid maxim, that requirement like giving of notice may be waived as the same is intended for the benefit of the person concerned was referred to. The Court also referred to “Statutory Interpretation” (1984) of Francis Bennion in which the author observed that the person entitled to the performance can effectively waive performance of the duty by the person bound. The decisions in Toronto Corporation v. Ressel (1908 A.C., 493:24 TLR 908) and Stylo Shoes Limited v. Prices Tailors Limited (1960 Ch 396: (1959 3 ALL ER 901) were referred by the author as holding that a duty to give notice of certain matters can be waived by the person entitled to notice, if there is no express or implied indication that absence of notice would be fatal. The Apex Court also referred to Administrative Law by H.W.R. Wade, where the author quoted Lord Denning, MR’s observation in Wells v. Minister of Housing and Local Government (1967) 1 WLR 1000):(1967 (2) All England Reporter 1041):
“I take the law to be that a defect in procedure can be cured, and an irregularity can be waived, even by a public authority, so as to render valid that which would otherwise be invalid.”
The Court concluded that :-
“We may end this journey into the field of law by referring to the meaning of the words “irregularity” as given at page 469 of Vol. 22-A of “Words and Phrases” (Permanent Edition) and of ‘nullity’ at pages 772 and 773 of Vol.28-A of the aforesaid book. As to ‘irregularity’ it has been stated that it is “want of adherence to some prescribed rule or mode of proceedings” whereas “nullity” is “a void act or an act having no legal force or validity” as stated at Page 772. At page 773 it has been mentioned that the safest rule of distinction between an “irregularity” and a “nullity” is to see whether” a party can waive the objection: if he can waive, it amounts to irregularity and if he cannot, it is a nullity.”
13. We have referred the above said case in detail since the question arising for consideration before us has been directly dealt with therein and the ultimate test developed by Their Lordships to distinguish between irregularity and nullity is to see whether the right, the infringement of which is complained is one which could be waived in which case it would be an irregularity, and that which could not be waived would be an illegality. Viewed in this background, the distinction between the Full Bench decision in Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition, V.U.D.A., Visakhapatnam v. M.J. Swamy (6 supra) and that of Krishanlal”s case (8 supra) has to be borne in mind. Whereas in the case before the Supreme Court the nullity of the proceeding was examined from the stand point of the person who complains of violation of the condition the performance of which was to be in his favour, the Full Bench was examing the question as to the nullity or otherwise of the proceeding from the view point of not somebody, whose right had been affected because of the non-publication of the notice at the locality within the stipulated time, but from the angle of the authorities as to whether a fresh notification could be issued by the Government which had committed the breach of the provision, and whether they could treat the effect of the non-compliance as rendering the notice invalid and as requiring them to issue a fresh notification. The ambit of examination and the essence of the decision in the two cases are essentially, different and we are to hold that while the decision of the Full Bench is in no way affected by the decision of the Supreme Court and holds the field on its own, yet to the facts of the present case, the decision of the Supreme Court is exclusively appropriate and clinches the issue.
14. It is at this stage necessary to enquire as to whether the requirement of publication of the substance of the notification at the locality within 40 days is one which is capable of being waived. As has been seen, it was held in the earlier Full Bench decision in Shaik Kannam Saheb and Ors. v. The District Collector, Khammam (5 supra) in Paragraph-9.
“The object of the publication of the notification Under Section 4(1) is to enable the persons interested in filing objections for an enquiry Under Section 5-A (unless it is dispensed with). The decision of the Supreme Court reported in Deepak Pahwa v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (3 supra) also makes this abundantly dear.”
15. Section 5-A(1) provided at the relevant time that any person having interest in the land, which is notified Under Section 4(1), could object to the acquisition of the land within 30 days of causing the public notice. The section, coming immediately, after Sections 4 and 5, expressly refers to Section 4(1) and hence, it is proper to infer that the purpose of publication of Section 4(1) notification at the locality at the convenient place is for the purpose of giving notice to the person who is interested in the land to be aware of the notification and be able to object to the acquisition. This was also so recognised in Deepak Pahwa’s case (3 supra) in paragraph-4 of the Judgment. We are hence fortifed in our conclusion both on the authority of the Full Bench of this Court as well as of the Supreme Court that the purpose of the provision of publication of Section 4(1) notification at the site is intended for the benefit of the person who is interested in the land to be acquired, so as to enable him to effectively object to the acquisition proceedings. No public policy is involved in the prescription of the notice to be published at the site and the infraction thereof is not expected to cause any public inconvenience. The purpose of the condition being thus, it is, on the authority of the decision of the Supreme Court in (8 supra), available to be waived. Waiver, as is well known, can be either by express words or by necessary implication. If a person, who is entitled to complain of non-publication within 40 days yet does not make such a grievance and willingly participates in the enquiry made Under Section 5-A of the Act either independently or responding to the notice under that Section, it has to be necessarily held that he has waived his individual right, for which reason, so far as he is concerned, the land acquisition proceedings would not become a nullity or a void proceeding. Consequently, when the proceeding has been continued by the participation of the land-holders at the successive stages, even if they might not have agreed to the acquisition or have raised other objections to the acquisition, yet the proceeding would not be null or void so far as they are concerned and on the contrary, their participation would bring in an estoppel against them to challenge it subsequently on the ground which was available to them earlier but had been waived by them, if the other party to the acquisition has, in any way, changed its position and has acted to its detriment because of the in-action of the landholders to raise the question. It appears in the counter-affidavit filed by the 2nd respondent in Writ Petition No. 14394/86 from which Writ Appeal No. 1505 of 1989 arises, that compensation of Rs. 16,69,322-15 was deposited in the reference case Under Section 30 of the Act. It also appears in the Award that the compensation amount has been deposited by HUDA in the other cases also. Deposit of such huge amounts and its being blocked from any beneficial use to the appellant-HUDA is detrimental to it by itself. The conclusion being reached as such, the submission urged on the basis of Article 300-A also does not survive the land acquisition proceedings being held not to be invalid or void. The question of any deprivation of the respondents of their land by process not authorised by law does not arise.
16. At this stage, it will be beneficial to refer to the individual cases for consideration of the question of delay and laches. The Judgment of the Apex Court was delivered on 30th September, 1985. So far as the respondents in Writ Appeal No. 811 of 1994 are concerned, it is for the first time that on 14-12-1987, an advocate notice was issued to the appellants referring to the Judgments of the Supreme Court and the Full Bench of this Court that they should not interfere with the possession and enjoyment of the land of the respondents. Thereafter the matter was pursued by them before the Municipal Commissioner to grant them permission and sanction plan and lay out for construction upon the lands and some efforts were also made by way of filing Writ Petition No. 1191 of 1991, seeking direction to the Municipal Authorities to grant statutory permission for the construction of the buildings, the case was disposed of on 30th January, 1991 directing the Municipal Corporation to decide the application within four weeks. The Municipal Council decided on 22-1-1992 against the respondents as they were not parties before the Supreme Court and were also not in the possession of the land. Writ Petition No. 1783 of 1992 was filed by the respondents, which was disposed of on 25th June, 1992 directing the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad to dispose of the matter as per rules after giving opportunity to all the concerned parties. Ultimately, the Municipal Corporation decided against the respondents on 8-8-1993. Writ Petition No. 14570 of 1993 was filed on 22-9-1993, which was decided on 23-6-1994, taking the view of the entire land acquisition proceedings being void ab initio and directing the M.C.H. to consider the application of the respondents without reference to the contentions of the appellants and decide the matter within four weeks.
17. So far as events prior to 14-12-1987 when the notice was given to the appellants are concerned the facts are that Sri T. Lakshmaiah, the land-holder to whom the present respondents have succeeded had stated om 26-5-1978 in the Section 5-A enquiry that he had no hesitation for acquiring the land in Survey No. 244/2, that he should be provided with alternative land as he had no other houses for residential purposes, and regarding Survey No. 246, measuring 16 guntas, his objection was that he has been cultivating the land personally, that he had no objection for the acquisition but that besides payment of good compensation he should be allotted a Mulgi when the super bazar is constructed. He, thus, made it abundantly clear that he had no objection to the acquisition of tine land but should be compensated suitably. The notice of the award enquiry was duly sent to him and the Award was made on 27-7-1981. Notice Under Section 12(2) of the Act to receive compensation was given on the same day. On 30-4-1979, an application was made by him to the Land Acquisition Officer stating that if the Department is bent upon to acquire the land, he is ready to part with the same at the rate of Rs. 200/- per square yard. On 12-7-1981, one Smt. P. Satyamma issued a letter to the Land Acquisition Officer with T. Laxmaiah as a co-signatory, that the land acquisition case had come to a final stage in which Award has to be passed and that 100 square yards should be recorded in her name.
18. So far as the facts in Writ Appeal No. 1505 of 1989 are concerned, notice for Section 5-A enquiry was issued on 12-5-1978, to which objections were filed by the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents, P. Madhusudhan Reddy on 26-5-1978 seeking denotification of the land as he had sold the land to a Cooperative Housing Society. No objection was taken of the land being not liable for acquisition because of non-publication of the notification at the locality within forty days. Section5-A enquiry was commenced on 29-5-1978 and closed on 26-7-1978 and thereafter, Section 6 declaration was made on 15-2-1979. Notices for Award enquiry was issued on 13-2-1979. The enquiry was held from 11-4-1979 to 6-7-1981 in which P. Madhusudhana Reddy, filed a claim petition on20-7-1979, in view of the nature of the land, claiming compensation at the rate of Rs. 200/- per square yard. Similarly, a claim was filed on the same day by the respondent Smt. P. Kamala Devi, claiming the compensation at the same rates. The Award was made on 27-7-1981 and the claimants were given notice on 28-7-1981 to deliver possession of the land. The land was taken possession on 4-8-1981 through Panchanama. While the matter was pending before the I Addl. Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, Under Section 30 reference in O.P.Nos. 12 and 13 of 1983, a Memo was filed by the Land Acquisition Officer on 20-3-1986 stating that since because of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in The Land Acquisition Officer, Hyderabad Urban Development Authority, Hyderabad v. Mohd. Amri Khan and Ors. (4 supra), the case should be closed. In June, 1986, a Memo was filed by the claimants-respondents in relation to the memo filed by the Land Acquisition Officer saying that the land acquisition cases are to be dosed. But on 17-7-1986, the Land Acquisition Officer filed a modified Memo, requesting for closure of O.P.Nos. 12 and 13 of 1983 only in respect of claimants Nos. 9 to 15, 23 to 33 in O.P.No. 12 of 1983 and claimants Nos. 16 to 20, 26 and 27 in O.P.No. 13/83, ie., the persons who had filed the Writ Petitions Nos. 5563/ 81, 5722/81, 5644/81 and 5538/81 which had ultimately ended in the Supreme Court. On filing of such a memo by the Land Acquisition Officer, the respondents filed Writ Petition No. 14394 of 1986, which, having been allowed on 12-9-1989, the Writ Appeal No. 1505 of 1989 has been filed.
19. So far as the two C.R.Ps.No. 4035 and 4036 of 1980 are concerned, the facts are similar with the difference that not only the petitioners had participated throughout in the land acquisition proceedings at all stages but also when the memo was filed by the Land Acquisition Officer on 20-3-1986 seeking closure of O.P.Nos. 12 and 13 of 1983 and the Civil Court having issued a Memo, dated 8-4-1986 calling upon the petitioners to redeposit the amounts that had already been received by them, the claimants filed a Counter Memo on 15-4-1986 opposing the request of closure of the cases and the learned I Addl. Judge passed order on 6-9-1989 confirming the closure of the cases only to the claimants in the four earlier writ petitions and it is then only these two C.R.Ps. have been filed.
20. The facts in Writ Petition No. 792 of 1991 are similar to that of these two C.R.Ps. The petitioners also received the compensation amount and have straight away filed the writ petition, seeking denotification of the land as a consequence of the decision of the Supreme Court. The possession of the lands involved in both the C.R.Ps. and the writ petition has also been taken over.
21. The narration of the facts disclose that eventhough the award was passed on 27-7-1981, the earliest challenge before this Court to the notification was only in the year 1986 by the wife and sons of Sri P. Madhusudhana Reddy. Before that, they participated in Section 5-A award inquiry, during which they lodged their claim as to the rate at which the compensation was to be paid to them. The heirs of T. Lakshmaiah filed a Writ Petition only in 1993, while C.R.Ps. were filed in the year 1989 and the other writ petition was filed in the year 1991. Even apart from the delay in filing the writ petition, no objection has been raised by Shri P. Madhusudhana Reddy, his wife and sons after the judgment of the Supreme Court was delivered and it is only in June, 1986 they filed a Memo, claiming closure of O.P.Nos.12 and 13 of 1983, after such a Memo had been filed by the Land Acquisition Officer. In W.A.811/1994 the earliest objection wa9 only on 14-12-1987, whereas in the other cases it was much long after. These facts go to show that the petitions suffer from gross laches and delay.
22. In Aflatoon and Ors. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Ors., . where notification Under Section 4(1) had been issued in the year 1939 but the writ petition was filed in the year 1972, by which time Section-6 declaration had been made, on the ground that the notification did not specify the public purpose for which the land was to be acquired and that the Chief Commissioner was not competent to issue the notification, the Court observed, throwing out the challenge:
“To have sat on the fence and allowed the Government to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis that the notification Under Section 4 and the declaration Under Section 6 were valid and then to attack the notification on grounds which were available to them at the time when the notification was published would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics. The writ petitions are liable to the dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioners.”
This decision was followed in Smt. Ratni Deviand Anr. v. Chief Commissioner, Delhi and Ors., . State of Mysore and Ors. v. V.K. Kangan and Ors. (7 supra) was a case similar to the present one. There, the notification Under Section 4 was published on 13-4-1967 and objections were filed by the respondent Under Section 5-A of the Act. Objections were overruled by the Government and the notification u/s.6 of the Act was published on 19-10-1968. The writ petition, challenging the notifications was filed sometime in July or August, 1969 on the ground that public notice as required by Section 4 of the Act was not given which per se vitiated the notification Under Section 4. The Court held that the respondent is not entitiled to challenge the validity of the notification, as he should have challenged its validity within a reasonable time of its publication. It was observed:-
“We do not think that the respondent was entitled to challenge the validity of the notification Under Section 4 of the Act as the writ petition challenging the notification was filed after an unreasonable lapse of time. If public notice as required by Section-4 of the Act was not given and that would per se vitiate the notification Under Section-4, the appellant should have challenged its validity within a reasonable time of the publication of the notification. The respondent knew of the notification and filed objection Under Section 5-A of the Act. In these circumstances, we see no reason to accept the submission of counsel.”
23. Har Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab, is a case where the appellant had no complaint against the acquisition and had only wanted higher compensation. It was held that the appellant, having acquiesced in the acquisition of land cannot challenge the notification.
24. On the strength of these authorities we are to hold that the petitions are barred by delay and laches.
25. Having reached the conclusions, we are confronted with the situation that while a portion of the land acquired under notification on 4-8-1977 have been renotified again on 22-4-1987 and fresh proceedings are continuing in respect of that, the lands of the present respondents which had been notified in the year 1977 are to be dealt with in those proceedings and the compensation determined on the basis of the 1977 notification eventhough admittedly the lands in both the notifications of the years 1977 and 1987 form one contiguous patch.
26. It has been argued by Mr. K.G. Kannabhiran, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in the Civil revisions that an obvious discrimination is practised because of determination of compensation in respect of the same lands by different modes, remitting in payment of higher compensation to a group of persons. No doubt the respondents themselves are responsible for the circumstance for having not challenged the 1977 notification in time. But it is well known that where obvious inequalities result, the Court may, in deciding an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, also modify the relief. In Ved Prakash and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (1994)1 SCC 45 this principle was acknowledged. The Court observed that the relief of quashing the acquisition proceedings having become inappropriate due to the subsequent events, the grant of a modified relief, considered appropriate in the circumstances, would be the proper course to adopt. The High Court or the Supreme Court can grant a modified relief taking into consideration the injury caused to the claimants by the inaction on the part of the respondents and direct payment of any additional amount in exercise of power under Article 226 or Article 32.”
27. In that case, the Court directed payment of an additional amount of compensation at the rate of 12% per annum. In some other cases, the Supreme Court postponed the Section 4(1) notification to a later date to ameliorate the situation, of which reference will be made to Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v. Raj Kumar John and Ors., .
28. In Gauri Shankar Gaur and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors.1, the Supreme Court directed that “it is not in the interest of justice to quash the proceedings, but the appellants shall be paid compensation of the land acquired at market value prevalent in the year in which the declaration analogous to Section 6 of the L.A. Act published issued by fictionally assuming that fresh notification under the Act analogous to Section 4 was issued in that year.”
29. The principle of payment of higher compensation for identical lands, is reflected in Section 28-A of the Act which however requires that where land covered under the same notification Under Section 4 of the Act is admitted to higher compensation than what has been awarded by the Collector Under Section 11 of the Act, all interested persons, whose lands have been acquired by the same notification, may apply to the Collector within three months, eventhough they might not have made applications earlier Under Section 18 of the Act, for redetermination of the compensation payable to them on the basis of the award passed by the Court. It is true that, in the present case, the lands of the respondents are not covered by the same notification Under Section 4 of the Act, as 1987 notification Under Section 4 of the Act is confined to the lands of the persons, who had challenged the Section 4(1) notification of the year 1977 only. But keeping the underlying principle in view, we think that equity of the situation would be appropriately met by directing that as and when the award is passed in respect of the notification, dated 22-4-1987 and any subsequent award is made by the Court in reference Under Section 18 of the Act, the respondents in these cases shall be entitled to have their compensation determined on the same basis by an application made to the Collector within three months of the award by the Court or the Collector, as the case may be.
30. We, however, make it clear in redetermination of the compensation, the respondents shall not be entitled to interest on the compensation from 1977 to 1987.
31. It is submitted by Mr. E. Ayyapu Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents, that the respondents viz., Smt Talari Gangamma, Talari Venkatesh, Talari Ashok and Talari Anjaneyulu, are now residing in the huts constructed by them in the premises in question and that they should be given some time to vacate. Considering his request, the aforesaid respondents are allowed time for two months to vacate the premises. But it is made dear that they shall exercise no act of possession in the surrounding lands and shall remain in the huts and the vacant possession of their houses shall be handedover after two months from to-day, falling which, it shall be contempt of the Court.
32. In the result, Writ Appeals No. 811 of 1994 and 1505 of 1989 are allowed and the C.R.P. Nos. 4035 and 4036 of 1989 and Writ Petition No. 792 of 1991 and the Cross-Objections in the Writ Appeal 811/1994 are dismissed subject to the observations regarding the reliefs. No costs.
33. At the conclusion of the Judgment, an oral application is made for grant of leave to the Supreme Court of India by the learned counsel for the respondents. After hearing them, we do not find any substantial question of law relating to the interpretation of the Constitution involved in the case or that the case involves any substantial question of law of general importance, which, in our opinion, is necessary to be decided by the Supreme Court. Leave is rejected.