ORDER
V. Gopala Gowda, J.
1. Petitioners in these writ petitions have sought for issuance of a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 16-6-2000 passed by the Labour Court, Chickmagalur, in I.D. No. 57 of 1990 as per Annexure-B urging various grounds.
2. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of D.P. Maheshwari v Delhi Administration and Ors., , wherein the Supreme Court interpreting the powers of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India and the discretionary and supervisory powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when the interlocutory orders are challenged by the employer has laid down the law at paragraph (1) to the following effect.–
“We think it is better that Tribunals, particularly those entrusted with the task of adjudicating labour disputes where delay may lead to misery and jeopardise industrial peace, should decide all issues in dispute at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary issues. Nor should High Courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution stop proceedings before a Tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by them. Neither the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution nor the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 may be allowed to be exploited by those who can well-afford to wait to the detriment of those who can ill afford to wait by dragging the latter from Court to Court for adjudication of peripheral issues, avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. Articles 226 and 136 are not meant to be used to break the resistance of workmen in this fashion. Tribunals and Courts who are requested to decide preliminary questions must therefore ask themselves whether such threshold part-adjudication is really necessary and whether it will not lead to other woeful consequences”.
3. The said legal principle has been reiterated in another two judgments of the Supreme Court in National Council for Cement and Building Materials v. State of Haryana and Ors., (1996)3 SCC 202 and Raunaq International Limited v. I.V.R. Construction Limited and Ors., . Further in Cooper Engineering Limited v. P.P. Mundhe, law has been succinctly laid down as hereunder.–
“19. We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that when a case of dismissal or discharge of an employee is referred for industrial adjudication the Labour Court should first decide as a preliminary issue whether the domestic enquiry has violated the principles of natural justice. When there is no domestic enquiry or defective enquiry is admitted by the employer, there will be no difficulty. But when the matter is in controversy between the parties that question must be decided as a preliminary issue. On that decision being pronounced it will be for the management to decide whether it will adduce any evidence before the Labour Court. If it chooses not to adduce any evidence, it will not be thereafter permissible in any proceeding to raise the issue. We should also make it clear that there will be no justification for any party to stall the final adjudication of the dispute by the Labour Court by questioning its decision with regard to the preliminary issue when the matter, if worthy, can be agitated even after the final award. It will be also legitimate for the High Court to refuse to intervene at this stage. We are making these observations in our anxiety that there is no undue delay in industrial adjudication”.
4. The Labour Court for the reasons recorded in the impugned order passed on I.A. No. II filled by the employer seeking to lead evidence on merits has rejected the same placing reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shambhu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda and Ors., and the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, Bangalore v. G.B. Basangoudar and Anr., 1992(2) Kar. L.J. 180, ILR 1992 Kar., wherein this Court placing reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court referred to supra, in the said case at paragraph 6 has succinctly laid down the law holding that the Labour Court was justified in refusing to allow the appellant therein to file further application to lead evidence and thus to lead evidence before it to support the charge of misconduct levelled against the workman and that if the employer is aggrieved of the order passed on the preliminary issue or on the interlocutory order, the same can be challenged after determination of the dispute between the parties, if the award is passed against the employer.
5. In this view of the matter, the Labour Court has rightly rejected the application for the reasons recorded in the impugned order holding that the preliminary issue regarding the validity of the domestic enquiry was answered against the petitioner/Management vide its order dated 5-11-1998; that thereafter though adequate opportunity was given to it to lead evidence on merits, with an intention to prolong the proceedings it did not lead evidence that thereafter the case was posted for hearing the arguments on merits; that having regard to the pendency of the matter since 1983 and the fact that 17 years had elapsed as on the date of passing of the impugned order, if the permission is granted to lead evidence on merits, again the proceedings will be delayed and in that event, the concerned workman would be put to great hardship and inconvenience. For the above said reasons it cannot be termed as arbitrary exercise of power by the Labour Court taking into consideration the relevant facts, namely the pendency of the dispute before it for a period of 17 years as on the date of passing of the order and also the fact that for nearly two years, the petitioner did not take necessary steps to adduce evidence. Hence, I do not find any good reason to interfere with the impugned order.
6. During the pendency of these writ petitions, since the impugned order is challenged, this Court suggested for payment of interim relief from the date of setting aside the validity of the domestic enquiry till the date of adjudication of the main dispute if the petitioner wanted to justify its order or in the alternative to pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/- to each one of the workmen to see that the cases are decided on merits by the Labour Court by remanding the matter. Though the matters were adjourned from time to time, the petitioner/employer has made submissions that the petitioner is not willing to pay interim relief to the workmen. For this reason also, this Court need not interfere with the impugned order. Hence, these petitions must fail. Accordingly, these petitions are dismissed.