High Court Madras High Court

The Managing Director vs S.Shanmugam on 25 October, 2010

Madras High Court
The Managing Director vs S.Shanmugam on 25 October, 2010
       

  

  

 
 
 BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT

DATED: 25/10/2010

CORAM
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE K.CHANDRU

W.P.(MD)No.4260 of 2008
a n d
W.P.(MD) No.13249 of 2009

W.P.(MD) No.4260 of 2008

The Managing Director
Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation
  (Madurai Division -1) Ltd
Bye-Pass Road
Madurai.				...		Petitioner

Vs

S.Shanmugam				...		Respondent


W.P.(MD) No.13249 OF 2009

S.Shanmugam				...		Petitioner

Vs

The Managing Director
Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation
  (Madurai Division -1) Ltd
Bye-Pass Road
Madurai.				...		Respondent


PRAYER in W.P (MD) No.4260 of 2008

Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, praying for the issuance of Writ of certiorari to call
for the records pertaining to the order passed by the labour Judge, Madurai in
I.D.No.125 of 2004 dated 14/6/2007 and quash the same as illegal.

PRAYER in W.P (MD) No.13249 of 2009

Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, praying for the issuance of Writ of certiorarified
mandamus to call for the records relating to the award passed by the labour
Court in I.D.No.128 of 2004 and quash the same in so far as it relates to denial
of backwages to the petitioner, consequently to direct the respondent to pay the
backwages to the petitioner with effect from 5/10/2000.

In W.P.(MD) No.4260 of 2008

!For Petitioner     ... Mr.M.Prakash
^For Respondents    ... Mr.S.M.Mohan Gandhi

In W.P.(MD) No.13249 of 2009
For Petitioner     ... Mr.S.M.Mohan Gandhi
For Respondents	   ... Mr.M.Prakash

- - - - -

:COMMON ORDER
	It is the State Transport Corporation, Madurai Division (herein after
called as the 'Management'), aggrieved by both the order of reinstatement with
service continuity but without backwages has filed the first writ petition viz.,
W.P.(MD) No.4260 of 2008.

	2.  In the second writ petition viz., W.P.(MD) No.13249 of 2009, the
workman has filed the writ petition, challenging that portion of the order in
declining to grant the benefit of backwages with effect from 5/10/2000, which is
a date of his non-employment.

	3.  In view of the interconnectivity between both the writ petitions, they
were grouped together and a common order is passed.

	4.  In the first writ petition, notice regarding admission was granted on
30/4/2008.  Pending the writ petition, interim stay was granted.  By order dated
22/8/2008, interim stay was extended until further orders in M.P.No.1 of 2008.
Subsequently, on a petition being filed by the workman in M.P.No.2 of 2008, this
Court granted a payment under section 17 (B) as an interim relief.  The
petitioner thereafter, filed M.P.No.1 of 2009 seeking for the payment of full
wages.

	5.  It is during the pendency of the writ petition, the worker has filed
another cross-objection which came up for admission on 15/12/2009 and
accordingly, it was admitted.  On notice, the Management has filed a counter.
It is seen from the records that the petitioner in W.P.(MD) No.13249 of 2009 was
appointed as a Conductor on 20/10/1993.  Subsequently, the Corporation found
that he was a chronic absentee and a charge memo was issued in terms of standing
order Clause 16 (7) and a domestic enquiry was conducted.   The petitioner not
only did not give any explanation also did not attend the enquiry.  The enquiry
was held ex parte and the Enquiry Officer found the petitioner did not give any
explanation and therefore, he was dismissed from service on 5/10/2000.
Subsequently after three and a half years later, he raised the dispute.  Before
the labour Court, on the side of the workman, two documents were filed and
marked as Exs.W.1 and W.2 and on the side of the Management,  8 documents  were
filed and marked as Exs.M.1 to M.8.  The labour Court found that the enquiry was
held fair and proper and despite several opportunities, the petitioner did not
avail the same.  But, however, the labour Court also found that the charge of
absence was proved.  But considering the petitioner was worked for seven years
and he was searching for his lost son and also due to ailment, he could not come
to work and hence, the Labour Court, Madurai dismissed the claim of back wages.
But on the quantum of relief, the Management contended that since the petitioner
who did not come to work, no wages should be paid to him on that account.

	6.  In this context, it is necessary to refer to the decision of the
Supreme Court in J.K. Synthetics Ltd. Vs. K.P. Agrawal reported in (2007) 2 SCC
433, wherein it is held as follows:-

19.But the cases referred to above, where back wages were awarded, related to
termination/retrenchment which were held to be illegal and invalid for non-
compliance with statutory requirements or related to cases where the Court found
that the termination was motivated or amounted to victimisation. The decisions
relating to back wages payable on illegal retrenchment or termination may have
no application to the case like the present one, where the termination
(dismissal or removal or compulsory retirement) is by way of punishment for
misconduct in a departmental inquiry, and the court confirms the finding
regarding misconduct, but only interferes with the punishment being of the view
that it is excessive, and awards a lesser punishment, resulting in the
reinstatement of employee. Where the power under Article 226 or Section 11-A of
the Industrial Disputes Act (or any other similar provision) is exercised by any
court to interfere with the punishment on the ground that it is excessive and
the employee deserves a lesser punishment, and a consequential direction is
issued for reinstatement, the court is not holding that the employer was in the
wrong or that the dismissal was illegal and invalid. The court is merely
exercising its discretion to award a lesser punishment. Till such power is
exercised, the dismissal is valid and in force. When the punishment is reduced
by a court as being excessive, there can be either a direction for reinstatement
or a direction for a nominal lump sum compensation. And if reinstatement is
directed, it can be effective either prospectively from the date of such
substitution of punishment (in which event, there is no continuity of service)
or retrospectively, from the date on which the penalty of termination was
imposed (in which event, there can be a consequential direction relating to
continuity of service). What requires to be noted in cases where finding of
misconduct is affirmed and only the punishment is interfered with (as contrasted
from cases where termination is held to be illegal or void) is that there is no
automatic reinstatement; and if reinstatement is directed, it is not
automatically with retrospective effect from the date of termination. Therefore,
where reinstatement is a consequence of imposition of a lesser punishment,
neither back wages nor continuity of service nor consequential benefits, follow
as a natural or necessary consequence of such reinstatement. In cases where the
misconduct is held to be proved, and reinstatement is itself a consequential
benefit arising from imposition of a lesser punishment, award of back wages for
the period when the employee has not worked, may amount to rewarding the
delinquent employee and punishing the employer for taking action for the
misconduct committed by the employee. That should be avoided. Similarly, in such
cases, even where continuity of service is directed, it should only be for
purposes of pensionary/retirement benefits, and not for other benefits like
increments, promotions, etc."

	7.  Therefore, the Managements' contention that the labour Court has
exercised its discretion improperly, cannot be accepted.  The workman's claim
that he is eligible for back wages even for the period that he did not work also
cannot be considered.

	8.  In this context, the Supreme court in case of absence, the discretion
of the labour Court to exercise its power under Section 11 A came to be
considered in L&T Komatsu Ltd. v. N. Udayakumar reported in (2008) 1 SCC 224 and
the relevant paragraphs are extracted hereunder:-

9.In LIC of India v. R. Dhandapani2, it was held as follows
......

In recent times, there is an increasing evidence of this, perhaps well-meant but
wholly unsustainable, tendency towards a denudation of the legitimacy of
judicial reasoning and process. The reliefs granted by the courts must be seen
to be logical and tenable within the framework of the law and should not incur
and justify the criticism that the jurisdiction of the courts tends to
degenerate into misplaced sympathy, generosity and private benevolence. It is
essential to maintain the integrity of legal reasoning and the legitimacy of the
conclusions. They must emanate logically from the legal findings and the
judicial results must be seen to be principled and supportable on those
findings. Expansive judicial mood of mistaken and misplaced compassion at the
expense of the legitimacy of the process will eventually lead to mutually
irreconcilable situations and denude the judicial process of its dignity,
authority, predictability and respectability. (See Kerala Solvent Extractions
Ltd. v. A. Unnikrishnan3.)

Though under Section 11-A, the Tribunal has the power to reduce the quantum of
punishment it has to be done within the parameters of law. Possession of power
is itself not sufficient; it has to be exercised in accordance with law.

The High Court found that the Industrial Tribunal had not indicated any reason
to justify variations of the penalty imposed. Though learned counsel for the
respondent tried to justify the award of the Tribunal and submitted that the
Tribunal and the learned Single Judge have considered the case in its proper
perspective, we do not find any substance in the plea. Industrial Tribunals and
Labour Courts are not forums whose task is to dole out private benevolence to
workmen found by the Labour Court/Tribunal to be guilty of misconduct. The
Tribunal and the High Court, in this case, have found a pattern of defiance and
proved misconduct on not one but on several occasions. The compassion which was
shown by the Tribunal and unfortunately endorsed by the learned Single Judge was
fully misplaced.”

10.In Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. N.B. Narawade4 it was noted as follows: (SCC
p.141, para 20)

“20. It is no doubt true that after introduction of Section 11-A in the
Industrial Disputes Act, certain amount of discretion is vested with the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal in interfering with the quantum of punishment awarded
by the management where the workman concerned is found guilty of misconduct. The
said area of discretion has been very well defined by the various judgments of
this Court referred to hereinabove and it is certainly not unlimited as has been
observed by the Division Bench of the High Court. The discretion which can be
exercised under Section 11-A is available only on the existence of certain
factors like punishment being disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct so
as to disturb the conscience of the court, or the existence of any mitigating
circumstances which require the reduction of the sentence, or the past conduct
of the workman which may persuade the Labour Court to reduce the punishment. In
the absence of any such factor existing, the Labour Court cannot by way of
sympathy alone exercise the power under Section 11-A of the Act and reduce the
punishment. As noticed hereinabove at least in two of the cases cited before us
i.e. Orissa Cement Ltd.5 and New Shorrock Mills6 this Court held: ‘Punishment of
dismissal for using of abusive language cannot be held to be disproportionate.’
In this case all the forums below have held that the language used by the
workman was filthy. We too are of the opinion that the language used by the
workman is such that it cannot be tolerated by any civilised society. Use of
such abusive language against a superior officer, that too not once but twice,
in the presence of his subordinates cannot be termed to be an indiscipline
calling for lesser punishment in the absence of any extenuating factor referred
to hereinabove.”

10. In view of the above factual matrix and the legal precedents, both
the writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the connected
Miscellaneous Petitions are closed. The Management is hereby directed to
implement the award within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a
copy of this order.

mvs.