JUDGMENT
Rajesh Tandon, J.
1. Heard Sri Lalit Belwal counsel for the review applicant and Sri Lalit Sharma counsel for the respondent No. 2.
2. The National Insurance Co. has filed the present review application against the judgment dated 1.10.2007 passed by this Court. The grounds taken for the review of the judgment are that the amount calculated as compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act is wrong. Further ground is that the rate of interest can be calculated only from the date of the award of the Workmen Compensation Commissioner till the deposit of the amount by insurance company.
3. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the review application are quoted below:
6. That when the judgment was received, then it transpired that this Hon’ble court has considered that as per the provisions of the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923 the claim comes to Rs. 98,977/-, which is totally wrong as this is the amount which will come on the death of the employee and not in the present case, where disability has been pleaded. This Honb’ble Court has also failed to consider the arguments raised that without proving the disability and the percentage of the disability, the claim cannot be calculated as the compensation has to be derived as per the details given in Part I and Part II of the Schedule I of the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923 and thus the judgment is liable to be reviewed accordingly. The certified copy of the judgment dated 1.10.2007 is being filed as Annexure No. A-1 to this affidavit.
7. That arguments were also advance don the point that as per the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Civil Appeal No. 5623 of 2006, National Insurance Co. Ltd. versus Mubasir Ahmed copy of which was supplied at the time of advancing arguments, the liability of the appoellant insurance company if comes, if any, under the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923 then the rate of interest can be calculated only from the date of the award of the Workmen Compensation Commissioner till the deposit of the amount by insurance company and not beyond that but this point was not touched as the liability under the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923 was not considered.
4. Counsel for the review applicant has placed reliance on the observations made by the Apex Court in the case National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Prembai Patel . The said case law has already been relied upon by this court in the impugned judgment dated 1.10.2007. There is no impediment for the legal representatives of the deceased employee or injured employee himself to file a claim petition under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, for the grant of compensation before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal instead of filing before the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner. The case will proceed according to the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act and compensation will be awarded according to the norms prescribed therein but in that case the liability of the insurance company would be restricted to that arising under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and additional amount, if any, would be paid by the owner/insured of the vehicle. The argument of the counsel for the appellant has been duly considered in the judgment and calculation of compensation was made according to the provisions of Workmen’s Compensation Act, which was found more than the amount awarded as compensation by the Claims Tribunal.
5. It was also held that no permission under Section 170 of the M.V. Act has been obtained by the Insurance Company, therefore, no appeal lies on the quantum of compensation as held by the Apex Court in the case National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nocolletta Rohtangi .
6. So far as the interest on the amount of compensation is concerned, the Claims Tribunal has awarded interest from the date of petition which is quite justified but the review applicant in paragraph 7 of the affidavit has submitted that according to the provisions of Workmen’s Compensation Act, interest is payable from the date of award. Counsel for the review applicant has relied upon the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd; v. Mubasir Ahmed and Anr. II (2007) ACC 374 (SC) in support of his contention. This case law has been cited by this Court in number of judgments and in A.O. No. 23-A of 2001 decided on 17.7.2007 it has been held that the date of adjudication referred in the said case law is date of examination of the injuries by a medical practitioner. Thus under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, interest is payable from the date of examination of the injured or deceased employee by a medical practitioner.
7. Thus the review petition is liable to be rejected in view of the fact that the grounds taken by the review petitioner have already been discussed and considered on merit. The power of review cannot be exercised as an alternative mode of appeal or to permit the parties to provide another opportunity of hearing on merit.
8. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case Northern India Cateres (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi has observed as under:
It is well-settled that a party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by this Court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so: Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan. For instance, if the attention of the Court is not drawn to a material statutory provision during the original hearing, the Court will review its judgment: G.L. Gupta v. D.N. MehtaiS. The Court may also reopen its judgment if a manifest wrong has been done and it is necessary to pass an order to do full and effective justice: O.N. Mohindroo v. Distt. Judge, Delhi. Power to review its judgments has been conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 137 of the Constitution, and that power is subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or the rules made under Article 145. In a civil proceeding, an application for review is entertained only on a ground mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in a criminal proceeding on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record (Order 40 Rule 1, Supreme Court Rules, 1966). But whatever the nature of the proceeding, it is beyond dispute that a review proceeding cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case, and the finality of the judgment delivered by the Court will not be reconsidered except “where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility”: Sow Chandra Kante v. Sheikh Habib .
9. In the case Parison Devi v. Sumitri Devi Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that while exercising power under Order XL VII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is not permissible for erroneous decision to be reheard and corrected and the power of review cannot be exercised to be an appeal in disguise. Hon’ble Supreme has observed as under:
It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt of A.P. (SCR at p. 186) this Court opined:
What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any substantial question of law is an ‘error apparent on the face of the record’. The fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an ‘error apparent on the face of the record’, for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by ‘error apparent’. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error.
Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise.
10. In the case Union of India v. Paul Manicram the preposition of law discussed as above hs been consistently upheld by the Apex Court.
As noted supra, for the first time in the review application it was disclosed that the representation was made to the President of India and no representation was made to the State of Tamil Nadu or the Union of India who were arrayed in the writ petition as parties. This appears to he a deliberate attempt to create confusion and reap an undeserved benefit by adopting such dubious device. The High Court also transgressed its jurisdiction in entertaining the review petition with an entirely new substratum of issues. Considering the limited scope for review, the High Court ought not to have taken into account factual aspects which were not disclosed or were concealed in the writ petition. While dealing with a habeas corpus application undue importance is not to be attached to technicalities, but at the same time where the court is satisfied that an attempt has been made to deflect the course of justice by letting loose red herrings the court has to take serious note of unclean approach. Whenever a representation is made to the President and the Governor instead of the indicated authorities, it is but natural that the representation should indicate as to why the representation was made to the President or the Governor and not the indicated authorities. It should also be clearly indicated as to whom the representation has been made specifically, and not in the manner done in the case at hand. The President as well as the Governor, no doubt are constitutional Heads of the respective Governments but the day-to-day administration at respective levels is carried on by the Heads of the Departments/Ministries concerned and the designated officers who alone are ultimately responsible and accountable for the action taken or to be taken in a given case. If really the citizen concerned genuinely and honestly felt or was interested in getting an expeditious consideration or disposal of his grievance, he would and should honestly approach the real authorities concerned and would not adopt any dubious devices with the sole aim of deliberately creating a situation for delay in consideration and cry for relief on his own manipulated ground, by directing his representation to an authority which is not directly immediately concerned with such consideration.
11. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi has observed that rehearing the matter for detecting an error in the earlier decision and then correcting the same do not fall within the ambit of review jurisdiction. The Apex Court has observed as under:
It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of this Court opined:
What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any substantial question of law is an ‘error apparent on the face of the record’). The fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an ‘error apparent on the face of the record’, for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by ‘error apparent’. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error.
12. The Claims Tribunal has awarded the compensation of Rs. 75,000/- to the claimant while calculating the amount in accordance with Section 4(1)(b) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the same has been worked out at 900X V2 x 219.95 = Rs. 98,977.00 which is much higher than the amount awarded by the Claims Tribunal.
Consequently, the review application is dismissed with costs.
