CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 5764 of 1997 PETITIONER: The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. RESPONDENT: C. Padma & Anr. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/09/2003 BENCH: S.N. VARIAVA & H.K. SEMA. JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
SEMA,J
This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated
5.12.1996 passed by the High Court.
Briefly stated the facts leading to the filing of the present appeal arise
out of the following circumstances. In a motor accident, which took place
on 18.2.1989, the respondents sustained bodily injuries. The claim petition
was filed on 2.11.1995, claiming compensation of Rs.one lakh. The Claims
Tribunal rejected the plea of limitation raised by the appellant herein and
awarded compensation of Rs. 45,000/-. The Revision Petition, filed by the
appellant, was also dismissed by the High Court on 5.12.1996.
We have heard Mr. Sunil Kapoor, learned counsel for the appellant.
Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were put to notice. The Office Report dated
24.7.2003 disclosed that the notice was served on respondent No.1 on 14th
October, 1997 by affixing notice on the door of the house of respondent
No.1. A certificate of the High Court dated 24th October, 1997 indicates that
respondent No.2 had refused to accept the notice and the same was affixed
on the door of her given address. The respondents are, therefore, not
represented before us.
The only contention, which has been strenuously urged by the counsel
for the appellant, is that the accident had taken place on 18.2.1989 and the
claim petition was filed on 2.11.1995; when the claim was barred under the
old Act, the same could not have been revived under the new Act. It is his
contention that on this score alone the claim petition should have been
dismissed. To answer this contention it would be useful to have a quick
survey of changes that have taken place in the Act. The old Act of 1939 has
been repealed and since then there is a sea of changes in the Act. In the old
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) sub-section (3)
of Section 110-A provided:
“110-A. (3) No application for such compensation shall
be entertained unless it is made within six months of the
occurrence of the accident:
Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the
application after the expiry of the said period of six months if it
is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause
from making the application in time.”
The 1939 Act was repealed w.e.f 1.7.1989. The period of limitation
prescribed in the new Act is provided under sub-section (3) of Section 166.
It reads:-
“166.(3) No application for such compensation shall be
entertained unless it is made within six months of the
occurrence of the accident:
Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the
application after the expiry of the said period of six months but
not later than twelve months, if it is satisfied that the applicant
was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application
in time.”
The only difference that has been brought about in between the old
Act and the new Act is that the Tribunal may entertain an application after
the expiry of period of six months but not later than twelve months.
In the instant case, at the time, when the respondents had filed claim
petition on 2.11.1995, the situation was completely different. Sub-section
(3) of Section 166 of the Act had been omitted by Act 53 of 1994 w.e.f.
14.11.1994. The result of the Act 53 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment)
Act, 1994 is that there is no limitation prescribed for filing claim petitions
before the Tribunal in respect of any accident w.e.f. 14.11.1994.
It is noticed that the High Court while dismissing the Revision
Petition filed by the appellant had followed the decision rendered by this
Court in Dhannalal vs. D.P.Vijayvargiya, (1996) 4 SCC 652. The facts
of that case were like this. The appellant was injured in a motor accident,
which took place on 4-12-1990. The claim petition for compensation was
filed before the Tribunal on 7.12.1991 along with an application for
condonation of delay, which was allowed by the Tribunal by its order dated
18.11.1993. The validity of order of the Tribunal was challenged before the
High Court and the High Court by its order dated 31.7.1995 set-aside the
order of the Tribunal holding that the power of Tribunal to condone the
delay under Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act of
1988 had been withdrawn and therefore the claim petition must be filed
within the period prescribed therein. This Court set aside the High Court
order.
This Court in Dhannalal’s case (supra), after examining the effect of
the various amendments that have been brought about in the Act, stated in
paragraphs 6 and 7 as under:-
6.”Before the scope of sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act
is examined, it may be pointed out that the aforesaid sub-
section (3) of Section 166 of the Act has been omitted by Act
53 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994 which came
in force w.e.f. 14.11.1994. The effect of the Amending Act is
that w.e.f. 14.11.1994 there is no limitation for filing claims
before the Tribunal in respect of any accident. It can be said
that Parliament realised the grave injustice and injury which
was being caused to the heirs and legal representatives of the
victims who died in accidents by rejecting their claim petitions
only on ground of limitation. It is a matter of common
knowledge that majority of the claimants for such
compensation are ignorant about the period during which such
claims should be preferred. After the death due to the accident
of the breadearner of the family, in many cases such claimants
are virtually on the streets. Even in cases where the victims
escape death some of such victims are hospitalised for months
if not for years. In the present case itself the applicant claims
that he met with the accident on 4.12.1990 and he was being
treated as an indoor patient till 27.9.1991. According to us, in
its wisdom, Parliament rightly thought that prescribing a period
of limitation and restricting the power of the Tribunal to
entertain any claim petition beyond the period of twelve months
from the date of the accident was harsh, inequitable and in
many cases was likely to cause injustice to the claimants. The
present case is a glaring example where the appellant has been
deprived by the order of the High Court from claiming the
compensation because of delay of only four days in preferring
the claim petition.
7.”In this background, now it has to be examined as to
what is the effect of omission of sub-section (3) of Section 166
of the Act. From the amending Act it does not appear that the
said sub-section (3) has been deleted retrospectively. But at the
same time, there is nothing in the amending Act to show that
benefit of deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166 is not to be
extended to pending claim petitions where a plea of limitation
has been raised. The effect of deletion of sub-section (3) from
Section 166 of the Act can be tested by an illustration. Suppose
an accident had taken place two years before 14.11.1994 when
sub-section (3) was omitted from Section 166. For one reason
or the other no claim petition had been filed by the victim or the
heirs of the victim till 14.11.1994. Can a claim petition be not
filed after 14.11.1994 in respect of such accident? Whether a
claim petition filed after 14.11.1994 can be rejected by the
Tribunal on the ground of limitation saying that the period of
twelve months which had been prescribed when sub-section (3)
of Section 166 was in force having expired the right to prefer
the claim petition had been extinguished and shall not be
revived after deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166 w.e.f.
14.11.1994? According to us, the answer should be in negative.
When sub-section (3) of Section 166 has been omitted, then the
Tribunal has to entertain a claim petition without taking note of
the date on which such accident had taken place. The claim
petitions cannot be thrown out on the ground that such claim
petitions were barred by time when sub-section (3) of Section
166 was in force. It need not be impressed that Parliament from
time to time has introduced amendments in the old Act as well
as in the new Act in order to protect the interests of the victims
of the accidents and their heirs if the victims die. One such
amendment has been introduced in the Act by the aforesaid
Amendment Act 54 of 1994 by substituting sub-section (6) of
Section 158 which provides:
“158. (6) As soon as any information regarding any
accident involving death or bodily injury to any person is
recorded or report under this section is completed by a police
officer, the officer in charge of the police station shall forward a
copy of the same within thirty days from the date of recording
of information or, as the case may be, on completion of such
report to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction and a copy
thereof to the concerned insurer, and where a copy is made
available to the owner, he shall also within thirty days of receipt
of such report, forward the same to such Claims Tribunal and
insurer.”
In view of sub-section (6) of Section 158 of the Act the
officer-in-charge of the police station is enjoined to forward a
copy of information/report regarding the accident to the
Tribunal having jurisdiction. A copy thereof has also to be
forwarded to the insurer concerned. It also requires that where
a copy is made available to the owner of the vehicle, he shall
within thirty days of receipt of such copy forward the same to
the Claims Tribunal and insurer. In this background, the
deletion of sub-section (3) from Section 166 should be given
full effect so that the object of deletion of the said section by
Parliament is not defeated. If a victim of the accident or heirs
of the deceased victim can prefer claim for compensation
although not being preferred earlier because of the expiry of the
period of limitation prescribed, how the victim or the heirs of
the deceased shall be in a worse position if the question of
condonation of delay in filing the claim petition is pending
either before the Tribunal, the High Court or the Supreme
Court. The present appeal is one such case. The appellant has
been pursuing from the Tribunal to this Court. His right to get
compensation in connection with the accident in question is
being resisted by the respondents on the ground of delay in
filing the same. If he had not filed any petition for claim till
14.11.1994 in respect of the accident which took place on
4.12.1990, in view of the amending Act he became entitled to
file such claim petition, the period of limitation having been
deleted, the claim petition which has been filed and is being
pursued up to this Court cannot be thrown out on the ground of
limitation.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The ratio laid down in Dhannalal’s case (supra) applies with full
force to the facts of the present case. When the claim petition was filed sub-
section (3) of Section 166 had been omitted. Thus, the Tribunal was bound
to entertain the claim petition without taking note of the date on which the
accident took place. Faced with this situation, Mr. Kapoor submitted that
Dhannalal’s case does not consider Section 6A of the General Clauses Act
and therefore, needs to be reconsidered. We are unable to accept the
submission. Section 6A of the General Clauses Act undoubtedly provides
that the repeal of a provision will not affect the continuance of the enactment
so repealed and in operation at the time of repeal. However, this is subject
to “unless a different intention appears”. In Dhannalal’s case the reason for
the deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166 has been set out. It is noted
that the Parliament realized the grave injustice and injury caused to heirs and
legal representatives of the victims of accidents if the claim petition was
rejected only on ground of limitation. Thus “the different intention” clearly
appears and Section 6A of the General Clauses Act would not apply.
Mr. Kapoor, learned counsel for the appellant, has placed reliance on
the decision rendered by this Court in Vinod Gurudas Raikar vs.
National Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1991 SC 2156. The facts of that case
were that the appellant was injured in an accident, which took place on
22.1.1989. The claim petition of the appellant was filed on 15.3.1990 with a
prayer for condonation of delay. The Tribunal held that in view of sub-
section (3) of Section 166 of the new Motor Vehicles Act, which came into
force on 1.7.1989, the delay of more than six months could not be condoned.
In the facts and circumstances of that case this Court held that the case of the
appellant was covered by the new Act and the delay for a longer period than
six months could not be condoned. In our view, the facts of the case in
Vinod Gurudas (supra) are different from the facts of the present case, as
noticed above.
Learned counsel for the appellant, next contended that since no period
of limitation has been prescribed by the Legislature, Article 137 of the
Limitation Act may be invoked, otherwise, according to him, stale claims
would be encouraged leading to multiplicity of litigation for non-prescribing
the period of limitation. We are unable to countenance with the contention
of the appellant for more than one reason. Firstly, such an Act like Motor
Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at providing relief to the
victims or their families, if otherwise the claim is found genuine. Secondly,
it is a self contained Act which prescribes mode of filing the application,
procedure to be followed and award to be made. The Parliament, in its
wisdom, realised the grave injustice and injury being caused to the heirs and
legal representatives of the victims who suffer bodily injuries/die in
accidents, by rejecting their claim petitions at the threshold on the ground of
limitation, and purposely deleted sub-section (3) of Section 166, which
provided the period of limitation for filing the claim petitions and this being
the intendment of the Legislature to give effective relief to the victims and
the families of the motor accidents untrammeled by the technicalities of the
limitation, invoking of Article 137 of the Limitation Act would defeat the
intendment of the Legislature.
In the result, we do not find any infirmity in the order under
challenge, which would warrant our interference. This appeal, being devoid
of merits, is, accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.