PETITIONER: THE NEWSPAPERS LTD. Vs. RESPONDENT: THE STATE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, U.P. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20/03/1957 BENCH: KAPUR, J.L. BENCH: KAPUR, J.L. BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. CITATION: 1957 AIR 532 1957 SCR 754 ACT: Industrial Dispute, Meaning of-Dispute between employer and a single workman - Whether industrial dipute-Government making reference on the assumption that a dispute exists between the, employer and his workmen-Whether validity of the reference can be questioned -U . P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (U.P. XXVIII of 1947), SS. 2, 3-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV Of 1947), S. 2 (k). HEADNOTE: A dispute between an employer and a single workman does not fall within the definition of " industrial dispute " under the U.P. industrial Disputes Act, 1947. But though the applicability of the Act to an individual dispute as opposed to a dispute involving a group of workmen is excluded, if the workmen as a body or a consicrerable section of them make common cause with the individual workman then such a dispute would be an industrial dispute. 755 Central Provinces Transport Service Ltd. v Raghunath Gopal Patwardhan, (1956) S. C. R. 956 and D. N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherjee, (1953) S.C.R. 302, referred to. Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (1953) I L.L.J. 757, in so far as it decided that a dispute raised by an, individual workman is within an industrial dispute, disapproved. Case-law reviewed. The third respondent was employed as a lino typist by the appellant company but on allegations of incompetence he was dismissed from service. His case was not taken up by any union of workers of the appellant company nor by any of the unions of workmen employed in similar or-allied trades, but the U.P. Working journalists Union, Lucknow, with which the third respondent had no connection took the matter to the Conciliation Board, Allahabad, and - ultimately the Government made a reference to the Industrial Tribunal by a notification in which one of the points for determination referred was as to- whether the services of the third respondent were wrongfully terminated by the management. The legality of the reference was challenged by the appellant and the question was raised as to whether a dispute between an employer and a single workman falls within the definition of "industrial dispute" under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Held, that the reference was bad because the dispute was not between the employer on the one hand and his workmen on the other, nor could the U.P. Working journalists Union be called " his workmen ", within the meaning of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Though the making of a reference by the Government under the Act is the exercise of its administrative powers, an aggrieved party can question the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal to show that what was referred was not an industrial dispute. State of Madras v. C. P. Sarathy, (1953) S.C.R. 334, referred to. JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 213 of 1956.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated Septem. ber 22,
1954, of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 8 of
1954 arising out of the judgment and decree dated January 6,
1954 of the said High Court in Civil Miscellaneous Writ
Petition No. 651 of 1953.
S. P. Sinha and S. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant.
G. G. Mathur and C. P. Lal, for respondent No. 2.
756
1957. March 20. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KAPUR J.-The ground on which the appellant company seeks to
have the order of the Industrial Tribunal set aside is that
no industrial ‘dispute existed within the meaning of the
expression as used in the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(XXVIII of 1947) (hereinafter called the U.P. Act) and
consequently the U.P. Government had no power to make the
reference in question. I Industrial Dispute’ is defined in
s. 2 of the U.P. Act as having the same meaning assigned to
it as in s. 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (here-
inafter termed the Central Act). There this expression has
been defined in s. 2 (k) to mean :
” any dispute or difference between employers and employers,
or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and
workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-
employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions
of labour, of any person. ”
The controversy between the parties arose in the following
circumstances:
Tajammul Hussain, respondent No. 3 was employed as a lino
typist by the appellant company. He was dismissed on May 8,
1952, on, allegations of incompetence under r. 12 (ii) of
the Standing Orders of the appellant company. It was
alleged that the dismissal of Respondent No. 3 was welcomed
by his co-workers and other workmen in the employ of the
appellant company and they made no grievance of it, nor did
they espouse his cause.
The case of respondent No. 3 was not taken up by any union
of workers of the appellant company nor by any of the unions
of workmen employed in similar or allied trades, but the
U.P. Working Journalists Union, Lucknow, with which
respondent No. 3 had no connection whatsoever, took the
matter to the Conciliation Board, Allahabad. Ultimately,
the U.P. Government made a reference to the Industrial
Tribunal on June 3, 1953, by notification; the prefatory
words of which are:
757
” Whereas an industrial dispute in respect of the matters
hereinafter specified exists between the concern known as
Newspapers Ltd., Allahabad and its workmen; and whereas in
the opinion of the Governor it is necessary so to do for the
maintenance of public order and I for maintaining
employment.
One of the questions referred was:-
“‘ Whether the services of Sri Tajammul Hussain Lino
Operator were wrongfully terminated by the Management
On February 13, 1953, the State Industrial Tribunal at
Allahabad decided in favour of respondent No. 3 and ordered
his reinstatement ” without break of continuity of service ”
and also ordered the payment of his wages for the period
during which he “remained dismissed”. An appeal was taken
by the appellant company to the Labour Appellate Tribunal,
who by its ,order dated February 24, 1953, affirmed the
order of the Tribunal with costs. The appellant company
then moved a petition in the Allahabad High Court under Art.
226 of the Constitution but this was dismissed by Bhargava
J. on January 6, 1954, and a Special appeal against this
judgment was also dismissed. The appellant company has come
up in appeal with a certificate under Art. 133 (1) (c) of
the Constitution.
The controversy which arises in this case is whether a
dispute between an employer and a single workman falls
within the definition of I industrial dispute’ as used in
the U.P. Act. In order to resolve this controversy, it is
necessary to refer to the scheme of the U.P. Act and the
relevant rules made thereunder. The preamble of the Act
runs: ” to provide for powers to prevent strikes and look-
outs, and for the settlement of industrial disputes and
other incidental matters “. Section 3 of the Act confers
certain powers on the State Government for the purpose of
prevention of strikes, lock-outs, etc.- The portion of this
section relevant for the purpose of this appeal reads as
follows:
If in the opinion of the State Government, it is necessary
or expedient so to do for securing the public safety or
convenience, or the maintenance of public
758
order or supplies and services essential to the life of the
community, or for maintaining employment, it may, by general
or special order, make provision-
(c) for appointing industrial courts;
(d) for referring any industrial dispute for conciliation
or adjudication in the manner provided in the order
(g) for any incidental or supplementary matters, which
appear to the State Government necessary or expedient for
the purpose of the order; ”
Under s. 23 of the Act, the State Government can make rules
consistent with the Act for giving effect to the provisions
of the Act.
Under clauses (b), (c), (d) and (g) of s. 3 and under s. 8
of the U.P. Act, rules governing Conciliation Boards and
Industrial Tribunals in U.P. were promulgated by
Notification No. 615 (LL) XVIII-7 (LL)-1951, dated Lucknow,
March 15, 1951. Rule 4 deals with the reference of disputes
to Conciliation Boards. The relevant portions of this rule
are:
,,Any workman or an employer or a registered association or
trade union of employers or registered trade union of
workmen or any federation of such associations or trade
unions or where no registered trade union of workmen exists
in any particular concern or industry, the representatives
not more than 5 in number of the workmen in that concern or
the industry, duly elected in this behalf by a majority of
the workmen employed in that concern or industry, as the
case may be, at a meeting held for the purpose, may by
application in writing move a Conciliation Officer of the
area for settlement of any industrial dispute by
conciliation. The application shall clearly state the
industrial dispute or disputes. ”
Rule 5 deals with proceedings and the power of inclusion of
other undertakings. The proviso to this
rule is:
” Provided that if the Board of its own motion or on an
application made to it, is of the opinion that any question
involved in any such dispute or matter affects or is likely
to affect more than one workman in the same concern or
industry or business or more
759
than one concern in the same industry or business,
constituted within the jurisdiction of the Conciliation
Board, it shall include in its proceedings relating to such
dispute or order every such workman or concern or where
there is a registered trade union covering the, majority of
such concerns of workmen, such trade unions.”
Rules 7 to 11-A deal with Industrial Tribunals. Rule 10
gives power to the Government to make a reference of any
dispute to the Industrial Tribunal either on its own motion
or after considering the Report of the Conciliation Board
made under r. 6.
Rule 15(1) which deals with the representation of parties to
the dispute provides:
” The parties may in their discretion be represented before
a Board or Tribunal or an Adjudicator-
(1) In the case of a workman by-
(a) an officer of a registered trade union of which
he is a member;
(b) an officer of a federation of trade unions to which the
trade union referred to in sub-clause (a) is affiliated ;
(c) Where the workman is not a member of any registered
trade union, by an officer of any registered trade union
connected with, or by any other workman employed in the same
industry or business, if so authorised in writing by the
workman.”
The language of section 36(1) of the Central Act is almost
identical.
Rule 27 prohibits strikes and look-outs; and r. 28 gives
finality and conclusiveness to the orders made or directions
given.
The use of the word ‘workmen’ in the plural in the
definition of industrial dispute’ does not by itself exclude
the applicability of the Act to an individual dispute
because under a. 13(2) of the General Clauses Act
subject………….
(2) words in the singular shall include the plural and vice
versa,”
760
But in order to get its true import it is necessary to view
the enactment in retrospect, the reasons-for enacting it,
the evils it was to end and the objects it was to subserve.
The Act has therefore to be viewed as a whole and its
intention determined by construing all the constituent parts
of the Act together and not by taking detached sections or
to take one word here and another there. Exposition ” ex
visceribus actus ” is applicable. Lincoln College’s Case
(1).
So construed the provisions of the U.P. Act show that the
machinery of the Act has been devised with the object of
maintaining industrial peace so as to prevent interference
with public safety or public order or with the maintenance
of supplies and services essential to the life of the
community or of employment. The Act is based on the
necessity of achieving collective amity between labour and
capital by means of conciliation, mediation and
adjudication. The object of the Act is the prevention of
industrial strife, strikes and lock-outs and the promotion
of industrial peace and not to take the place of the
ordinary tribunals of the land for the enforcement of
contracts between an employer and an individual workman.
Thus viewed the provisions of the Act lead to the conclusion
that its applicability to an individual dispute as opposed
to dispute involving a group of workmen is excluded unless
it acquires the general characteristics of an industrial
dispute, viz., the workmen as a body or a considerable
section of them make common cause with the individual
workman and thus create conditions contemplated by s. 3 of
the U.P. Act which is the foundation of State Governmental
action under that Act. The other provisions which follow
that section only subserve the carrying out of the objects
of the Acts specified therein.
The use of the word workman in the singular in rr. 4, 5 and
15 forms the basis of the argument for the inclusion of an
individual dispute in the expression industrial dispute.
But this suffers from more infirmities than one. Rule 4
authorises a workman to
(1) 3 Co. Rep. 58: 76 E. R. 764.
761
apply to a Conciliation Officer for the settlement of an
industrial dispute. The meaning sought to be given to this
word is inconsistent with the language of the latter part of
that rule;
or where no registered trade union of workmen exists in any
concern or industry, the representatives not more than 5 in
number of the workmen………… duly elected.”
The first proviso to r. 5 is no surer foundation for the
argument because in the context it can only be interpreted
to mean that, should there be an industrial dispute then all
workmen who may individually be the cause of the dispute or
are to be affected by its decision should get notices of the
proceedings. Similarly, r. 15 only provides for the
representation of ” a workman ” even if he is only one by an
officer of a trade union or other person mentioned in the
rule. Besides, s. 13(2) of the General Clauses Act as to
the interpretation of the singular and the plural consider-
ably reduces the efficacy of the argument, which altogether
loses its force in view of r. 26 which is as follows :
” During the pendency of any conciliation proceeding or
proceedings before the Tribunal or an Adjudicator in respect
of any dispute an employer shall not (a) alter to the
prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute the
conditions of service applicable to them immediately before
the commencement of such proceedings or (b) discharge or
punish, whether such punishment is by dismissal or
otherwise, any workman concerned in such dispute save with
the express permission in writing of a Conciliation Officer
of the area concerned irrespective of the fact whether the
dispute is pending before a Board or the Tribunal or an
Adjudicator.”
The use of the words ” workmen” and ” workman in the above
rule is indicative of the intention of the Act being
applicable to collective disputes and not to individual
ones, and this is fortified by the finality and the binding
effect to awards by r. 28 and more speciall.v by a. 18 of
the Central Act which makes
98
762
awards binding not only on the individuals present or
represented but on all the workmen employed in the
establishment and even on future entrants.
Another objection to reading these rules in the manner above
suggested is that it would be tantamount to enlarging the
scope of the expression ‘industrial dispute’ and the powers
conferred on the State Government under s. 3 of the U. P.
Act. The executive cannot under the power of framing rules
and regulations clothe itself with powers which the Statute
itself does not give and which are inconsistent with the
interpretation put on the expression ‘industrial dispute’.
The cardinal rule in regard to promulgation of bye-laws or
making rules is that they must be legi fidei rationi
consona, and therefore all regulations which are contrary or
repugnant to statutes under which they are made are
ineffective. If the expression I industrial dispute’ as
ordinarily understood and, construed conveys a dispute
between an employer on the one hand and the workmen acting
collectively on the other, then the definition of those
words cannot be widened by a statutory rule or regulation
promulgated under the Statute or by Executive fiat.
I The notification in the present case was under s. 3(c),
(d) and (g) and under s. 8 which deal with (c) the
appointment of industrial Courts, (d) referring any
industrial disputes and (g) incidental or supplementary
matters. The Executive may in the exercise of these powers
make such regulations which are necessary but under that
garb it cannot extend the definition of the term industrial
disputes, nor is this extended meaning necessary to subserve
the objects of the Act.
I In our opinion therefore rules- 4, 5 and 15 of the Rules
cannot be a valid foundation for sustaining the argument
raised that an individual dispute was within the definition
of ‘industrial dispute’. Ordinarily, an award of a tribunal
binds or affects the rights of parties to the proceedings
but awards of Industrial Tribunals have extended
implications and may affect the rights of all workmen of a
concern or undertaking end even the future entrants. This
doctrine of
763
representation which enlarges the meaning of ‘parties’ in
the U.P. & Central Acts is an essential idea associated with
industrial disputes and support-, collectiveness as opposed
to individualism. See Latham C. J. in Metal Trades
Employers Association v. Amalgamated Engineering Union(1).
Then there is the prohibition under r. 26 of the U.P. Act
and s. 33 of the Central Act against any change in
conditions of service during the pendency of the proceedings
the object of which is to ensure discipline and industrial
truce during that period which also supports the basic idea
of collectiveness in ‘industrial disputes’.
In Central Provinces Transport Services Ltd. V. Raghunath
Gopal Patwardhan (2), this Court observed that decided cases
in India disclose three views as to the meaning of
‘industrial dispute’
(i) a dispute between an employer and a single workman
cannot be an ‘industrial dispute’;
(ii) it can be an industrial dispute; and
(iii) it can not per se be an industrial dispute but
may become one if taken up by a trade union or a number of
workmen.
This Court discussed the scope of industrial dispute as
defined in s. 2(k), of the Central Act, and after referring
to the conflict of judicial opinion as to its applicability
to the case of a dispute between an employer and a single
workman further observed:
of the last of the three views stated above, and there is
considerable reason behind it. Notwithstanding that the
language of s. 2(k) is wide enough to cover a dispute
between an employer and a single employee, the scheme of the
Industrial Disputes Act does appear to contemplate that- the
machinery provided therein should be set in motion, to
settle only disputes which involve the rights of workmen as
a class and that a dispute touching the individual rights of
a workman was not intended to be the subject of an
adjudication under the Act, when the same had not been taken
up by the union or a number of workmen.”
(1) [1935] 54 C.L.R. 387.
(2) [1956] S.C.R. 956.
764
Although the question did not directly arise, this Court in
D . N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherjee and others(1) discussed
the meaning of the expression ‘industrial dispute’ and was
of the opinion that it “conveys the meaning to the ordinary
mind that the dispute must be such as would affect large
groups of workmen and employers ranged on opposite
sides…… But at the same time, having regard to the
modern conditions of society where capital an labour have
organised themselves into groups for the purpose of fighting
their disputes and settling them on the basis of the theory
that in union is strength, and collective bargaining has
come to stay, a single employee’s. case might develop into
an industrial dispute, when as often happens, it is taken up
by the trade union of which he is a member and there is a
concerted demand by the employees for redress”.
This view is in consonance with the basic idea underlying
modern industrial legislation. The interpretation given to
the corresponding phrase “trade dispute” in English law and
“industrial dispute” in Australian Law also accords with
this view and in the absence of an express provision to the
contrary or necessary intendment there is no reason to give
a different interpretation to the expression in the Indian
Statute.
According to English decisions an individual dispute of a
workman is not included in ‘trade dispute’ which corresponds
to ‘Industrial Dispute’ in the Indian Act. In the English
Trade Disputes Act of 1906 and 1919 as also in Reg. 58-AA of
the Defence (General) Regulation, 1939, ‘trade dispute’ was
defined in language very similar to ‘industrial dispute’ in
the Indian Statute. Dealing with a trade dispute, Lord Shaw
in Conway v, Wade (2) said,:
” But I cannot see my way to hold that “trade dispute”
necessarily includes accordingly every case of person al
difference between any one workman and one or more of his
fellows. It is true that after a, certain stage even such a
dispute, although originally grounded,
(1) [1953] S.C.R. 302, 310.
(2) [1909] A.C, 596, 520.
765
it may be, upon personal animosity, may come to be a subject
in which sides are taken, and may develop into a situation
of a general aspect containing the characteristics of a
trade dispute; but until it reaches that stage I cannot hold
that a trade dispute necessarily exists.”
Lord Wright observed in National Association of Local
Government Officers v. Bolton Corporation (1)
” I think the same may be said of the Industrial Courts Act
and of reg. 58-AA, in both of which the word ‘trade’ is used
in the very wide connotation which it bears in the modem
legislation dealing with conditions of employment,
particularly in relation to matters of collective bargaining
and the like..”
Ex parte Keable Press Ltd.(2) was an instance of an
individual dispute developing into a ‘trade dispute’
because. of the strike by a union to enforce the rein-
statement of dismissed workman. That was how this term
(trade dispute) was interpreted by the Court of Appeal in R.
v. National Arbitration Tribunal(3) after taking into
consideration the definition of the word ‘dispute’.
In Australian cases also, without specific reference to any
definition of the phrase the courts have excluded individual
disputes from the scope of industrial disputes. In Jumbunna
Coal Mine v. Victorian Coal Miners Association (4), Griffths
C.J. observed:
” An industrial dispute exists where a considerable number-
of employees engaged in some branch of industry make common
cause in demanding from or refusing to their employers
(whether one or more) some change in the conditions of
employment which is denied to
them…………………………………………… ”
Similarly in Federated Saw Mills & Co. Employees of
Australasia v. James Moore & Son Proprietory Ltd. (5),
Griffths C.J. gave the characteristics of an industrial
dispute as follows:
” It is necessary at the outset to consider the meaning
which the term ‘industrial dispute’ conveyed
(1) [1943] A.C. 166, 185.
(2) [1943] 2 All E.R. 633.
(3) [1951] 2 All E.R. 828.
(4) [1908] 6 C.L.R. 309, 332.
(5) [1909] 8 C.L.R. 465, 487, 488.
766
in 1900 to the, minds of persons conversant with the
English language…………………
“The word ‘industrial denotes two qualities which
distinguish them from ordinary private disputes between
individuals, namely (2) that on one side at least of the
dispute the disputants are a body of men acting collectively
and not individually.” Isaacs J. in George Hudson Ltd. v.
Australian Timber Workers’ Union(1) stated:
“The very nature of an ‘industrial dispute’, as
distinguished from an individual dispute, is to obtain new
industrisl conditions, not merely for the specific
individuals then working It is &’battle by the claimants,
not for themselves alone and not as against the respondents
alone, but by the claimants so far. as they represent their
class
According to Griffths C.J. “The term- “industrial dispute”
connotes a, real and substantial difference having some
element of persistency, and likely, if not adjusted, to
endanger the industrial peace of the community”. Vide
Federated Saw Mills Case(2) at p. 488. The same meaning was
attached to the expression by Latham C.J. in Metal Traders
Employers Association v. Amwlgamated Engineering Union(3) at
p. 403:
“Industrial disputes are essentially group contests-there is
always an industrial group on at least one side. A claim of
an individual employee against his employer is not in itself
an industrial dispute We shall now refer to the Indian
decisions which bear on this question.
Rajamannar C.J. in Kandan Textile Ltd. v. The Industrial
Tribunal,,Madras and another(4) held that the definition of
industrial dispute is wide enough to cover a dispute between
an employer and an individual workman but taking into
consideration s. 18 of the Central Act he was of the opinion
that such an extended definition cannot be given to it in s.
2(k) of the Central Act. Mack J. agreed with the decision
of Rajamannar C. J. but he said that the case of an
English language.,
(1) (1923] 32 C.L.R. 413, 441.
(2) [1909] 8 C.L.R. 465, 487, 488.
(3) [1935] 54 C.L.R. 387, 403.
(4) A.I.R. 1951 Madras 616.
767
individual workman if taken up by the worker’s union makes
such a dispute an industrial dispute. In that case 1 1
items of difference were referred to the Industrial
Tribunal., One of the items in dispute was the wrongful
removal of a workman, Sundaram by name. In the’, High Court
an objection was taken to the legality of the award on the
ground that no industrial dispute existed and that there was
no material before the Government on the basis of which it
could make a reference. It was held that the dispute as to
a single workman was not an industrial dispute. Kandan
Textile Ltd. case (1) was followed in United Commercial
Bank, Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Labour, Madras (2) which
was a case under s. 41 of the Madras Shops and
Establishments Act and the right of appeal given to an
individual employee against the order of the employer
dispensing with his services under s. 41(2) of Madras Shops
and Establishments Act was challenged on the ground that it
had been taken away by the Central Act. It was held that an
individual worker had the right to appeal. Vishwanatha
Sastri J. in his judgment referred with approval to the
distinction made between an individual dispute and an
industrial dispute in Kandan Textile Ltd. v. Industrial
Tribunal, Madras (supra).
The second view that such a dispute falls within the
definition of the word “industrial dispute” is supported by
a decision of a Full Bench of the Labour Appellate Tribunal-
Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen (3) There
the question was mainly decided on the- basis of s. 33-A of
the Central Act (introduced in 1950) which gives the right
to an individual workman dismissed or dealt with contrary to
s. 33 of the Act during an industrial dispute to raise the
matter before a tribunal. The introduction of s. 33-A would
not alter the construction to be placed on the phrase
‘industrial dispute’. On the contrary it supports the view
that an individual dispute is not comprised in that phrase.
In view of what has been said above, we are of the opinion
that in so far as that case lay& down
(3) [1953] 1 L.L.J. 757.
768
that a dispute raised by an individual workman as to his
personal grievance is within an industrial dispute, it
cannot be said to have been correctly decided.
The cases which support the third view are the following:
J. Chowdhury v. M. C. Bannerjee (1) Was a case in which a
lino operator was removed from service on the ground of his
negligence and arrears of work. The matter was referred to
the Industrial Tribunal under the Central Act. The
Management moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the
Constitution and s. 45 of the Specific Relief Act and it was
held that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the
matter as on a perusal of the various sections of the
Central Act including ss. 10 and 18 the dispute of an
individual workman was not covered by the term industrial
dispute.’
In Bilash Chandra Mitra v. Balmer Lawrie & Co.
a suit was brought for the recovery of arrears of wages on
the basis of an award of an Industrial Tribunal and one -of
the issues raised was’ whether an ‘individual dispute’ fell
within ‘industrial dispute’. Following the judgment in I.
Chowdhury v. M. C. Bannerjee (1), Bose J. held that it did
not.
Another case in which this view was held is N. 1. Assurance
Co. v. C. G. I. Tribunal (3). There the Government referred
the question of dismissal of an employee of an Assurance Co.
and it was not proved that his case was taken up by the
employees association. The same view was adopted in
Standard Vacuum Oil Co. v. Industrial Tribunal (4).
In Lakshmi Talkies, Madras v. Munuswami and Others (5),
Balakrishna Ayyar J. held that an industrial dispute’ arises
where a case of an individual workman is espoused by a
union. The same view was taken in Lynus & Co. v. Hemanta
Kumar Samanta (6).
The view taken in these cases is in accord with the
interpretation we have put on the expression ‘Industrial
dispute’ as defined in the U. P. Act or the Central Act.
(1) [1935] 55 C.W.N. 256.
(2) [1953] A? C.W.N. tog.
(3) [l953] I.L.R. 32 Patna 181
(4) I.L.R. [1952] Trav.Co. 432.
(5) [1055] L.L.J. 477.
‘(6) [1956] 2 L.L.J. 89,
769
Taking into consideration the whole tenor of the Act and the
decisions of this Court the decided cases to the extent that
they take a contrary view, i.e., an individual dispute is
comprised in an ‘industrial dispute’ must unless there is
something peculiar- as to facts, be
In spite of the fact that the making of a reference by the
Government under the Industrial Disputes Act is the exercise
of its administrative powers, that is not destructive of the
rights of an aggrieved party to show that what was referred
was not an ‘industrial dispute’ at all and therefore the
jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal to make the award
can be questioned, even though the factual existence of a
dispute may not be subject to a party’s challenge. State of
Madras v. C. P.
Sarathy (1),
It may also be noted that the notification issued by the U.
P. Government on January 3, 1953, already quoted proceeds on
the assumption that a dispute exists between the “employer
and his workmen”. The points of dispute in the reference,
however, comprise the wrongful termination of the service of
only Tajammul Hussain, a lino operator. The words used in
the first part of the notification show that the Government
was labouring under the misapprehension that this dispute
was between the employer on the one hand and his workmen on
the other, which, in fact it was not. Tajammul Hussain
could not be termed work-, men (in the plural) nor could the
U. P. Working Journalists Union be called “his workmen” nor
is there any indication that the individual dispute had got
transformed into an industrial dispute. The very basis,
therefore, of the reference was bad and must be held to be
so.
We would, therefore, allow this appeal with costs.
Appeal allowed.
(1) [1953] S.C.R. 334, 347.
99
770