JUDGMENT
B.K. Sangalad, J.
1. The Insurance Company has challenged the liability to satisfy the compensation of Rs. 83.500/- awarded in MVC No. 761 of 1992 for the death of Basheer Ahamed, son of respondents 1 and 2 and husband of Respondent No. 3 and father of Respondents 4 to 7. On the date of accident, i.e., on 13.10.92 at about 8.20 am. the deceased was going on his Luna Moped bearing No. CNQ 43 towards Shahapet. When he was so going near KSFC office from the opposite side, one lorry bearing No. MYZ 7844 was coming in high speed driven rashly and negligently and the said lorry dashed against the deceased Basheer Ahamed resulting in his death on the spot. The respondents who are the L.Rs of the deceased, filed the MVC petition before the Tribunal and the Tribunal has awarded the above stated compensation holding that the Appellant is liable to satisfy the award. Being aggrieved by this, the present appeal arises.
2. The main contention of the Appellant according to Mr. S.P. Shankar is that on the date of the accident, the driver of the lorry had no effective driving licence. As such, the Insurance company cannot be saddled with burden of satisfying the award. On the other hand Mrs. B.S. Patil learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that although the licence of the driver was not renewed on the date of accident, he did not suffer from any disqualifications. As such there was no violation of the condition enumerated in the policy. According to Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Driver must suffer from disqualification, otherwise the Insurance Company is estopped from taking up any other contentions than satisfying the award. In the light of these rival submissions when other facts are not in dispute namely place, time and date of accident, it has to be seen whether there are any grounds to interfere with the findings of the Tribunal.
3. All the out-set it has to be seen in respect of the relevant provisions regarding driving licence, necessity of driving licence, granting of licence, currency of licence to drive the motor cycle, renewal of driving licence. The renewal of driving licence has been covered under Section 2, 10, 3, 9, 14, and 15. Its validity is covered by Sections 19, 20, 132, 134 and 185 of the Act. It is not necessary to reproduce all these sections. What is required in this appeal is that whether on the date of the accident, the driver had been duly licenced or not. More often, the Insurance Company takes shelter under Section 149(2)(a)(ii). The Insurance company always takes up the defence as enumerated under Section 149(2)(a) and (b) to avoid the liability and takes up the defence that the person who was driving the vehicle on the date of the accident was not duly licenced and it would disqualify him from holding or obtaining the licence during the period of dis-qualification.
4. It is pertienent to note that the alleged accident took place in this case on 13.10.92. The period of driving licence had expired on 9.6.88 and it was renewed on 3.11.1992 for a period upto 2.11.1995. According to the appellant since the renewal was done on 3.11.1992, on the date of accident i.e., on 13.10.1992, the driver was not duly licenced. For the sake of more clarification,
Section 149(2)(a)(ii) is reproduced,
(ii) a condition excluding driving by a named person or persons or by any person who is not duly licensed, or by any person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence during the period of disqualification”.
5. The wordings used as ‘or’ assumes much importance in this case. According to the construction of this section, the Insurance Company can succeed only if the person was not duly licenced or he was disqualified from holding or obtaining the driving licence during the period of disqualification. According to the construction of the language either of the conditions has to be duly fulfilled. But in the policy issued the word ‘and’ is used as conjunction. By the use of word ‘and’ it goes to show that the Insurance Company has to prove that the driver was not only not duly licenced but also was also disqualified for holding the licence. The word ‘or’ and the word ‘and’ used in the policy assumes much importance. There cannot be compromise between the word ‘or’ and ‘and’. The plain language as it is read has to be understood. In this direction, Mr. B.S. Patil, learned Counsel for the respondents relied upon the observation as how the construction of the statute be understood. On page 96 of the Interpretation of Statutes by Maxwell it is stated as follows:-
” To suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.
It is said to be the duty of the Judge to make such construction of a statute as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy”
6. The another golden rule that is to be remembered is that the statute is capable of being interpreted in two ways. In the case on hand the claimants shall become the victims in the event the Insurance Company is exonerated. The very purpose of issuing the policy is to protect the third party risk. If the Insurance Company is allowed to go scot free on this ground, great hardship would be caused to the claimants. Hence in view of the impending danger that is likely to arise in the case of claimants, the beneficial interpretation has to come to the rescue of the claimants. It is oft-quoted that the duty is to provide the light and not to generate heat. Unless the Insurance Company can place any of the materials covered by Section 19, 20, 132, 134 and 185, it can never be said that there was any disqualification to hold the licence. It goes without saying that when the specific contention of disqualification is taken by the insurance Company, the burden is also on the Insurance Company to adduce the evidence that the driver was not duly licenced and was disqualified. No material evidence is adduced in this direction.
7. In the case of SKANDIA INSURANCE COMPANY LTD v. KOKINABEN CHANDRAVADAN, is it held as follows:-
Motor Vehicles Act (4 of 1939), Sections 96(1)(2)(b)(ii) 94 and 84 – Accident – award – liability of insurer to satisfy – Exclusion of clause in policy prohibiting driving by person other than one holding driving licence – Mere breach of clause does not absolve insurer of his liability has to establish that insured himself was guilty of committing breach of promise in contract of insurance”
In this decision, it is also held as follows on page No. 1191
” These must therefore be interpreted in the spirit in which the same have been enacted accompanied by an anxiety to ensure that the protection is not nullified by the backward looking interpretation which serves to defeat the provision rather than to fulfil its life aim. To do otherwise would amount to nullifying the benevolent provision by reading it with a non-benevolent eye and with a mind not tuned to the purpose and philosophy of the legislation without being informed of the true goals sought to be achieved. What the legislature has given the Court cannot deprive of by way of an exercise in interpretation when the view which renders the provision potent is equally plausible as the one which renders the provision impotent. Infact it appears that the former view is more plausible apart from the fact that this more desirable. When the option is between opting for a view which will relieve the distress and misery of the victims of accidents or their dependents on the one hand and the equally plausible view which will reduce the profitability of the insurer in regard to the occupational hazard undertaken by him by way of business activity, there is hardly any choice. The Court cannot but opt for the former view. Even if one were to make a strictly doctrinaire approach, the very same conclusion would emerge in obeisance to the doctrine of ‘reading down’ the exclusion clause in the light of the ‘main purpose’ of the provision so that the “exclusion clause’ does not cross swords with the ‘main purpose’ highlighted earlier. The effort must be to harmonize the two instead of allowing the exclusion clause to snipe successfully at the main purpose”
8. This case is subsequently followed in the case of B.V. NAGARAJU v. ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED, HASSAN, wherein in para 8 it is stated as follows:-
” The National Commission went for the strict construction of the exclusion clause. The reasoning that the extra passengers being carried in the goods vehicle could not have contributed, in any manner, to the occurring of the accident, was barely noticed and rejected sans any plausible account, even when the claim confining the damage to the vehicle only was limited in nature. We, thus are of the view that in accord with the Skandia’s case (AIR 1987 SC 1184), the aforesaid exclusion term of the insurance policy must be read down so as to serve the- main purpose of the policy that is indemnify the damage caused to the vehicle, which we hereby do”
9. After going through these decisions and the relevant provisions, I am of the opinion that the Tribunal is justified in fastening the liability on the Insurance Company. As such this appeal is liable to be dismissed and accordingly it is dismissed. I am also inclined to observe that the conditions incorporated in the drivers clause in the Insurance Policy may be of some relevance when there is dispute between the insurer and insured and not against the third party