ORDER
1. These batch of civil revision petitions are directed against the orders passed by the Civil Judges at Chitradurga, Bailahongala, Jamkhandi and Chikodi on various dates allowing the application of the claimants made under Sections 151 and 152, Civil Procedure Code claiming enhanced benefits under the amended provisions of Land Acquisition Act of 1984. Since common questions of law and facts are raised in these revisions, they are consolidated, heard and disposed of by this common order.
2. In all these cases, lands were acquired by the Government for public purpose viz., in some cases for irrigation projects and in someother cases for other public purpose. The legality of acquisition as such, was not challenged by the land owners. The acquisitions became final when the Land Acquisition Officer determined the amount of compensation, and possession was taken. Aggrieved by the same, the owners of the lands filed reference applications under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and that the reference Court accepted those references in part and in most of the cases enhanced the compensation by re-determining the market value of the acquired lands. In some cases, the Reference Courts had granted the enhanced benefits in part while in other cases, the benefits were refused. Unfortunately, in these cases, except in C.R.P. No. 587 of 1996 and C.R.P. No. 1614 of 1996 the claimants have not questioned the legality and correctness of those orders in appeals. They allowed the decrees to become final. Sometime later, they were advised to file applications under Sections 151 and 152, Civil Procedure Code seeking an order of amendment of the decree passed by the Reference Court bringing to the notice of the Court the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India and Another v Raghubir Singh (dead) by L.Rs.1, which has affirmed the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in K. Kamalajam-manniavaru (dead) by L.Rs. v Special Land Acquisition Officer . The reference Courts have accepted this submission and passed the impugned orders granting enhanced interest in some cases and other benefits under the amended provisions of Act in some
other cases. The State of Karnataka has thus preferred these revisions on the ground that the reference Courts have committed illegality in allowing the applications filed for amendment of the decree in the absence of clerical or arithmetical errors in the decree.
3. The main contention put forth by Sri Hanumanthrayappa, learned High Court Government Pleader, on behalf of the State is that the Courts below have no jurisdiction to amend the decree by grant of additional benefits within amended provisions of the Act in exercise of the powers under Sections 151 and 152, Civil Procedure Code when there is no clerical error in the decree. In support of this contention he has relied upon a few decisions of the Supreme Court which question is reaffirmed in the latest decision of the Supreme Court in case of Union of India v Swaran Singh and Others . It is also his contention that the awards were passed in some cases prior to the date of Amended Act, and the claimants are ineligible for any benefits under the amended Act.
4. Sri Siraguppi and his colleagues who appeared for the respondents in these batch of revisions submitted that where a statute conferred certain benefits to the land owners who have lost their land, Courts have to be liberal in granting those benefits and not to deny them on technical grounds, that the very purpose of the legislation enacted by the Parliament is defeated by denying these benefits to the farmers who have surrendered their lands for the benefit of the community at large. Therefore, they submitted that the Reference Courts have taken these facts into consideration while allowing these applications filed by the claimants though at a belated stage and they have not exceeded the jurisdiction in allowing those applications and granting statutory benefits which the respondents are legally entitled to.
5. In the light of these submissions certain important aspects arise in these batch of revisions for consideration. They are:
(i) Whether Reference Courts herein have exceeded their jurisdiction in allowing the applications under Sections 151 and 152, Civil Procedure Code in granting additional benefits under the amended
provisions of Land Acquisition Act.
(ii) Having regard to the circumstances involved in these batch of revisions. Whether there is no remedy left upon for the respondents who have lost their lands.
6. Regarding Point No. 1:–Indeed it is really tragic and mockery of law that the owners of lands whose lands have been acquired for public purpose are now put into this unsavoury situation to defend the action brought by the Government. The tragic aspect of the matter is that when Parliament confers certain additional benefits, the same has not reached the beneficiaries. The question whether the statutory benefits conferred by the Amended Act of 1984 are applicable to awards or references prior to 30-4-1982 is now settled by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Raghubir Singh’s case, supra. That decision was rendered by the Court consisting of five Judges. The law is set out at paras 31 and 32 of the said judgment as follows:–
“In construing Section 30(2), it is just as well to be clear that the award made by the Collector referred to here is the award made by the Collector under Section 11 of the Parent Act, and the award made by the Court is the award made by the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction under Section 23 of the Parent Act on a reference made to it by the Collector under Section 19 of the Parent Act. There can be no doubt that the benefit of the enhanced solatium is intended by Section 30(2) in respect of an award made by the Collector between 30 April, 1982 and 24th September, 1984. Likewise, the benefit of the enhanced solatium is extended by Section 30(2) to the case of an award made by the Court between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984 even though it be upon reference from an award made before 30 April, 1982”.
It is further held that “The words ‘any such award’ are intended to have deeper significance, and in the context in which those words appear in Section 30(2) it is clear that they are intended to refer to awards made by the Collector or Court between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984. In other words Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act extends the benefits of the enhanced solatium to cases where the award by the Collector or by the Court is made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984 or to appeals against such awards decided by the High Court and the Supreme Court whether the decisions of the High Court or the Supreme Court are rendered before 24 September, 1984 or after that date. All that is material is that the award by the Collector or by the Courts should have been made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984. We find ourselves in agreements with the conclusion reached by this Court in K. Kamalajammanniavaru’s case, supra and find ourselves unable to agree with the view taken in Bhag Singh v Union Territory of Chandigarh. The expanded meaning given to Section 30(2) in the latter case does not in our opinion, flow reasonably from the language of that sub-section. It seems to us that the learned Judges in that case missed the significance of the word ‘such’ in the collocation ‘any such award’ in Section 30(2). Due significance must be attached to that word and to our mind it must necessarily intend that the appeal to the High Court or the Supreme Court, in which the benefit of the enhanced solatium is to be given, must be confined to an appeal against an award of the Collector or of the Court rendered between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984”.
(emphasis supplied)
7. In the light of this judgment, the awards should have been passed by the Collector or the Reference Court between 30-4-1982 and 24-09-1984 and appeals arising out of the awards passed during the period and pending appeals for entitlement of the statutory benefits conferred upon them under the Amendment Act.
8. The references in all these cases were passed in most of the cases after coming into force or after the introduction of the amended bill i.e., after 30-4-1982. Therefore, in law, all those people who were before the Collector or before the Reference Court between these two periods and therefore are entitled to additional benefits conferred on such people by the Amendment Act. Unfortunately, in these cases, neither the Land Acquisition Officer nor the Reference Court had conferred certain benefits on
them at the time of passing the award. Therefore, there is admitted manifest illegality in the awards passed by the Land Acquisition Officers and also of the Reference Courts. As if, this is not enough, the respondents and their Counsels allowed these judgments and decrees to rest there which become final. Perhaps, they were not properly advised to question the legality of the award passed by the reference Courts in the Appellate Courts. After a sufficient lapse of time in some cases and in some other cases within a reasonable time respondents approached Reference Courts with applications under the provisions of Sections 151, 152 and 153 of Civil Procedure Code, requesting the Court to amend the decree and grant additional benefits under the Amended Act of 1984. The Reference Courts have allowed all their applications holding that it was within their jurisdiction to grant such a relief.
9. The respondents have invoked the inherent jurisdiction of the Court under Section 151 to correct the error committed by the Court while granting the decree. However, that cannot be done in exercise of the discretionary power under Section 151. The question was whether there was a clerical or arithmetical mistake found in judgments and decree or orders. The Courts below without having considered the language used in Section 152 of Civil Procedure Code have erroneously granted the applications.
10. In cases where applications under Sections 151 and 152 are made for correction of decrees granted by the Reference Court in particular, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Reference Courts have no such jurisdiction. The law on this point can be found in a series of judgments of Supreme Court in
AIR 1995 SC 1004, KS. Paripoornan v State of Kerala and
Others , State of Punjab v Babu Singh , State of Maharastra v
Maharau Srawan Hatkar’, State of Punjab v Jagir Singh and in the latest judgment of the Supreme Court in Swaran ‘Singh’s case, supra, it is held that it is settled law that after the Reference Court has granted an award and decree under Section 26(2) of the Act or an appeal under Section 54, the only remedy available to a party is to file an application for correction of
clerical or arithmetical mistakes in the decree. The award of solatium and interest would be granted on enhancement of compensation when the Court finds that the compensation was not correct. It is a part of the judgment or award. Admittedly, as on that date, the claimants were entitled to solatium at 15% and interest at 6%. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 came into force as on September 24, 1984. It is settled law that if the proceedings are pending before the Reference Court as on that date, the claimants would be entitled to the enhanced solatium and interest. In view of the fact that the Reference Court itself has answered the reference and enhanced the compensation as on December 24, 1981, the decree as on that date was correctly drawn and became final.
11. The question then is : whether the High Court has power to entertain independent applications under Sections 151 and 152 and enhance solatium and interest as amended under Act 68 of 1984. This controversy is no longer res Integra. In Jagir Singh’s case, supra and also in catena of decisions that follow thereafter in Union of India v Pratap Kaur (dead) by L.Rs. , Maharau Srawan Hatkar’s case, supra, Babu Singh, Raghubir Singh and Paripoornan’s cases, supra, this Apex Court has held that Reference Court or High Court has no power or jurisdiction to entertain any applications under Sections 151 and 152 to correct any decree which has become final or to independently pass an award enhancing the solatium and interest as amended by Act 68 of 1984. Consequently, the award by the High Court granting enhanced solatium at 30% under Section 23(2) and interest at the rate of 9% for one year from the date of taking possession and thereafter at the rate of 15% till date of deposit under Section 28 as amended under Act 68 of 1984 are clearly without jurisdiction and, therefore, a nullity.
12. Therefore, this question is no longer in controversy. In the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, it has to be held that the Reference Court has no jurisdiction to amend the decree nor exercise the jurisdiction under Section 152, Civil Procedure Code. Therefore, the impugned orders are clearly an illegality and are liable to be set aside. Therefore, I answer Point No.l in the affirmative.
13. Regarding Point No. 2: The second point arises for my consideration is whether the claimants have got remedy under the circumstances. The learned Counsels pleaded before this Court that large extent of lands belonging to small farmers were acquired in the larger interest of the society for construction of irrigation projects and for other public purposes. These small farmers who had no other avocation in life had no remedy except to receive the paltry sum granted by the Land Acquisition Officers and had to fight out the litigation for determination of proper market value. When the matters were pending before the Reference Courts, the amended Act came into force and that the Courts below for reasons not explained perhaps, due to the unsettled position of law, till the decision of the Supreme Court in Raghubir Singh’s case, supra, have admittedly committed, the error on the face of it in not granting certain statutory benefits. It is further submitted that when the Parliament through the Amended Act has granted certain benefits to the farmers who have lost their lands for public purposes, the very purpose is defeated, in this manner. It is submitted that technicalities apart, the Courts/Government concern must come to the assistance of these people to make available the benefits granted to them by the Parliament by the amended provisions of the Act.
14. I find some merit in these submissions having regard to the special circumstances noticed in these cases.
15. We have come across cases where persons who have lost their lands under the circumstances explained above, have not been able to receive even a portion of the benefits granted by the statutes. They have to fight out the litigation in a hard way to get the correct market value of their lands. This is one of the anomalies of our legal system. The uneducated people are made to fight out their rights in Courts of law for over decades and the ultimate result would be a few rupees in their hands. What then is the remedy is the question that comes up before this Court. The Supreme Court has now virtually ruled out grant of such benefits in exercise of the discretionary power or by way of a amendment to the decree under Section 152, Civil Procedure Code. Firstly, in such cases, the claimants could have moved the Reference Courts by involving the provisions of Order 41, Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code. The learned Government Pleader has raised initial objection for such an application before the Courts bringing to the notice of this Court the observation of the
Supreme Court in the case of Bai Shakriben (dead) by Natwar Melsingh and Others v Special Land Acquisition Officer and Another . Though in the said case an application was made under Order 47, Rule 1 and Section 151, Civil Procedure Code to amend the decree for award of benefit though the decree has become final, the prayer in the said application was to amend the decree but, not to review the order. It is very pertinent to note the observations made by the Supreme Court in the following words:
“We feel that the Executing Court cannot go behind the decree. It would have been appropriate for the claimants to have gone in appeal and have the matter corrected, but unfortunately, they did not claim the appellate remedy and allowed the decree to become final. The omission to award additional amounts under Section 23(1-A), enhanced interest under Section 28 and solatium under Section 23(2) are not clerical or arithmetical mistake crept in the award passed by the Reference Court but amounts to non-award. Under those circumstances, the Reference Court was clearly in error in entertaining the application for amendment of the decree and is devoid of power and jurisdiction to award the amounts under Sections 23(2),
23(1-A) and 28 of the Act”.
16. There is no specific reference to the powers of the Reference Court under the provisions of Order 47, Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code, Order 47, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code provides for an application for review of judgment.
“Any person considering himself aggrieved-
(a) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, from which no appeal has been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,
and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after, the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him
at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order”.
Two things which I would like to point out from the case of Bai Shakriben, supra, is that initially that was a case where award or reference was not pending as on the date of the coming into the force of the Amendment Act. Secondly, the claimants had exhausted the appellate remedy and an application for amendment of the decree was made at the time of the execution of the decree. It was under these circumstances, the Supreme Court has specifically observed that such application could not have been granted by the High Court. In my considered opinion, there is no bar under the special circumstances narrated supra to make an application for the review of the order.
17. The other aspect which I would like to mention in this case concerns the conduct of the Government in such cases. When the Parliament thought of conferring certain benefits to the losers of the lands for public purpose, whether the Government can put forth an obstacle by raising technical objections in the Courts of law? It must be remembered that laws are made for the benefit of the society and not to create obstacles in that process. If there is any obstacle in that process, Courts will have to necessarily remove these obstacles. It is not known as to how the attention of the State Government was not at all drawn to this important aspect of the matter. The object of construction of major irrigation projects in the Country or the State is for the benefit of large number of people though at the cost of few others. The benefit must necessarily be shared both by the subsequent beneficiaries and also by the losers of the land. Therefore, it is necessary for the Government to bestow its attention in this direction and to consider the entire thing afresh and the Court would in fact, go to the extent of advising the Government to take a very helpful decision in this matter.
18. The net result of this discussion is that the impugned orders are not justifiable in the light of Supreme Court rulings. Therefore, these revisions are allowed. The impugned orders are set aside. However, it is open to the respondents to agitate their rights in the light of the observations made in the course of this
judgment. Send a copy of this judgment to the Law Secretary, Honourable Law Minister, the Irrigation Secretary.