JUDGMENT
Nainar Sundaram, J.
1. These writ appeals are directed against the common order of the learned single Judge in W.P. Nos. 6537, 7142 and 7143 of 1985. In each of those writ petitions, the first respondent in the respective writ appeals was the petitioner; respondents 2 to 4 were respondents 1 to 3; and the appellant was the fourth respondent. We are referring to the parties as per their array in the writ petitions. The writ petitions were filed by the petitioners seeking for writs of mandamus to forbear the respondents from acquiring the lands of the petitioners, on the ground of inordinate delay in the prosecution of the land acquisition proceedings. Certain dates have to be set down. The notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1984, hereinafter referred to as the Act was published on 10.5.1962. The declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published on 18.1.1969. The proceedings under Section 9(3) read with Section 10 of the Act took place only on 15.5.1985. Thus, there was a delay of more than 23 years for the prosecution of the land acquisition proceedings, after the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made. It must be noted here that the fourth respondent is the beneficiary of land acquisition proceedings. The learned single Judge, who heard the writ petitions, took note of the principle that inordinate delay in the prosecution of the land acquisition proceedings must be frowned upon as vitiating the very land acquisition proceedings and repelling the only contention put forth by the fourth respondent that a writ of mandamus would not lie because there is no duty cast upon the respondents to drop the acquisition proceedings, allowed the writ petitions. As stated above, these writ appeals are directed against the common order of the learned single Judge.
2. Mr. V. Santhanam, learned Counsel for the fourth respondent, would submit that the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 68 of 1984, hereinafter referred to as Act 68 of 1984, introduced Section 11-A into the Act effective from 24.9.1984 and as per the said provision in a case where the declaration under Section 6 of the Act has been published before the commencement of the Act 68 of 1984, the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement and in the instant case that period had not yet lapsed when the writ petitions were heard and disposed of by the learned single Judge and further on the filing of the writ petitions in June, 1985, there were orders of stay and learned Counsel for the fourth respondent submits that in the said circumstances, the land acquisition proceedings could not be quashed on the ground of delay. In support of his submission, learned Counsel for the fourth respondent would place reliance on the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Gujarat State Transport Corporation v. Valjimulji A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 64 and Kaliyappan v. State of Kerala A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 239.
3. Mr. R. Thiagarajan, learned Counsel for the petitioners, in answer, would advance two points, to take away the force of the contention put forth by the learned Counsel for the fourth respondent. The first point is that the petitioners lacked the very locus standi either to implead themselves as parties to the writ petitions and when the decision at the hands of the learned single Judge has gone against them they lacked the very same locus standi to prefer and prosecute these writ appeals. Learned Counsel for the petitioners would submit that the pronouncement of the Full Bench in Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd. v. Rangaswami 1989 Writ L.R. 281, has countenanced the principle that a beneficiary of the land acquisition proceedings could not claim himself to be a person interested to challenge the land acquisition proceedings. Learned Counsel for the fourth respondent is conscious of the fact that the ratio of the Full Bench was laid down with reference to the challenge of the compensation proceedings; but, he would submit that the Full Bench, in terms, has taken guidance, after construing the implications, from the pronouncement of the Supreme Court, where it has been countenanced that a beneficiary could not acquire any right to challenge the land acquisition proceedings.
4. We have carefully gone through the pronouncement of the Full Bench in Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd v. Rangaswami 1989 Writ L.R. 281. The Full Bench refers to the pronouncement of two learned Judges of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation, Ahmedabad v. C.S. Patel and Ors. (1970) 1 S.C.W.R. 183. The judgment of the Supreme Court is a brief one and at the same time important and it would be worthwhile if the same, as reported, is extracted as follows:
Certain lands belonging to the first respondent were notified for acquisition under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act by the Government of Bombay by a Notification dated February 19,1959. The area in which the land is situate having thereafter been allotted to the state of Gujarat on the bifurcation of the State of Bombay under the States Reorganisation Act, 1960, a Divisional Commissioner of the State of Gujarat issued a Notification under Section 6 on May 2,1961. Both the Notifications mentioned the purpose for acquisition as ‘for school and neighbourhood work’. The Notifications were challenged by the first respondent in a petition filed by him in the High Court of Gujarat on various grounds which it is not necessary to set out. The petition was granted. The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad which was the fourth respondent in the petition has appealed to this Court A Preliminary objection is raised against the maintainability of the appeal filed by the Corporation, it is urged that the Corporation is not aggrieved by the order. In our judgment, ‘ the contention must be upheld.
2. The Municipal Corporation was impleaded as the fourth respondent before the High Court but no relief was claimed against the Municipal Corporation. The property, it is true, was notified for acquisition by the State Government for the use of the Municipal Corporation after it was acquired by the Government, but that, in our judgment, did not confer any interest in the Municipal Corporation so as to enable it to file an appeal against the order of the High Court allowing the petition. Substantially the grounds on which the petition was filed were that the Notifications were invalid on account of diverse reasons. Some of these reasons have been upheld and some have not been upheld; but all those grounds related to the validity of the Notifications issued by the Government of Bombay and the Government of Gujarat. Not even an order of costs has been passed against the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad. We fail to see what interest the Municipal Corporation has which would sustain an appeal by it against the order of the High Court allowing the writ petition filed by the first-respondent.
3. The appeal is dismissed as not maintainable. There will be no order as to costs.
5. It is true that there is another pronouncement of two other learned Judges of the Supreme Court in Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. F.V. Goutinho , wherein it has been held that such a person is vitally interested, both in the title to the property as also in the compensation. Mr. V. Santhanam, learned Counsel for the fourth respondent, very much relies on this pronouncement. The Full Bench, has in fact, referred to both the pronouncements of the Supreme Court and the learned Judges of the Full Bench have found a warrant to interpret the pronouncement in Municipal Corporation, Ahmedabad v. C.S. Patel and Ors. (1970) 1 S.C.W.R. 183, as throwing proper and correct light on the question. The Full Bench adverted to Municipal Corporation, Ahmedabad v. C.S. Patel and Ors. (1970) 1 S.C.W.R. 183, in the following terms:
In the decision in The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamaladas Patel (1970) 1 S.C.W.R. 183, the Supreme Court held that even though the property was notified for acquisition by the State Government for the use of the Municipal Corporation after it was acquired by the Government, it did not confer any right in the Municipal Corporation so as to enable it to file an appeal against the order of the High Court allowing the petition. However, that case did not arise under any reference under Section 18 of the Act. But, the principle decided therein would be of some importance for the purpose of the present cases.
The Full Bench discussed also at length the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. F.V. Goutinho and summed up as follows:
Therefore, we have to proceed on the basis that the question now involved in these proceedings has not been decided directly in the said case. It is unfortunate that the earlier case of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel (1970) 1 S.C.W.R. 183, above referred to was not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court since the Supreme Court was concerned about the validity of the acquisition proceedings only.
In such a contingency, sitting as we do, as Judges of a Division Bench of this court, we are bound by the interpretation and preference given by the Full Bench of this Court. This will be in consonance with the decorum of our judicial functioning. It is well settled that an interpretation (and equally a misinterpretation) by a larger Bench of the High Court, of a decision or decisions of the Supreme Court, is binding on a smaller Bench of the same court, and the latter cannot refuse to follow the decision of the larger Bench, on the ground that the larger Bench has wrongly understood or construed the decisions of the Supreme Court. Taking note of this principle, we are obliged to hold that the appellants could not be held to have locus standi to prefer and prosecute these writ appeals. Hence, we are obliged to sustain the first point put forth by Mr. R. Thiagarajan, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners.
6. Learned Counsel for the petitioners advances as the second point the proposition that the State preferred writ appeals W.A. Nos. 1321 to 1323 of 1986 as against the very same common order of the learned single Judge and those writ appeals have been dismissed by a Bench of this Court on 5.1.1987 and m the said circumstances, it is not open to the fourth respondent to reagitate the matter on merits assuming that it has locus standi to do so. We have not gone into this point, because we have sustained the first point put forth by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. Equally so, we have not gone into the contention raised by Mr. V. Santhanam, learned Counsel for the fourth respondent. For the above reasons, these writ appeals fail and they are dismissed. No costs.
7. Nainar Sundaram, J.: The matter comes up “for being mentioned.” We only directed this matter to be posted “for being mentioned” because after we delivered the judgment and subscribed our signatures to it, we found that in the body of the judgment, certain sentences do not bring out the real meaning of the proposition which we were called upon to resolve. In paragraph 3 of the judgment, we have referred to the pronouncement of the Full Bench in Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd. v. Rangaswami 1989 Writ L.R. 281, as countenancing, “A beneficiary of the land acquisition proceedings could not claim himself to be a person interested to challenge the land acquisition proceedings”. In the very same paragraph towards its end we further stated that “A beneficiary could not acquire any right to challenge the land acquisition proceedings”. The proposition properly stated is “a beneficiary has no locus standi to intervene to oppose the challenge of the land acquisition proceedings by persons interested and seek to sustain it.” The above sentences occurring in our judgment must be read in the above manner.