PETITIONER: THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR. Vs. RESPONDENT: B. K. TAKKAMORE & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/02/1967 BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. WANCHOO, K.N. RAMASWAMI, V. CITATION: 1967 AIR 1353 1967 SCR (2) 583 CITATOR INFO : E 1969 SC 707 (49) R 1976 SC 232 (10,18) R 1987 SC 570 (14) F 1989 SC1185 (23) ACT: City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 (C.P. & Berar Act 2 of 1950), s. 408-Municipality--Supersession-Grounds of interference in writ application-Order if sustainable when one of the two charges found not proved. HEADNOTE: By s. 408 of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 the State Government may, after giving an opportunity to the Corporation to show cause, pass an order superseding the Corporation, if it is of opinion that the Corporation is not competent or persistently makes default in the performance of the duties imposed on it by or under the Act. After the requisite show cause notice the State Government passed the impugned Order superseding the Nagpur Municipal Corporation. The High Court, in a writ petition, quashed the Order holding that the State Government exercised its power' under s. 408 on grounds which were not reasonably related to its Legitimate exercise and that the finding upon which the Order was passed was rationally impossible on the materials before the State Government. On appeal to this Court: HELD:The Order of supersession was valid and could not be set aside. (i)Of the two grounds on which the opinion of the State Government was based the first ground could not be sustained, firstly because the Corporation had no opportunity to show cause against the charge, and secondly, because no reasonable person on the materials before the State Government could possibly form the opinion that the charge was proved. Regarding the second ground there were materials before the State Government upon which it could find that the Corporation was not competent to perform the duties imposed upon it. [588H; 592D] In a writ application the court will not review the facts as an appellate body. But the Order of supersession is liable to be set aside, as in excess of the, statutory power under s. 408, if no reasonable person on a proper consideration of the materials before the State Government will form the opinion that the Corporation is not competent to perform or persistently defaults in the performance of the duties imposed on it. 'Me Order is also liable to be set aside if it was passed in bid faith or due opportunity to show cause was not given. [585H] (ii)The Order cannot be set aside for the reason that one of the grounds is found to be non-existent or irrelevant. The Order, read with the show cause notice shows that in the opinion of the State Government the second ground by itself was serious enough to warrant action under s.408. [595 A-B] An administrative or quasi-judicial Order based on several grounds, all taken together, cannot be sustained if it be found that some of the grounds are non-existent or irrelevant and there is nothing to show that the authority would have passed the Order on the basis of the other relevant and 584 existing grounds. But, an Order based on several grounds some of which are found to be non-existent or irrelevant can be sustained if the Court is satisfied that the authority would have passed the Order on the basis of other relevant and existing grounds and the exclusion of the irrelevant or non-existent grounds could not have affected the ultimate 'opinion or decision. [594 E-G] Dwarka Das Bhatia v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, [19651 S.C.R, 948. Dhirajilal Girdharilal v. Commissioner of Income-tax, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 271, State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mahapatra, [1963] Supp. I S.CR. 648 and Naursinha v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. [1958] M.P. 397. referred to. JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2340 of 1966.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated October 7, 1966 of
the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench in Special Civil Appli-
cation No. 940 of 1965.
M. C. Setalvad, N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for
appellant No. 1.
A. S. Bobde, and S. G. Kukdey, for respondent No. 1.
M. M. Kinkhede, G. L. Sanghi and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for
respondents Nos. 3-16, 19-31, 33, 34, 36-45, 47-53, 55 and
57.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Bachawat, J. This appeal arises out of a writ petition filed
by respondent No. 1 before the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay
High Court, challenging the show-cause notice dated July 21,
1965 and the order dated September 29, 1965, superseding the
municipal corporation of the city of Nagpur. In July, 1962,
the term of office of the present Councillors commenced. On
July 21, 1965, the Government of Maharashtra issued a notice
to respondent No. 1, the Mayor of the Nagpur Municipal
Corporation, asking him to show cause why the corporation
should not be superseded. On August 1, 1965, respondent No.
I filed his reply to the show-cause notice. On September
29, 1965, the State Government passed the impugned order
superseding the corporation under ss. 408 and 409 of the
City of Nagpur Corporation Act 1948 (C. P. & Berar Act 11
of 1950). On September 30, 1965, respondent No. I filed a
writ petition challenging the show-cause notice and the
order of supersession. The High Court allowed the writ
petition and quashed the order of supersession. The High
Court held that the State Government exercised its power
under S. 408 on grounds which were not reasonably related to
its legitimate exercise and the finding upon which the order
was passed was rationally impossible on the materials before
the State Government. The State of Maharashtra now appeals
to this Court on a certificate granted by the High Court.
By an order of this Court, the Administrator of the City of
Nagpur appointed under the order of supersession of
September 29, 1965, has been joined as the second appellant.
585
Section 408 of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act 1948 is
in ‘these terms:-
“408. (1) If at any time upon representations
made or otherwise it appears to the State
the Corporation is not competent to perform or
persistently makes default in the performance
of the duties imposed on it by or under this
Act or any other law for the time being in
force, or exceeds or abuses its powers the
State Government may’, after having given an
opportunity to the Corp oration to show cause
why such an order should not be made, or if
it” appears to the State Government that the
case is one of emergency, forthwith issue an
order directing that all the Councillors shall
retire from office as and from such date as
may be appointed and declare the Corporation
to be superseded. Such order shall be
published in the Gazette and the reasons for
making it shall be stated therein.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in
sections 17 and 20, all Councillors shall
vacate their office from the date mentioned
in- any order under sub-section (1).”.
The consequence of supersession of the corporation under s.
408 is that all its members vacate their office, all powers
and duties of the; corporation; the Standing Committee and
the chief executive officer may be exercised by the
administrator of the city appointed by the State government,
and all property vested in the corporation vests in the
administrator (s. 408).
The conditions for the exercise of he power under s. 408 are
clearly stated in the section. It must appear to the State
government that the corporation is not competent or
persistently makes default in the performance of the duties
imposed on it by or under the Act or any other law for the
time being in force, or exceeds or abuses its powers.
Except in cases of emerge icy, the State government must
give to the corporation an opportunity to show cause why the
order under the section should not be made. If on a
consideration of the explanation submitted by the
corporation, the State government considers that there is no
ground for making the order, the Government may drop the
proceeding. Otherwise, it may issue an order declaring the
corporation to ‘be superseded and directing that all the
Councillors shall retire from office. The order must be
published in the Gazette and the reasons: For-making it must
be stated therein. There is no appeal to the court from the
order under s. 408. in a writ application the court will not
review the facts as an appellate body. But the order is
liable to be set aside if no reasonable person on a proper
consideration of the materials before the State government
could form the opinion that the corporation “is not
competent to perform, or persistently makes default in the
performance of the duties imposed on it by or under this Act
or any other law for the
586
time being in force, or exceeds or abuses its powers”.
Likewise, the order is liable to be set aside if it was
passed in bad faith or if in a case which was not one, of
emergency, due opportunity to show cause was not given to
the corporation. In all such cases, the order is in excess
of the statutory power under s. 408 and is invalid.
On the question whether the order under s. 408 is an
administrative or quasi-judicial act, our attention was
drawn to the decisions in Municipal Committed, Karali and
Another, v. The State of Madhya Pradesh(1) and Shri
Radheshyam Khare and Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and
Others.(2) These cases turned on the construction of ss. 53A
and 57 of the C. P. & Berar Municipalities Act 1922 (Act 11
of 1922). The point whether the order under s. 408 is
quasi-judicial or administrative act is not very material,
for it is common ground,that the present case was not one of
emergency and the State government was bound to give
opportunity to the corporation to show cause why the order
should not be made.
The order dated September 29, 1965 was in these terms:-
“Whereas it is reported to the Government of
Maharashtra that the Municipal Corporation of
the City of Nagpur (hereinafter referred to as
‘the Municipal Corporation’) constituted under
the City of Nagpur Municipal Corporation Act,
1948 (C.P. & Berar Act 11 of 1950)
(hereinafter. referred to as ‘the said Act’)
(a) has, since the present Councillors
entered upon their office, planned its
-expenditure on the basis of uncertain
receipts as shown below, that is to say-
Year Receipts in budget as Actual of previous
passed by Corporation year
Rs. in lacs Rs. in lacs.
1963-64 351 173 1964-65 221 190 1965-66 258 (200 to 215 lacs anticipated.
and without exercising the proper controls provided by or
under the said Act has allowed its financial position to
deteriorate rapidly and-seriously to such an extent that the
free cash balance of Rs. 5.81 lacs approximately in March
1962 was reduced to Rs. 53,000 approximately on the 12th
July, 1965: and that the Corporation had no funds even to
(1) A.I.R. 1958 M.P. 323.
(2) [1959] S.C.R. 1440.
587
disburse the salaries of its officers and
‘servants as is noticed from the Resolution of
the Municipal Corporation No. 98, dated the
4th September, 1965; and
(b) has neglected to under take the
improvement of water supply and to provide a
sufficient supply of suitable water for public
and private purposes;
And whereas, an opportunity was given to the
Municipal Corporation to show cause why in the
aforesaid circumstances an order of
supersession under sub-section (1) of section
408 of the said Act should not be made-,
And whereas, after considering the reply of
the Municipal Corporation and subsequent it
submissions made by it the Government of
Maharashtra is of the opinion that the
Municipal Corporation is not competent to
perform the duties imposed on it by or under
the said Act;
Now’ therefore, in exercise of the powers
conferred by sub-section (1) of section 408
and subsection (1) of section 409 of the said
Act, and of all other powers enabling it in
this behalf, the Government of Maharashtra for
the reasons specified aforesaid, hereby-
(1) directs that all the Councillors of the
Municipal Corporation shall retire from office
as and from the 1st day of October, 1965;
(2) declares the Municipal Corporation to be
superseded from that date; and
(3) appoints Shri D. H. Deshmukh to be the
Administrator of the City of Nagpur
From the order it appears that there were two grounds on
which the State government formed the opinion that the
corporation was not competent to perform the duties imposed
on it by or under the Nagpur Municipal Corporation Act,
1948.
Annexure 2 to the show-cause notice dated July 21, 1965 Set
out the following facts relatable to the first ground
mentioned in paragraph 1(a) of the order:-
“II. (1) In March 1962, the free cash balance
with the Corporation was Rs., 5. 81 lacs. On
12-7-65, the opening cash balance of the
Corporation “,as Rs. 53,821. The Statement
‘A’ appended hereto will reveal the financial.
position of the Corporation. On the basis of
average daily receipts the Corporation will
have an opening balance of Rs. 7 -74 lacs on
1-8-65 as against that their immediate
liabilities are of the order of Rs. 30 84
lacs. ‘It is
588
thus clear that the Corporation is heading
for a grave. financial crisis and it will not
be in a position even to pay fully the
salaries and wages of their permanent and
temporary employees. Under Chapter IV of the
City of Nagpur corporation Act, the
Corporation is required to pay salaries to
their officers and servants as provided for in
Sections 47, 49 and 50 of the said Act. The
liability arising out of the payment of
salaries; and wages is the third charge on the
municipal fund the. previous two charges being
repayment of all loans payable by the
Corporation under Chapter IX of that Act and
the second being the payment for discharge of
all liabilities imposed on the Corporation in
respect of debts’ and obligations and
contracts of’ the Municipality, of Nagpur, to
whom the Corporation- is a successor. It is
assumed that such liabilities do -not any’
longer exist. Thus the payment of salaries
etc., is the ,second charge on the municipal
fund, and it is very obvious from the figures
in Statement `A’ that the Corporation is not
in a position to discharge that liability.”
The opinion of the State, government so far as it is based
on the first ground cannot be supported. The show-cause
notice did not mention the charge that the Councillors
planned the expenditure on the basis of uncertain receipts
or that they did not exercise .proper controls provided by
or under the Act. No opportunity was given to the
corporation to explain the charge. Without giving such an
opportunity, the State government could not lawfully and
that the charge was proved. The cash balances of the cor-
poration vary from day to day. No reasonable person could
possibly come to the conclusion hat the financial position
of the corporation had deteriorated from the fact that the
cash balances were Rs. 5,81,000 in March 1962 and Rs. 53,000
on July 12, 1965. The, statement that the corporation had no
funds to disburse the salaries of its officers and servants
had no factual basis. As a matter of fact, the corporation
paid the salaries. The dearness allowance was not paid
because the bills were not scrutinized.’ The resolution
dated September 4, 1965 referred to in the order was passed
long after the show-cause notice was issued and the
corporation was not given an, opportunity to explain it.
The resolution did not say that the co’ oration had no’
funds even to disburse’ the salaries of its officers and
servants. The, corporation resolved to raise a loan of Rs.
15 lacs from the State; Government, but, the; loan was not
raised. The High Court also pointed out that many of the
statements in the. statement “A” referred to in the show-
cause notice were factually incorrect. The opinion of the
State government, based on the first ground cannot be
sustained, firstly because the corporation had no,
opportunity to show cause against the charge, and secondly,
because no reasonable Person on the materials
589
before the State government could possibly form the opinion
that the charge was proved:-
The second. ground referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of the
order dated September 29, 1965 is more serious. Section
57(1)(k) of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948
provides that the corporation shall make adequate provision
by any means or measures which it may lawfully use or take
for……….. “(k) the management and maintenance of all
municipal water-works and the construction and maintenance
of new works and Means for providing sufficient supply of
suitable water for public and private purposes.” The charge
was that the corporation neglected to undertake the
improvement of water, supply and to provide a sufficient
supply of suitable water for public and private purposes.
The relevant facts were set out in annexure 1-1(1) to (4)
and annexure 11 to the show-cause notice. It is’ common
ground that the water supply of the city of Nagpur was
inadequate. The population of the city was fast increasing
and it was the duty of the corporation to augment the
supply. The improvement of the head works at the Kanhan
Stage III and also the re-modelling and redesigning of the
-distribution system was necessary for augmenting
and,improving the water supply. The work at Kanhan
Stage.111 commenced in 1964 and. for that purpose the
Government sanctioned an ad hoc loan of Rs. 21 lacs. The
cost of the remaining work at Kanhan Stage III and the work
of re-modelling and redesigning of distribution system was
estimated to be Rs. 70 lacs. The corporation could not meet
the cost without. raising a loan. II had the power to raise
a loan for this purpose with the previous sanction of the
State government under s. 90 of the City of Nagpur
Corporation Act 1948. The corporation was not in a position
to raise 1 he loan in the open market unless the repayment
of the loan was guaranteed by the Government. It approached
the. Government to give the guarantee. The Government was
willing to give the guarantee if two conditions were
fulfilled (1) the co oration would meter the water supply
immediately, and (2) in the annual budget, the budget of the
water works department for the supply of water would be
shown separately. The Government was not willing to, give
the guarantee unless conditions were fulfilled. In
May/June,.965, these conditions were communicated by, the
minister in charge to the municipal commissioner and the
chairman of the standing committee. On June 5, 1965, the
standing committee resolved:
“(i) The Corporation may raise in the open
market loan of Rs. 70 lacs for the purpose of
completing the Kanhan Stage III head works and
provision of Alteration plant and for
re-modelling -and redesigning the water
distribution system in Nagpur Corporation are.
590
(ii) The principle of universal meterisation
should be accepted and all water connection in
future should only be in the meter system’
(iii) The principle of providing a separate
subsidiary budget for water supply should be
accepted.”
At a meeting held on June 30, 1965, the corporation appears
to have disapproved of the standing committee’s resolution
regarding the principle of universal meterisation and
setting up a separate subsidiary budget for water supply
though no specific resolution to that effect was passed. A
meeting of the corporation on July 5, 1965 was convened to
discuss the matter of raising a loan of Rs. 70 lacs. In the
notice calling the meeting, the following office note
appeared at the foot of the relevant agenda:-
“In this connection the State Government
demanded the following two assurances from the
Corporation,
(1) Nagpur Corporation should meter the
water
supply immediately.
(2) In the annual budget of the Corporation,budget of the water works
department should be shown separately for
supply of water. In the said budget provision
for payment of loans, sinking. fund and future
increase, in expenditure should be made
separately. After making these provisions the
Corporation can expend the money for other
works.”
On July 5, 1965, the meeting was adjourned.
On July 1,2, 1965, the corporation passed the,
following resolution:-
“The Corporation gives its approval to the
raising of a loan of Rs. 70 lakhs, in the next
three years. Such a loan comprising of Rs. 24
lakhs for Kanhan 3 Stage scheme and Rs. 45
lakhs for improvement in the Distribution
System necessitated in view of the additional
29 million gallons of water that will be
available after completion of the Kanhan 3
Stage Scheme.
The office should take necessary action to
obtain the guarantee of the State Government
for raising this loan in the open market in
accordance with the above Resolution.”
The resolution is not printed in the paper book, but an
agreed copy of the resolution was filed before us. :The
State government was of the view that by the resolution
dated July 12, 1965, the corporation refused to accept the
two conditions mentioned in the office note and thereby made
it impossible for the corporation to meet the cost of
construction of the head works and the. remodelling and
591
redesigning of the distribution system and to provide a
sufficient supply of water for the public and private
purposes. The corporation could not raise the loan without
the Government guarantee and the government could, not
reasonably guarantee the loan unless the two conditions of
universal meterisation and the separate budget for the water
supply were accepted. The two conditions were reasonable.
The adoption of universal meterisation would have curtailed
the wastage of water and secured adequate revenues necessary
for the repayment of the loan and the setting up of an
adequate sinking and development fund for the water supply.
A separate budget for the supply of water would have ensured
that the receipts from the/ supply of water were a located
to the expenditure on the water supply scheme. The answer
of the corporation was twofold. The corporation said
firstly that the resolution dated July 12, 1965 neither
accepted nor rejected the two conditions and the question of
accepting the conditions was left for future negotiations
with the government after the government would be approached
for the sanction of the loan under s. 420(2)(r) of the City
of Nagpur Corporation Act 1948, read with City of Nagpur
Corporation Loans Rules 1951. The corporation said secondly
that the cost of immediate meterisation of the old
connections would be Rs. 52 lacs and it was impossible for
the corporation to raise this sum, nor could it lawfully
divert any portion of the loan of Rs. 70 lacs for meeting
this cost.
The High Court accepted the contention that at the meeting
held on July 12, 1965, the corporation had resolved that-the
matter with regard to the conditions imposed by the
government for giving the loan should be left for further
negotiations with the government. But it is to be noticed
that the resolution dated July 12, 1965 did riot state that
there should be any further negotiations with the government
on the matter, nor did it disclose the financial problem
with regard to meterisation or the basis upon which further
negotiations should take place. On June 30, 1965, he
corporation had talked out the recommendation of the
standing committee with regard to the universal meterisation
and separate budget. In this background, the State
government. could reasonably hold that the passing of the
resolution excluding the office note amounted to virtual
rejection of the conditions mentioned in the note. The High
Court was in error in accepting the first contention.
The High Court was also in error in holding that the Govern-
ment passed the order of September 29, 1965 without
considering that universal meterisation posed a formidable
problem which could not be overcome without a loan of Rs.
52, lacs in addition to the loan of Rs. 70 lacs. The
resolution of July 12, 1965 did not state that the
corporation wanted an additional loan of Rs. .52 lacs for
meeting the cost of universal meterisation. Even in the
answer to the showcause notice, the corporation did not say
that it wanted to raise
592
an additional loan of Rs. 52 lacs. The answer stated that
the raising of this sum for the present was an
impossibility. There is nothing to show that the State,
government would not have guaranteed repayment of this
additional loan or that it was not possible to raise the
loan backed, by a government guarantee. In the writ
petition respondent No.1 gave a summary of the reply to the
show-cause notice. But there was no specific averment in
the petition supported by affidavit that Rs. 52 lacs was
necessary for the meterisation and that the raising of this
sum was an impossibility. That is why the point was not
dealt with in the return to the writ, petition. Even
assuming that the meterisation would cost Rs. 52 lacs, there
is nothing to show that the government would not have
guaranteed the loan for this sum or that the corporation
could not have raised the loan with this, guarantee.
Moreover, if the Government was right in assuming that the
corporation had refused to entertain the proposal of
meterisation, the question of raising funds for the
meterisation would not arise and would be irrelevant. The
government passed the order after taking into consideration
the reply to the show-cause notice. There were materials be
“ore the State Government upon which it could find that the
corporation had neglected to undertake an improvement of
water supply and to provide a sufficient supply of water for
private and public purpose. On the basis of this finding,
the State government could form the opinion that the
corporation was not competent to perform the duties imposed
on it by or under the Act.
Mr. Bobde contended that the opinion of the State government
was based on two grounds arid as one of them is found to be
non-existent or irrelevant, the order is invalid and should
be set aside. The cases relied on by him may, be briefly
noticed. In a number of cases, the Court has quashed orders
of preventive detention based on several grounds one of
which is found to be irrelevant or illusory. After
reviewing the earlier cases Jagannadhadas J, in Dwarka Dass
Bhatia v. The State of Jammu and Kashmir (1) said:
“The principle underlying all these decisions
is ‘this. Where power is vested in a
statutory authority to deprive the liberty of
a subject on its subjective satisfaction with
reference to specified matters, if that
satisfaction is stated to be based on a number
of grounds or for a variety ‘of reasons all
taken together, and if some out of them are
found to be non-existent or irrelevant, the
very exercise of that power is bad. This is
so because the matter being one for subjective
satisfaction, it must be properly based on all
the reasons on which it purports to be based.
If ‘some out of them are found to be non-
existent or irrelevant, the Court cannot pre-
dicate what the subjective satisfaction of the
said authority would have been on the
exclusion of those grounds or
(1) [1956] S.C.R. 948,955.
593
reasons. To uphold the validity of such an
order in spite of the invalidity of -some of
the reasons or grounds would be to substitute
the objective standards of the Court for the
subjective satisfaction of the. statutory
authority. In applying these principles,
however, the Court must be. satisfied that the
vague or irrelevant grounds are such as, if
excluded, might reasonably have affected the
subjective satisfaction of the appropriate
authority. It is not merely because some
ground or reason of a comparatively un-
essential nature is defective that such an
order based on subjective satisfaction can be
held to be invalid. The Court, while anxious
to safeguard the personal liberty of the
individual will not lightly interfere with
such orders.”
In Maursinha v. State of Madhya Pradesh(1), the Madhya
Pradesh High Court, following the principle of the
preventive detention cases, held that an order of
supersession of the municipality under s. 208 of the Madhya
Bharat Municipal ties Act 1954, based on several grounds,
most of which were found to be irrelevant, was invalid. In
Dhirajlal Girdharilal v. Commissioner of Income-tax(2)
Mahajan, C. J., said with reference to the order of an
income-tax tribunal
“The learned Attorney-General frankly conceded
that it could not be denied that to a certain
extent the Tribunal had drawn upon its own
imagination and had made use of a number of
surmises and conjectures in reaching its
result. He, however, contended that
eliminating the irrelevant material employed
by the Tribunal in arriving at its conclusion,
there was sufficient material on which the
finding of fact could be supported. -In our
opinion, this contention is not well founded.
It is well established that when a court of
facts acts on material, partly relevant and
partly irrelevant, it is impossible to say to
what extent the ‘mind of’ the court was
affected by the irrelevant material used by it
in arriving at its finding. Such a finding is
vitiated because of the use of inadmissible
material and thereby an issue of law arises.”
In State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mahapatra(3) an
administrative tribunal in a disciplinary proceeding against
a public servant found the second charge and four out of the
five heads under the first charge proved and recommended his
dismissal. The Governor after giving him a reasonable
opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment
dismissed him. The High Court held that, the findings on
two of the heads under the first charge could not be
sustained as in arriving at those findings the tribunal had
violated rules of natural justice. It held that the second
charge and only
(1) A.I.R. 1958 M.P. 397 (2) A.I.R. 1956 S.C., 271 273.
(3) [1963] Supp. I S.C.R. 618,665-6.
594
two heads of the first charge were established and directed
the Governor to reconsider whether on the basis of these
charges the punishment of dismissal should be maintained.
On appeal, this Court set aside the order of the High Court.
In the course of the judgment, Shah, J, observed:
“If the High Court is satisfied that if some
but not all of the findings of the Tribunal
were ‘unassailable’, the order of the Governor
on whose powers by the rules no restrictions
in determining the appropriate punishment are
placed, was final, and the High Court had no
jurisdiction to direct the Governor to review
the penalty, for as we have already observed
the order Of dismissal passed by a competent
authority on a public servant, if the
conditions of the constitutional prote
ction ha*
been complied with, is not justiciable.
Therefore if the order may be supported on any
finding as to substantial misdemeanour for
which the punishment can lawfully be imposed,
it is not for the Court to consider whether
that ground alone would have weighed with the
authority in dismissing the public servant.
The Court has no jurisdiction if the findings
of the enquiry officer or the Tribunal prima
facie make out a case of misdemeanour, to
direct the authority to reconsider that order
because in respect of same of the findings but
not all it appears that there had been
violation of the rules of natural justice.”
The principle underlying these decisions appears to be this.
An administrative or quasi-judicial order based on several
grounds, all taken together, cannot be sustained if it be
found that some of the grounds are non-existent or
irrelevant, and there is nothing to show that the authority
would have passed the order on the basis of the other
relevant and existing grounds. On the other hand, an order
based on several grounds some of which are found to be non-
existent or irrelevant, can be sustained if the court is
satisfied that the authority would have passed the order on
the basis of the other relevant and existing grounds, and
the exclusion of the irrelevant or non-existent grounds
could not have affected the ultimate opinion or decision.
Now, the opinion of the State government that the
corporation was not competent to perform the duties imposed
on it by or under the Act, was based on two grounds one of
Which is relevant and the other irrelevant. Both the
grounds as also other grounds were set out in paragraphs 1
and 2 read with annexures 1 and 2 of the showcause notice
dated July 21, 1965. Para 3 of the show-cause notice
stated, “And whereas the grounds aforesaid jointly as well
as severally appear serious enough to warrant action under
section 408(1) of the said Act”. The (order dated September
29, 1965,
595
read with the notice dated July 21, 1965 shows that in the
opinion of the State government the second ground alone was
serious enough to warrant action under s. 408(1) and was
sufficient to establish that the corporation was not
competent to perform its duties under the Act. The fact
that the first ground mentioned in the order is now found
not to exist and is irrelevant, does not affect the order.
We are reasonably certain that the State government would
have passed the order on the basis of the second ground
alone. The order is, therefore, valid and cannot be set
aside.
In the result, the appeal is allowed, the order of the High
Court is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed. In
all the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs in
this Court and, in the court below.
Y.P.
Appeal allowed.
supCI/67-9
596