JUDGMENT
T. Nandakumar, J.
1. By this appeal, the State of Manipur is questioning the correctness of the judgment and order of the learned Sessions Judge, Manipur West dated 28-8-1998 passed in S. T. Case No. 9 of 1994 directing the acquittal of the respondent/ accused from the charge under Section 302, I. P. C.
2. Heard Mr. Jalal Uddin, learned PP for the appellant and Mr. N. Kumarjit, learned Counsel for the respondent/accused.
3. The prosecution story as unfolded during the trial, in nutshell, are as follows:
4. In the year 1989 Shri Oinam Deben Singh (PW-4) was reading in P. U. Sc. in Kha Manipur College, Kakching, during vacation in connection with Ningol Chakkouba and Gobardhan Puja for the year, 1989 he came back to his house at Thoubal Athokpam Khunou and one Shri Lourembam Hemanta (PW-3) s/o of Lourembam Chanbi Singh (PW-5) was his fast friend, Shri Oinam Deben, PW-4 and Shri Lourembam Hemanta Singh, PW-3 decided to enjoy the night at the house of Shri L. Hemanta. Accordingly, after taking meal Shri Oinam Deben (PW-4) went to the house of Lourembam Hemanta (PW-3) through Athokpam Khunou Mayai Leirak (road) at about 8 p.m. and it was dark night and he was not having any light i.e. torch light. When he came near the gate of one Ahongshangbam Herachandra Singh he heard an unusual sound never heard in his life and the sound was like that of groaning in the likeness of “KHRO KHRO”. On hearing that unusual sound he was terrified and then he directly rushed to the house of Shri Lourembam Hemanta, PW-3 but Hemanta was not at his house. Oinam Deben, narrated about the said terrifying sound to Shri Lourembam Chanbi Singh, PW-5, father of Lourembam Hemanta Singh, PW-3 at the house of PW-5, L. Chanbi Singh.
5. Out of curiosity, PW-4, Oinam Deben Singh and PW-5, L. Chanbi Singh went to the said place where the said terrifying sound was coming and they heard the sound from a distance of about 20 ft. in the darkness. PW-5, L. Chanbi Singh suggested that it would be dangerous on their part to approach the place and he further suggested to call some others. Shri L. Chanbi Singh, PW-5 further told PW-4, Oinam Deben Singh that PW-3, Lourembam Hemanta Singh would be enjoying TV programme in the house of one Ahongshangbam Borningthou Singh and PW-5, L. Chanbi Singh would call out the next door neighbour. When PW-4, Oinam Deben Singh entered the house of Ahongshangbam Borningthou Singh he found his friend PW-3, Lourembam Hemanta Singh, PW-1, L. Jiten Singh, PW-2, L. Ranachandra Singh and one Ningthouren Singh and others were enjoying TV programme. Shri O. Deben Singh, PW-4 narrated about the said unusual sound near the gate of Ahongshangbam Herachandra. That was the night of 30-10-1989. PW-4, Oinam Deben Singh, PW-2, Lourembam Ranachandra Singh and PW-1, Shri Lourembam Jiten Singh alias Ingoba, PW-5, Lourembam Chanbi, PW-3, Lourembam Hemanta Singh went to the said place from where the unusual sound was coming and found Shri Lourembam Biren Singh, the victim bleeding profusely on his face and he was unconscious. At first they along with PW-14, Shri Lourembam Ningthouren Singh and one Shri Iboton Singh shifted the victim to the Primary Health Centre, Thoubal for treatment and as the condition was serious the victim was again rushed to the Regional Medical College (RMC) Hospital, Lamphelpat in a jeep. In the very jeep PW-3, Lourembam Hemanta Singh along with PW-14, Shri Lourembam Ningthouren Singh and said Iboton Singh returned home. But PW.4, Shri Oinam Deben Singh, PW-2, Lourembam Ranachandra Singh, PW-1, Shri Lourembam Jiten, PW-7, Longjam Subhaschandra Singh, PW-5, Lourembam Chanbi Singh, remained in the hospital i.e. RMC.
6. After giving some treatment to the victim in the RMC Hospital he came to his sense about 2 am of the night. After the victim came to his sense PW-5, Lourembam Chanbi Singh asked the victim to disclose the name of the person who assaulted him. The victim replied in the presence of L. Jiten Singh, PW-1, O. Deben Singh, PW-4, L. Ranachandra Singh, PW-2, Shri L. Subhaschandra Singh, PW-7 and the Medical Officer in Manipuri vernacular that “ATHOK-PAM KHUNOU ARONG THONGKHONG MANAKTA LEIBA WAIKHOM YAIMANA (respondent/accused) PHURAMBANI”. (One Waikhom Yaima Singh who resides near Athokpam Khunou Arong Thongkhong had assaulted me.) After about 1/2 an hour the victim died. The medical officer who was by the side of the victim declared him death. After the death of the victim, Longjam Subhashchandra Singh and another one Deben Singh went back to the house of the victim for giving information about his death. PW-14, Lourembam Ningthouren Singh who was not present at the time of dying declaration made by the victim lodged the Ejahar to the Officer-in-charge, Thoubal Police Station that in the night of 30-10-1989 at about 8 pm the victim Lourembam Biren Singh was found lying near the gate of one Ahongshangbam Herachandra Singh of Athokpam Khunou and immediately he was taken to the RMC for treatment but on 31-10-1989 at about 3 O’clock the victim succumbed to his injuries. On receipt of the Ejahar/FIR the Officer-in-Charge; Thoubal PS registered a case being FIR No. 242(X)89 Thoubal PS under Section 302, IPC. PW-11, N. Gourakishore Singh took up the case for investigation, visited the place of occurrence, held inquest over the dead body of the victim, prepared sketch map, seized incriminating articles, recorded the statement of witnesses. The investigation of the case was taken over by PW-13, N. Ibohal Singh from PW-11, N. Gourakishore Singh and he also recorded statement of 5 (five) PWs.
7. Eventually on completion of the investigation, Police submitted charge-sheet. On receipt of the case the learned Sessions Judge framed the charge against the respondent/accused for the offence under Section 302, IPC for causing death of the victim, Lourembam Biren Singh. The charge was read over and explained to the respondent/ accused and he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The learned Sessions Judge, examined 15 (fifteen) PWs including PW-1, L. Jiten Singh, PW-2, L. Ranachandra Singh, PW-3, L. Hemanta Singh. PW-4, O. Deben Singh, PW-5, L. Chanbi Singh, PW-6, L(O) Modhumani Devi, w/o the deceased, PW-7, L. Subhashchandra Singh, PW-14, L. Ningthouren Singh.
8. The Prosecution tried to bring home of the charge against the respondent/accused mainly basing on the dying declaration made by the deceased in the presence of PW-1, L. Jiten, PW-2, L. Ranachandra Singh, PW-4, O. Deben Singh, PW-5, L. Chambi Singh and PW-7, Longjam Subhashchandra Singh.
9. The learned Sessions Judge brushed aside the case of the prosecution about the dying declaration made by the victim only on the reason that PW-14, L. Ningthouren Singh did not mention about the said dying declaration in the original Ejahar i.e. Ext. P-8 and also that there were discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses PWs.-l, 2, 4, 5 and 7 on one side and statement of PW No. 14, L, Ningthouren Singh and the said Ejahar on the other side and passed the impugned judgment and order for acquitting the respondent/accused from the charge for the offence under Section 302, IPC.
10. PW-4, O. Deben Singh deposed that in the year, 1989 he was reading P.U.Sc in the Kha Manipur College, Kakching and as there was long vacation in connection with Ningol Chakkouba and Gobardhan Puja for the year, 1989, he returned to his home at Thoubal Athokpam Khunou and one Hemanta, PW-3 was his fast friend and they decided to spend one night at the house of L. Hemanta, PW-3 in preparation of the forthcoming Ningol Chakkouba and Gobardhan Puja. After taking his meal he went to the house of his friend L. Hemanta, PW-3 at about 8 pm of the night of 30-10-1989 through Athokpam Mayai Leikai Leirak (road). It was a dark night when he came near the gate of Ahongshangbam Herachandra Singh he heard an unusual sound never heard so in his life. And being terrified he rushed to the nearby house of Hemanta Singh (PW-3) but he was not in his house. He informed about the said unusual terrifying sound to the PW-5, L. Chanbi Singh father of L. Hemanta Singh PW-3. After proceeding some distance to the place from where the said terrifying sound was coming, PW-5, Chanbi Singh suggested that it would be dangerous on their part to approach the said spot and further he suggested to call some others. Accordingly, Chanbi Singh, PW-5 went away to call the next door neighbour and he went straight to the house of Shri A. Borningthou Singh where the PW-3, Hemanta Singh was witnessing TV Programme along with Shri Ibotomba Singh, Jiten Singh, PW-1, L. Ranachandra Singh, PW-2, Ningthouran Singh, PW-14, Shri L. Subhaschandra Singh, PW-7 and others. He narrated about the said unusual and terrifying sound and then all of them went to the place from where the said terrifying sound was coming and found the victim with profuse bleeding at his face and unconscious. They had taken the victim firstly to the Primary Health Centre, Thoubal for treatment and as the condition became serious the victim was again shifted to the RMC Lamphelpat in a jeep. After giving medical treatment to the victim for about 1 1/2 hours he came to sense. PW-5, L. Chanbi Singh asked him the name of the person who assaulted him and the victim replied as follows : “ATHOKPAM KHUNOU ARONG THONGKHONG MANAKTA LEIBA WAIKHOM YAIMANA EIBU PHURAMBANI” (One Waikhoni Yaima Singh who reside near Athokpam Khunou Irong Thongkhong had assaulted me). The victim made the said statement in the presence of L. Chanbi Singh, PW-5, L. Ranachandra Singh, PW-2, L. Shubhashchandra, PW-7, L. Jiten Singh, PW-1 and medical officer, Oinam Deben Singh further deposed that he know the person i.e. Waikhom Yaima Singh mentioned by the victim before his death. He is none other than the present respondent/accused. PW-3, Oinam Deben Singh further deposed that in the locality of Athokpam Khunou Irong Thongkhong there is only one person called Waikhom Yaima Singh (the respondent/accused) and also there is no other person called Waikhom Yaima Singh as he was the only Yaima belonging to the “Waikhom” clan. The statement of PW-3, Oinam Deben Singh could not be shaken in the cross examination by the learned Counsel for the respondent/accused,
11. PW-1, Shri L. Jiten Singh also deposed that one day at about 8 pm, i.e. 8 pm of 30-10-1989 when he was enjoying TV programme at the house of one Ahongshangbam Nandabir Singh, s/o A, Borningthou Singh with some local villagers i.e. Nandabir Singh, Ranachandra Singh-PW-2, N. Ibotomba Singh, L. Hemanta Singh, PW-3. Shri L. Subhaschandra Singh, PW-7 and others got the information as reported by one O. Deben Singh, PW-4 that some sound emitting in the likeness of an animal (terrifying sound) was coming from a place near the gate of Ahongshangbam Herachandra Singh. Out of suspicion he along with PW-5, L. Chanbi Singh, L. Ranachandra Singh, PW-2, Ibotomba Singh and L. Shubhashchandra Singh, PW-7, Nandabir Singh, Oinam Deben Singh, PW-4 along with some other women and children went to the spot with lighted lantern and torch and when they reach the spot it was found that the victim L. Biren Singh was falling on the ground with bleeding injury in his face. He was given some sort of treatment at the Primary Health Centre, Thoubal and managed to hire a private jeep for shifting the victim to RMC for treatment. After giving some treatment in the RMC Hospital, the victim came to sense. When the victim came to sense, PW-5, L. Chanbi Singh asked the victim to disclose the name of person who assaulted him. The victim replied that “ATHOKPAM KHUNOU ARONG THONGKHONG MANAKTA LEIBA WAIKHOM YAIMANA EIBU PHURAMBANI” (One Waikhom Yaima Singh who reside near Athokpam Khunou Irong Thongkhong had assaulted me) in the presence of PW-5, L. Chanbi Singh, PW-4, O. Deben Singh, L. Shubhaschandra Singh, PW-7, L. Ranachandra, PW-2 and the medical officer. After about 1/2 an hour the medical officer who was by the side of the victim declared the victim dead. Again in the cross examination, statement of PW-2 could not be shaken by the learned Counsel for respondent/accused.
12. PW-2, L. Ranachandra Singh also deposed that one evening he was witnessing TV programme at the house of Ahongshangbam Borningthou Singh, who is the father of A. Nandabir Singh of his locality with some other villagers including A, Nandabir Singh, L. Jiten Singh, PW-1 alias Ingoba and others at about 8 pm. One Oinam Deben, PW-4 of his locality came to the place where they were witnessing TV programme reported that some terrifying sound in the likeness of an animal was coming from the place at Athokpam Khunou Mayai Leikai Lambi (road). PW-2, L. Ranachandra Singh along with other persons who were witnessing TV programme, i.e. PW-4, O. Deben Singh, PW-5, L. Chanbi Singh, PW-1, L. Jiten Singh rushed to the spot along with lighted lantern and torch and they found the victim L. Biren Singh lying with bleeding injury on his face and by the time he was unconscious. Then the victim was shifted to Thoubal Primary Centre and from there the victim was shifted to RMC hospital in a jeep. After treatment at the RMC Hospital for some time the victim came to his sense and he was able to speak. After the victim came to his sense, PW-5, L. Chanbi Singh asked the victim to disclose the name of person who assaulted him. The victim stated that “ATHOKPAM KHUNOU ARONG THONGKHONG MANAKTA LEIBA WAIKHOM YAIMANA EIBU PHURAMBANI” (One Waikhom Yaima Singh who reside near Athokpam Khunou Irong Thongkhong had assaulted me) in the presence of L. Chanbi Singh, PW-5, O. Deben Singh, PW-4, L. Jiten Singh, PW-1 and L. Subhashchandra, PW-7 and the medical officer.
13. PW-5, L. Chanbi Singh also deposed that PW-4, O. Deben Singh is the fast friend of his son, PW-3, L. Hemanta Singh. One night at about 8 pm or so about 5/6 years ago (statement of PW-5 was recorded on 29-6-94) the said O. Deben Singh i.e. PW-4 came to his house for the purpose of sleeping in his house along with his son-PW-3, L. Hemanta Singh. By that time, his son L. Hemanta Singh, PW-3 was not in his house as he was enjoying TV programme in the house of one Ahongshangbam Bornihgthou Singh of his locality. PW-4, O. Deben Singh reported him that he heard an unusual sound like “KHRO KHRO” on the road of Athokpam Khunou Mayai Leikai Lambi near the gate of Ahongshangbam Herachandra Singh, i.e. near the gate of PW-1, L. Jiten Singh. After getting the information, he along with the others who were enjoying TV programme at the house of A. Borningthou Singh and Shri O, Deben Singh, PW-4 went to the spot with lighted lantern and torch in their hand. He also said that the said persons who were witnessing TV programme at the house of A. Borningthou Singh was called by the PW-4, O. Deben Singh. On reaching the spot they found that the victim L. Biren Singh was lying on the road with bleeding injuries on the right side of his face. He was found unconscious. The victim was shifted to Thoubal Primary Health Centre- for treatment and as there was no means of treatment at the Thoubal Primary Health Centre they again shifted the victim to RMC Hospital, Lamphelpat in a private jeep. And they arrived at the hospital at about 11 pm. After giving treatment for about 2 hours the victim came to sense and he began to speak. He asked the victim to disclose the person who assaulted him. The victim replied that he was assaulted by Waikhom Yaima Singh of Athokpam Khunou Arong Thongkhong Manak (the respondent/ accused) in the presence of O. Deben, PW-4, L. Ranachandra, PW-2, Shubhashchandra Singh, PW-7, L. Jiten Singh, PW-1 and one medical officer.
14. PW-5 also deposed that Waikhom Yaima Singh of Athokpam Khunou Arong Thongkhong Manak mentioned by the victim is none other than the present respondent/accused and also he stated that there was no other person named Waikhom Yaima Singh of Waikhom clan/surname in the village of Athokpam Khunou Arong Thongkhong Manak except the present respondent/accused.
15. In the cross-examination, PW-5, L. Chanbi Singh stated that there are some other persons named Yaima Singh in addition to the present respondent/accused but he stated very clearly in his examination-in-chief that there is no person called Yaima Singh of “Waikhom” clan or surname. The victim in his dying declaration clearly mentioned the surname of Yaima Singh as “WAIKHOM” and also that the surname of the present respondent/accused in “WAIKHOM” and he is the only person having the name of Yaima Singh of “Waikhom” clan residing at Athokpam Khunou Arong Thongkhong Manak.
16. The Statement of PW-7, Shubhashchandra Singh also corroborated the statement of PW-1, L. Jiten Singh, PW-2, L, Ranachandra Singh, PW-4, O. Deben Singh and PW-5, L. Chanbi Singh. He also stated clearly that he being a local member also went to the hospital, i.e. RMC for treatment of the victim along with PW-5, L. Chanbi Singh, PW-1, L. Jiten Singh, PW-4, O. Deben Singh, one Ibotomba Singh and PW-14, L. Ningthouren Singh. After giving certain treatment to the victim the victim came to his sense and the victim was in a fit position to speak, L. Chanbi, PW-5 asked the victim who was the author of the injuries sustained; the victim replied that he was assaulted by Waikhom Yaima Singh of Irong Thongkhong in the presence of O. Deben Singh, PW-4, L. Chanbi Singh, PW-5, L. Ranachandra Singh, PW-2 and the medical officer. He along with O. Deben, PW-4 went to the house of the victim for giving information about the death of the victim. The statement of PW-7, L. Subhashchandra Singh could not be shaken in the cross-examination.
17. PW-12, is the medical officer who attended the victim for treatment at the RMC Hospital. In his statement, PW-12 clearly stated that after giving treatment to the victim he gained consciousness but he could not remember what he stated to the persons present during his brief conscious period.
18. From the statement of PWs the presence of PW-1, L. Jiten Singh, PW-2, L. Ranachandra, PW-4, O. Deben Singh, PW-5 L. Chanbi Singh, PW-7, L. Shubhash-chandra Singh at the time of treatment of the victim in the night of 30-10-1989 at RMC Hospital cannot be doubted. But PW-3, L. Hemanta Singh, clearly stated that he along with PW-14, L. Ningthouren Singh and the said Ibotomba Singh returned to their homes in the same jeep which had taken the victim to the RMC hospital in the night of 30-10-1989 for treatment. Over and above none of the witnesses stated that PW-14, L. Ningthouren Singh was all along in the Hospital in the night of 30-10-1989 while the victim was under treatment. This consistent statement of the PW. Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 that Shri L. Ningthouren Singh, PW-14 was not present in the hospital i.e. RMC in the night of 30-10-1989 while the victim was under medical treatment cannot be belied by the solitary statement of PW-14 that he was all along in the hospital. Over and above, PW-14 was not the person present at the time of making dying declaration by the victim at the hospital.
19. The learned Sessions Judge completely disbelieved the statement of PW Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 12 by fully relying on the statement of PW-14 in the cross examination that he stayed at the hospital till 3 am of the following day i.e. 31-10-1989 and the victim could not speak till 3 am.
20. As held by the Apex Court in a catena of cases, order of acquittal, generally, shall not be Interfered with because of the presumption of innocence of the accused, is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and another to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the accused is not less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored a duty is cast upon the appellate Court to reappreciate the evidence in a case where the accused had been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. In this regard we may recall the decision of the Apex Court in The State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram .
21. The Apex Court in Bihari Nath Goswami v. Shiv Kumar Singh held that there is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. In Bhagawan Singh v. State of M.P. the Apex Court held that the paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. The principle to be followed by the appellate Court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. These aspects were highlighted by the Apex Court in Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra (1973) 2 SCC 193 : 1973 Cri LJ 1783; Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat and Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana .
22. The Apex Court in Narendra Nath Khware v. Parasnath Khware held that the High Court being the first appellate Court against the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court is required to consider and re-appreciate the evidence on record and also held that the High Court erred in disposing of the appeal on the basis of some general observations without making any effort to go into the evidence on record. In Narendra Nath Khware v. Parasnath Khware (supra) the High Court did not consider/re-appreciate the evidence on record even if the High Court is the Court of first appellate and disposed of the appeal without going into the fact and question of law involved in the case. The Apex Court had expressed its un-happiness to the manner in which the High Court dismissed the appeal. Para 9 of the SCC in Narendra Nath Khware v. Parasnath Khware (supra) reads as follows:
9. We are constrained to observe a growing tendency with the High Courts in disposing of criminal appeals involving vexed questions of law and fact in cursory manner without going into the facts and the questions of law involved in the cases. May be this approach is gaining ground on account of huge pendency of cases. But such a summary disposal is no solution to the problem of arrears of cases in Courts. Disposal of appeals where the High Court is the first Court of appeal in such a manner results in denial of right of appeal to the parties. So long as the statute provides a right of appeal, in our view the Court will be failing in its duty if the appeal is disposed of in such a casual and cavalier manner as the High Court has done in the present case.
22. The witness is normally to be considered independent unless he/she spring from the source which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, wish to implicate him falsely. In the present case in hand, from careful appreciation of the statement of witnesses and also the case of the respondent/accused at the time of his examination under Section 313, Cr.P.C. there is absolutely no material to show that PW-1, L. Jiten, PW-2, L. Ranachandra, PW-4, O. Deben Singh, PW-5, L. Chanbi Singh, PW-7, Shri L. Shubhashchandra Singh have enmity against the respondent/accused and also had the wish to implicate him falsely. The present respondent/accused did not even made a whisper in the cross examination of the said witnesses that there are certain reasons such as enmity, personal grudge, so and so against him for falsely implicating his name stating that the victim made the dying declaration saying that he was the real culprit in their presence. In Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1953 SC 3641 : 1953 Cri LJ 1465 it has been held that “a wit ness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily a close relation would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth. However, we are not attempting any sweeping generalization. Each case must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are only made to combat what is so often put forward in cases before us as a general rule of prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case must be limited to and be governed by its own facts.
24. As discussed above, the evidentiary value of the statement of PW Nos. 1, L. Jiten, PW-2, L. Ranachandra Singh, PW-4, O. Deben Singh, L. Chanbi Singh, PW-5 and PW-7, L. Subhashchandra Singh cannot be diluted because of the statement of PW-14, L. Ningthouren Singh whose presence in the night of 30-10-1989 at the RMC Hospital is doubtful. The Apex Court in Bhargavan v. State of Kerala AIR 2004 SC 1058 held that the other PWs who were present at the time of dying declaration clearly stated that the victim mentioned the name and particulars of the accused in the dying declaration, and evidentiary value of their statements cannot be diluted only because one of the witnesses stated that he did not hear the name of the accused clearly. The Apex Court further held that so far as the non-disclosure of names of the accused to the Doctor is really of no consequence as the primary duty of the Doctor is to treat the patient and not to find out by whom the injury was caused. Paras 20 and 21 of the judgment in Bhargavan v. State of Kerala (supra) reads as follows:
20. So far as non-disclosure of names to the doctor, same is really of no consequence. As rightly noted by the Courts below, his primary duty is to treat the patient and not to find out by whom the injury was caused. The plea in this regard is clearly unacceptable. The question was examined by this Court in Pattipati Venkaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh and similar view was taken.
21. The evidence of PWs. 2, 3 and 4 is cogent and credible, clearly supporting the claim that dying declaration was made before them. The names of the accused persons were claimed to have been stated before PWs. 2, 3 and 4. Merely because PW-2 says that he did not hear the name of accused No. 1 clearly, that cannot dilute evidentiary value of the evidence of PWs. 3 and 4 who categorically stated that the name of accused No. 1 was stated.
25. It is now fairly well settled that, dying declaration can be the sole basis for conviction once the Court is satisfied that declaration was voluntary, and inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness, no doubt the Court is to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutory, or prompting or a product of imagination. The Apex Court in Muthu Kutty v. State by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu AIR 2005 SC 1473, after discussing the earlier decisions of the Apex Court as to how the Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration and the conditions required for accepting the dying declaration, laid down the requirements for accepting dying declaration as true and requirements of the dying declaration for forming basis of conviction. Para 15 of the (AIR) judgment in Muthu Kutty v. State by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu (supra) reads as follows:
15. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, or promoting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under as indicated in Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujarat ;
(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (See Munnu Raja and Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1976) 2 SCR 746 : 1976 Cri LJ 1718.
(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (See State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav and Ors. and Ramavati Devi v. State of Bihar .
(iii) The Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (See K. Ramachandra Reddy and Anr. v. The Public Prosecutor .
(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (See Rasheed Beg v. State of Madhya Pradesh ).
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (See Kaka Singh v. State of M.P. ).
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (See Ram Manorath and Ors. v. State of U.P. ).
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does contain the details as to the occurrence it is not to be rejected. (See’ State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu ).
(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (See Surajdeo Oza and Ors. v. State of Bihar ).
(ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (See Nanahau Ram and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh ).
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (See State of UP v. Madan Mohan and Ors. ).
(xi) Where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declaration could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted. (See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra ).
26. Keeping in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court we have carefully re-appreciated the statements of PWs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 12, N. Shyamjai Singh and satisfied that the dying declaration was not the result of tutory, prompting or imagination and the victim was in a fit state of mind to made the declaration. The identity of the accused mentioned in the dying declaration is clear enough to come to the conclusion that the present respondent/accused is the very person mentioned as accused/assailant in the dying declaration made by the victim and also that the dying declaration is made voluntarily and conviction can be based on it.
27. The learned Sessions Judge had committed a miscarriage of justice in acquitting the respondent/accused by passing the impugned judgment and order by misconstruing and by misunderstanding the evidentiary value of the FIR/Ejahar and also the purpose, for which FIR to be used under the law in a criminal trial. In the present case, the dying declaration was neglected/ ignored on the ground that in the FIR i.e. original Ejahar, Ext. P. 8 lodged by the PW/ 14, Shri L. Ninghthouren Singh, the dying declaration made by the victim was not mentioned. From the materials available on record and also from appreciation of the statement of witnesses it is clear that PW/ 14, L. Ningthouren Singh was not present at the time of making dying declaration by the victim and also that he was not present throughout the night of 30-10-1989 at RMC Hospital. The Ejahar/FIR is only a report about the information as to the commission of an offence which is not the substantive evidence, as the Police has yet to investigate the offence. The FIR can be utilized for the purpose of corroborating or contradicting only the materials thereof. The FIR cannot be used to discredit the testimony of other reliable witnesses (Ref : Andrew v. State of Kerala ). The Apex Court in Superintendent of Police (CBI) and Ors. v. Tapan Kumar Singh held that the information/report i.e. Ejahar is not an encyclopedia which must disclose all the facts and details relating to the offence reported. The informant may lodge a report about the commission of an offence though he may not know the name of the victim or its assailants. Law does not require the mentioning of all the evidence of the offence under the FIR, it is only after a complete investigation, it may be possible to say whether any offence is made out on the basis of an evidence collected by the investigating agency. The Apex Court in Ravi Kumar v. State of Punjab held that:
15…
It has been held time and again that the FIR is not a substantive piece of evidence and can only be used to corroborate the statement of the maker under Section 161 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the ‘Evidence Act’) or to contradict him under Section 145 of that Act. It can neither be used as evidence against the maker at the trial if he himself becomes an accused nor to corroborate or contradict other witnesses. It is not the requirement of law that the minutest details be recorded in the FIR lodged immediately after the occurrence. The fact of the state of mental agony of the person making the FIR who generally is the victim himself, if not dead, or the relations or associates of the deceased victim apparently under the shock of the occurrence reported has always to be kept in mind. The object of insisting upon lodging of the FIR is to obtain the earliest information regarding the circumstance in which the crime was committed.
28. In Sohan Lal alias Sohan Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab there are some discrepancies and contradictions between the FIR and dying declaration. In that case, the Supreme Court held that dying declaration is creditworthy, the informant lodging FIR prove to have not spoken to the deceased before lodging FIR and also that the dying declaration found otherwise reliable cannot be rejected for the reasons that there are contradictions between the FIR and dying declaration. The fact of the case is spelt out in para 22 in Sohan Lal alias Sohan Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab (supra) and Para 27 which are quoted hereunder:
22. According to the learned Counsel for the accused, the circumstances under which the deceased-Kamlesh Rani died have been narrated differently on five different occasions. First, there is the version in the FIR lodged by Bansi Ram (PW 2); second, is the version given in the deposition of Bansi Ram (PW 2); third, is the dying declaration recorded by Naib Tehsildar Lakhbir Singh (PW 6) (Ex. PN); fourth, is the version in the statement of Kamlesh Rani recorded under Section 161 of the Cr. P. C. and fifthly, the version given in the deposition of Jit Singh (PW 7) under cross examination. Learned Counsel contended that each one of the versions is inconsistent with the others, and, therefore, taking an overall view, as each one the versions conflicts with the dying declaration (Ex. PN), it would be unsafe to rely on the dying declarations to uphold the conviction of the appellants. Although, at the first blush, the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants seems attractive, upon a careful appraisal it has no substance. We have already analysed the deposition of Bansi Ram (PW 2) in the light of the deposition of Usha Rani (PW 3). A cumulative reading of the two, together with the medical endorsements made on the bed-head ticket of the G. N. D. Hospital, clearly ruled out Bansi Ram as having received any information from deceased-Kamlesh Rani. It is true that both in the FIR as well as in the deposition of Bansi Ram (PW 2) an exaggerated version had been given. Merely, because Bansi Ram takes it upon himself to give an exaggerated and coloured version of the circumstances under which Kamlesh Rani died, we do not think that it would be proper to reject the dying declaration (Ex. PN) which we have tested on the anvil of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Laxman (2002 Cri LJ 4095) (supra) and found it to have passed. We are, therefore, not inclined to accept the contention that the dying declaration (Ex. PN) needs to be rejected because of the FIR of Bansi Ram and the deposition of Bansi Ram do not tally with it.
27. Once we come to the conclusion that the dying declaration is creditworthy, there is no doubt that the accusations against the appellants-accused Harbans Kaur and accused Kanchan are fully proved. In the circumstances, we are of the view that both the Courts below were justified in relying upon the dying declaration and convicting the two accused, Harbans Kaur and Kanchan. We see no reason to take a different view in the matter.
29. From the above discussions, inevitable conclusion is that the judgment of the Trial Court, i.e. impugned judgment and order dated 28-8-1998 is indefensible and deserved to be set aside, which we direct. Appeal is allowed. Consequent upon our allowing the appeal, respondent/accused is convicted under Section 302, I. P. C. and sentence him to imprisonment for life. Respondent/accused, who is on bail shall surrender his bail bond and be taken to custody forthwith to serve out the sentence imposed upon him.