JUDGMENT
J.S. Narang, J.
1. The petitioner-respondent had joined the Indian Army as a Sepoy on 20.07.1959 and he ramained in service till 9.11.1977. Thereaf-ten, he sought appointment in the Civil Service as a Clerk in the Sessions Division, Bathinda and was appointed as such on 8.1.1980. The petitioner claimed the benefit of the period of service rendered by him during 26.10.l962 to 8.1.1968 and 3.12.1971 to 27.3.1977, which as per law, falls within the ambit of “Military service” as defined un-der the provisions of the Punjab Government National Emergency(Consession) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter reffered to as the rules). The representation of the petitioner was rejected by the District and Sessions Judge, Bathinda. Resultantly, the petitioner filed Civil Writ petition no.10292 of 1989.
2. The State contested the claim of the petitioner and filed a detailed written state-ment. The case of the State is that the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of army Service, as claimed by him, as he had joined the service prior to the proclamation of emergency and therefore, he is not entitled to the benefits as admissible under the rules. The same would be applicable and admissible to a limited class of persons, who had re-sponded to the call of nation during the period of emergency.
3. Learned Single Judge, while disposing of the aforestated petition, vide judgement dated 13 1.1992, had interpreted Rule 2 of the rules, which reads as under;-
“2. Definition.- For the purpose of this rules, the expression ‘Military Service’ means the service rendered by a person who had been enrolled or commissioned during the period of operation of the proclamation of emergency made by the President under Article 352 of the Constitution of India on the 26th October, 1962, in any of three wings of the India Armed Forces (including the service as a Warrant Office) during the period of the said Emergency or such other service as may hereafter be declared as military service for the purpose of these rules. Any period of military training followed by military service shall also be reckoned as military service.”
4. Reference has also been made to Rule 4 of the Rules which deals with increment, seniority and pension which reads as under:-
“4. Increments, seniority and pension- period of military service shall count for increments, seniority and pension as under:-
(i) Increments:- The period spent by a person on military service, after attaining the minimum age prescribed for appointment to any service or post, to which he is appointed, shall count for increments. Where no such minimum age is prescribed the minimum age shall be as laid down in Rules 3.9,3.10 and 3.11 of the Punjab Civil Service Rules, Volume II commission shall, however, be admissible only on first appointment.
(ii) Seniority.- The period of military service mentioned in Clause (i) shall be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining the seniority of a person who has rendered military service.
(iii) Pension.- The period of military service mentioned in Clause (i) shall count towards pension only in the case of appointments to permanent services or post under the Government subject to the following conditions:-
1)The person concerned should not have earned a pension under military rules in respect of the military service in question;
2) Any bonus or gratuity paid in respect of military service by the defence authorities shall have to be refunded to the State Government.
3) The period, if any,between the date of discharge from military service and the date of appointment to any service or post under the Government shall count for pension, provided such period does not exceed one year. Any period exceeding one year but not exceeding three years may also be allowed to count for pension in exceptional cases under the orders of the Government.”
5.It has been held by the learned Single Judge that the period of service rendered by the petitioner, during the proclamation of emergency,falls within the ambit of definition under Rule 2, therefore, the increments, have to be granted to the petitioner. So far as counting of service for the purpose of seniority is concerned, the relief has not been granted as the person who would be likely to be affected by the grant of such benefits, had not been impleaded.
6. The State aggrieved of the aforestated judgment has filed the present appeal. It has been contended by Mr B.S.Chahal, A.A.G. Punjab, that the matter relating to interpretation of Rule 2 stands finally settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India while rendering judgment in re, Ram Janam Singh v. State of U.P. and Anr., . This dicta has been, further followed by the Hon’ble Supreme Count of India while rendering judgment in re: Chittaranjan Singh Chima and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Ors., .. This has been further followed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of india while deciding Civil Appeal No. 3444 of 1998 – State of Punjab and Ors. v. Jang Singh and Ors.,. In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India to the effect that the period of service rendered during emergency, as proclaimed, cannot’ be beneficially interpreted for those who were in regular service prior to the declaration of emergency
7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioner-respondent has argued that the relief which has been granted to the petitioner vide judgment of the Hon’ble Single Judge stands affirmed by the dicta of the Full Bench of this Court rendered in re: Jang Singh and Ors. v. Stale of Punjab and Ors.,4 (1997-3)117 P.L.R. 271 (F.B.). Resul-tantly, the relief has been correctly granted to the petitioner by the learned Single Judge. As a sequel thereto, the- appeal deserves to be dismissed.
8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the paper book as also the judgment of learned Single Judge and have also been taken through the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and also the Full Bench of this Court, as aforestated.
9. We would take up in the first instance the dicta of the Full Bench of this Court in regard to the interpretation of Rule 2 of the Rules. Their Lordships have discussed this matter threadbare and have also noticed the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Chittaranjan Singh Chima’s case (supra) and have categorically observed that the benefit of emergency service will be available only to the persons who joined the armed forces during the period of emergency. Reference may be made to the, relevant para of the Full Bench which reads as under.-
“17. The relief claimed by the petitioners in this writ petition itself is a limited one. The petitioners have not claimed that they are entitled to get benefit under the aforestated Rules for the entire period of service rendered by them in Military, but only to the extent of the military service rendered during the emergency period. In view of the judgment in Chittaranjan Singh Chima’s case (supra) we do not even consider it necessary to embark upon this concession as this question does not arise even squarely or incidentally in the present case. The object of these Rules is to grant benefit to the members of the Armed Forces for their service rendered during the period when emergency was proclaimed by the President of India under Article 352 of Constitution of India. It has been settled that the persons who joined the Armed Forces during the period of emergency itself could validly form a class than from the persons who had joined and opted Army as a career. Such classification is based upon an intelligible differentia. One of such classes may be entitled to a 1imited benefit while the other may be entitled to a larger benefit within the purview and scope of the various rules framed by the State Government and legislature. Some rules were enacted to give benefit at the point of entry into civil service while others were to give benefit of increments, seniority, pension and still some others to provide reservations in the non-technical service of the State. The expression ‘military service’ as defined in Rule 2 in the above rules restricts period for which the benefits can be granted to the service rendered during the emergency. The endeavor of the Court has to be to read the Rules in their plain language and give their intended meaning as postulated by the Legislature. To substract or add words to the rules and give a meaning different from the one intended would be reading the rule in a manner which is against the well accepted principles of interpretation of statute. The doctrine of “the golden rules of construction” would be applicable to the interpretation of the Rules of the present kind which are intended to give benefit to a class of persons. In particular reference can be made to the following paragraph from the book of Justice K.P.Singh titled ‘Interpretation of Statutes’.
“For a modern statement of the rule one may refer to the speech of Lord Simon of Glaisdale in a recent case where he said, : “Parliament is prima facie to be credited with meaning what is said in an Act of Parliament. The drafting of statutes, so important to a people who hope to live under the rule of law, will never be satisfactory unless Courts seek whenever possible to apply “the golden rule” of construction, that is to read the statutory language, grammatically and terminologically, in the ordinary and primary sense which it bears in its context, without omission or addition. Of course, Parliament is to be credited with good sense, so that when such an approach produces injustice, absurdity, contradiction or stultification of statutory objective the language may be modified sufficiently to avoid such disadvantage, though no further.”
Rule 2 admits of no ambiguity and its plain reading indicates the commonweal intended by the Legislature which the rule seeks to achieve. To us it appears that the reading of Rule 2 and Rule 4 of the Punjab Rules cannot be interpreted or placed at par in its meaning and scope with that of the amended rule of the State of Haryana. The unamended Rule of the Haryana State can be equated to the present Rule of Punjab in its interpretation and meaning.. Any change effected by the Legislature cannot be treated as meaningless. On the other hand every amendment of a rule must logically lead to its purpose. Reading and interpretation of the Punjab Rules in the manner of the amended Haryana Rules would not be consonance with the settled principles governing the Interpretation of Statutes. The State of Haryana amended the Rules obviously, to change the scope of application of the unamended Rules and to Restrict its scope in regard to the definition of the military service. It clarified that benefit will be available only to the persons who joined the. Armed Forces and served during the period of emergency.”
10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, while interpreting this rule, once again has held that a preferential treatment be given to those who joined Armed Forces during emergency and that grant of notional seniority in Civil Service by taking into account the service rendered in Armed Forces is constitutionally valid but such benefit cannot be extended to those who joined Armed Forces during the normal times. In this regard, a pointed reference may be made to para 5 of the judgment rendered in Chittaranjan Singh Chima ‘s case (supra) which reads as under ”
“5. This Court in Ram Janam Singh v. State of U.P., , to which one of us (K. Ramaswamy, J.) was a member, had held that preferential treatment be given to those who joined armed forces during emergency and that grant of notional seniority in civil services by taking into account service rendered in armed forces is constitutionally valid but such benefit cannot be extended to those who joined armed forces during normal times.”
11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has interpreted the word “military service” as used in Rule 2 and has categorically held that the notional seniority in civil service cannot be granted to a person who had joined the service as a career but the benefit is to be given only to those who had rendered service during the period when the emergency was proclaimed and this would form a class apart and that this cannot be equated with those who had joined the military service as career. In this regard we may make a pointed reference to para No. 12, 13 and 14 in the judgment rendered in re: Ram Janam Singh’s case (supra), which reads as under :-
“12. But, we fail to, understand as to how persons who joined after the emergency was over, i.e., after January 10, 1968 and before December 3, 1971 when another emergency was imposed in view of the foreign aggression, can be treated on a par or on the same level. It need not be pointed out that such persons were on the lookout for a career and joined the Armed Forces of their own volition. It can be presumed that they were prepared for the normal risk in the service of the Armed Forces. Those who joined Armed Forces after November 1, 1962 or December 3, 1971, not only joined Armed Forces but joined a war which was being fought by the nation. If the benefits extended to such persons who were commissioned during national emergencies are extended even to the members of the Armed Forces who joined during normal times, members of the Civil Services can make legitimate grievance that their seniority is being affected by persons recruited to the service after they had entered in the said service without there being any rational basis for the same.
13. In the case of Dhan Singh v. State of Haryana this court considered as to whether persons commissioned before November 1, 1962 were entitled to add the period of army service,which admittedly included their service during the period of emergency, was answered in the negative. It was held that the relevant rule only extended the benefit of army service to persons who joined Army on or after November 1, 1962 after declaration of emergency because such persons belonged to a separate class for preferential treatment. In the case of Union of India v. Dr. S.Krishna Murthy it was said that persons who had joined after the declaration of emergency, had voluntarily offered their services for the defence of the country during the period of emergency. They belonged to a separate class and there was no question of discrimination in giving any benefit in matters of seniority by the rules which were under challenge. The rules with which we are concerned, were considered by this Court in the case of Narendra Nath Pandey v. State of UP. And it was held that benefits by the rules aforesaid had been given to persons who were either Emergency Commissioned Officers or Short Service Commissioner Officers of the Armed Forces of the Union of India, who had been commissioned on or after November 1, 1962 during the Indo-Chinese War and were demobilised from Armed Forces in or about 1968; such persons had rendered services to the country during the emergency when the nation’s security was in peril due to external aggression.
14. Can it be said that the persons who had joined Army after the declaration of emergency due to foreign aggression and those who joined after the war came to an end stand on the same footing? Those who joined Army after revocation of emergency joined Army as a career. It is well known that many persons who joined army service during the foreign aggression, could have opted for other career or service. But the nation itself being under peril,impelled by the spirit to serve the nation, they opted for joining Army where then risk was writ large. No one can dispute that such persons formed a class by themselves and by rules aforesaid an attempt has been made to compensate those who returned from war if they compete in different services. According to us, the plea that even persons who joined army service after cessation of foreign aggression and revocation of emergency have to be treated like persons who have joined army service during emergency due to foreign aggression is a futile plea and should not have been accepted by the High Court. It need not be impressed that wherever any particular period spent in any other service by a person is added to the service to which such person joins later, it is bound to affect the seniority of persons who have already entered in the service. As such any period of earlier service should be taken into account for determination of seniority in the later service only for some very compelling reasons which stand the rest of reasonableness and on examination can be held to be free from arbitrariness.”
12. We are of the considered opinion that in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and the interpretation given by the Hon’ble Full Bench of this Court the appeal of the State deserves to be allowed. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed and Civil Writ Petition No. 10292 of 1989 filed by the petitioner is dismissed.