PETITIONER:
THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE MEWAR TEXTILE MILLS LTD., BHILWARA AND OTHERS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
17/03/1954
BENCH:
HASAN, GHULAM
BENCH:
HASAN, GHULAM
MAHAJAN, MEHAR CHAND (CJ)
MUKHERJEA, B.K.
DAS, SUDHI RANJAN
BOSE, VIVIAN
CITATION:
1954 AIR 396 1954 SCR 1229
ACT:
Industrial Disputes Act (Act XIV of 1,947), s. 7(3) (a),
and (b) as amended by s. 34 of the Industrial Disputes
(Appellate Tribunal) Act (XLVIII of 1950)- A Judge of a High
Court and a District Judge-whether includes a Judge of the
High Court and a District Judge in the former State of
Jodhpur.
HEADNOTE:
Held, that under s. 7(3) (a) and (b) of the Industrial
Disputes Act (XIV of 1947) as amended by s. 34 of the
Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act (XLVIII of
1950) the phrase "a Judge of a High Court and a District
Judge" includes a Judge of the High ,Court and a District
Judge in the former State of Jodhpur.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPFLLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 103 of 1952.
Appeal under article 133(1) (c) of the Constitution of
India- from the Judgment and Order, dated the 10th August,
1951, of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at
Jodhpur (Wanchoo and Bapna JJ.), in D. B. Civil
Miscellaneous Application No. 21 of 1951.
K. S. Hajela, Advocate-General of Rajasthan, for the
appellant.
No appearance for the respondents.
1954. March 17. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
GHULAM HASAN J.-This appeal is brought under a
certificate granted by the High Court of Rajasthan under
article 133(c) of the Constitution of India against a
judgment and order of that High Court in writ petition under
article 226 holding the appointment of one Shri Sukhdeo
Narain as invalid and directing that all proceedings taken
by him as the Industrial Court under section 7 of the
Industrial Disputes Act (No. XIV of 1947) are null and
void.
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We are informed that Shri Sukhdeo Narain has ceased to
work as an Industrial Tribunal and the present appeal,
therefore, becomes infructuous, but we are invited by the
Advocate-General on behalf of the State of Rajasthan who is
the appellant before us to decide the question as to the
validity of the appointment, as it is likely to affect other
awards made by tribunals under the Industrial Disputes Act.
We accordingly proceed to give our decision.
The question involved in the case is whether the
appointment of Shri Sukhdeo Narain is invalid because he
does not fulfil the qualifications laid down for a tribunal
under section 7(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Section 7(3) hereinafter referred to as the Industrial Act
says:-
” Where a tribunal consists of one member only, that
member, and where it consists of two or more members, the
chairman of the tribunal, shall be a person who-
(a) is or has been a Judge of a High Court; or
(b) is or has been a District Judge
…………………………”
The Industrial Act was applied to Rajasthan by the
Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance, 1950
(Ordinance IV of 1950), by the Rajpramukh on January 24,
1950. By this adaptation section 7 of the Industrial Act
came to be applied to Rajasthan. Shri Sukhdeo Narain was
appointed on October 9, 1950, by a notification which ran as
follows:-
“In exercise of the powers conferred by section 7 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.(XIV. of 1947) the Government
of Rajasthan is pleased to constitute an Industrial Tribunal
consisting of Shri Sukhdeo Narain, a retired Judge of the
High Court of the erstwhile Jodhpur State for the
adjudication of an Industrial dispute in the Mewar Textile
Mills Ltd., Bhilwara, in Rajasthan. ”
The appointment of Shri Sukhdeo Narain was objected to by
the respondent on the ground that, the
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words “a Judge of a High Court” in section 7(3) mean ” a
Judge of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan
established under the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949″
and as Shri Sukhdeo Narain had been a Judge of the High
Court of the former State of Jodhpur, he could not be held
to be Judge of the High Court under section 7(3) of the
Industrial Act. This objection was upheld by the High
Court.
Though the appointment of Shri Sukhdeo Narain in the
notification was based upon the fact that he was a retired
Judge of the High Court of Jodhpur, in arguments it was also
contended before the High Court that even if he was not
qualified for appointment as a former Judge of a High Court,
he was certainly qualified for appointment as a former
District Judge. The High Court repelled this contention.
It appears that the United State of Rajasthan came into
existence on April 7, 1949, and the United State of Matsya
was integrated with it on May 15, 1949. Section 5 of
Ordinance No. IV of 1950 lays down that:
” For the purpose of the application of any Central law to
Rajasthan, unless there be anything repugnant in the suject
or context,-
(ix) references therein to other civil, criminal and
revenue courts, to public offices, and to Judges,
Magistrates, officers or authorities shall be deemed to be
references to such courts, offices and Judges, Magistrates,
officers or authorities of or in Rajasthan. ”
The High Court held that the word “Rajasthan” as defined
in Ordinance I of 1949 means the United State of Rajasthan
and “the Judges an d other officers” mentioned in section
5(ix) must be held to be those in the service of the United
State of Rajasthan. Accordingly they held that Shri Sukhdeo
Narain could not be held to be a District Judge within the
meaning of section 7(3) (b) and his appointment as an
Industrial Tribunal under that section was, therefore,
invalid. We are of opinion that this appeal can be decided
on a short ground. The Industrial Disputes (Appellate
Tribunal) Act (XLVIII of 1950) came into force on May 20,
1950. By section 34 it was provided that the
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Industrial Disputes Act, XIV of 1947, shall be amended in
the manner specified in the Schedule and the Schedule
substituted sub-section (2) to section (1) of the Industrial
Act as follows :-
“It extends to the whole of India except the State of
Jammu and Kashmir. ”
As we have already stated the appointment of Shri
Sukhdeo Narain was made on October 9, 1950, i.e., after the
Industrial Disputes Act had become applicable to Rajasthan.
It is not necessary therefore to invoke the provisions of
Ordinance.IV of 1950 in deciding the question of the
validity of the appointment. The argument based on section
34 of Act XLVIII of 1950 was put forward before the High
Court at the time of the hearing of the application for
leave to appeal and it was contended that in view of section
34 the provisions of Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws
Ordinance, 1950, namely section 5, subsections (vii) and
(ix), stood amended or repealed but the High Court observed
that even if this argument had been raised before them in
appeal, it would have made no difference. It has been
contended before us by Mr. Hajela, the learned Advocate-
General on behalf of the State, that after the Industrial
Disputes Act of 1947 was extended to Rajasthan by section 34
of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, XLVIII
of 1950, the provisions of the former stood amended by
section 34 and could not be read subject to section 5 of the
Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance IV of 1950.
We think there is force in this contention. The effect of
section 34, as we have already indicated, was to extend the
territorial application of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, to the whole of India including Rajasthan the
exception being the State of Jammu and Kashmir only. This
being so the words “A Judge of a High Court and a District
Judge” used in section 7(3) (a) and (b) respectively of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, must be held now to include
“A Judge of the High Court and a District Judge in the
former State of Jodhpur”. There is now no room for the
application of section 5 of Ordinance IV of 1950 according
to which a Judge of the High Court
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and a District Judge could only. mean a Judge of the High
Court for Rajasthan established under the Rajasthan High
Court Ordinance 1949 and a District Judge of or in Rajasthan
within the meaning of section 5(ix) of Ordinance No. IV of
1950. Accordingly we hold that the appointment of Shri
Sukhdeo Narain was perfectly valid.
We accordingly set aside the order of the High Court but
without costs, as the respondent is not, represented.
Agent for the appellant: R. H. Dhebar.