PETITIONER: THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH Vs. RESPONDENT: KAUSHALIYA AND OTHERS DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/10/1963 BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. WANCHOO, K.N. SHAH, J.C. DAYAL, RAGHUBAR CITATION: 1964 AIR 416 1964 SCR (4)1002 CITATOR INFO : F 1978 SC 771 (22) ACT: Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 (104 of 1956), s. 20-"On receiving information", meaning of- Whether information could be from any source. Constitution of India, Art. 14-Whether Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women Act, 1956, s. 20 gives Magistrate uncandlised power-Article 19-Whether s. 20 a reasonable restriction. HEADNOTE: The respondents in the above 6 appeals are alleged to be prostitutes carrying on their trade in Kanpur. On receiving information from the Sub-Inspector of Police who is not a Special Police Officer, the City Magistrate issued notices to the respondents under s. 20(1) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 to show cause why they should not be required to remove themselves from the place where they were residing. The respondents filed their objections claiming that the proceedings were not legally maintainable. The Magistrate repelled the objections. Their revision petitions were dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge. The High Court allowed their re- vision on the ground that s. 20 of the Act offended Arts. 14 and 19(1)(d)(e) of the Constitution of India. The State appealed to this Court on certificates granted by the High Court. Before this Court it was contended that the information re- ceived by the Magistrate must be information received from a special police officer designated under s. 13 of the Act. The next Contention was that in as much under s. 20 the Magistrate acted in his executive capacity, his powers were uncanalized, he is conferred with power capable of discriminating between prostitute and prostitute and he could interfere on flimsy grounds in the lives of respec- table woman and that the section offended against Art. 14. It was further contended that s. 20 imposed an unreasonable restriction on girls and women leading a life of prostitution and hence it violated Art. 19(1)(d) and (c). Held : (i) If the Legislature intended to confine the expression "information" only to that given by a special police officer, it would have specifically stated so in the section. The omission is a clear indication that a particular source of information is not material for the application of the section. Giving the rational meaning to the expression "on receiving information" it is dear that information may be from any source. (ii)The Act discloses a clear policy affording a real guidance for the Magistrate to decide the two questions which he is called upon to adjudicate under s. 20 of the Act. He functions as a court and decides the said two questions after giving full opportu- 1003 nity to the alleged prostitute to respresent her case and examine her evidence. His decision is subject to revision by the Sessions Court or the High Court as the case may be. In the circumstances it is not possible to say that uncanalized power is conferred on the Magistrate as an executive authority to decide the fate. of an alleged prostitute in an arbitrary manner. (iii) It is well settled that Art. 14 does not prohibit reasonable classifications for the purpose of legislation and a law will not infringe Art. 14 if the classification is founded on an intelligible differentia and the said differentia has rational relation to the object to be achieved by the said law. There are pronounced and real difference between a woman who is a prostitute and one who is not and between a prostitute who does not demand in public interest any restriction on her movements and a prostitute whose action in public places call for the imposition of restriction on her movement and even deportation. The difference between these classes of prostitutes has a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. Section 20 in order to prevent moral decadence in a busy locality, seeks to restrict the movements of the second category of prostitutes or to deport such of them as the peculiar methods of their operation in an area may demand. Section 20 therefore does not offend Art. 14. Begum State, A.I.R. 1963 Bom. 17 and Shama Bat v. State of U. P. A.I.R. 1959 All 57. (iv) The reasonableness of a restriction depends upon the value of life in a society, the circumstances obtaining at a particular point of time when the restriction is imposed, the degree land urgency of the evil sought to be controlled and similar others. 'The vice of prostitution has to be controlled and regulated and one of the objects of the Act is to control the' growing evil of prostitution in public places. The restrictions placed by s. 20 are certainly in the interest of the general public and as the imposition of the restriction is done through a judicial process on the basis of a clearly disclosed policy the said restrictions are reasonable. Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1950] S.C.R. 759 and State of Madras v. V. G. Row, [1952] S.C.R. 597. (v) Once it is held that the activities of a prostitute in a particular area having regard to the conditions obtaining therein, are so subversive of public morals and so destructive of public health that it is necessary in public interest to deport her from that place, them is no reason why the restriction should be held to be unrea sonable. The decision of the Bombay High Court in Begum v. State, is not correct to the extent it holds that the restriction under s. 20 encroach upon the fundamental right guaranteed under Art 19(1)(d) and (e). Those are reasonable restrictions imposed in 'public. interest and do not infringe the fundamental rights under Art. 19(1)(d) & (e) of the Constitution. JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeals Nos. 21
to 26 of 1962.
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Appeals from the judgment and order dated November 17, 1961,
of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Revision nos. 322,
323, 324, 611, 612 and 613 of 1961.
C. B. Agarwala and C. P. Lal, for the appellant (in all
the appeals).
J. P. Goyal, for the respondents (in Cr. A. Nos. 21-24
and 26 of 1962)-
October 1, 1963. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SUBBA RAO J.-These six appeals filed by certificates granted
by the High Court of judicature at Allahabad raise the
question of the vires of s. 20 of the Suppression of Immoral
Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 (104 of 1956),
hereinafter called the Act.
The relevant facts may be briefly stated. The respondents
are alleged to be prostitutes carrying on their trade in the
City of Kanpur. On receiving information from the Sub-
Inspector of Police, who is not a Special Police Officer,
the City Magistrate, Kanpur, issued notices to the
respondents under s. 20(1) of the Act to show cause why they
should not be required to remove themselves from the places
where they were residing and be prohibited from re-entering
them. The respondents received the notices and filed
objections claiming that the proceedings were not legally
maintainable. The learned City Magistrate repelled the said
objections. Against the orders of the Magistrate the
respondents went up in revision to the Additional Sessions
Judge Kanpur but the same were dismissed. Thereafter the
respondents preferred revisions to the High Court of
judicature at Allahabad and the said High Court allowed the
revision petitions and set aside the proceedings pending
against the respondents in the Court of the City Magistrate,
Kanpur. The High Court held that s. 20 of the Act abridged
the fundamental rights of the respondents under Art. 14 and
sub-cls. (d) and (e) of Art. 19(1) of the Constitution.
After obtaining certificates for leave to appeal from the
High Court, the present appeals have been preferred by the
State.
As the argument turns upon the provisions of s. 20 of the
Act, it will be convenient at the outset to read it :
Section 20. (1) A Magistrate on receiving information that
any woman or girt residing in or frequent-
1005
ing any place within the local limits of his jurisdiction is
a prostitute, may record the substance of the information
received and issue a notice to such woman or girl requiring
her to appear before the Magistrate and show cause why she
should not be required to remove herself from the place and
be prohibited from re-entering it.
(2) Every notice issued under subsection (1) shall be
accompanied by a copy of the record aforesaid and the copy
shall be served alongwith the notice on the woman or girl
against whom the notice is issued.
(3) The Magistrate shall, after the service of the notice
referred to in sub-section (2), proceed to inquire into the
truth of the information received, and after giving the
woman or girl an opportunity of adducing evidence, take such
further evidence as he thinks fit and if upon such inquiry
it appears to him that such woman or girl is a prostitute
and that it is necessary in the interests of the general
public that such woman or girl should be required to remove
herself therefrom and be prohibited from re-entering the
same, the Magistrate shall, by order in writing communicated
to the woman or girl in the manner specified therein,
require her after a date (to be specified in the order)
which shall not be less than seven days from the date of the
order, to remove herself from the place to such place
whether within or without the local limits of Ms
jurisdiction, by such route or routes and within such time
as may be specified in the order and also prohibit her from
re-entering the place without the permission in writing of
the Magistrate having jurisdiction over such place.
The first question raised is whether the information
received enabling a Magistrate under s. 20 of the Act to
make the enquiry provided thereunder should be only from a
special police officer designated under s. 13 of the Act.
Section 13 of the Act says that there shall be for each area
to be specified by the State Government in this behalf a
special police officer appointed by or on behalf of that
Government for dealing with offences under this Act in that
area. The post of special
1006
police officer is created under the Act for dealing with
offences under the Act, whereas s. 20 does not deal with
offences. That apart, the expression used in s. 20, namely,
on receiving information” is not expressly or by necessary
implication limited to information received from a special
police officer. If the Legislature intended to confine the
expression “information” only to that given by a special
police officer, it would have specifically stated so in the
section. The omission is a clear indication that a
particular source of information is not material for the
application of the section. There is an essential
distinction between an investigation and arrest in the
matter of offences and information to the Magistrate : the
former, when dealing with women, has potentialities for
grave mischief and, therefore, entrusted only to specific
officers, while mere giving of information ‘Would. not have
such consequences particularly when” as we would indicate
later, the information received by the Magistrate would only
start the machinery of a judicial enquiry. We therefore,
hold, giving the natural meaning to the expression “on
receiving information”, that’ “information” may be from any
source.
The next question is whether s.20 of the Act offends Art. 14
of the Constitution. It is stated that the power conferred
on the Magistrate under s. 20 of the Act is an uncanalized
and uncontrolled one, that he acts thereunder in his
executive capacity, that the said section enables him to
discriminate between prostitute and prostitute in the matter
of restricting their movements and deporting them to places
outside his jurisdiction, and that it also enables him on
flimsy and untested evidence to interfere with the lives of
respectable women by holding them to be prostitutes and,
therefore, it violates Art.14 of the Constitution. So
stated, the argument appears to be plausible, but a closer
scrutiny of the section and the connected sections not only,
reveals a clearcut policy but also the existence of,
effective checks against, arbitrariness. ; Let us At the
outset scrutinize the. provisions of the Act. The preamble
of the Act shows that the Act was made to provide in
pursuance of the Intentional Convention signed, at) New
York on May 9, 1950, for suppression of immoral traffic in
women and girls. The short title of the Act
1007
says that the Act may be called “The Suppression of Immoral
Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956”. Though the preamble
as well as the short title shows that the Act was intended
to prevent immoral traffic in women and girls, the other
sections of the Act indicate that it was not the only
purpose of the Act. Section 2(b) defines “girl” to mean a
female who has not completed the age of twenty-one, s. 2(1),
“woman” to mean a female who has completed the age of 21
years, s. 2 (e), “prostitute” to mean a female who offers
her body for promiscuous sexual intercourse for lure,
whether in money or in kind, and s. 2(f), “prostitution” to
mean the act of a female offering her body for promiscuous
sexual intercourse for hire, whether in money or in kind.
There are provisions in the Act for punishing men who run
brothels and who procure girls and women for prostitution,
for punishing women and girls who seduce or solicit for the
purpose of Prostitution in public places, for placing the
rescued women and girls in detention in protections in
protection home for closure of brothels and eviction of
offenders from premises, for restricting the movements of
prostitutes and even for deporting them to places outside
the Jurisdiction of the Magistrate, Section 7(1) provides
for the punishment of a prostitute, if she carries on
prostitution in any premises Which are within a distance of
two hundred yards or any place of public religious worship,
educational institution, hostels, hospitals, nursing home or
such other public place or any kind notified in that behalf
by the Commissioner of- Police or the District Magistrate,
as the casec it may be. Section 8 prohibits seducing or
soliciting for purpose of prostitution in any public place
or within sight of, and in such manner as to be seen or
heard from, any public place, whether from within any
building or house or not, and makes such soliciting or
seducing an offence under the Act. Section 18 provides for
the closure of brothels and eviction of offenders from the
premises, if such premises are within a distance of two
hundred yards from a public place mentioned in s. 7(1) and
are used or run as a brothel by any person or used by
prostitutes for carrying on their trade. The Act was
conceived to serve a public social purpose, viz., to
suppress immoral traffic in women and girls, to rescue
fallen women and girls and to prevent deterioration in
1008
public morals. The Act clearly defines a “prostitute”, and
gives definite indications from which places prostitutes
should be’ removed or in respect whereof their movements
should be restricted.
With this policy in mind, let us now give close look to the
provisions of s. 20(1) of the Act. The following procedural
steps are laid down in s. 20 of the Act: (1) the enquiry is
initiated by a Magistrate on his receiving the requisite
information that a woman a girl is a prostitute; (2) he
records the substance of the information; (4) he sends,
along with the notice, a copy of the record; (5) he shall
give the woman or girl an opportunity to adduce evidence on
two points, namely, (i) whether she is a prostitute, and
(ii) whether in the interests of the general public she
should be required to remove herself from the place where
she is residing or which she is frequenting; (6) the
Magistrate shall give his findings on the said questions,
and on the basis thereof, he makes the appropriate order;
and (7) the disobedience of the order entails punishment of
fine.
It is argued that the enquiry is not in respect of “of-
fences”, though disobedience of an order made thereunder may
entail punishment of fine, and, therefore, the order is one
made in an administrative capacity. The expression
“Magistrate” has been defined to mean a District Magistrate,
a Sub-Divisional Magistrate, a Presidency Magistrate or a
Magistrate of the first class specially empowered by the
State Government, by notification in the Official Gazette,
to exercise jurisdiction under this Act. The definition
shows that special jurisdiction is conferred upon a Magis-
trate of comparatively high status who can safely be relied
upon to discharge the onerous and delicate duties inherent
in such jurisdiction. The jurisdiction under s. 20 is not
conferred on such a Magistrate as a persona designata but is
to be exercised by him in his capacity as a Magistrate
functioning within the limits of his territorial juris-
diction. The procedure prescribed thereunder, which we have
analysed earlier, approximates, as nearly as possible, to
that of a judicial enquiry. The enquiry starts on infor-
mation; notice, along with a copy of the record, is given to
the alleged prostitute; she is given an opportunity to
1009
adduce evidence which necessarily implies a right to have a
public enquiry, to engage an Advocate, to ask for the
examination of the informant or informants and to cross-
examine them and to adduce her evidence, both oral and
documentary. The Magistrate, on the basis of the evidence,
decides the aforesaid two questions, and makes a suitable
order indicated in the section. The right with respect
whereof the jurisdiction is exercised is an important one.
It is a fundamental right of personal liberty. No right can
be more important to a person than the right to select his
or her home and to move about in the manner he or she likes.
Even depraved woman cannot be deprived of such a right
except for good reasons. When the Legislature conferred
Jurisdiction on a Magistrate to decide the question of
imposing restrictions on such a right by following judicial
procedure, it is reasonable to hold that it conferred
jurisdiction on him as a court, unless the clear provisions
of the Act compel us to hold otherwise. Indeed the analysis
of the section earlier made negatives any intention to the
contrary. The fact that the enquiry does not relate to an
“offence ” is not decisive of the question whether the
Magistrate is functioning as a court. There are many
proceedings under the Code of Criminal Procedure, such as
those under ss. 133, 144, 145 and 488, which do not deal
with offences but still it is never suggested that a
Magistrate in making an enquiry in respect of matters
thereunder is not functioning as a court. We therefore,
hold that in the circumstances the Magistrate must be held
to be acting as a court. If the Magistrate is acting as a
court, as we have held he is, it is obvious that be is
subject to the revisional jurisdiction conferred under ss.
435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The said
sections confer ample authority on the courts mentioned
therein to set right improper orders passed by a Magistrate
in appropriate cases. The result of the discussion is that
the Act discloses a clear policy affording a real guide for
the Magistrate to decide the two questions which he is
called upon to adjudicate under s. 20 of the Act. He func-
tions as a court and decides the said two questions after
giving full opportunity to the alleged prostitute to repre-
sent her case and examine her evidence. His decision is
subject to revision by the Sessions Court or the High
1010
Court, as the case may be. In the circumstances it is riot
possible to say that uncanalised power is conferred on the
Magistrate as an executive authority to decide the fate of
an alleged prostitute in an arbitrary manner.
The next question is whether the policy so disclosed offends
Art. 14 of the Constitution. It has been well settled that
Art. 14 does not prohibit reasonable classification for the
purpose of legislation and that a law would not be held to
infringe Art. 14 of the Constitution if the. classification
is founded on an intelligible differentia and the said
differentia has a rational relation to the object sought to
be achieved by the said law. The differences between a
woman who is a prostitute and one who is not certainly
justify their being placed in different classes. So too,
there are obvious differences between a prostitute who is a
public nuisance and one who is not. A prostitute who
carries on her trade on the sly or in the unfrequented part
of the town or in a town with a sparse population may not be
so dangerous to public health or morals as a prostitute who
lives in a busy locality or in an overcrowded town or in a
place within the easy reach of public institutions like
religious an educational institutions. Though both sell
their bodies, the latter is far more: dangerous to the
public, particularly to the younger generation during the
emotional stage of their life. Their freedom of
uncontrolled movement in a crowded -locality or in the
vicinity of public institutions not only helps to demoralise
the public morals, but, what is worse, to spread diseases
not only affecting the present generation, but also the
future ones. Such trade in public may also lead to scandals
and unseemly broils. There are, therefore, pronounced and
real differences between a woman who is a prostitute and one
who is not, and between a prostitute, who does not demand in
public interests any restrictions on her movements and a
prostitute, whose actions in public places call for the
imposition of restrictions on her movements and even
deportation. The object of the Act, as has already been
noticed is not only to suppress immoral traffic in women and
girls, but also to improve public morals by removing.
prostitutes from busy public places in the vicinity of
religious and educational., tutions. The differences
between these two- classes of
1011
stitutes have a rational relation to the object sought to be
achieved by the Act. Section 20, in order to prevent moral
decadence in a busy locality, seeks to restrict the
movements of the second category of prostitutes and to
deport such of them as the peculiar methods of their
operation in area may demand.
judicial decisions arising under the Act and under analogous
Acts were cited at the Bar. The question whether a
particular provisions offends Art. 14 of the Constitution or
not depends upon the provisions of the Act wherein that
section appears. The decisions oil other Acts do not afford
any guidance to decide the Vires of s. 20 of the Act. We
shall, therefore, briefly notice the decisions which have a
direct bearing on s. 20 of the Act.
A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, in Begum v.
State(1) bad to consider the same question now before us.
It held that the provisions of s. 20 of the Act would not be
bit by Art. 14 of the Constitution, though it held that the
provisions of s. 20 of the Act which enable a Magistrate to
direct a prostitute to remove herself from the place where
she is residing to a place without the local limits of his
jurisdiction was an unresonable restriction upon the
fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(d) and (e) of
the Constitution. We agree with the High Court in so far as
it held that the section does not offend Art. 14 of the
Constitution, but we cannot accept the view expressed by it
in respect of Art. 19(1)(d) and (e) thereof. We shall
consider this aspect at a later stage.
In Shama Bai v. State of U. P. (2), Sabai J., though he
dismissed the writ petition without giving notice to the
other party, made some observations indicating his view that
the said provision prima facie offends Art. 14 of the
Constitution. For the reasons already stated by us, we do
not agree with this view. We, therefore, hold that s. 20 of
the Act does not infringe Art. 14 of the Constitution.
Now coming to Art. 19(1)(d) and (e) of the Constitution, the
question that arises is whether s. 20 of the Act imposes an
unreasonable restriction on girls and women leading a life
of prostitution. To state it differently,
(1) A.I.R. 1963 Bom. 17.
(2) A.I.R. 1959 All. 57
1012
does s. 20 of the Act impose reasonable restrictions on the
exercise of the fundamental right of the prostitutes under
Art. 19(1)(d) and (e) of the Constitution in the interests
of the general public. Under Art. 19(1)(d) the prostitute
has a fundamental right to move freely throughout the ter-
ritory of India; and under sub-cl.(e) thereof to reside and
settle in any part of the territory of India. Under s. 20
of the Act the Magistrate can compel her to remove herself
from place where she is residing or which she is frequenting
to places within or without the local limits of his
jurisdiction by such route or routes and within such time as
may be specified in the order and prohibit her from re-
entering the place without his permission in writing. This
is certainly a restriction on a citizen’s fundamental right
under Art. 19(1)(d) and (e) of the Constitution. Whether a
restriction is reasonable in the interests or the general
public cannot be answered on a priori reasoning; it depends
upon the peculiar circumstances of each case. Mahajan J.,
as he then was, speaking for the Court in Chintaman Rao v.
The State of Madhya Pradesh(1) succinctly defined the
expression “reasonable restrictions” thus :
“The- phrase “reasonable restriction” connotes the
limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of the right
should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond
what is required in the interests of the public. The word
“reasonable” implies intelligent care and deliberation, that
is, the choice of a course which reason dictates.”
A fairly exhaustive test to ascertain the reasonableness of
a provision is given by Patanjali Sastri C.J. in The State
of Madras v. V. G. Row(2). Therein the learned Chief
justice observed thus :
“It is important in this context to bear in mind that the
test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed) should be
applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract
standard, or general pattern, of reasonableness can be laid
down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right
alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of
the restrictions
(1) [1950] S.C.R. 759, 763.
(2) [1952]_ S.C.R. 597, 607.
1013
imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be
remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the
prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the
judicial verdict.”
If we may say so, with respect, this passage summarized the
law on the subject fully and precisely. The reasonableness
of a restriction depends upon the values of life in a
society, the circumstances obtaining at a particular point
of time when the restriction is imposed, the degree and the
urgency of the evil sought to be controlled and similar
others. If in a particular locality the vice of
prostitution isendemic degrading those who live
by prostitutionand demoralising others who come into
contact with them, the Legislature may have to impose severe
restrictions on the right of the prostitute to move about
and to live in a house ‘of her choice. If the evil is
rampant, it may also be necessary to provide for deporting
the worst of them from the area of their operation. The
magnitude of the evil and the urgency of the reform may
require such drastic remedies. It cannot be gainsaid that
the vice of prostitution is rampant in various parts of the
country. There cannot be two views on the question of its
control and regulation. One of the objects of the Act is to
control the growing evil of prostitution in public places.
Under s. 20 of the Act the freedom of movement and residence
are regulated, but, as we have stated earlier, an effective
and safe Judicial machinery is provided to carry out the
objects of the Act. The said restrictions placed upon them
are certainly in the interests of the general public and, as
the imposition of the restrictions is done through a
judicial process on the basis of a clearly disclosed policy,
the said restrictions are clearly reasonable.
It is said that the restrictions on prostitutes, though they
may be necessary, are excessive and beyond the requirements
the eradication of the evil demands. The movements of
prostitutes, the argument proceeds, maybe controlled, but
that part of the section which enables the Magistrate to
deport them outside his jurisdiction is far in excess of the
requirements. It is suggested that by consecutive orders
made by various Magistrates, the point may be reached when a
prostitute may be deported out of India.
1014
The second argument borders on fantasy. The first argument
also has no force. If the presence of a prostitute in a
locality within the Jurisdiction of a Magistrate has a
demoralising influence on the public of that locality,
having regard to the density of population, the existence of
schools, colleges and other public institutions in that
locality and other similar causes, we (lo not see how an
order of deportation may not be necessary to curb the evil
and to improve the public morals. Once it is held that the
activities of a prostitute in a particular area, having
regard to the conditions obtaining therein, are so
subversive of public morals anti so destructive of Public
health that it is necessary in public interest to deport her
from that place, we do not see any reason why the
restrictions should be held to be unreasonable. Whether
deportation out of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is
necessary or not depends upon the facts of each case and the
degree of the demoralizing influence a particular prostitute
is exercising in a particular locality. If in a particular
case a Magistrate goes out of the way and makes an order
which is clearly disproportionate to the evil influence
exercised by a particular prostitute, she has a remedy by
way of revision to an appropriate court.
The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Begum v.
State(1) no doubt held that the portion of s. 20 of the Act
which enables the Magistrate to direct a prostitute to
remove herself from the place where she is living to a place
without the local limits of his jurisdiction unreasonably
encroaches upon the fundamental right guaranteed under Art.
19(1)(d) and (e) of the Constitution and is, therefore,
invalid. For the aforesaid reasons, we cannot agree with
this view.
We, therefore, hold that the provisions of s. 20 of the Act
are reasonable restrictions imposed in public interest
within the meaning of s. 19(5) of the Constitution and,
therefore, do not infringe the fundamental rights of the
respondents under Art. 19(1)(d) and (e) thereof.
In the result, the appeals are allowed. The orders of the
High Court are set aside and those of the Additional
Sessions judge are restored. The City Magistrate will now
proceed with the enquiry on merits.
Appeals allowed.
(1) A.I.R. 1963 Bom. 17.
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