JUDGMENT
Shiv Kumar Sharma, J.
1. The petitioner who has been detained under the provisions of National Security Act, 1980 (in short NSA) has approached this Court through his mother Smt. Kesuli seeking quashing of the detention order.
2. As per the averments made in the writ petition the petitioner and his brothers have been declared as trespassers over the agricultural land bearing Khasra No. 1236 measuring 18 Bighas and 2 Biswas by the revenue authorities. During the pendency of the litigation about the said land the police authorities registered false criminal cases against the petitioner and his brother. The brother of the petitioner namely Tej Singh was detained by the respondents 2 and 3 under the provisions of NSA for a period of one year and he has been released on 28.8.2001. While the period of one year of the preventive detention of aforesaid Tej Singh was about to expire the police authorities hatched up a conspiracy to initiate the proceedings under the NSA against the petitioner also and a false case was registered against him and one Deep Chand Meena under Section 399/402, IPC at Police Station, Masalpur District Karauli. The petitioner was arrested in the said case and vide order dated 31.8.2001 the respondent No. 3 was directed to detain the petitioner in Central Jail, Jaipur. While detaining the petitioner under the provisions of the NSA, copy of the order passed under Section 3(2) of the NSA was not supplied to him. The petitioner was however supplied the grounds of detention after the expiry of 10 days. The State Government approved the order of detention vide communication dated 5.9.2001 and the matter was referred to the Advisory Board. The mother of the petitioner submitted representation to the various authorities on 29.9.2001. The Advisory Board approved the detention of the petitioner and the State Government vide order dated 25.10.2001 passed the final order under Section 12 of the NSA and thereby kept the petitioner in detention for a period of one year i.e. 31.8.2001 to 30.8.2002. The representation submitted by the mother of the petitioner was rejected after much delay which was unexplained.
3. The respondents in their reply averred that the petitioner has been rightly detained by invoking the provisions of Section 3 of the NSA by the competent authority. The allegation of lodging false cases against the petitioner and his family was denied. It has been further averred that not only the petitioner has been regularly indulging in commission of offences punishable under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code, but also his brother Tej Singh is involved in as many as 22 criminal cases of varied nature. The circumstances had come to such that his brother Tej Singh had to be detained under NSA by passing a similar order on 28.8.2000. The habeas corpus petition bearing No. 44/2001 filed challenging the detention of Tej singh was rejected by this Court on 20.4.2001. It was also averred in the reply that the petitioner and one Deep Chand Meena were caught red handed on spot and FIR No. 92/2001 was registered against them at the police Station, Masalpur. The petitioner was served with the copy of the order of detention dated 31.8.2001 on the same day through Deputy Superintendent District Jail, Karauli. The photostat copy of the order dated 31.8.2001 on which the petitioner put his signatures in token of receiving the order and the report of SHO concerned to the effect that copy of the order was served on Tikam Singh in presence of Deputy Superintendent of District Jail, Karuali was enclosed with the reply. The grounds of detention containing as many as five pages and documents running into 107 pages were duly supplied to the petitioner with letter dated 1.9.2001. The receipt given by the petitioner was enclosed with the reply. The order of the District Magistrate dated 31.8.2001 detaining the petitioner was approved by the State Government vide order dated 5.9.2001. The detention of the petitioner was duly reported to the Central Government through a special messenger and the same was received by the Central Government on 6.9.2001. The representation dated 29.9.2001 submitted by the mother of the petitioner was rejected by the State Government on 29.1.2002 and by the Central Government on 22.10.2001. The Advisory Board gave its report on 3.10.2001 and the State Government passed the confirmation order detaining the petitioner on 25.10.2001. It was further averred in the reply that all the eleven cases pending against the petitioner relate to the offences of robbery, theft, attack on police party and Government employee, for possessing illegal arms and illegal wines under the Indian Arms Act and Excise Act. The Advisory Board also noted in its report that the cases were registered against the petitioner in the year 1994, 1996 and 1999 pertaining attack on police party. The Advisory Board opined in the report that the cases registered against the petitioner were not isolated incidents, but showed a consistent pattern and that he was causing serious threat to social peace and tranquillity by affecting public order. The Advisory Board however did not find sufficient reason for approving the detention of Deep Chand Meena and proceedings against him were dropped.
4. We have heard the rival submissions and carefully scanned the material on record. The first contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that the petitioner was in Jail on the date of passing of the impugned detention order on 31.8.2001. Therefore it was incumbent on the detaining authority while passing order under Section 3(2) of the NSA to have considered and mentioned in the order itself in case the detenu was detained under the provisions of NSA and there was likelihood of his being released on bail. Reliance is placed on Amrit Lal v. Union of India, ((2001) 1 SCC 341 and Binod Singh v. D.M. Dhanbad .
5. Having gone through the ratio of the aforesaid cases we find that the facts of those cases are not akin to the instant case. During the course of arguments it has been brought to our notice that the petitioner was granted bail in said criminal case bearing No. 92/2001. In view of this subsequent event the petitioner is not entitled to any benefit even if the ground of likelihood of the petitioner to be released on bail was not considered by the detaining authority at the time of passing the detention order.
6. It is further contended by the learned counsel that the representations submitted on behalf of the petitioner on 29.9.2001 was not decided by the respondents within the reasonable time and delay in deciding the representation was not explained. We find no merit in the submission. The respondent State of Rajasthan in the reply averred that the representation submitted by the petitioner was received by the District Collector on 5.10.2001. The ADM after his noting placed the same before the Collector on 18.10.2001. The Collector Karauli dictated the detailed order rejecting representation on 19.10.2001. The draft order was put up for signatures on 22.10.2001. Since the District Collector was on tour at Chainpur and Nadoti on 22/23.10.2001, the order of rejection was signed by him on 25.10.2001 and the same was accordingly issued on 27.10.2001. The State Government upon receipt of the representation called for the comments of the District Magistrate by letter dated 9.11.2001. Since the District Magistrate, Karauli was seriously ill and remained hospitalised at SMS Medical Hospital at Jaipur from 14.11.2001 at 17.12.2001 and in fact went into coma for 48 hours, the comments could be given by him on 21.12.2001 after he resumed his duties. The State Government thereafter rejected the representation by order dated 29.1.2002. The Central Government also rejected the same representation by order dated 22.10.2001. Thus the representation was decided within a reasonable time and no prejudice can be said to have been caused to the petitioner on that count.
7. In Venmathi Selvam v. State of T.N. and Anr. , it was indicated that though the delay by itself is not fatal, the delay which remains unexplained becomes unreasonable. In the instant case the delay in deciding the representation has been explained and we do not find the explanation unreasonable.
8. The learned counsel further contended that the petitioner was not informed of his right to make representation in the detention order by the detaining authority and on account of which the petitioner was prevented to make an effective representation to the State and the Central Government. We have seen the document Annex.R/3 and we find that the petitioner was informed of his right to make representation. Thus, we do not find any merit in this contention also. We are also not impressed with the contention that the police party hatched up conspiracy against the petitioner with a view to initiate proceedings under the NSA. From the material on record it is revealed that the petitioner has committed grievous offences continuously and his detention was necessary to maintain public order. The offences committed by the petitioner in 1999 were not the sole reason for his detention. From the record it appears that there were serious apprehensions about his threatening the witnesses to obtain acquittal from the competent criminal Courts. We find that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in the instant case is based on relevant considerations. The persistent indulgence of the petitioner in organised crime against members of the community had the effect of disturbing even tempo of life of the community and was prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. Various incidents detailed out in the grounds of detention clearly exhibit the criminal potentiality of the petitioner to disturb the public order. In so far as case of Deep Chand Meena is concerned, his case was not approved by the Advisory Board and therefore proceedings against him were quashed.
9. In Amanulla Khan Kudetalla Khan Pathan v. State of Gujrat and Ors. , their Lordships of the Supreme Court propounded thus:
Even an activity violating an ordinary legal provision may in a given case be a matter of public order. It is the magnitude of the activities and its effect on the even tempo of life of the society at large or with a section of society that determines whether the activities can be said to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order or the same amounted to breach of law and order. The fallout and the extent and reach of the alleged activities must be of such a nature that they travel beyond the capacity of the ordinary law to deal with him or to prevent his subversive activities effecting the community at large or a large section of society.
The case of the petitioner is squarely covered by the aforequoted ratio indicated by the Supreme Court.
10. In view of what we have discussed hereinabove we do not find any merit in the petition, it stands accordingly dismissed.