JUDGMENT
K.J. Sengupta, J.
1. This writ petition is directed against a communication and/or letter dated 8th October 1983, whereby the product of the petitioners namely, non-cellulosic synthetic wastes blended with viscose has been sought to be classified under item 18(III)(ii) of the first schedule to Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. Initially the aforesaid product was classified, filed under item No. 18(III)(i) and he same was cleared upon payment of Excise Duty related to the aforesaid classification. In the affidavit-in-opposition the point of territorial jurisdiction has been taken. Admittedly the petitioner has its factory situated at Abu Road in the District of Sirohi in the State of Rajasthan and the higher rate of Excise Duty under different classification is sought to be levied at the factory of the petitioner situated at Sirohi, which situates outside the territorial limit of this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. On the question of jurisdiction the petitioner has sought to establish that the aforesaid impugned letter was received by the company at its Head Office in Calcutta which situates within the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court also the impugned letter prejudicially affects the petitioner at Calcutta within the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court. So part cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court. In the affidavit-in-opposition the respondents have alleged that the said impugned letter though addressed to the petitioner at its Calcutta Office but it was received by the petitioner No. 2, personally from the Officer of the respondent authorities at Sirohi, Rajasthan. In the affidavit-in-reply the petitioner further denied the aforesaid fact of having taken delivery of the impugned letter from the respondents personally in Rajasthan. A xerox copy of the envelope carrying the aforesaid letter has been annexed and it appears that the said letter was addressed to the Managing Director of the writ petitioner No. 1 company at its Calcutta Head Office situates at P-4, Narkeldanga, CIT Road, Sector VI-M, Calcutta-54 and the same was despatched from Sirohi and it appears through postal communication the said envelope together with the letter were received at Calcutta. Mr. Talukdar, learned advocate appearing in support of the writ petitioner contends on the question of jurisdiction that from the aforesaid fact and evidence it will appear that the impugned letter was served upon the petitioner at its Calcutta Office and thereby the petitioner has been affected at Calcutta. Therefore, part cause of action in this case has arisen within the territorial limit of this Hon’ble Court. In support of his submission he has relied on a decision of the Supreme Court . He contends it will appear from the Calcutta decision that if the impugned letter is served at a place where the petitioner is having place of business, the territorial jurisdiction of the concerned High Court entertain this writ petition. Mr. Ghosh senior counsel appearing for respondents contends, citing two Supreme Court decisions and also one decision of this Court, , 1994(IV) SCC 715, and 1998 Vol. I CLJ 425 respectively, that mere service of the impugned letter upon the petitioner at its Calcutta Office is not the integral part of cause of action. The decision in this matter for reclassification of the aforesaid product has been taken in Rajasthan and by the impugned letter it has been merely communicated to the petitioner. The goods, in question, is manufactured and further cleared from the factory premises of the petitioner situates in Rajasthan. Therefore, he contends, entire cause of action has arisen outside territorial jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court. On the question of fact it appears that during pendency of this writ petition the respondents have taken a decision on or about 23rd January, 1999 clarified amongst other the product manufactured by the petitioner falls under item No. 18(III)(i) which attracts a lower duty. This clarification has been brought in record by filing a supplementary affidavit. Therefore, it appears that there is no dispute at all to decide, as the grievance of the petitioner ventilated in the petition has been redressed by the respondents themselves, only question remains for decision, whether this Court has jurisdiction or not. Factually it was once disputed in the affidavit-in-opposition that the impugned letter was not sent by the respondents at the Head Office of the petitioners at Calcutta, but such contention in my view has been repelled by the writ petitioner by annexing the envelope by which the letter was received. I have carefully examined the original also in Court and I found that the envelope carrying the impugned order was sent, and received by the petitioner at Calcutta in its Head Office. Now the question remains as to whether the receipt of the impugned letter constitute an integral part of cause of action or not. By this time it has been reiterated by all the Courts which I repeat that cause of action means and includes the facts and bundle of facts if traversed by the advisory, the petitioner or plaintiff is required to prove in order to get relief in accordance with law. It is true in this case that the impugned decision for reclassification of the above product was taken in Rajasthan by the respondents. However, taking of decision may be one part but not the whole part of the cause of action simply because the decision is not effective unless it is sought to be enforced or implemented compelling payment. Therefore, until and unless the decision is made known to the person affected cannot be enforced. By the impugned letter respondents have communicated the decision and demanded payment of Excise Duty at a higher rate. I am unable to accept contention of Mr. Ghosh that the whole cause of action has arisen in this case at Sirohi as the decision has been taken and the petitioner has got its factory there. I hold that as the demand has been made for payment and logically the petitioner shall suffer loss and injury at its Calcutta Office also, therefore, part cause of action has arisen within the territorial limit of this Court. I find in support of this proposition from the decision of our Court reported in 90 CWN page 438 as appropriately cited by Mr. Talukdar. In this decision of Division Bench after analysing and summing up of large number of decisions on this subject it was decided amongst other in paragraph 5 :-
“an order has been made by an authority or a person a place beyond the territorial limits of a particular High Court The same is. given effect
to against the petitioner within the said High Court’s jurisdiction. In such a case, at least a part of cause of action arises, where the impugned order is implemented. Thus when an order becomes effective only when it is communicated or served, the service of the order or receipt of a notice thereof would form part of cause of action for filing a writ petition by the person aggrieved thereby.”
2. Earlier another Division Bench of this Court in Umasankar v. Union of India (86 CWN 355 para 18) held amongst other that an order of dismissal had become effective only when the same was served at Calcutta and therefore this Court had jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
3. The decisions cited by Mr. Ghosh, in my view are wholly distinguishable, factually in this case. In those cases no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this High Court. In the case of Oil & Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, the Apex Court held amongst other, knowledge of tender from publication in the newspaper, submission of tender form from registered Office of the petitioner do not form any part of the cause of action. Therefore, I hold that this Court has got jurisdiction as part of cause of action has arisen.
4. Therefore, as I have already observed in view of subsequent development the case of the petitioner is bound to succeed. Accordingly, I allow the writ petition and make the Rule absolute. I direct the respondent to return the bank guarantee and bond and the payment which has been made by the petitioner in terms of the interim order shall be refunded with interest at the rate of 10 per cent per annum from the date of deposit till payment. No order as to costs.