JUDGMENT
B. Bhattacharya, J.
1. By filing two separate applications, one M/s. Jay Prestressed Production Ltd. (“Jay”) and another M/s. Sharma Chemical
Works (“Sharma”) have prayed for recalling our order dated July 2, 1998 by which we disposed of the appeal by confirming the sale of the assets of Tirupati Woollen Mills Ltd. under liquidation (“Company”) in favour of Divya Manufacturing Co. Pvt. Ltd., the respondent No. 6 herein (“Divya”) on certain terms and conditions.
2. The factual backgrounds leading to the filing of the aforesaid two applications can be summarised thus:
(a) A learned Single Judge of this court in B.I.F.R. Case No. 11 of 1998 (in re: Tirupati Woollen Mills Limited in liquidation) by order dated February 6, 1998 confirmed the sate of all the assets and properties of the Company in favour of Divya at the price of 85 lakhs. By the said order, the said learned Single Judge refused the prayer of the appellant herein, one of secured creditors of the Company, for setting aside the sale on the ground of inadequacy of sale price. However, by the said order, the secured creditors were given one last chance to find a buyer who could make a higher offer than that of Divya and further re-employ the workmen who were out of employment on the terms and conditions as those mentioned in the agreement between Divya and the Employees’ Union within the period of 30 days. In default, however, the said sale stood confirmed in favour of Divya.
(b) Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid order dated February 6, 1998, the appellant herein preferred the instant appeal and on its application for stay this court stayed the operation of the order passed by the learned Single Judge.
(c) While hearing the instant appeal, on May 6, 1998, this court directed the Official Liquidator to make a wide publication for fresh sale of the assets and properties of the Company by keeping the appeal pending.
(d) Pursuant to the said advertisements, lenders were received and ultimately on July 2, 1998 the sale of all the assets and properties of the Company was held before this court. After completion of the bids by the intending purchasers, the offer of Divya being highest was accepted and confirmed by this court for Rs. 1.3 crore. The offer of Jay was the second highest for Rs. 1.25 crore.
(e) it will not be out of place to mention here that Sharma moved an application on July 1, 1998 thereby praying for permission to participate in the sale to be held on July 2, 1998 but as the said Sharma did not comply with the requirements of the advertisement for sale, this court on July 2, 1998 before commencement of auction rejected their prayer for participation. (f) As indicated earlier, on July 2, 1998, we accepted the offer of Divya and confirmed the sale in its favour by directing the said Divya to pay the entire balance consideration money within 30 days from that day.
(g) On July 23, 1998 the instant two applications were moved, when both the applicants offered Rs. 2 crores for purchasing the assets of the company on the same terms and conditions upon which it has been sold to Divya. Both the petitioners in order to show their bona fides expressed their intension through their respective counsels to deposit earnest money to the extent of 20% of Rs. 2 crores in the shape of
demand draft or bankers’ cheque by July 27. 1998. They also gave undertaking before this court that they would purchase the assets of the company as a going concern and shall be bound by the direction contained in order dated July 2, 1998 in so far as the employment of the workers in the factory is concerned (Clause IX) appearing at page 41 of the application of Jay.
(h) This court accordingly on July 2, 1998 directed the two applicants to deposit before the Official Liquidator. High Court, by demand draft or bankers’ cheque a sum of Rs. 40 lakhs each without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties in these proceedings. We further made it clear that such deposit would not create any right in favour of these two applicants unless the issue is finally decided by us on the next date. On that day, the learned counsels further gave undertaking before us that if no other purchaser comes forward to purchase the assets at the aforesaid amount of Rs. 2 crores or at any higher amount than Rs. 2 crores, the earnest money deposited by them shall stand forfeited if they refuse to purchase at the price of Rs.2 crores. We accordingly accepted their undertaking and directed the parties to exchange their affidavits and fixed the matter for hearing on July 31, 1998. The parties have accordingly filed their respective affidavits.
3. In the application filed by Sharma, the said applicant has alleged that on July 2. 1998 while their prayer for permission to participate in the auction was rejected, the applicant was not aware of the judgment of the apex court in the cases of Lica Pvt. Ltd. v. Official Liquidator and another reported in 1996 Company Cases paged 788 and 792 respectively and as such the applicant’s learned counsel could not show those judgments while moving the said application. By relying upon the said judgments, Sharma contended that they were inclined to purchase the assets at the price of Rs. 1.45 crure which was Rs. 15 lakhs above the price at which the sale has been confirmed in favour of Divya. As indicated earlier, although Sharma prayed for recalling our order dated July 2, 1998 by offering Rs. 1.45 crorc in the application, at the time of pressing the application, its learned counsel enhanced the said amount to Rs. 2 crores.
4. In the application filed by Jay, the said petitioners stated that at the time of auction on July 2. 1998 the said applicant could not increase its offer beyond Rs. 1.25 crore as the representative of the applicant who was giving instruction to his counsel at that point of lime was not authorised to go beyond Rs. 1.25 crorc. The further case of the said applicant is that when the bid rose up to Rs. 1.3 crore. Its representative was not in a position to give any higher offer and requested his counsel to ask for time till Monday next since there was a wedding ceremony in the family of the Directors of the applicant company on July 2. 1998. Further by reason of industrial strike on July 3, 1998 it was not possible for the petitioner’s representative to come on July 3, 1998 to give further instruction. Thus, the applicant prays that there was a bona fide mistake on its part in not giving instruction to the said representative in the court with regard to maximum amount beyond Rs. 1.25 crore.
5. In the said application the applicant prayed for re-opening the said confirmed sale with an offer to purchase the same at the price of Rs. 1.40
crore. As noted earlier, the said applicant however at the time of hearing of the application on July 23. 1998 enhanced its offer to Rs. 2 crores on the same terms and conditions upon which sale has been confirmed in favour of Divya.
6. The aforesaid two applications have been opposed by Divya and also the respondent No. 2 viz. Tirupati Woolen Shramik Sangha Samity thereby challenging the maintainability of the application as well as the bona fides of the applicants in making these applications.
7. Mr. Banerjee, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of Sharma, strongly relied upon the two decisions of the apex court in the cases of Lica Pvt. Ltd. (1) and Lica Pvt. Ltd. (2) reported in 1996 Company Cases page 788 and page 792 respectively and contends that the purpose of an auction is to get most remunerative price and it is the duty of the court to keep openness of the auction so that the intending bidders would be free to participate and offer higher value. Mr. Banerjee contends that in view of the fact that the applicants have reappeared with an offer of excess 70 lakhs, if the earlier order is set aside and a fresh auction is held, the property may fetch even Rs. 2.5 crores. Thus. Mr. Banerjee asked us to apply the principle laid down in the aforesaid two decisions to the facts of the present case.
8. Mr. Chakraborly, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of Jay has similarly relied upon the aforesaid two decisions and contends that at the time of auction, in view of the marriage ceremony in the house of the Director of the applicant, the representative of his client could not give proper instructions to him to put forward further bids beyond Rs. 1.25 crore. Mr. Chakraborty contends that in view of the offer made by his client this court for the interest of the secured creditors as welt as the employees of the company should recall its earlier order dated July 2, 1988 confirming the sale at the price of Rs. 1.3 crore.
9. Mr. Mitra, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has supported the contentions of Mr. Banerjee and Mr. Chakraborty and has submitted that the price offered by these two applicants itself shows that the properly was previously sold at an inadequate price. Thus for the interest of the secured creditors as well as that of the workers of the company. Mr. Mitra continue, we should set aside the sale.
10. Mr. Sen, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of Divya has strongly opposed the aforesaid two applications. According to Mr. Sen, we should not follow the aforesaid two decisions of the apex court in the cases of Lica (1) and Lica (2) [supra] inasmuch as the ratio of the said decisions is not in conformity with the earlier decision of the apex court in Navalkha. and Sons v. Ramanuja Das . Mr. Sen further contends that so far Jay is concerned, it having participated in the auction and having failed as second highest, cannot after the completion of sale come out with a new offer. According to Mr. Sen after the acceptance of offer by this court, the sale should have been treated as closed and should not be re-opened for the purpose of considering any other offer on a subsequent date even if the said offer is higher. Mr. Sen contends that if this course is adopted, there would be no finality in any matter and in such event now and then the offer already accepted may be upset rejecting the same in view of some higher offer.
11. As regards the application of Sharma, Mr. Sen contends that on the date of sale their prayer for participation in the auction proceedings was turned down by this court as they did not comply with the formally mentioned in the advertisement for sale. Thus. Mr. Sen contends, the said order refusing permission to Shanna to participate had attained finality and the principle analogous to res judicata should be applied. In support of such contention Mr. Sen relied upon the decision of the apex court in the case of Arjun Singh v. M.K. and Others . By relying upon the said decision Mr. Sen contends that the nature of order passed on July 2, 1998 rejecting the prayer of the applicant is in the nature of a final order and as such it is precluded from filing a fresh application for permission to participate with a higher offer.
12. Mrs. Mukherjee, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 2 viz. the Employees’ Union of the Company has however adopted the contention of Mr. Sen and contended that they having entered into an agreement with Divya whereby Divya having assured the workmen to re-employ, in case of a fresh sale, the interest of the workmen will be jeopardised. Mrs. Mukherjee however fairly conceded that if this court lakes care of the interests of the employees and compels the purchaser to abide by the agreement between the Union and Divya as regards re-employment of the employees, she did not find any reason to oppose the prayer of resale resulting in increase of sale proceeds by at least Rs. 70 lakhs.
13. Before we proceed to consider the respective submissions of the parties it will be apposite to refer to Clause 11 of the terms and conditions of sale. The said Clause No. 11 is quoted hereunder:
‘The Hon’ble High Court may set aside the sale in favour of purchaser/ purchasers even after the sale is confirmed and/or purchaser consideration is paid on such terms and conditions as the court may deem fit and proper for the interest and benefit of creditors, contributories and all concerned and/or public interest.”
The very argument that has been advanced by Mr. Sen in opposing the prayer of the applicants was made in the case of Lica (1) and the apex court at page 90 of the judgment has quoted the said argument which was made before the Division Bench of this court. It appears that the apex court rejected the said argument by relying upon Clause 11 of the terms and conditions therein which is same as condition No. 11 as quoted above.
14. As mentioned above admittedly the sale being subject to condition No. 11, which gives power to the court to set aside the same even after confirmation, in our opinion, we are left with no other alternative but to reject the submission of Mr. Sen. The decision of Arjun Singh (supra) cited by Mr. Sen, in our opinion, does not apply to a case of this nature where even after confirmation of sale the court is vested with authority to set aside the same for the benefit of the creditors, contributories and all concerned and/or public interests implying that there is no finality on the mere fall of hammer.
15. In this case we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that initially the property was proposed to be sold at the price of Rs. 37 lakhs. By the order impugned in the instant appeal sale was confirmed at Rs. 85 lakhs and at our instance it was enhanced to Rs. 1.3 crore. In view of the fact that the two applicants have come forward with a proposal to purchase the self-same
property on the same conditions at the price of Rs. 2 crorcs, in our opinion, the principles laid down in the cases of Lica (1) and Lica (2) apply squarely to the facts of the present case. Mr. Sen further contends that this is not a case where the sale is yet to be confirmed and as such the said principle should not be made applicable. We are afraid, we cannot accept such contention in view of the fact that in the case of Lica (2) even sale deed was executed and notwithstanding such fact the apex court set aside the order confirming Sale.
16. We are quite conscious of the fact that there should be a finality even in a company sale. Therefore, in our opinion, so long as possession is not handed over to the purchaser, pursuant to the execution of sale deed, the court by virtue of Clause 11 of the terms and conditions and by applying the principles laid down in the cases of Lica (supra) is authorised to re-open any order confirming sale notwithstanding the fact that deed is executed. It goes without saying that in the instant case although Divya, during the pendency of these two applications, has deposited the balance consideration money, no sale deed has yet been executed.
17. We are also quite conscious that in this case pursuant to our order dated July 2, 1998 Divya got prepared a Bank draft of the balance amount of Rs. 90,000 on July 7. 1998 and has deposited the entire amount of Rs. 1.3 crore with the Official Liquidator. We are however not prepared to accept the contention of Mr. Sen that the decisions given in the aforesaid cases of Lica are no authority for the proposition that a court dealing with a sale in a company liquidation matter cannot re-open a confirmed sale on the ground that a person has approached the court with a higher bid. The decisions of Navalkha and Sons (supra) , in our opinion, in no way conflict with the decisions of the apex court in Lica (supra).
18. We must not lose sight of the fact that the sale of assets and properties of a company in liquidation stands on a different footing from that under Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In case of liquidation of the company, the Official Liquidator has the custody of the assets and properties of it as a representative of court and accordingly the degree of responsibility of court, in case of such a sale, is very high, so much so, that it becomes court’s responsibility to see that not only the basic formalities are complied with but also satisfaction of court’s conscience to the fullest extent precedes the confirmation of such sale. The fact of shareholders and creditors lies in the hands of court and lack of alertness on the part of the court, however small apparently it may be, may result in disastrous consequences.
19. Thus, keeping in view the principles laid down by the apex court and in view on the entire facts and circumstances of the case we have no hesitation in conclude that Rs. 1.3 crore is not adequate price of the assets proposed to be sold and we think it proper to recall our order dated July 2, 1998 and to direct the Official Liquidator to advertise for a fresh sale on the same terms and conditions as was done as per our earlier order dated May 6, 1998 with only this variation that no purchaser should make any offer for price below Rs. 2 crores. Since the applicants have already deposited Rs. 40 lakhs each being 20% of the reserved price the Official Liquidator will retain the amount and they will be entitled to participate in the fresh auction subject to their undertaking given to this court on July 23. 1998. The Official Liquidator is directed to refund Rs. 1.30 crore deposited by Divya by tomorrow.
V.K. Gupta, J.
20. I have had the privilege of reading very well-reasoned and elaborate judgment of my learned Brother B. Bhattacharya, J. I agree with the judgment in its entirety, but since the point raised appears to be of some importance and significance, I wish to add a few words of my own.
21. Indeed in a situation like the “one with which we are confronted in the present appeal, a very delicate balance has to be struck by the court, with the sole purpose and objective of arriving at a harmonious conclusion, logical, fairly and objectively so as to ensure that ultimately justice prevails and the parties and their interests do not suffer, merely because in a peculiar situation, compounded by some more peculiar facts, the court may have to re-open an issue already decided by it in apparent culmination of legal proceedings.
22. Mr. P.C. Sen, the learned senior advocate very vehemently argued that if the sale finally confirmed by the court is re-opened, time and again after each such confirmation, on one pretext or ground or the other, properly founded or not, the faith of the purchaser in the confirmed sale in so far as the court is concerned is likely to be shaken. Mr. Sen has relied upon the following observations made in para-6 of the judgment in the case of Naualkha & Sons v. Ramanya Das and Ors. . These observations of their Lordships may be re-produced:
“….. It is well to bear in mind the other principle which is equally well
settled namely that once the court comes to the conclusion that the price offered is adequate, no subsequent higher offer can constitute a valid ground for refusing confirmation of the sale or offer already received. (See the decision of the Madras High Court in Roshan and Co.’s case .”
23. Mr. Sen also argued that in the two judgments of Lica (1) and Ltca (2) (supra), the aforesaid observations of the apex court were not noticed by their Lordships and we should therefore not rely upon the ratio in the two Lica cases and instead follow the aforesaid observations in Navaikha (supra).
24. In Navaikha their Lordships actually made these observations with reference to the peculiar facts of that case in which the concern was more with the highest price to be fetched up for concluding a sale by the court. The observations even in Navaikha go to show that it is the duty of the court to satisfy itself that having regard to the market value of the property the price offered is reasonable and unless the court is satisfied about the adequacy of the price, the act of confirmation of the sale would not be a proper exercise of judicial discretion. The following observations in Para-6 are relevant in support of this well-established principle:
“….In every case it is the duty of the court to satisfy itself that having regard to the market value of the property the price offered is reasonable. Unless the court is satisfied about the adequacy of the price the act of confirmation of the sale would not a proper exercise of judicial discretion. In Gordhon Das Chanilal v. Kanthimathinatha Pillai AIR 1921 Mad 286, it was observed that where the property is authorised to be sold by private contract or otherwise it is the duty of the court to satisfy itself that the price is the best that could be expected to be offered. That is because the court is the custodian of the interests of the Company and its-creditors and the sanction of the court required under the Companies Act has to
be exercised with judicial discretion regarding being had to the interests of the Company and its creditors as well.”
25. It is therefore basically a question of exercise of judicial discretion by the court, the sole objective being to ensure that the price being offered, having due regard to the market value of the property, is not only reasonable but the highest that the property can possibly fetch. In Navalkha the court had no occasion to consider the applicability and relevance of a condition in the Sale notice like clause 11 in our case. Their Lordship did not have any occasion therefore to interpret the applicability parameters of such a condition. In my respectful opinion, the observations at the end of para-6 (supra), therefore were of general nature and, keeping in view the ratio in Lica (1) and Lica (2) having a direct bearing on the question arising for consideration in our case, cannot be ignored or overlooked at all.
26. The observations in Navalkha did not lake into account the peculiarities of the situation also nor could these observations comprehend the dilemma of the court faced with a stark reality that the earlier sale confirmed was based on a grossly inadequate sale price. The following observations in Lica (1) (supra) are apposite which I quote with advantage:
‘The purpose of an open auction is to get the most remunerative price and it is the duty of the court to keep openness of the auction so that the intending bidders would be free to participate and offer higher value. If that patch is cut down or closed the possibility of fraud or to secure inadequate price or underbidding would loom large. The court would, therefore, have to exercise its discretion wisely and with circums and keeping in view the facts and circumstances of each case. One of the terms of the offer in this case is that even confirmation of the sale is liable to be set aside by the High Court as per clause 11 of the conditions of offer. The sale conducted was subject to confirmation. Therefore, mere acceptance of the offer of Mr. Shantilal Malik does not constitute any finality of the auction nor would it be automatically confirmed. The appellant offered a higher price even now at Rs. 45,00,000. Keeping in view the interest of the company and the creditors and the workmen to whom the sale proceeds would be applied, the learned company judge was right in exercising her discretion to reopen the auction and directing Mr. Shantilal Malik as well to make a higher offer than what was offered by the appellant. In every case it is not necessary that there should be fraud in conducting the sale, though on its proof the sale gets vitiated and it is one of the grounds to set aside the auction sale. Therefore, the discretion exercised by the learned single judge cannot be said to be unwarranted. Under the circumstances, we are satisfied that the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court committed manifest illegality in interfering with the order of the learned single judge. The appeal is allowed.”
27. Getting most remunerative price is the duty of the court, appears to be the basic ratio of the observations in Lica (1). Fraud or no fraud, the court cannot shirk its responsibilities once, even after a sale is confirmed it finds that the earlier price was grossly inadequate. The discretion of course has to be exercised wisely and with circumspection and after properly understanding and appreciating the facts and circumstances of each case. Undoubtedly the exercise of such a discretion at times may result in undue hardship to a person who had clinched the sale in his favour in the earlier proceedings
held by the court but then. Clause 11 of the terms and conditions of sale would always be an overriding factor as long as the successful bidder, having clinched the sale in his favour, ultimately does not actually come to occupy and hold the property physically. At times even the execution of the deed of Conveyance, which admitted was not done in our case, also may not be a factor tilting in favour of the earlier purchaser. However, the situation may be different in a case where the earlier successful purchaser has not only got the Conveyance deed executed in his favour, but has also entered upon the property, taking full control and possession thereof and has started operating it as its true and absolute owner. In a situation like that however, the court may find itself helpless in exercising the discretion, even if the court is convinced that the deal earlier clinched was very grossly inadequately priced and that the new intending purchasers arc offering a higher price. In such a situation perhaps a right can be considered to be vested in the earlier purchaser which cannot be taken away, even by act of the court. In a case however where neither the deed of Conveyance has been executed nor has the earlier successful purchaser in any manner taken control or possession of the property, clause 11 would always operate as an overriding condition of sale. As is well known and as well established, each case would depend upon its own facts and each fact situation is required to be dealt with on its own merits. What would the court do in a given fact situation, upon due application of legal principles may be different from what the court may do in another fact situation upon application of same principles of law. It cannot, therefore, be said that re-opening of a confirmed sale may be an un-ending process, time and again and that each re-opening may undo the previously concluded sale. This cannot be termed as a bland statement of law, nor a sweeping factual reality because, as observed earlier, each attempt by the court to undo the previously confirmed sale has to be based on absolutely compelling circumstances, with due caution and circumspection kept in mind and with the sole consideration that the price at which the earlier sale was confirmed was indeed grossly in adequate, so inadequate that perhaps it may even be called un conscionable and in equitable.
28. If we go into the chain of events starling from the earlier price being offered at Rs. 37 lacs, the sale being confirmed by the learned Single Judge at Rs.85 lacs and then because of our efforts, the price being enhanced to Rs. 1.30 crores. offer of the minimum bid now at Rs. 2.00 crores is mind-boggling and opens for our vision an opportunity which we could not have imagined at the stage of first link of this long chain of over-pricing, step by step. How can we shut our eyes to a possible reality where the sale may now be clinched at almost double the earlier price? Does it not mean that the confirmation at Rs. 1.30 crotes was indeed at a grossly inadequate price? Once therefore we find that out, can we remain mute spectators to an emerging situation where we have a fine opportunity of correcting the earlier gross Inadequacy to a fairly reasonable and marketable price. I am of the opinion that in every such situation it is the duly of the court to seize upon such an opportunity and ensure that the grossly inadequate lower price earlier offered Is substituted by the reasonably higher price now being offered.
29. I am therefore also of the opinion that we should recall our earlier order dated 2nd July, 1998.
30. At the same time however, we cannot remain oblivious of one fact that Divya has suffered hardship, firstly at the stage when the order of the
learned Single Judge concluding sale at Rs. 85 lacs was set aside by us in appeal and secondly now when we are recalling our order dated 2nd July. 1998 despite confirmation of sale by us in favour of Divya. On all such occasions Divya had deposited huge amounts with the Official Liquidator. Even presently, as observed earlier, Divya has already deposited the sale price in full which has not served any useful purpose as far as Divya’s interests too. Divya indeed has suffered monetary loss on that account and we are of the opinion that the two applicants namely. Jaya and Sharma should make good this loss to Divya at least tokenly by way of small compensation. We are saying so, also because the facts would indicate that these two applicants by their acts of omission and commission can be said to have created a situation originally and initially whereby we had to pass order on 2nd July, 1998. We are therefore of the opinion that both these applicants, namely, Jaya and Sharma should be required to compensate Divya by paying Rs. 70,000 each for the loss suffered by Divya.
ORDER OF THE COURT
We accordingly while disposing of the two applications and recalling our earlier Order dated 2 July, 1998 Order and direct as under :
1. The applications filed by Jaya and Sharma are allowed and our Order dated 2nd duly, 1998 confirming sate in favour of Divya is recalled, subject to Jaya and Sharma paying Rs. 70,000 each to Divya within one week from today. Such payment shall be a condition precedent for recalling our Order dated 2nd July, 1998.
2. The amount of Rupees forty lacs each deposited by Jaya and Sharma shall immediately be invested by the Official Liquidator in short-term Fixed deposits, automatically renewable until further Orders from us.
3. The entire amount of Rs. 1.30 crores, or whatever sum deposited by Divya. shall be refunded to it within 24 hours along with interest, if any accrued thereupon.
4. The appellant Union Bank of India shall deposit with the Official Liquidator latest by 18th August, 1998 an amount of Rs. 2.00 lacs as tentative expense provisionally for effecting the publication of advertisements in the newspapers which we propose to indicate herein below. The Official Liquidator shall maintain a true account of expenditure incurred and refund the excess amount if any. after the completion of proceedings.
5. The Official Liquidator shall issue advertisements in those newspapers as mentioned in our Order dated 6th May, 1998 in the manner as indicated therein latest by 28th August. 1998. All other stipulations, provisions, prescriptions and terms contained in clauses 2,3.4 & 5 in our Order dated 6th May. 1998 shall be squarely applicable in effecting the advertisements, carrying out inspection, receipt of bids, fixing terms & conditions etc. etc. with such modifications of date or month as would now be applicable, except with regard to the upset price would we now fix at Rs. 2,00 crores instead of Rs. 85.00 lacs. as earlier fixed in our Order dated 6th May, 1998 and that the Official Liquidator shall also have the liberty to receive the bids at Calcutta, if offered by an intending purchaser, in addition to the bids which might be received by his representative at Sonepat.
Jaya. Sharma and Divya shall also be at absolute liberty to submit their bids in accordance with the advertisements to be published.
6. In the advertisements it shall be clearly mentioned that the Factory
shall be sold as a growing concern.
Later :
31. After this judgment was pronounced, the learned advocate for Divya Mr. Choudhury made an oral prayer for staying of the operation of the judgment. Upon consideration the prayer is rejected.
32. It was then suggested by Mr. Banerjee, the learned advocate appearing for Union Bank of India that we should fix a date in the court for conduct of the sale in the open court. On consideration, we direct that the matter shall appear in the court on 11th September, 1998 at 2.00 p.m. for conduct of the sale and for confirmation we direct that this fact shall be also incorporated in the advertisements to be published by the Official Liquidator.
33. Let a xerox copy of this judgment duly countersigned by the Assistant Registrar of this court be delivered to the parties upon their undertaking to apply for and obtain certified copy of the same on the usual undertaking.
34. Applications disposed of