JUDGMENT
Devinder Gupta, C.J.
1. Appellant-Society has challenged the order passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing its Writ Petition (W.P. No. 24958 of 2002) by which the society had sought declaration that the order passed on 11.12.2002 by the second respondent, (Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise, Andhra Pradesh) is illegal, arbitrary and violative of the excise policy of the Government for the year 2002-2003 and is against the principles of natural justice.
2. Parties are being referred to as they were arrayed in the Writ Petition. Three grounds were urged by learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of his submission to have the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge and the order impugned in the writ petition set aside.
3. Firstly, it was urged that as per the Bye-laws of the petitioner-society, it’s area of operation extends to the entire Sadasivapet Municipality and, therefore, respondent No. 2 could not have exercised jurisdiction under the A.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1964 (for short “the Societies Act”) in issuing the order impugned in the writ petition permitting another society to be formed within the same area which was within the area of operation of the petitioner’s society. Such an order would amount to bifurcating the society. Without following the procedure laid down in Section 15-A of the Societies Act, such an order could not have been passed and the order passed by Respondent No. 2 is not within his competence since the Excise Superintendent, Medak District alone had authority and jurisdiction to pass such an order.
4. Secondly, it was urged that as per the excise policy announced for the year 2002-2003, creation of new Toddy Tappers Co-operative Society could have been done not later than 31st May, 2002, therefore, the order in the writ petition is in violation of the excise policy announced for the year 2002-2003.
5. Thirdly, it was urged that even assuming that the Supreme Court on 6.9.2001 had directed the second respondent to take a decision in the matter, even such an order would not clothe the respondent No. 2 with jurisdiction to pass an order of bifurcation since the delegated powers under Section 3 of the Societies Act, vests only with the 3rd respondent who alone has authority and jurisdiction to pass such an order of bifurcation of the society.
6. Before we consider the points urged, it is necessary for us to briefly refer to certain facts that are apparent on record:
7. An application was submitted by the 4th respondent and others on 28.9.1998 and on 15.7.1999 to the 3rd respondent seeking membership of the petitioner-society. The Sub-Divisional Prohibition and Excise Officer, Sangareddy had recommended their names for admission as members of petitioner-society observing that the applicants were qualified. On 3.2.2000 the 3rd respondent issued directions to the petitioner-society to enroll them as members under the provisions of the Societies Act. President of the petitioner-society declined to admit them. As no action was taken by the petitioner-society on the directions of the 3rd respondent, the 4th respondent and others made separate representations to the petitioner-society on 20.5.2005 to admit them as members of the society, but the same was also not considered. Feeling aggrieved, respondent No. 4 and others submitted representation to the Government for establishment of a new Toddy Cooperative Society at Sadasivpet. It was forwarded by the Government to the 2nd respondent.
8. 4th respondent in the meanwhile approached this Court by way of W.P. No. 17039 of 2000 in which interim direction was issued to the 2nd respondent to consider and dispose of the representation made by the 4th respondent and others within one week. The 2nd respondent considered the representation of Respondent No. 4 and others and directed the 3rd respondent on 21.3.2001 to form a new Toddy Cooperative Society for them and to take necessary action for allotment of ration, fixation of rental and grant of licence. Feeling aggrieved by the directions of the 2nd respondent, petitioner-society filed writ petition (W.P.No. 5684 of 2001). While the said writ petition was pending, the petitioner filed revision before the Government. By order-dated 17.4.2001, Government stayed the proceedings of the Commissioner. Aggrieved by the said order of the Government, respondent No. 4 and others approached this Court by way of W.P.No. 10486 of 2001. Both writ petitions were dismissed on 5.7.2001. W.P.No. 10486 of 2001 was dismissed on the ground that 4th respondent has no locus standi to seek any direction against the order passed on the revision filed by the President of the petitioner-society before the State Government.
9. While the matter stood at that, the District Collector, Medak submitted proposals on 23.7.2001 for fixation of ration and rental of TCS Sadashivpet for the next excise year. In the meanwhile, two appeals were filed against the orders passed by this Court in W.P. No. 5684 of 2001 and W.P.No. 10486 of 2001 being W.A.No. 1116 of 2001 and W.A. No. 7771 of 2001 respectively. Both the appeals were disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court on 1.7.2002. While disposing of appeals, it was observed that it was not permissible for the petitioner-society to lay a claim that its area of its operation extend beyond Ward Nos. 1, 5, 6, 10, 12 and 15 of Sadashivpet Municipality for which alone licence had been issued to the society as per excise policy for the year 1996-97 and thereafter it was open to the 3rd respondent to consider the application of the 4th respondent and others to form a society and that the registration of the society and grant of licence to it shall be strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Societies Act and A.P. Excise Act, 1968 (for short “the Excise Act”). On the basis of the proposals of the 3rd respondent, the 2nd respondent passed an order dated 26.7,2002 according permission to the 3rd respondent to form a new Toddy Tappers Co-operative Society to be run by the name TCS Sadasivpet-II. The 4th respondent made a representation to the 2nd respondent seeking clarification in the order-dated 26.7.2002 to mention about the number of shops the society can open. In the report of the Collector dated 23.7.2001 it was proposed to grant licence for four shops. On the said representation, the Deputy Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise, Nizamabad by proceedings dated 28.8.2002 forwarded, the report and proposals of the Collector, Medak for sanction of three toddy shops in favour of the new society to be formed.
10. At that stage, the petitioner-society feeling aggrieved by the order passed by Division Bench of this Court in the W.A. Nos. 1116 and 1117 of 2001, filed Special Leave Petitions (SLP(Civil).Nos. 14420-21 of 2002) before the Supreme Court which were disposed of by the Supreme Court on 6.9.2002 directing the 2nd respondent to deal with the grievance of the 4th respondent and others after affording an opportunity of hearing to them as also the petitioner-society.
11. Pursuant to the directions of the Supreme Court, the entire matter was examined by the 2nd respondent, who on 11.12.2002 passed the order impugned in the writ petition allowing the representation of the 4th respondent and others for formation of a new TCS society viz., Sadashivpet-II and sanctioning three shops for allotment to the said society with allotment of trees, annual rental, monthly rental and rental for each tree as mentioned in the said order. Respondent No. 2 in his order observed that when new excise policy was introduced in 1996-97 by reason of G.O. Ms. No. 802 dated 30.9.1996, the area of operation of the petitioner-society was specifically restricted to six wards only, namely, 1, 5, 6, 10, 12 and 15 and since the area of operation of the petitioner- society stood restricted which order was not challenged by the petitioner-society, therefore, there was no justification in the objection raised by the petitioner against the formation of new society by respondent No. 4 and others as the area of operation of the new society was different from the area of operation of the petitioner-society. Learned single Judge by the impugned order dismissed the writ petition filed by the petitioner. Appeal is against the said order.
12. Learned Single Judge turned down the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner and holding that as the Supreme Court in the SLPS filed by the petitioner directed the 2nd respondent to take a decision in the matter, therefore, it was not permissible for the petitioner to have questioned the jurisdiction of the 2nd respondent in taking a decision in the matter irrespective of the fact that under law it was respondent No. 3 alone who could have passed the said order. Learned Single Judge also held that there was no violation of the excise policy.
13. Admittedly, the petitioner-society was formed on 24.10.1972. Its area of operation as mentioned in the bye-laws was the municipal area of Sadashivpet and surrounding villages of Siddapuram and Ishratabad. Part of the said and subsequently stood excluded when it was included in another Municipal area. Lastly on new excise policy for the year 1996-97 being announced in 1996 the area of operation of the petitioner-society stood restricted only to six wards since licences were issued to the petitioner-society only for the six wards. As per the excise policy 1996-97 ward numbers were required to be mentioned in the licences.
14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner made reference to the provisions of Section 15 of the Societies Act as also the procedure laid down in Section 15-A of the said Act. Section 15 dealt with the. power of the Government to direct division or amalgamation of the societies, which stood omitted by Act No. 22 of 2001. Section 15-A was added by A.P. Act 19 of 1976 and was substituted by A.P. Act No. 6 of 1977 and again by Act 1 of 1987, which empowers the Registrar of Societies to amalgamate or merge any society with any other such society or to divide and restrict or transfer the area of operation of a society. Further as per G.O. Ms. No. 234, F&A dated 3.10.1979, in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 3 of the said Act, the Excise Superintendent has been delegated with the authority to exercise the powers of Registrar of the Societies under the Societies Act with respect to division or amalgamation of Toddy Cooperative Societies. It was contended that since the formation of the new society within the same Municipal area would amount to bifurcation of the petitioner’s society, therefore, such power could have been exercised by the 3rd respondent alone and not by the 2nd respondent. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in E.S.P. Rajaram v. Union of India, AIR 2001 SC 581, it was also contended that if the Supreme Court had directed Respondent No. 2 to take a decision in the matter, it would not confer jurisdiction on the 2nd respondent to take decision in the matter since he had none.
15. There is no manner of doubt that under Section 3 of the Societies Act, the powers of the Registrar have been delegated only to the Excise Superintendents and not to the Commissioner of Excise in respect to the matters as mentioned in the G.O. But the question that falls for consideration is, whether the direction issued by the 2nd respondent in the order impugned in the writ petition permitting formation of new society amounts to bifurcation of the petitioner-society. On the face of it, the direction issued by the 2nd respondent permitting 4th respondent and others to form into a new society to operate in the area, which is beyond the area of operation of the petitioner’s society, does not amount to bifurcation petitioner’s society. As noted earlier, Respondent No. 4 and others did approach the petitioner-society to admit them as members of the petitioner-society. Their request was turned down by the petitioner-society. On their representation, a proposal was mooted by the authorities for formation of a new society. Decision was ultimately taken permitting a new society to be formed within the same municipality but with restricted area of operation, which is beyond the area of operation of the society. There is no prohibition either under the Societies Act or under the Excise Act nor any provision was brought to our notice under which it is not permissible to form a new society within the same municipality but for different areas of operation. May be that at the time when petitioner’s society was formed, under its bye-laws its area of operation extended over the entire municipality, but under the excise policy issued as far back in 1996-97, the area of operation of the petitioner’s society stood restricted only to six wards. The remaining wards were not within the area of operation of the petitioner’s society. In the absence of any statutory prohibition no exception can be taken to any of the actions of he respondent No. 2 in having granted permission for formation of a new society or in ordering a new co-operative society to be constituted for Respondent No. 4 and others. By the impugned order, the operation of the petitioner’s society has not been restricted. It stood restricted in 1996 itself when the excise policy for the year 1996-97 was issued. Division Bench of this Court also in its order dated 1.7.2002 while dismissing the appeals had mentioned that the area of operation of the petitioner’s society stood restricted in 1996. That part of the order of this Court was not interfered with by the Supreme Court and more over no challenge was made by the petitioner’s society as regards the, reduction of its area of operation. Therefore, formation of new society does not amount to bifurcation as contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner-society.
16. The word “bifurcation” has not been defined either under the provisions of the Excise Act or the Societies Act, in common parlance, “bifurcation” would mean ‘division’. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 2001 Edition defines “bifurcation” to mean “the division of something into two branches or parts”. In other words, some thing is to be split into two or more parts. By the order impugned in the writ petition neither the petitioner-society has been bifurcated nor the formation of new society would amount to bifurcation. It would have amounted to bifurcation had there been distribution of the shops held by the petitioner-society or splitting up of it’s liabilities among the petitioner-society and the newly formed society or if there was any reduction in the area of its operation and making over those areas to the newly formed society. By the order impugned, the area of operation of the petitioner’s society was not divided. The area of operation of the petitioner society already stood reduced in 1996 by reason of the excise policy announced for the year 1996-97 itself. Even otherwise also, the bye-laws of the petitioner-society cannot restrict the executive power of the Government to take any policy decision in the matter for formation of new societies for such area for which there is no licence issued in favour of any society or to amalgamate or merge any existing society with another one. The newly formed society has an independent existence and it has not been carved out from the petitioner-society.
17. The next question for consideration is whether Respondent No. 2 could not have exercised jurisdiction in the matter since he was not a person delegated with the powers of the Registrar under Section 15-A of the Societies Act. Since the order passed by the 2nd respondent does not amount to bifurcation, there is no force in the submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that respondent No. 2 had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order.
18. Clause 22 of the Excise Policy issued for the year 2002-2003 provides for creation of new Toddy Tapper Co-operative Societies and states that it shall be done not later than 31.5.2002 and additional shops shall also be notified by the commissioner before 15.6.2002 and no changes shall be made thereafter. This question was examined by the 2nd respondent in detail in the order impugned in the writ petition observing that much prior to the excise policy coming into force proposals for formation of a new society was under consideration but the same could not be finalised due to interjection on behalf of the petitioner-society to ensure that new society is not allowed to be formed. There was already recommendation made by the authorities for formation of a new society prior to the cut off date and therefore the time limit prescribed in the exercise policy for 2002-2003 would not apply to the instant case. We do not find any fault in the action of the respondents in having permitted a new society to be formed and shops assigned to the society. The reason being that there was already recommendation made by the authorities for formation of a new society for Respondent No. 4 and others because of the circumstances explained above and that too for such wards over which the petitioner-society had no jurisdiction or licence. Shops were already notified for the four wards and it cannot be said that these are new places to be allotted and more over it being a procedural aspect meant for the guidance of the officers implementing the policy, the cut off date cannot be said to be mandatory. In the facts and circumstances of the present case where petitioner was opposing the very formation of society for considerable time though there were recommendations made by the authorities, it is not open for the petitioner-society to urge that since the society has been permitted to be formed after 31.5.2002, the order is bad in law. Needless to add that new society has already been formed and is carrying on its business. The said society is also not a party to the writ petition or this appeal. The order of the learned Single Judge, therefore, in our considered view, does not call for any interference.
19. For the reasons aforesaid, we find no merit in the appeal and it is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.