ORDER
R.G. Deshpande, J.
1. Rule, returnable forthwith. With the consent of the parties, the matter is taken up for final hearing.
2. Heard Shri A.M. Kasliwal, the learned Counsel for the petitioner and Shri S.V. Gangapurwala, learned Counsel for respondent Nos. 1(i) to 1(v).
3. By order dated 10-1-1995 passed by this Court, it appears that since no steps are taken by the petitioner to serve the respondent No. 2, the matter appears to have stood dismissed for want of prosecution, as against him.
4. One Syed Tameezuddin filed Case No. 89/ARC/26 before the Rent Controller, Aurangabad for eviction of the defendant – Talukchand Kasturchand Pande, under section 15(3)(a)(iv) of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction & Lease) Control Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act” for the purposes of brevity). The property from which the eviction was sought, is shown as Shop No. 2 and 3 of Municipal House No. 4.6.77 situated at New Mondha, Aurangabad. It appears that the suit summons of the above-said proceeding was served on 1-5-1989 on the defendant and the defendant did appear before the Court on 9-6-1989 as is clear from the judgment of the Rent Controller, Aurangabad. The matter appear to have been dealt with by the learned Rent Controller in accordance with the provisions prescribed and the learned Rent Controller, Aurangabad by his judgment and order dated 5-4-1991 allowed the application of the plaintiff and, Talukchand Kasturchand Pande, the original defendant is ordered to be evicted from the suit premises and it is further directed to hand over the vacant possession in peaceful manner to the plaintiff within thirty days from the date of that order.
5. Rent Appeal No. 44/91 challenging the above-said judgment and order was filed before the learned District Judge, Aurangabad. This appeal is filed by one Trilokchand Bansilal Pande. This appellant Trilokchand was not a party to the suit before the Rent Controller. However apprehending eviction in pursuance of the judgment and order passed as against Talukchand Kasturchand Pande, this Trilokchand Bansilal Pande initiated the appeal proceedings, challenging the judgment and order on various grounds. The matter was heard by the learned District Judge, Aurangabad and the learned Judge by his judgment and order dated 20th June 1992 dismissed the appeal on the ground that the appeal at the instance of the appellant-Trilokchand Bansilal Pande was not maintainable. The reason given by the learned Judge of the Appellate Court is that since it is the case of the appellant himself that he is not known and identified as talukchand Kasturchand Pande and the appeal at the instance of Trilokchand cannot be said to be maintainable as he has no locus standi, though he has approached the Court under the apprehension that he was likely to be evicted in pursuance of that decree. The learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court has observed that there could be any other remedy open to the present appellant Trilokchand but not the remedy of an appeal. It is this judgment and order which is under challenge in the present Revision Application.
6. Shri A.M. Kasliwal, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, vehemently urged that the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court was wrong in dismissing the appeal solely on the ground that he had no locus standi to file the appeal. According to Shri Kasliwal, since he was the person who was likely to be affected by the said judgment and order of the Court below, he had every right to file an appeal. I am afraid that this argument of Shri Kasliwal can be accepted blindly. The fact remains on the record and as is admitted that the present appellant is not Talukchand. It is also on the record that the judgment and order passed by the Rent Controller is against Talukchand and not against Trilokchand Bansilal Pande; if at all there was possibility of his being evicted under the judgment no doubt, in view of this Court the learned Judge of the Appellate Court was justified in observing that there could be other remedy open for the present revisionist, but definitely not the appeal which he had filed. Shri Kasliwal, contended that since he is the person affected, he has every right to file appeal though he was not a party and, in support of his contention Shri Kasliwal, relied upon the decision reported in the matter of D. Pullayya v. Nagabhushanam, a Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, reported in A.I.R. 1962 A.P. 140. The ratio of the decision is that if a person who is not a party to the proceeding and who is likely to be affected by the decision in the proceeding, can file an application under Order 1, Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code for the leave to appeal and, in ordinary course, such leave should be granted. It is also pertinent to observe that if the decision rendered in the proceeding would adversely affect and would be of a binding nature to the said person who was not a party, then, in such a case, leave can be granted and appeal can be said to be maintainable at the instance of that party. In short, we have to see as to whether could this judgment and order of the Rent Controller, be said to be binding on the present revisionist, particularly when neither he was a party respondent before the Rent Controller nor the judgment and order in any manner is binding upon him. The said judgment and order is, no doubt, binding only on Talukchand Kasturchand Pande.
7. Shri Kasliwal, brought to my notice the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar, . In this matter, the question was as to whether the Bar Council of Maharashtra was entitled to file the appeal, particularly when the Bar Council of Maharashtra though was a party before the Appellate Authority, i.e. the Bar Council of India, did not appear before that authority and having found the decision of the Appellate Authority against the Bar Council, the Bar Council preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court of India. The matter related to suspension of one Bar Council member of the State of Maharashtra. In this case, it is held by the Apex Court that the appeal at the instance of the Bar Council of Maharashtra was maintainable. I do not think that this matter is of any help to Shri Kasliwal, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, in support of his contention in the present matter. One thing to be noted is that it was the Bar Council of Maharashtra as also of Bar Council of India who were concerned with the protection of the purity and dignity of the profession and was also concerned with entertaining the complaint as against the advocate members and particularly when it is a disciplinary authority in such matter, the appeal at the instance of the Bar Council of Maharashtra was definitely held to be maintainable. However the facts of the present case in hand, are absolutely different and, therefore, the learned Judges of the courts below could not be said to be wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable.
8. Shri Kasliwal, also brought to my notice another decision of the High Court of Bombay in the matter of Fakirchand v. Charity Commissioner and others, reported in A.I.R. 1957 Bom. 304. In this case, a person who had filed an application in the suit for intervention and whose intervention came to be rejected, filed an appeal and wherein the appeal was entertained at the instance of that person. It is clear that an appeal at the instance of the intervenor claiming to be a person interested in the suit property and appointed as a trustee under the Scheme was not a party to the litigation and, therefore, if such a person is aggrieved by any such decision, no doubt at his instance, appeal could be said to be maintainable because he happened to be a person directly concerned and affected by any decision in that litigation. According to me, this decision also is of no help to Shri Kasliwal.
9. Shri Kasliwal, then, brought to my notice another decision of the Bombay High Court in the matter of (Smt. Anita M. Harretto v. Abdul Wahid Sanaullahy, . Shri Kasliwal relied on this judgment to show that it was incumbent on the learned Judge of the lower Court to frame proper issues in accordance with the provisions of Order 41, Rule 31 as according to Shri Kasliwal, the statement of points for determination gathering all important questions must be framed. Shri Kasliwal submits that the judgment deserves to be declared against the provisions of law and liable to be set aside. It appears that Shri Kasliwal failed to notice from the judgment in para 4 of the learned District Judge that it is specifically observed that the first question that arose before him was about the maintainability of the appeal. After having come to this specific conclusion, the learned Judge, then, proceeded to decide on that first point only and since the learned Judge on that very first point held against the appellant, there was no necessity for the learned Judge to have framed an additional issue, which could have been a futile task. I do not find that the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court, thus, committed any mistake or error in law in not framing additional points to be decided in the appeal at that stage itself. This cannot be said to be any jurisdictional error on the part of the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court nor could it be said that the learned Judge has committed any error in exercising properly the jurisdiction vested in him.
10. After having gone through the judgment of the learned District Judge, Auranga-bad, I find that the learned Judge was perfectly right in reaching to the conclusion that the appeal at the instance of the present petitioner was not maintainable as he had no focus standi. The petitioner may exhaust some other remedy open to save his possession if at all he is likely to be evicted in pursuance of the judgment and order of the Court below.
11. I find that there is no substance in the present Revision. The Revision application stands rejected. Rule discharged.
12. Revision application dismissed.