JUDGMENT
1. U. P. State Roadways Transport Corporation by this appeal has assailed the order of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as M. A. C. T), inter alia, on the grounds that the claim petition did not disclose any cause of action. Neither there are any averments nor description of negligence on the part of the driver of the vehicle. In the absence of any particulars of negligence and the cause of action having been pleaded, the petition ought to have been dismissed. That there were glaring contradictions in the statement of the witnesses examined on he half of the claimants. In the absence of consistency their testimony ought to have been rejected. Moreover, the witnesses adduced by the claimants were not cited as witnesses by the police in the criminal case. Hence, no reliance should have been placed on their testimony. No award could have been given on equity or on sympathy.
2. In order to appreciate the objections raised the facts in brief are that the deceased Avinash Kumar was running a business of selling artware. On 18th October 1978 at about 8.30 P.M. when he was going on his scooter, a bus (UPB-6446) belonging to U. P. State Roadways Corporation and driven by respondent No. 2 hit his scooter from behind. As a result of this accident he fell down and died at the spot. His wife was sitting on the pillion seat of the scooter at the time of accident On account of the loss of life of her husband she filed a claim for Rs. 5,00,000/-(Rupees Five lakhs only) as compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act (in short the Act). Monthly income of the deceased as given in the petition was Rs. 6,000/- per month. He was 35 years old at the time of death.
3. The Tribunal after considering the evidence, awarded a sum of Rs. 45,000/- in favour of the claim ant vide Award dated 30th September, 1982.
4. At the outset it must be mentioned that petition was filed on 12th April 1979. The original file was lost. The original claim petition, hence is not on the record. This fact finds mention in the order passed by this Court in C. M. (M) No. 196/ 80 decided on 10th November, 1981. Justice S. B. Wad while disposing of that petition tiled by the claimant Smt. Shanti devi observed that :–
“It is a sad commentary on the noble profession.
But a more grave problem to the administrative of justice, is a complaint regarding the general working of the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal. The complaints regarding unsatisfactory working are now publicly voiced. It is high time that this Court take a serious note of it and directs the administration to take effective steps to set the things right. The litigants appearing before these Tribunals are unfortunate victims of road accidents or are their relations, if they arc subjected to hardships by the Insurance companies. Advocate, the administrative staff in the Tribunal and the Tribunals close their eyes to the frustration generated in these victims the very purpose of the establishment of Accident Tribunals would he defeated.”
“I had called tor the file of this case from the Tribunal. But it was reported by the Tribunal that the file was not traceable. I therefore, adjourned the matter and directed the Tribunal to investigate as to how the file was not traceable. On 14th October, 1981, the Tribunal sent a report in forming that in spite of the best efforts the file was not traceable. Explanation of Ahalmad was also sent along with the report. It is strange that the original file is not traceable in the tribunal so far. However, luckily the certified copies of the orders passed by the Court are already filed in this Court A copy of the application made by the petitioner under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicle Act is also available on the file of this Court.”
5. These observations made on, l()th November. 19S1 show that the original file containing original petition filed by the claimant way back in April. 1979 was not available. Petitioner filed a copy of the petition afresh before the Tribunal on 30th November. 1981. Fact remains that in the copy of the petition tiled before this Court in para 23 it has been mentioned that details were given in Annexure-1. The said Annexure contained all other information that was necessary and helpful in thc disposal of the case. Unfortunately neither that Anncxurc-1 is available on the record nor the original petition.
6. So far us the objection regarding nondisclosure of cause of action, I find no merits in the same. Para X of the petition is reproduced as under :–
“8. Place date and time of accident
: 8.30 p.m. on 18-10-1978 at Laxmi Nagar bus
stand New Delhi through rashness of UPB-6446. owned by respondent No. 1 and driven by respondent No. 2”
7. Reading of this para shows that due to rashness of the driver who was driving the bus this accident was caused. The Tribunal, to my mind, rightly interpreted that the words “rashness of the driver” meant rash driving by the driver i.e. respondent No. 2 that the accident was caused. This information sufficiently put the appellant and the driver to notice that the accident was caused by the rash driving of the driver of the bus. It was not necessary to use the word negligence. In fact in reply to para 8, the applicant heroin in his written statement took the plea that driver was not negligent for causing the accident. This clearly shows that the appellant understood the case of the claimant. Appellant understood that claimant was alleging that due to rash and negligent driving of the bus by the driver the accident was caused thereby killing Avinash Kumar. It is only after understanding the allegation of rash and negligent driving which caused accident that the appellant and driver look the plea of a dog coming in front of the motor cycle causing accident or slipping of the motor cycle thereby causing death of the motor cyclist. Para 8 of the written statement reads as under :–
“8. That each and every fact alleged in para No. 8 of the petition is incorrect and is denied.
It is wrong that the death of Shri Avinash Kumar occurred through rashness of vehicle owned by respondent No. I and driven by respondent No. 2 as is stated in this para. In fact on 18-10-1978 the Pus No. UPB 6446 of respondent No. I driven by respondent No. 2 was going from Delhi to Bulandshahr and had reached near Lalit Park. Lakshmi Nagar. Delhi, at about 8 p.m. A motorcycle driven by the deceased was going in front and all of a sudden one dog came in front of the Motor Cycle. The Motor Cyclist tried to a void hitting the dog and in the process lost control of the motor cycle and fell down on the road. The said Motor Cyclist got injury while falling off the Motor Cycle on the road. The bus did not strike against the motor cycle but was stopped near me place of accident. The Motor Cyclist was taken to the Hospital and as learnt later on he died while going to the Hospital. The accident was not caused due to rashness or negligence of respondent No. 2.”
8. A reading of this reply of the written statement makes it clear that the appellant was not taken by surprise with regard to the allegation of negligence on the part of the driver which is the cause of action pleaded by the claimant. In me absence of there being any clement of surprise it cannot be said that the pleading lacked cause of action or that the evidence was beyond the pleadings. Once the parties understood each other’s case and thereafter led evidence it cannot be said that such an evidence could not be looked into. Witnesses of the claimant were cross-examined at length by the appellant. It, therefore, now does not lie in his mouth to say that evidence let by the claimant was beyond pleadings or that petition did not disclose any cause of action. Supreme Court in the case of Bhanwarlal v. Satyanarain , observed that it is the duty of the Court to consider applicability of the rules on averments made. Procedure is slave of substantive justice and not its master. The averments made in the petition have not be considered in its totality. If the pleadings arc understood by the parties then mere non-mentioning of a particular expression like “negligence” will not affect the maintainability of that petition nor the award passed by the Tribunal can be called bad in the eye of law. Court has to look to the substance and not to the form of pleadings. As already observed above, if a plea is not properly worded it would make no difference, if the substance is clear and the other side is not likely to be misled thereby. The whole object of the pleadings is to bring the parties to an issue and if a pleading fulfills this object no objection can be entertained merely on the ground that it is not expressed in particular term. Hence the reliance placed by Mr. Rajesh Goel, counsel for the appellant, on the decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in the Case of Roop Chand v. Dr. (Mrs.) V. N. Naik reported in 1991 (1) TAC 558 is of no help to him. There the Court was dealing with an evidence which was in the absence of any foundation in pleadings. But that is not the case in hand. In para 8 of the petition foundation had been laid by claimant when she asserted that due to rashness of the respondent/ driver, the accident was caused. This was properly understood by the appellant owner as well as by the driver of the bus, therefore, it cannot be said that oral evidence in this case was in the absence of any foundation and
pleading.
9. Similarly, reliance by Mr. Goel to the judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of M/s United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Lydia Prem Vardhan, 1995 (2) TAC 20 is also not applicable to the facts of this case. In that case the Insurance Company had not taken the plea of limited liability being Rs. 50,000/-. Hence on the basis of the evidence adduced before him the Tribunal awarded an amount of Rupees 2,50,000/- to the claimants. He held that the liability of the insurance company was for the entire amount of the compensation. It was in this background that the Court observed that in the absence of any specific plea of limited liability having been taken by the Insurance Company mere placing on record, the insurance policy, the liability cannot be made limited. That is not the facts in hand. Here rashness causing accident had been made the basis. Foundation, therefore, had been laid in thiscasc. Hence on that basis evidence was led which was as per the pleadings of the parties. Mr. Goel, there fore, cannot take advantage of the observations in the case of M/s. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra).
10. On the other hand observation of the Supreme Court in the case of N. K. V. Bros. (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal squarely apply to the facts of this case. The Apex Court observed that (Para 3) :–
“Accidents Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability, must be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. The Court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybres.”
11. In view of what has been observed by the Apex Court in the case of N. K. V. Bros. (P.) Ltd. (supra) there is no doubt left that the plea raised by the appellant that the petition did not disclose any cause of action is without substance. It was not necessary for the claimant to plead evidence in the petition. Suffice it was for an illiterate woman to convey to the respondents that it was due to their act that her husband met with an accident which killed him at the spot. Contention of Mr. Rajesh Goel counsel for the appellant that the manner of accident has not been disclosed docs not, to my
mind, made the petition incomplete, nor would lead to the conclusion that the cause of action had not been disclosed. On this account I find no merit in the appeal. As a matter of fact the evidence adduced by the parties appears to have been properly analysed by the Tribunal. The findings of the Tribunal are based on the oral as well as documentary evidence produced before him and the same can not be, interfered on technical grounds nor can be faulted with.
12. For the reasons stated above. I find no merit in the appeal. Dismissed.
13. Appeal dismissed.