JUDGMENT
Jawahar Lal Gupta, J.
1. The petitioner’s prayer for a reference to the Labour Court under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) having been declined vide order dated January 8, 1991, he has approached this Court through the present writ petition. A few facts may be noticed.
2. The petitioner avers that he was employed with Jai Bharat Auto Industries, respondent No. 3. His services were illegally terminated in March 1990. He consequently served a notice of demand dated Noverber 16, 1990, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure P-4. His prayer has been declined by the Joint Secretary to Government of Haryana, Labour Department vide order dated January 8, 1991 that “Government does not think your case fit to be referred to the Court for adjudication since the enquiry has revealed that you on your own have left the job on July 31, 1989.” Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner submitted a representation to the Government. Having failed to get any relief, he has approached this Court through the present writ petition. The order has been challenged as being violative of the provisions of the Act.
3. A written statement has been filed on behalf of respondent No. 3. It has inter alia averred that the petitioner had left the job on July 31, 1989 on his own. Consequently, he is dis-entitled to claim any relief. It has been further averred that the petitioner had worked with the respondent only for a period of two months and as he had left the job on his own, he is not entitled to any relief.
4. In order to controvert this position , the petitioner has placed on record an extract from the Register of Employees maintained by the respondent No. 3.This document has been produced along with Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 2401 of 1993 in which it has been averred that the petitioner had actually worked upto March 1990.
5. I have heard Mr. Anil Khetarpal, learned counsel for the petitioner. Mr. Rameshwar Malik has appeared on behalf of respondent No.3.
6. Section 10 of the Act inter alia provides that “where the appropriate Government is of the opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time, by order in writing, refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute, if it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule to a Labour Court for adjudication.” It is no doubt correct that the appropriate Government does not have to mechanically make a reference to the Labour Court. It has to form an opinion regarding the existence of an industrial dispute. It is also true that every frivolous claim which may be belated does not have to be referred to the Labour Court for adjudication. However it is equally clear that the primary function of the State Govt. is to form an opinion that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. It does not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute. It cannot investigate facts so as to arrive at a decision on the merits of the controversy.
7. In the present case, the Government appears to have adjudicated upon the dispute and come, to a conclusion that the workman had himself abandoned the job. This is not the function of the Government in exercise of its powers under Section 10. It clearly erred in doing so. Mr. Rameshwar Malik, learned counsel for respondent No. 3. submits that in view of the order dated November 13, 1990 passed by the authority under Minimum Wages Act, 1948, it is ap-parent that the petitioner had worked only for two months and that his claim for reference of the dispute is wholly untenable.
On the other hand, Mr. Anil Khetarpal, ; learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the document at Annexure P-8 which is an extract from the Register of Employees maintained by respondent No. 3. He submits that this document has been submitted by respondent No. 3 to the appropriate authority under the Employees State Insurance Act. He points out that in respect of the petitioner, the deductions had been made for all the months from June 1989 to March 1990. 8. Appreciation of evidence is not the function of the Writ Court at this stage of the proceedings. It is a matter for the appropriate authority to consider. So far as the present petition is concerned, it is sufficient to point out that the Government had entered upon adjudication of the dispute which was not its function. Accordingly, the impugned order cannot be sustained.
9. As a result, this writ petition is allowed. The impugned order viz. Annexure P-5 passed on January 8, 1991 is set aside. The case is remitted to the Government for a fresh decision in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.