JUDGMENT
M.M. Kumar, J.
1. This is tenant’s petition filed under Section 15(6) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (for brevity), the (‘Haryana Rent Act’) challenging concurrent findings of facts recorded by both the Courts below holding that the landlord-respondent requires the demised premises bona fidely for the use of his two sons, namely, Jagdish and Satpal in order to carry on the business of Goldsmith therein. In support of their findings, both the courts below have referred to the statement of AW-1 Sadhu Ram landlord-respondent who has stated that he was engaged in the work of Goldsmith in the shop adjacent to the shop in question alongwith his two sons, namely, Jagdish and Satpal. The aforementioned statement was not controverted by the tenant-petitioner when the landlord-respondent had asserted that the shop in his possession is very small and not sufficient for their business. On the basis of absence of cross-examination of the landlord-respondent on the aforementioned statement, an adverse inference has been drawn against the tenant-petitioner and reliance has been placed in that regard on a judgment of this Court in the case of Maghna Singh v. Gurdial Singh and Ors., 2004(1) R.C.R. (Civil) 338. The statements of AW-2 Vijay Pal and AW-3 Jagdish fully corroborated the version of the landlord-respondent. The stand of the tenant-petitioner that sons of the landlord-respondent are living separately and working independently has not been accepted in view of the evidence produced by the landlord-respondent showing that their ration card depicted only one address i.e. DE/115, Ward No. 5, Pataudi. The aforementioned evidence has been considered sufficient to show that Jagdish and Satpal sons of the landlord-respondent were living together. On the basis of the evidence, the Rent Controller has recorded the following findings:-
“… Hence, from the oral as well as documentary evidence on file, I am of the considered view that petitioner is doing work of Goldsmith alongwith his sons namely Jagdish and Satpal. Even for the sake of arguments, if it is presumed that Jagdish and Satpal are not living with the petitioner, it does not mean that they also cannot do business together with the petitioner. Ld. counsel for respondent also contended that petitioner is also having two other shops within the Municipal Limits of Pataudi and one of shop was rented recently and petitioner could have started his business in that shop. I find no merit in this contention.”
2. The other two shops which are owned by the landlord-respondent have also been taken into account by the Courts below. In one of the shop another son of the landlord-respondent, namely Khem Chand has been found to be running a Tea Shall and the other one is on rent. In any case, those shops have been found to be situated on Tehsil road, which would not be suitable for running the business of Goldsmith as compared to the demised shop. The reason which has prevailed upon the Courts below is that the demised shop is more suitable because it is part of the residential house and is more safe for transacting the gold business. The shops on the Tehsil road are not suitable because there is lot of open area and less abadi. After considering the aforementioned aspects, the Rent Controller has recorded the findings which read as under:-
“In view of facts and circumstances of present case, it is obvious that shop in question is more suitable as it is safer than the shop at tehsil road and also petitioner is already running his business in the shop adjacent to shop in question. Further no court can compell the person to start business in a particular premises, if there is another premises which is under the possession of tenant, which is less suitable for business in comparison to the premises under the occupation of tenant.”
3. On appeal, the plea raised by the tenant-petitioner assailing the findings of bona fide requirement of the landlord-respondent has been rejected. In paragraph 12 of its judgment, the Appellate Authority, has affirmed the findings recorded by the learned Rent Controller and the same read as under:-
“12. The plea raised is untenable. There is ample evidence on the file that Jagdish and Satpal [two sons of the respondent] are also jointly doing business with the respondent. The premises presently in possession of the respondent is adjacent to the tenanted premises. The landlord is entitled to make his choice in the context and his discretion in that behalf cannot be faulted on any valid score because his inclination for expansion of trade would appear to be a viable proposition, particularly because his two sons are assisting him in the trade. The relevant aspect of the matter was discussed in detail by the learned Rent Controller at pages 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the Judgment under appeal. The line of reasoning adopted is based on the material obtaining on the file. Though there is evidence to the effect that the respondent owns two other sons as well but that does not hurt his success prospects in the present cause because his own son [Khem Chand] is running a tea stall in one of the shops [of the size of 7 x 8 feet] and the other shop is already on rent. It would be pertinent to notice in the context that those two shops are situated on Tehsil road [at a distance of about 200 yards from the tenanted premises]; while the tenanted premises is a part of his own residential house and is ideal for expansion of business because the business is presently being run by the respondent in a shop adjacent thereto. By the very nature of things, the averred/proved expansion of business by joining two [adjacent] shops would be an ideal phenomenon, particularly because residential house of the respondent is further adjacent thereto.”
4. Mr. Lokesh Sinhal, learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner has made an attempt to persuade me to accept his sole submission that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Harbilas Rai Bansal v. State of Punjab, (1996-1) 112 P.L.R. 227 (S.C.) would not apply to the provisions of the Haryana Rent Act. It may be appropriate to mention that judgment of the Supreme Court in Harbilas Rai Bansal’s case (supra) had struck down the distinction between the ‘residential property and the commercial property’ for the purposes of personal necessity. Learned counsel has also submitted that once the judgment In Harbilas Rai Bansal’s case (supra) is inapplicable to the Haryana Rent Act, then a commercial property cannot be made subject matter of an ejectment petition on the ground of personal bona fide necessity.
3. Having heard the learned counsel at some length, I am of the considered view that there is no merit in this petition. There is over-whelming evidence on record as is evident from perusal of orders of both the Courts below that there exists a bona fide requirement of the landlord-respondent to occupy the demised premises for his personal use alongwith his two sons. It is well settled that the landlord is entitled to decide as to in what manner he is to use his property and he is the best Judge of his need. In this regard, reference may be made to the judgments of the Supreme court in Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnanan, (1996) 5 S.C.C. 363 and Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar v. Traders and Agencies, . This Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 15(6) of the Haryana Rent Act cannot appreciate evidence and record a finding different than the one recorded by the Courts below. The aforementioned proposition has been considered by the Supreme court in the cases of Veneet Jain v. Jagjit Singh, (2000-3) 126 P.L.R. 263; Shiv Lal v. Sat Parkash, 1993 (Suppl.) 2 S.C.C. 345, Kanchana v. P. Manian, J.T. 2002 (Suppl.1) S.C. 36. All the aforementioned judgments alongwith many others were considered by this court in the case of Krishan Kumar v. Mukandi Lal, (2003-2) 134 P.L.R. 334 and it was concluded that the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below cannot be reversed by this court under Section 15(6) of the Act by reassessing the evidence merely because a different view than the one recorded by the Courts below is possible.
6. The argument of the learned counsel that the view taken by the Supreme Court in Harbilas Rai Bansal’s case (supra) would not govern the issue in respect of the Haryana Rent Act is without any merit because a Division Bench of this Court has followed the judgment of the Supreme Court in Harbilas Rai Bansal’s case (supra) and has done away with the distinction between the ‘commercial and residential buildings’ for the purposes of personal bona fide necessity. A reference may be made to a Division Bench judgment of this court in the case of State of Haryana v. Ved Parkash Gupta, (1999-1) 121 P.L.R. 482 and a Single Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Gainda Ram and Ors. v. L.C. Narula and Ors., 2002 H.R.R. (Punjab & Haryana) 39. Therefore, there is no room to entertain any doubt that within this jurisdiction, the distinction between the ‘residential and commercial property’ even in respect of the Haryana Rent Act does not exist for the purposes of bona fide personal necessity of a landlord.
7. For the reasons stated above, this petition fails and the same is dismissed. Petition dismissed.