ORDER
N.G. Das, J.
1. By means of the present application under Section 115 of C.P.C. the order dated 10-7-1990 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, North Tripura, Kailashhar accepting the report of the Survey Commissioner in a suit, namely T.S. 4 of 1982 has been challenged.
2. In order to appreciate the controversy between the parties, a brief narration of facts relating to this petition is necessary. On 23-3-1982 one Suresh Chandra Paul filed the aforesaid suit, namely, T.S. 4/1982 for declaration of his jote right on the suit land described in the schedule attached to the plaint, a decree for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from entering into the suit land and some other incidental reliefs against 29 defendants.
3. Some of the defendants contested the suit by filing written statement. The petitioner is one of them. On 23-5-1987 the plaintiff filed an application under Order 26 Rule 9 of C.P.C. for local investigation of the suit land. After hearing learned counsel of the parties learned Sub-Judge appointed a Survey Commissioner for investigation of the suit land as per the prayer of the plaintiff. One Rabati Mohan Sarkar was appointed Survey Commissioner. The Survey Commissioner submitted his report on 6-2-1988. The present petitioner, who is defendant No. 7 prayed for time to file objection against the report of the Survey Commissioner. The prayer was granted by learned Sub-Judge by his order dated 21-7-88. Learned Sub-Judge granted a number of adjournment to enable the petitioner to file written objection against the report of the Survey Commissioner and ultimately on 2-1-1989 the petitioner submitted a written, objection against the report of the Survey Commissioner.
4. Thereafter, learned Sub-Judge posted the case for hearing on the report of the Surrey Commissioner. It appears from the order-sheets that at this stage the case suffered a good number of adjournments arid the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties were concluded on 28-6-1990 when learned Sub-Judge after hearing the arguments of learned counsel of the parties posted the case to 10-7-1990 for order and on this date learned Sub-Judge accepted the report of the Survey Commissioner. Present Revision petition is against this order of acceptance of the report of the Survey Commissioner.
5. The only contention raised by Mr. P.K. Majumder, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner is that the impugned order is bad in law as the Survey Commissioner made the local investigation without serving any notice upon the petitioner. His precise submission is that Survey Commissioner did the investigation work behind the back of the petitioner without serving any notice upon him and as such it cannot be accepted.
6. But Mr. D. Chakraborty, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents contended that it would appear from the notice that it was issued by the Survey Commissioner to Mr. S. Dasgupta, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Dasgupta received the notice on 23-12-1988. It appears that after receiving the notice Mr. Dasgupta gave a note on the original copy to the effect that notice might be served upon the party in person, as the party did not contact with him after execution of the vakalatnama in his favour. But on the same notice another note appears to have been given by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that Mr. S. Das gupta subsequently accepted the notice without raising any objection. Now Mr. Majumder has based his argument on this note of Mr. Dasgupta which was given on 21-12-87 and contended that in view of the note of the learned Advocate Mr. Dasgupta it could not be said that notice was served upon the parties. The note of Mr. Dasgupta given on the notice reads:–
“Notice may be issued in favour of the party himself since the party did never appear before me after execution of Vakatatnama in my favour.”
7. Now on examination of the record it is found that Mr. Dasgupta was appointed by the petitioner on 3-6-87 and on that day Mr. Dasgupta accepted the Vakalatnama being satisfied. On further examination of the order-sheet of the trial court, it is found that Mr. Dasgupta appeared on behalf of the defendant-petitioner by filing his memo of appearance on 10-6-87 and 29-6-87. The order of the learned Sub-Judge dated 10-6-87 shows that on that day Mr. Dasgupta learned counsel for the petitioner and others appeared before him and submitted a petition stating that the defendants would submit no objection against the plaintiffs’ prayer for local investigation. So, the note of Mr. Dasgupta cannot be of any help to the petitioner as it is apparent from the order-sheets that after execution of Vakalatnama Mr. Dasgupta appeared on behalf of the petitioner on a number of dates. Not only that, Mr. Dasgupta also filed written objection against the report of the Survey Commissioner and he also argued on the report of the Survey Commissioner before the trial court.
8. Mr. Majumder has, however, cited a decision rendered in the case of Pulin Das Kakati v. Rajendra Nath Hazarika, reported in AIR 1972 Gauhati 25, and submitted that in view of this decision it must be held that service of notice upon the pleader is not the effectual service upon the party. But this decision lends no support to the point raised by Mr. Chakraborty, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent. What happened in that case was that in a suit for rendition of accounts a commission was issued for looking into the accounts and submitted a report to the court. Before the Commissioner could submit his report the appellant who was then an employee in the Army moved his Commanding Officer for requesting that court for stay of the proceedings in the terms of the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925. On a prayer from the Commanding Officer the court stayed the further proceedings till 30th April, 1965 by its order dated 23-1-65. Thereafter, the case was placed before the trial court on 13-12-65 when the court directed that it should come up before it on 29-1-66 in presence of the learned advocates of both the parties for orders. But on two successive dates the advocates did not put in appearance. So, on the later date it was reported to the court that the plaintiff’s advocate had not been informed and so necessary direction in that respect was issued by the court while adjourning it to 21-3-66. It is on that date the suit was decreed in presence of the plaintiff’s advocate after going through the Commissioner’s report which had been received in the meantime.
9. That ex parte order was challenged and the appellant prayed for setting aside that ex parte decree. It was stated by the appellant that he being employed in Military was posted outside Gauhati so could get no knowledge of fraud played on him by the other side in the matter of securing final decree at his back. It was found by the High Court that the appellant did not receive any notice from the court in connection with the revival of the proceedings. So, the question that arose before the court for determination was whether a party should be penalised for lapse on the part of the pleader. Their Lordships after elaborate discussion of the facts of that case and also citing a number of decisions came to the conclusion that Rule 5 of Order 3 does not raise a conclusive presumption, that it is open to the client concerned to establish by appropriate evidence that a process served on his pleader had not been communicated to him and that if he succeeds in establishing that fact the court may proceed on the basis that the service had not been effected on the client.
10. But in the instant case, it would be apparent from the facts I have stated above that the note of Mr. Dasgupta that his client namely, the present petitioner did not contact with him after execution of Vakalatnama is not true. It is abundantly clear from the order-sheets that after execution of that Vakalatnama he put in his appearance on behalf of the petitioner before the court on a number of dates and he also filed the written objection on behalf of the petitioner and argued the case in respect of the report of the Survey Commissioner. Further the note of the learned counsel of the plaintiff shows that Mr. Dasgupta received the notice subsequently without any objection. In the instant case the petitioner adduced no evidence in support of his contention that his lawyer did not inform him about relaying of the suit land to be done by the Survey Commissioner. The order dated 10-6-87 shows that on that date learned advocate for the defendant No. 7 (the present petitioner) and No. 14 submitted a petition stating that they would not submit any written objection against the plaintiff’s petition for local investigation.
11. So, from all these facts, it is clear that the petitioner was aware of the facts that Commissioner was appointed and he would go for surveying the suit land. It is already stated that petitioner adduced no evidence in support of his contention that his appointed lawyer did not communicate the fact that the Survey Commissioner would go to the field for investigation of the suit land. So, on facts the decision cited by Mr. Majumder is not applicable to the present case.
12. In this context, it may be mentioned that in the case of Nilkantha Sidramappa Singashetti v. Kashinath Somahna Ningashetti, reported in AIR 1962 SC 666, it was held that according to Article 158 of the Limitation Act, 1908 the period of limitation for an application to set aside the award began to run from “the date of service of the notice of the filing of the award” and that the notice which the court is to give under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act to the parties need not be a notice in writing and it may be given orally. It was further held that communication of the information about the filing of the award to the pleader of the parties is sufficient compliance with the requirement under Section 14(2) since notice to the pleader is notice to the parties in terms of Rule 5 of Order 3 of the Code.
13. In the instant case, it is not argued that appointment of Mr. Dasgupta was determined by the petitioner. So, in view of the provisions laid down under Rule 4(2) of Order 3 it must be held that Mr. Dasgupta remained the appointed lawyer.
14. So, upon consideration of all the facts discussed above and in view of the dictum of the Supreme Court referred to above it can be safely concluded that service of notice to the pleader of the party is sufficient compliance in terms of Rule 5 of Order 3 of the Code unless it is shown by a cogent evidence that the pleader of the party did not send necessary communication to his client. In the instant case, I have also stated above that the petitioner did not adduce any evidence whatsoever, that his pleader never sent any information to him about the investigation to be held by the Survey Commissioner. On the other hand, it appears from the order-sheet of the trial court that Mr. Dasgupta the learned counsel appeared on a number of dates, and that he also made submission about the report of the Survey Commissioner. There is no allegation that the report of the Survey Commissioner suffers from any infirmity.
15. Mr. Majumder, the learned counsel for the petitioner was asked if the petitioner had any grievance against the report of the Survey Commissioner. But in reply he simply submitted that Survey Commissioner held investigation behind the back of his client and hence it should not have been accepted. There is no averment in this revision petition also that report of the Survey Commissioner suffers from any infirmity. On further examination of the record I find that a few other defendants were present at the time of investigation by the Survey Commissioner. So, it cannot be said that Survey Commissioner held investigation only in presence of the plaintiff.
16. The report of the Survey Commissioner is only evidence and it is not binding on the court.
17. The next question which falls for-consideration is whether this court in exercise of its powder under Section 115 of CPC can interfere with the impugned order. It has been held by the Apex Court in a number of decisions that when the order is within the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Court, even if the order is right or wrong or in accordance with law or not unless it has exercised its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere (Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Ajit Prasad Tarway, AIR 1973 SC 76; Sher Singh v. Joint Director, AIR 1978 SC 1341). In the instant case, I do not find that in passing the impugned order learned Sub-Judge exercised his jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.
18. In the result, I find that this revision appeal has no substance. Hence it is rejected. The rule is discharged. I make no order as to costs. The stay order, if any is vacated.