ORDER
Birendra Prasad Sinha, J.
1. In this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, a prayer has been made for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing Annexure 1 to this application. Annexure 1 is an order dated 13-6-1977 passed by respondent No. 1, the Special Secretary, Education Department, Government of Bihar.
2. The facts relevant for the decision of this case are stated hereunder. On 11-2-1961, the petitioner was appointed as a clerk in High School, Pitwans, in the district of Patna. On 14-5-1971 he was discharged from his service by the acting Head Master of the School. It appears that he filed appeals and representations before the authorities concerned and ultimately he was re-inslated in his post on 31-1-1977 by respondent No. 2, Adhyaksha, Bihar Madhyamik Shiksha Board, Patna (vide Annexure 8). Respondent No. 6, Bijay Narain Sharma, one of the affected persons filed an appeal against the order of respondent No. 2 before respondent No. 1. Such an appeal is provided under Section 63 (7) of the Bihar Madhyamik Shiksha Board Act. The petitioner was impleaded as respondent No. 2 in the said appeal. He also received notice from respondent No. 1 and appeared before him. On 7-5-1977 respondent No. 1 passed the following order which I would like to quote :–
“Lawyer on behalf of the appellant appeared. Sri H. N. Prasad, Assistant Secy, of the Board also appeared. Lawyer on behalf of the respondent party No. (2) Sri Umeshwar Sharma also came to present his case. He said that notice has been sent to him. Checking of the notice I find that contrary to the practice followed by this court notice had wrongly been sent to the Respondent No. (2) by my P. A. (Sri Madhav Pande) on behalf of this court, for which he was cautioned. Since it is an appeal against the Board’s order, the notice is sent only to the Board, which in any case has to justify and defend its own order. Thereby the interests of the respondent No. 2 is automatically protected, it is not, therefore, necessary to complicate the matter before this court by involving all interested persons and thereby lengthen the proceeding. The main issue to be decided by this court is to see how far the Board has been just and proper in taking the decision so far as the appellant’s case is concerned. I am therefore, not entertaining the petition on behalf of respondent No. 2.”
Ultimately, without hearing the petitioner, respondent No. 1 allowed the appeal of respondent No. 6 and directed the Madhyamik Shiksha Board to terminate the service of the petitioner and reinstate respondent No. 6, Bijay Narain Sharma.
3. Mr. Balbhadra Prasad Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. has raised the following two points :–
(i) that the order at Annexure 1 has been passed against the principles of natural justice and is vitiated by the decision of respondent No. 1 himself at Annexure 9 not allowing the petitioner to be heard in the matter although the order under appeal related to the restoration of the petitioner in the post. The petitioner alone was vitally interested in the matter and no order could be passed without giving him a hearing;
(ii) that the order of the Chairman of the Madhyamik Shiksha Board was final and there was no provision of appeal to the Secretary in respect of such orders passed by the Chairman.
4. The doctrine of natural justice is the result of a natural evolution. This phrase is used in a popular sense and must not be taken to mean that there is any justice natural among men. It is the result of civilization and not barbarism, refinement and not savagery. It is not only the common law world that pays it respect, but all civilized people. In English law, its necessity was recognised and insisted upon in the famous cases of Boswel (1605-77 ER 326), Bagg (1615-77 ER 1271) and Dr. Bentley (88 ER 111). In the case of Dr. Bentley (Supra) Fortes J. observed. “I heard a learned civilian say, that God himself would not condemn Adam for his transgression until he had called him to know what he could say in his defence.” Today the feat that writ of certio-rari invokes in public administration much depends upon the doctrine of natural justice. In the case of Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1974 SC 1471), Krishna Iyer, .T. speaking for the court aptly summarises it in the following words (at p. 1475)-
“In Indian constitutional law, natural justice does not exist as an absolute jural value but is humanistically read by courts into those great rights enshrined in Part III as the quintessence of reasonableness. We are not unmindful that from Sneca’s Medea, the Magna Carta and Lord Coke to the constitutional norms, of modern nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights it is a deeply rooted principle that ‘the body of no free man shall be taken, nor imprisoned, nor disseised, nor outlawed, nor banished nor destroyed in any way’ without opportunity for defence and one of the first principles of this sense of justice is that you must not permit one side to use means of influencing a decision which means are not known to the other side.”
Here, respondent No. 1 who is the special Secretary in the Education Department having a jurisdiction over the matter seems to have exercised it disregarding the obligation to give a hearing before passing an order which vitally affects the petitioner. Such an order is, on the face of it, void. The petitioner has the fundamental right of being heard and it is needless to emphasise that before any order is passed affecting his rights, he should be given due hearing. If any perse : was vitally interested in this matter before respondent No. 1, it was the petitioner, Respondent No. 1 was entirely wrong in saying that the interest of the petitioner was automatically protected by the Board which also was appearing before him. It is not a question of lengthening the proceeding by hering the parties concerned. It is a question of doing justice. Justice must not be only done, it also must appear to have been done. Fundamentals of fair play require that the person concerned should be given an opportunity to represent his case before any order is passed. Even if the ultimate decision is substantially right, if the party has a right to be heard and he has been denied that right, a writ would go and the proceeding would be quashed. The authorities at least should be aware of the principles of audi alteram partem while hear-ing appeals as statutory bodies.
5. Learned counsel appearing fop the State has fairly not supported the impugned order.
6. In view of my decision on point No. 1, I do not propose to decide point No. 2 raised by learned counsel for the petitioner. It will be open to the petitioner to raise this, point before the appropriate authorities.
7. In the result, this application succeeds. The order dated 13-6-1977 passed by respondent No. 1 (Annexure 1) is accordingly quashed. The case is sent back to the appellate authority, respondent No. 1, for rehearing the appeal after giving opportunity to the petitioner to be heard. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.