High Court Karnataka High Court

Union Bank Of India vs Little Industries And Others on 13 September, 1990

Karnataka High Court
Union Bank Of India vs Little Industries And Others on 13 September, 1990
Equivalent citations: 1992 75 CompCas 311 Kar
Author: M Ramakrishna
Bench: M Ramakrishna


JUDGMENT

M. Ramakrishna, J.

1. In this revision petition, the petitioner-plaintiff has sought for revision of the order made by the trial court in O.S. No. 139 of 1986, dated March 7, 1987, by which it rejected part of the claim put forward in an application under Order 6, rule 17, Civil Procedure Code, and allowed the remaining part.

2. The salient facts that are necessary for the purpose of disposal of this revision are as follows :

The plaintiff-petitioner has brought a suit in O.S. No. 139 of 1986 on the file of the Court of Prl. Civil Judge, Mysore, seeking to recover a certain amount of money from the defendants-respondents. During the pendency of the suit, an application under Order 6, rule 17, Civil Procedure Code, came to be filed on July 29, 1986. In that application, the following prayer was made to amend the plaint :

1. By amending paragraph 4, after the words (?) to add as “For all the transactions mentioned above.”

2. In para 6, to delete the total amount mentioned therein and he also wants to introduce para 8(a) seeking permission of the court to file separate suit based on common security against the defendants.

3. In para 11, for the figures Rs. 1,72,238, the figures Rs. 2,50,457.35 be substituted.

4. In para 13, to delete the last two columns and insert four columns mentioned in the application and also to make consequential amendments.

3. The object of the application to amend the plaint is that the plaintiff-bank has filed a suit along with an affidavit disclosing the facts of the case that the bank sought to recover a sum of Rs. 1,72,238 due in respect of bills purchased or facility extended by the plaintiff-bank which the eighth defendant accepted and, since he did not pay the amount to the plaintiff, the suit was brought. It is also disclosed that on March 24, 1986, some bills were lapsed and hence the plaintiff-bank filed a suit on the face value of the principal sum mentioned in paras 3 and 6 of the plaint. But the interest is payable at the current rate of 17.5% per annum from the date of bills and the interest of each bill is to be calculated and added to the principal sum. It is necessary to mention here that there are 30 bills referred to in the course of the averments of the plaint seeking to recover not only the principal amount involved in the bills, but also the interest to be calculated and recovered from the defendants. In para 7 of the order under revision, the learned trial judge referred to the salient facts wherein he has stated that out of 30 bills discounted on various dates right from March 25, 1983, to December 20, 1983, the total amount due from these bills amounted to Rs. 1,72,238 payable to the bank, according to them. It is pointed out in the application under Order 6, rule 17, seeking to incorporate certain additional prayers as indicated above that the plaintiff wants to introduce specific prayers in para 6 to introduce 4 columns which may in not only merely introducing an additional prayer as referred to in the application but it will result in introducing the additional amount of interest calculated and claimed in the application. Thus, the interest so calculated and sought to be claimed by way of amendment refers to the period from March 25, 1983, to July 29, 1983. In other words, though the suit came to be presented on March 24, 1983, which is within three years for the purpose of limitation, in the application under Order 6, rule 17, Civil Procedure Code, the plaintiff wants to introduce a certain sum of money payable not only as on July 29, 1983, but also subsequently. For instance, the plaintiff has calculated interest payable up to July 30, 1983, which is clearly barred by time. It is in this context, discussing the salient feature in paragraph 7 of the order, that the learned judge reached the conclusion that so far as the additional interest claimed on the principal is concerned, it is within time. Such permissible sum towards interest has to be added to the main claim and hence the total amount comes to Rs. 2,21,346.25 while the additional interest calculated and sought to be introduced by way of amendment comes to Rs. 29,111.10 which is beyond the date July 29, 1983. Thus, such additional sum of interest calculated is barred by time. The learned judge, calculating and referring to the period relevant for the purpose of considering limitation, has reached the conclusion that any sum payable by way of interest beyond July 28, 1983, cannot be allowed. The learned judge considered various decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the bank and held that they were not relevant to the facts of the present case and hence reached the conclusion against the plaintiff. Therefore, the court below allowed the application in part in so far as the amendment for introducing additional sums of rupees towards the interest payable as on July 29, 1983, and not beyond that. Thus, he allowed partly the application under Order 6, rule 17, Civil Procedure Code, while he rejected the part of the prayer which is beyond the period of limitation for the purpose of amendment. I went through the order under revision. The submission made by Sri. Chandrashekaraiah is that the view taken by the court below is perfectly justified and there is no ground warranting interference of this court.

4. Sri Chandrashekaraiah also relied upon the ruling of this court in V. Ramakrishna v. A. Davidappa [1970] 2 Mys LJ 334, wherein Mr. Santhosh J., as he then was, observed in para 6 as follows :

“Granting or refusing amendment of the pleadings is a matter lying within the discretion of the trial court. Though earlier, the various High Courts including this High Court had interfered in revision under section 115, Civil Procedure Code, with the orders of lower courts either granting or refusing amendment of pleadings, the Supreme Court has now laid down that the High Court should not under section 115, Civil Procedure Code, interfere in the exercise of its revisional power with the order of the trial court refusing or granting an amendment. In Radhey Shyam v. Ram Avtar (C.A. No. 506 of 1965 – 15-2-1967), reported in Gopalkrishna’s Supreme Court Short Notes dated February 15, 1967, item 60), it has been laid down by the Supreme Court that the High Court has no jurisdiction under section 115, Civil Procedure Code, to interfere, in the exercise of its revisional power, with the order of the trial court refusing amendment of the pleading. The Supreme Court has also pointed out in Rouschilla v. Bengal Jute Mills Ltd. (C.A. No. 469 of 1963 – 1-2-1965), reported in Gopalkrishna’s Supreme Court Short Notes dated February 1, 1965, item 12) that the question whether leave should have been granted to the appellant to amend its written statement, fell entirely within the discretion of the trial judge. Again, in Ratilal v. Ranchchodbhai, the Supreme court has observed as follows :

“Therefore, if the trial court had jurisdiction to decide a question before it and did decide it, whether it decided it rightly or wrongly, the court had jurisdiction to decide the case and even if it decided the question wrongly, it did not exercise its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.”

It is not necessary to consider the decisions of the High Courts relied on by Sri Gundappa, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court.”

5. In the light of the above ruling, the conclusion reached by the court below being justified, there is no ground warranting interference by this court. Similarly, in Chinnamma v. Srinivas [1970] 2 Mys LJ 306, a Division Bench of this court held that the plaintiff could not be allowed to amend the plaint to plead a claim under the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937, on the basis of a cause of action which accrued when the plaintiff died, as such a claim would have been barred by time. In the instant case, since the cause of action for the purpose of the suit being on July 29, 1983, for the purpose of limitation, the court below has rightly allowed the amendment to introduce the additional sums of money by way of interest to that extent and the amendment sought to introduce a certain sum of money by way of interest calculated beyond July 29, 1983, being clearly barred by time, it has rightly held that to that extent, the amendment being impermissible, the same came to be rejected. Similar is the view taken by this court in M. L. Shankaranarayana Rao v. Corporation of the City of Bangalore [1973] 2 Mys LJ 456 wherein Mr. Govinda Bhat C.J., as he then was, has held that :

“In allowing the amendment, the court has to consider whether the plaintiff’s claim in respect of the amended relief would be barred by limitation on the date of the amendment application.”

6. To reiterate, this application for amendment came to be presented on July 29, 1986. Therefore, as on the date when certain sums of monies were sought to be calculated and introduced by way of amendment towards interest, the claim was clearly barred by time. Hence, the trial court was right in not allowing that part of the claim. I do not see any good ground to interfere with the order of the trial court.

7. In the result, this revision petition fails and is, dismissed.