JUDGMENT
M.Y. Eqbal, J.
1. All the aforementioned
appeals have arisen out of a common judgment dated 5-2-1996 and the award dated 16-2-1996 passed by the First Additional Judicial Cormnissioner-cum-Tribunal constituted under the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 (for short ‘the said Act’) passed in Reference Cases Nos. 47,48,49,54,55,
56,57,58,59,60,61,62 and 63 of 1990, whereby and whereundcr the Tribunal on reference enhanced the amount of compensation payable to the claimants-respondents for the land acquired under the provisionsof the said Act. Since common question of law and facts are involved in all these appeals, the same have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2. The facts relevant for the purpose of these cases are that the Central Government in exercise of power conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act issued a notification dated 8-4-1978 of its intention to prospect for coal in the lands of village Kichto, P. S. Barkagaon, District Hazaribagh. Thereafter notification under Section 7(1) of the said Act for the acquisition of the aforesaid lands was made on 27-3-1980 and declaration under Section 8 was issued on 17-2-1982. After the said declaration compensation was determined under Section 13 of the said Act for the acquired lands to be paid to the interested persons, namely, the claimants-respondents. The claimants, however, received compensation under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount and filed petitions before the said authority claiming higher compensation. The matter was ultimately referred to the Tribunal for determination of compensation. It appears from the award of the competent authority that the lands acquired by the said authority comprises three categories, namely, Paddy, II, Tarn I and Tarn II lands and the authority under the act determined compensation at the rate of Rs. 7,668/- per acre for paddy II land, Rs. 12,300/- per acre for Tarn I land and Rs. 769/- per acre for Tarn II land and the authority also awarded additional compensation at the rate of 30% of the compensation amount and the interest at the rate of 9% per annum for [he first year and 15% per annum for the subsequent years.
3. The claimant-respondents appeared before the Tribunal and pleaded for enhancement of compensation. Both the parties adduced evidence both oral and documentary before the Tribunal. The Tribunal after considering the facts and evidence passed the impugned judgment and enhanced compensation. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the market rate of the acquired land prevailing at the time of acquisition was Rs. 90,000/- per acre which would be fair and reasonable compensation. The Tribunal, accordingly, awarded compensation at a flat rate
of Rs. 90,000/- per acre subject to deduction of 20% of the said amount on account of development expenses. In addition to the above, the Tribunal also awarded additional compensation at the rate of 12% of the market value of the acquired land for the period on the date of publication of notification under Section 4(1) of the said Act till the date of award and 30% solatium on the amount of compensation. The Tribunal further upheld the award of interest so determined by the authority. Hence this appeal.
4. Mr. Debi Prasad, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant assailed the impugned judgment and award of the Tribunal as being illegal, and contrary to law, facts and evidence on record. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the Tribunal has erred in law in not considering the provisions of the said Act, while determining the compensation and has further misdirected itself in law in determining the compensation by applying the provisionsof the Land Acquisition Act as amended in 1984. According to the learned eounsel, after acquisition of the land, the compensation amount was fixed and sanctioned by the Ministry on the basis of the rate fixed by the Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi. When no sale figure was available the Tribunal ought to have relied upon the letter of the Commissioner fixing the rate of different classes of land. Learned counsel then submitted that determination of compensation at flat rate is not permissible in law. Learned counsel lastly submitted that the Tribunal has committed grave error of law in allowing solatium at the rate of 30% on the value of the land, in addition 12% additional amount per year from the date of notification till the date of possession and further interest at the rate of 9% for the first year from the date of taking possession and thereafter 15% till the date of payment. Learned counsel relied upon the decisions of the case of Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi, (1996) 6 SCC 44 : (1996 AIR SCW 4020); in the case of Union of India v. Sher Singh, (1996) 4 SCC 549 : (AIR 1996 SC 3343); in the case of Union of India v. Hari Krishnan Khosla, (1993) Supp (2) SCC 149 : (1993 AIR SCW 105) and in the case of Union of India v. Borrea Coal Co. Ltd., AIR 1974 Pat 233.
5. On the other hand, Mr. V. Shivnath, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents
submitted that the amount of compensation assessed by the Tribunal is perfectly legal and justified and in no case, the letter of the Commissioner can be made the basts for determination of the compensation. In this connection, learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the decisions of the case of Bijoy Kumar Santhalia v. State of Bihan 1988 BLJ 707 : (AIR 1989 Pat 1) and in the case of Inder Prasad v. Union of India, AIR 1985 Del 304. Learned counsel submitted that sufficient evidence has come on the record that the land in question falls within the industrial bell and the land has been acquired for construction of coal washery. It has further come in evidence that the land is surrounded by industrial belt having bus stand, hospital, school, cement factory, railway station etc. and, therefore, the compensation assessed by the competent authority was much below the market value of the land. Mr. Shivnath then submitted that the award of interest and solatium is perfectly legal and valid and in accordance with law. Learned counsel submitted that the appellant cannot question the grant of additional compensation and interest in view of the fact that the competent authorities themselves on the advice of the Central Government have paid additional amount and interest along with the amount of compensation determined for the land. The competent authority while making reference to the Tribunal has also shown calculation on different heads. According to the learned counsel, the competent authority had no objection to give the benefit of additional compensation applying the statutory benefits of Land Acquisition Act. Learned counsel in this connection referred to Ext. D, the direction of the Central Government and Ext. D/1, the calculation of compensation in the reference to the Tribunal and submitted that these are binding upon the appellant. In this connection, learned counsel relied upon the decisions of the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. Sabanayagam, AIR 1998 SC 344 and in the case of Purshottam Das Tandon v. State of U.P., AIR 1987 All 56.
6. First I wish to take up the question as to whether the award of solatium and interest by the Tribunal is legal and justified. Mr. Debi Prasad very streneously argued that the said Act does not make any provision for payment of solatium and additional compensation and the amended provision of the Land Acquisition Act has not
been adopted by making amendment in the said Act. The awarding of solatium and additional compensation by the Tribunal is, therefore, wholly without jurisdiction. Learned counsel in this connection relied upon the decision of the Apex Court and the Patna High Court referred to herein above. In all the decisions of the Apex Court cited by Mr. Debi Prasad, question involved was whether solatium and interest are payable for the acquisition of the land under the Requisition and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952. In the case of Union of India v. Hari Krishan Khosla, (1993 AIR SCW 105) (supra) the Apex Court held that in absence of any provision for payment of solatium and interest in the Act under which the land is acquired, the same cannot be awarded by applying the provision of Land Acquisition Act. In that decision, their Lordships considered all the earlier decisions. However, in paragraph 79 of the judgment, their Lordships took the view that for about 16 years no arbitrator was appointed by the authority under the provisions of the Act and the matter was lingered at the instance of Union of India, it was a fit case in which solatium and interest could be awarded. In the subsequent two decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Sher Singh, (AIR 1996 SC 3343) (supra) and Union of India v. Dhaawanti Devi, (1996 AIR SCW 4020) (supra), the principle laid down in H. K. Khosala case (supra) has been followed and it has been held that when the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and interest on the amount of compensation then the same cannot be paid. Their Lordships in the case of Dhanwanti Devi, (1996 AIR SCW 4020) (supra) has held as under (Para 17 of AIR):–
“All the decisions cited by Mr. Vaidyanathan in support of his contention on solatium were considered in Hari Krishan Khosla case (1993 AIR SCW 105). His repeated attempts failed to persuade us to have that decision referred to a larger Bench of five Judges. We are unable to persuade ourselves to doubt the correctness of the judgments in Hari Krishan Khosla case. All the decisions cited by the counsel were considered in extenso by the Bench in Hari Krishan Khosla case. We are, therefore, of the opinion that it is not necessary to re-examine all the decisions once over. We are in respectful agreement with the ratio in Hari Krishan Khosla case. It would be seen that Sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Land
Acquisition Act Act expressly states that the solatium is “in addition” to the compensation as considered for compulsory nature of acquisition. This distinction………… was pointed out in
acatena of decisions including the one referred by a Bench of three Judges in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corpn. of India Ltd., (1996 (2) SCC 71). For parity of reasons, without further discussions it was held that interest also was not payable. We, therefore, respectfully agree with the ratio in Hari Krishan Khosla case that the Act omitted to pay solatium and interest, in addition to compensation. The omission by the Legislature, as stated earlier, is deliberate. In Distt. Judge case a Bench of two Judges of this Court had held that the claimant is not entitled to solatium and interest. Accordingly, we hold that the respondents are not entitled to solatium and interest.”
7. There is no dispute that there is no provision under the said Act for payment of solatium and interest on the amount of compensation. The question, therefore, arose whether the decision aforesaid will apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Before coming to the facts of the instant case, I must take help of the guidelines laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Dhanwanti Devi (1996 AIR SCW 4020) (supra) in the matter of applying ratio decided by the higher Courts. The Apex Court held as under ;
“It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge’s decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates– (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of fact is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein norwhat logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions
which may be found there, is not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found.
Therefore, in order to understand and appreciate the binding force of a decision it is always necessary to see what were the facts in the case in which the decision was given and what was the point which had to be decided. No judgment can be read as if it is a statute. A word or a clause or a sentence in the judgment cannot be regarded as a full exposition of law. Law cannot afford to be static and, therefore, Judges are to employ an intelligent technique in the use of precedents.”
8. Now coming to the facts of the instant case. It appears that the notification under Section 4 of the said Act was issued on 8-4-1978 and thereafter the declaration under Section 9of the said Act was issued on 17-2-1982. After the said declaration, the authority under the said Act determined compensation for the acquired land to be paid to the claimants-respondents and other interested persons. From the record it appears that besides the compensation amount, additional compensation at the rate of 30% of such amount and interest at the rate of 9% per annum for the first year and 15% per annum for the subsequent years were also calculated by the competent authority. The competent authority while making reference to the Tribunal has also shown calculation of the aforesaid amounts on different heads besides compensation. This was done by the competent authority on the advice of the Central Government. When the matter was referred to the Tribunal, the appellant did not question the calculation of payment of solatium and interest to the claimants-respondents rather the appellant opposed the enhancement of compensation only. For the first time the appellant has raised before this Court the legality and validity of the payment of 30% additional compensation and 9% and 15% interest so calculated by the competent authority. In this regard it would be useful to look into the letter issued by the Central Government to the Coal India Limited which has been marked as Ext. D before the Tribunal. The letter is dated 12-5-1989 issued by the Joint Secretary to the Govt. of India and addressed to the Chairman, Coal India Ltd. In the said letter it is admitted by the Central Government that the amount of compensation determined under the said Act is
much less as compared to the entitlement to under the Land Acquisition Act. In paragraph 2 of the letter, the Central Government taking into consideration the amended provision of the Land Acquisition Act has decided to pay additional compensation. Relevant paragraph of the said letter (Ext. D) is quoted herein below :
“The Department or Rural Development (Ministry of Agriculture) Government of India, have been putting pressure on us ever after the aforesaid amendments were carried out in the L.A. Act in 1984 to effect corresponding amendments in the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 also so that all the disparities between the two Acts, inasmuch as they relate to payment of compensation were removed and land’losers were not put to any discrimination. The Central Government has since taken a decision in principle, to amend the CBA Act in line with the L.A. Act and necessary consultations in this regard are already on with the concerned Ministeries of the Govt. of India. It will, however, take some time before the proposed amendments are enacted after completion of all formalities. Till then, decisions already exist to pay :
(a) Solatium, in addition to market value of me land @ 30% of the market value forall acquisitions made under the CBA Act.
(b) an interest @ 9% per annum for the first year and 15% per annum for the subsequent years on the amount of compensation, including solatium, so calculated for payment of the land owner.”
9. It is, therefore, evident that the competent authority acting on the said letter, determined the compensation and also calculated 30% additional compensation and interest at the rate of 9% per annum for the first year and 15% per annum for the subsequent years. As per calculation, the appellant paid the said amount and some of the claimants received the same on protest and then the matter was referred to the Tribunal. As stated above, the appellant has not questioned the payment of the aforementioned additional compensation and interest before the Tribunal when the matter was heard on reference. It is, therefore, evident that since the very beginning, the competent authority and the appellant were aware about the letter of the Central Govt. and
accepting the said decision, they calculated the additional compensation and interest and in fact, the same have been paid to some of the claimants. In such a situation, in my opinion, now the appellant cannot be allowed to turn back and say that the same is not payable for the reason that payment of such amount is not provided under the said Act. A similar question arose before the Apex Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Sabanayagam (AIR 1998 SC 344) (supra). That was a case under the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 and the question arose before their Lordships was whether the Payment of Bonus Act will be applicable to the employees of the Housing Board during the relevant accounting year. The contention of the appellant-Board was that the employees of the Board will not be entitled to the statutory bonus under the Act on the ground that the Board was exempted from the application of the aforesaid Act. The Apex Court holding the Board liable for payment of bonus held as under :(Para 12 of AIR)
“In this connection it is, therefore, too late in the day for the Tamil Nadu Housing Board to take a somersault and to try to submit that despite its consistent course of conduct spread over decades accepting the position that it was statutorily liable to pay the minimum bonus as per the Act, but for the exemption sought by it under Section 36 of the Act, in fact, the Act itself did not apply to it under Section 32(v)(c) of the Act and all attempts to get exemption from the Act under Section 36 were misconceived or uncalled for or an exercise in futility. We must therefore, proceed on the basis that it was an admitted position on behalf of the Housing Board during the relevant accounting years with which we are concerned that it is governed by the provisions of the Act and but for exemption under Section 36 of the Act it would be bound to pay the minimum statutory bonus as laid down by the Act to its employees. On the basis of this admitted position and stand on behalf of the Housing Board the High Court was quite justified in observing that the Housing Board had waived its objections regarding non-applicability of the Act under Section 32(v)(c) of the Act in the present cases. There is no question of any estoppel against statute as tried to be submitted by the learned senior counsel for the appellants in this connection. On factual aspects if a consistent stand is taken by the Housing Board to the effect
that it is governed by the Act, implicit in the stand is the admission on facts that statutory exemption under Section 32(v)(c) of the Act factually is not earned by the Board. When on facts the Housing Board has not thought it fit to raise such a factual dispute or contention for the relevant accounting years its stand admitting the non-existence of the Act relevant data for invoking Section 32(v)(c) of the must be held binding to the Housing Board. It is obvious that facts which are admitted need not be proved. The Housing Board itself by its conduct admitted non-existence of the relevant factual data for invoking the powers under Section 32(v)(c) of the Act. Therefore, it can certainly be held to be bound by its admission on these facts and it can at least to the lowest be said to have waived its contention in this connection for the relevant accounting years. It would amount to estoppel on facts and not on law and would also certainly amount to a conscious giving up of its claim for statutory exemption under the said provision. Thus on the principle of waiver and estoppel the second contention of the appellants has to be repelled as has been rightly done by the High Court. Point No. 2 is, therefore, answered in the negative.”.
10. From the impugned judgment of the Tribunal it appears that even before the Tribunal, the appellant-referencer admitted that the claimants are entitled to the statutory benefits as provided under the amended provision of the Land Acquisition Act. However, this admission, in my opinion, will not come in the way of the appellant to raise the validity of the award of additional compensation @ 12% on the market value of the acquired land from the date of notification by the Tribunal by applying the provisions of Land Acquisition Act.
11. Having regard to the facts of the instant case and the law discussed herein above, I come to the following conclusions :
(1) The claimants-respondents are entitled to payment of additional compensation/solatium @ 30% of the amount of compensation and interest at the rate of 9% per annum for the first year and 15% per annum for the subsequent years as calculated and accepted by the competent authority pursuant to the letter of the Central Government since the same was not challenged by the appellant before the Tribunal rather conceded that the same is payable to the claimants. The impugned award
of the Tribunal to this effect is perfectly legal, valid and justified. The decision relied upon by Mr. Debi Prasad does not apply in the peculiar
facts and circumstances of the case.
(2) Besides the above, the additional compensation @ 12% on the market value of the land from the date of notification as awarded by the Tribunal by applying the provisions of Land Acquisition Act is not legal and justified as the paymentof such additional compensation is neither provided under the said Act nor ever offered by the appellant or calculated by the competent authority and this part of the award is in the teeth of the principle laid down by the apex Court discussed hereinabove.
12. The next poi nt for consideration is whether the amount of compensation determined by the Tribunal under the said Act is fair and reasonable. It appears that the competent authority determined the compensation on the basis of rate of compensation fixed by the Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi, in its letter dated 28-7-1985 in regard to different categories of land, a copy of that has been marked as Ext. A. The Tribunal held that the rate fixed by the competent authority on the basis of Ext. D is not valid for the reason that the different authority has no role to fix the valuation. In my opinion, the approach of the Tribunal is correct and it has rightly been held that Ext. A cannot be the basis of determining compensation. The other documents brought on the record are sale deeds (Exts. E and E/1) of the year 1984. By Ext. E about 1.24 1/2 across of land of village Kichto was sold for Rs. 50,000/- and by Ext. E/1, 6.89 acres of land of the same village was soldat Rs. 50,000/-. The Tribunal considered Exts. E and E/l which shows that in the year 1984 the market rate was Rs. 40,000/- per acre, but the Tribunal has not relied upon those sale deeds for the reason that the land sold by Exts. E and E/l are jungle, Tarn and ditches. The Tribunal further has not relied upon Exts. 1, 1/1, 1/2 and 2 holding that those documents show that the transferred lands are of different villages. However, the Tribunal followed the rate of the lands fixed and determined in the judgment of the same Tribunal delivered in other cases and held that the market rate of the lands should be Rs. 90,000/- per acre subject to deduction of 20%.
13. It is well settled that the market value of the lands means what the willing purchaser would pay to a wilting seller for the property having regard to the advantage available to the land and the development activities which may be going on in the vicinity and potentiality of the land and such consideration must be confined to the date of notification. In the case of Land Acquisition Officer v. Justi Rohini (1995) 1 SCC 717 : (1995 AIR SCW 823), the Apex Court held as under (Para 11 of AIR):
“In fixing the market value on the basis of its potentiality for use for building purposes, it must be established by evidence aliunde that the potential purpose must exist as on the date of acquisition by other possible purchasers in the market conditions, prevailing as on the date of the notification. Existence of constructed house or construction activity in the other similar lands in the locality for the purpose contended for or of purchase for such purposes as on the date of proposed acquisition prima facie indicates that there is demand for and the possibility of the immediate user of the land and it is a reasonable possibility to infer that the acquired lands also are possessed of potential value. Therefore, the existence of a demand for and a market at the time of acquisition for potential use must be established as a fact from reliable and acceptable evidence to show that if the acquired land has been thrown into the market, others would have bought it for the special purposes or for building activity which would show the demand for and a market to purchase the land possessed of potential value for the purpose of building activity at that time. On proof thereof the land must not be valued as though it has already been built up but the possibility to use for building purpose existing as on the date of notification must be taken into consideration. The question whether the land has potential value as a building site or not is primarily one of the fact depending upon diverse factors as to its conditions, the use to which it is put or is reasonably capable of being put and its suitability for building purpose. Its proximity to residential, commercial or industrial area, existence of educational, cultural, industrial or commercial institutions, existence of amenities like water, electricity, drainage and the possibility of future extension in that area, the
existence of or prospects of building activities towards the acquired land or in the neighbourhood thereof are the relevant facts to be taken into consideration in evaluating the market value on the basis of potential use of the land. It is true that an element of guess, in an estimate, would have a play in determining the market value. But the present value alone falls to be determined and feats of imagination should not run riot or travel beyond its manifest limits nor be an arbitrary or whim of the Court in determining the compensation or the fixation of the market value. The existing conditions, the demand for the land in the neighbourhood and other related and relevant facts should be taken into consideration in determining the compensation on the basis of potential value of the land.”
14. In the present case, the witnesses have admitted that the adjacent village is fully developed i.e. colliery area, having cement factory, bank, bazar, schools and other constructions. However, it is not disputed that the adjacent village and the village in question is intervened by Damodar river and there is no bridge or road connecting the two villages. The Tribunal held that village Bachra lying just south of village Koch to only intervened by Damodar river, was an industrial and urbanised area and there are collieries, schools, colleges, hospital, market and railway station. There was, therefore, suitability of the acquired land for industrial activities. However, there is no finding that on the date of notification of acquisition, the land in question was having same potentiality. The Tribunal determined the rate of compensation only on the basis of rate fixed by the Tribunal in another reference case. In my opinion, the Tribunal ought to have taken into consideration Exts. E and E/1 which are important documents for the purpose of determining the market value of the land on the date of acquisition. Although in the instant case, the notification was issued in the year 1978 and 1980 and the sale deeds (Exts. E and E/1) are of the year 1984. There is no positive evidence before the Tribunal for holding that the lands sold by Exts. E and E/l were jungle, Tarn and ditches. In my opinion, Exts. E and E/l must have been taken into consideration by the Tribunal while determining the compensation. Admittedly necessary notifications under the said Act were Issued in between 1978 and 1982 and, therefore,
the people became aware that the lands of village have been acquired and by reason of such acquisition the village will become develop and be come urbanised area like that of adjacent village? That might be the reason in the year 1984 the land of the same village was sold at higher price of Rs. 40,000/- although the rate fixed by the Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi, by Ext..A was only in between Rs. 7,000/- and 12,000/- -per acre. As noticed above, the village in question is not developed like that of village Bachra which is a colliery area having schools, colleges, hospital, market etc. The reason is that two villages are separate by Damodar river and there is no bridge connecting these two villages. The sale transaction of the land of village Bachra cannot, therefore, be made the basis for determining the rate of the land in question. The Tribunal failed to consider this aspect of the, matter and simply proceeded to determine the rate on the basis of the rate determined in the judgment passed by it in another case. TheTribunal although valued the land in question at a flat rate of Rs. 90,000/- but deducted only 20% on account developmental expenses. Firstly determination of valuation at a flat rate is not very sound and reasonable. The Tribunal was conscious of the fact that the village where the land was acquired required huge expenses for development. In my opinion, having regard to the location of village Kochto and the fact that it is separated by Damodar river having no communication, even if rate of valuation fixed by the Tribunal at a fiat rate of Rs. 90,000/- is accepted to be reasonable, at least 40% should have been deducted by the Tribunal on account of development expenses. In that view of the matter, the award of the Tribunal on the valuation of the acquired land needs modification. Accordingly, I confirm the award of the Tribunal so far as it relates to valuation of the acquired land at the rate Rs. 90,000/- per acre, but subject to 40% deduction on account of developmental expenses. In other words, the award of the Tribunal on its score is reduced from Rs. 72,0007- to Rs. 54,000/-. As noticed above, Exts. E and E71 show that in the year 1984 the lands of the same village was sold at the rate of Rs. 40,0007- per acre. Even assuming that the lands under those sale deeds are far away from the lands acquired, the in creased rate of Rs. 54,000/- per acre for the
acquired land would be reasonable and adequate.
15. Having regards to the entire facts and circumstances of the case, in my view, the claimants-respondents are entitled to compensation of the land in question at the rate of 54,000/- per acre besides 30% additional compensation on the valuation of the land and interest @ 9% per annum for the first year and 15% per annum for the subsequent years till the payment. I further hold that besides the above the claimants-respondents are not entitled to additional compensation @ 12% on the market value of the acquired land as awarded by the Tribunal.
16. In the result, all the aforementioned appeals are allowed in part and the judgment and award are modified accordingly.