JUDGMENT
K.P. Sivasubramaniam, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the award of the Railway, Claims Tribunal, Madras Bench, in O.A. II/2/1990 dated 3-12-1990. The Union of India represented by its General Manager is the appellant in the above appeal,
2. According to the claimant one Deenal, wife of Ramanathan. It was contended that shewas travelling by train No. 92 7, Karnataka Express on 18-4-1989 from Katpadi to New Delhi in Second Class Sleeper Coach. The trian met with an accident on 18-4-1989 at 2.30 p.m. at Lalilpur in the course of which the claimant sustained injuries. In the application it was stated that she sustained fracture of pelvis bone and she was treated in several hospitals from 18-4-1989 to 30-5-1989 and later she undertook treatment at
Christian Medical (College Hospital, Veilore. She had also lost her personal belongings. Total compensation of Rs. 46,000/- was claimed.
3. In the counter filed by the Railways, the accident wns admitted. The fact that the petitioner had received treatement in the hospitals as mentioned in the application for the injuries sustained by her was also admitted. But it was contended that the claimants did not suffer permanent or partial disability. Ex gratia payment of Rs. 2,000/- was made by the Railway Administration. The amount claimed as compensation was excessive. It was also contended that there was no loss of property as contended by the petitioner.
4. The claimant examined herself as PW 1 and had marked Exs. A 1 to A5.
5. The Tribunal after considering the evidence held that the claimant was entitled to a total sum of Rs. 2G,500/- as compensation. Out of the said amount a sum of Rs. 20,000/- was awarded towards fracture of pelvis and a further sum of Rs. 5,000/- for the injury sustained by her as shown in the medical report Ex. B1 namely, Sacro Iliac displacement. A further sum of Rs. 1500/-was awarded towards loss of cash, personal clothing and other articles. Hence, the present appeal by the Railways.
6. The only point which arises for consideration in this appeal is as regards whether the present claim petition would be governed by the earlier Railway Accidents (Compensation) Rules, 1989 (1989 Rules) or by the subsequent Railway Accidents Claims Rules, 1990 (1990 Rules).
7. The Tribunal held that even though the accident took place on 18-4-1989 when the
1989 Rules held the field and before the coming into force of 1990 Rules, the earlier Rules were superseded and hence the assessment has to be made only in terms of
1990 Rules. This decision is sought to be challenged.
8. According to learned counsel for the appellant, the accident having occurred on 18-4-1989, it is only the old Rules which would apply. Learned counsel contends that 1989 Rules were passed under the powers conferred under Section 82-A of the Indian Railways Act, 1890. But the Rules were framed only in the context of the powers to be exercised by the Railway Claims Tribunals con
stituted under the Railway Claims Tribunal A.CI, 1987. Commencement of the Rules was specified to be the same as the “appointed day” within the meaning of Section 2(b) of Railway Claims Tribunals Act, 1987. But the 1990 Rules were framed under the corresponding provision of the Rule making power namely, under Section 129 of the Indian Railways Act. 1989 which replaced the 1890 Act. The new Railways Act 1989 came into force with effect from 1-7-1990 only. Under the 1990 Rules. Rule 1(2) specifically mandates that they shall come into force on the date of commencement of the Act. Therefore, according to learned counsel, the Railways Act, 1989 having come into force only on 1-7-1990, the 1990 Rules cannot be applied in the case of an accident which took place on 18-4-1989. The rate or quantum of compensation as specified in the Schedule to 1990 Rules can apply only to accidents which had occurred subsequent to 1-7-1990.
9. On the facts of the present case, it is contended that the claimant had suffered fracture to her pelvis, which was not covered under any of the items mentioned in the Schedule of 1989 Rules. Therefore, in terms of second proviso to Rule 3 , the maximum amount to which the claimant would be entitled to was Rs. 20,000 /-. According to learned counsel, the nature of injury was not specified in the Schedule and therefore, as provided under the second proviso to Rule 3, the maximum amount to which the claimant is entitled to was Rs. 20,000/-. In the present case, the Tribunal adopted the 1990 Rules whereunder fracture of pelvis was classified as Item No. 32 and a sum of Rs. 20,000/- was specified as compensation payable. Inasmuch as 1990 Rules cannot be applied for the present case, the award of Rs. 20.000/- for fracture of pelvis and a further sum of Rs. 5,000/- for another injury was not permissible.
10. I am unable to agree with the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant for the following reasons :–
(A) The following extract of the preamble of 1990 Rules clearly indicate that 1989 Rules are positively superseded.
“G.S.R. 552 (E) :– in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 129 of the Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989) read with Section 22 of the General Clauses Act (10 of 1897) and in supersession of the Railway Accidents (Compensation) Rules, 1989 except in re
spect of things done or omitted to be done before such supersession, the Central Government hereby makes the following rules namely :”
The effect of supersession is that the superseded Rules are completely erased out of the statute book and non est in the eye of law. Therefore, when the claim is alive before the Tribunal, the Tribunal has no other alternative except to go by the prevailing Act or the Rules and cannot look bark on a superseded provision.
(B) The commencement of 1989 Rules was fixed as “the appointed day” within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Railway Claims Tribunals Act, 1987. The said Act came into force on 8-11-1989. But that would not mean that 1989 Rules will not apply to accidents which occurred prior to 8-11-1989, The commencement of the Rules had to be fixed as the date on which the Claims Tribunals Act, 1987 came into force since the Rules were contemplated only in the context of the constitution of the Claims Tribunals. The fixation of the said date was only a statutory formality. But the right to claim compensation was always available to an aggrieved citizen namely, before the Civil Court, before the constitution of the Claims Tribunal. After I he constitution of the Claims Tribunal, such claims pending before the Civil Court or the Claims Commissioner were to be transferred to the Tribunals under Section 24 of the Claims Tribunals Act. Therefore, the Claims Tribunal while dealing with any claim petition coming up for disposal, is to be guided by the prevailing Rules irrespective of the dale of the accident or the commencement of the Rules. This is undoubtedly the position while the Claims Tribunals were governed by the 1989 Rules. If so. when once the 1989 Rules had been sperseded and replaced by 1990 Rules the Tribunal has to be naturally guided only by 1990 Rules and cannot be bogged down by any reference to the commencement clause.
(C) it should also be appreciated that the right to receive just and fair compensation is a common law right and remedy and the quantification of various types of disabilities do not depend only upon the executive enlisting certain disabilities. For instance under Part III of the Schedule to the Rules, in the 1989 Rules only 26 items of disabilities were specified, in the 1990 Rules, 34 items of disabilities have been identified and en
listed. Any submission that a disability not enlisted in the Schedule cannot attract award of damages, cannot be countenanced. Rule 3(2) states that the amount of compensation payable for an injury not specified in the Schedule, but which in the opinion of the Claims Tribunal is such as to deprive a person of all capacity to do any work shall be Rs. 2,00,000/-. Sub-clause (2) of Rule 3 deals with injuries depriving a person of all capacity to do any work. Sub-clause (3) of Rule 3 deals with other injuries not falling under the Schedule and it is stated that the total compensation in respect of such injuries shall not exceed Rs. 40,000/-. In the background of these factors, the Tribunal has to necessarily evaluate the nature of disability and award just and fair compensation irrespective of the fact that the type of the injury had been enlisted or not. Therefore, the schedule has to be taken only as a guideline and not an exhaustive provision. Viewed from that angle, there can be no hard and fast or rigid rule as regards the quantification of the damages. The latest and prevailing guideline should be the guiding factor and not guideline which had become superseded and found to be obsolete.
(D) While interpreting a beneficial legislation, regard should be had to the ultimate benefit souhgt to be conferred upon the claimant and not to be tied down to executive instructions issued from time to time. Even in respect of statutory amendments to the Legislative Acts, the Supreme Court had given the benefit of retrospective application of a beneficial amendment in Dhannalal v. D.P. Vijayvargiya, . In that case, the amendment deleting Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, providing for a period of limitation for filing claim petition before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal came up for consideration. The Supreme Court even after holding that the amending Act did not envisage retrospective application, nevertheless held that there was nothing in the amending Act to show that the benefit should not be extended to pending Claim Petitions.With the result, it was held that the benefit of the amendment shall also apply to all proceedings pending on the date wherein the objection of limitation was pending for consideration. Adopting the same reasoning I am inclined to hold that the 1990 Rules do not contain any specific bar for applying the Rules for accidents prior to its commence
ment. Therefore, the Rules are retrospectively applicable.
(E) It. Is also noteworthy that in U.P. State Board Transport Corpn. v. Trilok Chandra, , the Supreme Court while considering the binding nature of the schedule of multiplier prescribed under the Motor Vehciles Act. In the case of fital accidents, found that the Table under the Schedule was full of mistakes and therefore, neither the Tribunals nor the Courts can go by the ready reckoner. It was held that the table could be used only as a guideline. Therefore, the Rules framed udner the Railways Act also can be taken only as a guideline and hence the latest and prevailing Rules should be held to be applicable.
11. In the result, the Tribunal had rightly held that it was only 1990 Rules which were applicable’. Therefore, the grant of Rs. 20.000/- for the pelvis injury falling under Item No. 32 of the 1999 Rules and a further sum of Rs. 5,000/- towards Sacro Iliac displacement was pefeetly justified. A further sum of Rs. 1,500/- has also been granted towards the loss of cash and personal belongings. There is no reason to interfere with any of the amounts so awarded by the Tribunal.
12. In the result, there are no merits in the above appeal and the same is dismissed. No costs.