JUDGMENT
Vinod K. Sharma, J.
1. By way of present revision petition the Union of India has challenged the order dated 19th September, 2005 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Bhiwani, allowing the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 herein to lead additional evidence in appeal.
2. The plaintiff-respondent No. 1 herein moved an application for additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the plea that Shri A.P. Dadoo was appointed as General Power of Attorney and designated as President of the Company vide resolutions passed by the Board of Directors of the Company dated 18.4.1982 and 2.9.1986. It was further claimed that in pursuance to the powers conferred on Shri A.P. Dadoo, he further delegated his powers to Shri B.M. Sharma vide power of attorney. These documents could not be produced inadvertently in trial Court and, therefore, it was claimed that these documents may be allowed to be produced by way of additional evidence.
3. The application was contested by the Union of India primarily on the ground that this application has been moved at a belated stage in order to fill up the lacunae. It was further pleaded that these documents were not intentionally produced in the trial Court and, therefore, the application deserved to be dismissed.
4. The lower Appellate Court took note of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar and Ors. A.I.R. 1097 S.C. 3 to hold that public interest cannot be permitted to be defeated on mere technicality or procedural defects which did not go to the root of such matter. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further held that there was sufficient power under the Code of Civil Procedure to ensure that injustice is not done to any party who has a just cause and that a substantive right should not be allowed to be defeated on account of procedural defect which is curable. The learned lower Appellant Court further took note of the judgment in the case of National Insurance Company Limited v. Bant Kaur (1998-1)118 P.L.R. 216 to hold that non-filing of documents does not mean that those documents could not be produced on the later date to show that the person who filed the appeal, had the authority to file the same and then application was accordingly allowed.
5. Mr. Lakhwinder Singh, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, contended that issue No. 1 was decided in favour of the petitioner whereas issue No. 2 was decided against the plaintiff by holding that the suit was not filed by a properly authorised person. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the application for producing additional evidence was filed in order to fill up the lacunae which could not be allowed.
6. It was next contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that instead of granting permission to lead additional evidence, the learned lower Appellate Court has allowed placing on record the resolutions and power of attorney thereby admitting the same in evidence.
7. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 on the other hand placed reliance on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Uday Shankar Triyar v. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh and Anr. to contend that the order passed by the learned lower Appellate Court is in consonance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court as substantive rights of a party cannot be allowed to be defeated by procedural defects and irregularities. He further placed reliance on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Wadi v. Amilal and Ors. 2002 P.L.J. 228 to contend that Sub-clause (b) of Rule 27 is an enabling provision of Order 41 Rule 27 which empowered the Appellate Court to permit additional evidence which is necessary to pronounce a satisfactory judgment in the case as the interest of justice is of paramount consideration. He also placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in the case of Subh Timb Steel Ltd. v. Inder Paul Dua (2000-1)124 P.L.R. 168, wherein it has been held as under:
(4) Learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that on 19.11.1992 the Board had authorised the Managing Director to institute the appeal and the revision with respect to the disputed premises and the action so taken, if any, stood ratified. He strongly relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar and Ors. A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3. The Supreme Court considering a similar question held:
It cannot be disputed that a company like the appellant can sue and be sued in its own name. Under Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure a pleading is required to be signed by the party and its pleader, if any. As a company is a juristic entity it is obvious that some person has to sign the pleadings on behalf of the Company. Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, provides that in a suit by or against a Corporation the Secretary or any Director or other Principal Officer of the Corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case might sign and verify on behalf of the company. Reading Order 6, Rule 14 together with Order 29, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure it would appear that even in the absence of attorney having been executed a person referred to in Rule 1 of Order 29 can, by virtue of the office which he holds, sign and verify the pleadings on behalf of the Corporation. In addition thereto and de hors Order 29, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as a company is a juristic entity, it can duly authorise any person to sign the plaint or the written statement on its behalf and this would be regarded as sufficient compliance with the provisions of Order 6, Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A person may be expressly authorised to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company, for example, by the Board of Directors passing a resolution to that effect or by a power of attorney being executed in favour of any individual. In absence thereof and in case where pleadings have been signed by one of its officers a Corporation can ratify the said action of its officers. In signing the pleadings. Such ratification can be express or implied. The Court can on the basis of the evidence on record and after taking all the circumstances of the case, specially with regard to the conduct of the trial, come to the conclusion that the corporation had ratified the act of signing of the pleadings by its officer.
8. In the light of the authorities referred to above, it would be seen that the order passed by the learned lower Appellate Court is in consonance with the law and additional evidence has been allowed as it is necessary for doing substantial justice between the parties. Thus, there is no error in exercise of jurisdiction by the learned lower Appellate Court which may call for interference by this Court.
Accordingly, the revision petition is dismissed.