JUDGMENT
R.L. Khurana, J.
1. The present appeal under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) has been preferred by the defendant. Union of India, against the judgment and decree dated 21-9-1993 of the learned single Judge passed in Civil Suit No. 98 of 1991 whereby the objections preferred by the defendant under Sections 30/33 of the Act to the award dated 1-5-1991 were dismissed and such award was made the rule of the Court and a decree in terms thereof came to be passed in favour of the respondent-plaintiff and against the defendant.
2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are these. The work of “Provision of water Borne Sanitation at Bakloh Cantonment” in District Chamba was awarded to the plaintiff vide agreement No. CWE/M-35/85-86. Since a dispute arose between the parties with regard to such agreement and the execution of the work, Lt. Col. P.S. Raina was appointed as the sole Arbitrator to go into the dispute between the parties and to make his award in respect thereof. As many as twenty six claims under various heads were raised by the plaintiff. Only one counter claim was raised by the defendant with regard to cost of arbitration. The learned Arbitrator on consideration of the material placed before him awarded a total sum of Rs. 1,71,390.92 under various heads of claims in favour of the plaintiff vide his award dated 1-5-1991. The plaintiff was also awarded interest on such sum as under :
(a) at the simple rate of 18% per annum for the period 25-9-1987 to 23-3-1990 on the sums awarded under various claims except on the sum awarded under claim No. 24, and
(b) at the compound rate of 18% per annum on the whole amount awarded from the date of award or the date of court decree, if any, whichever is earlier. No interest was payable if payment of the amount under the award was made within 60 days from the date of the award.
3. The counter claim of the defendant with regard to cost of arbitration was rejected and the parties were directed to bear their own costs of arbitration.
4. The Arbitrator, through his letter dated 14-5-1991, authorised the defendant through its authorised representative Shri Darshan Kumar Goyal, ASW, c/o Chief Works Engineer, Mamun Cantonment, to file the award in Court for being made the rule of the Court. Pursuant to such letter of authorisation, Shri Darshan Kumar, a representative of the defendant filed the award in Court on 3-6-1991. The Arbitrator vide letter dated 6-6-1991 also informed the parties about the award having been filed in Court on 3-6-1991.
5. It appears that as a result of some objections having been raised by the Registry, the award was returned to the Arbitrator. After removing the objections, the award was refiled in the Court on 21-10-1991 by Shri Deepak Gupta, AGE, a representative of the defendant, upon having been authorised in this regard by the Arbitrator vide letter dated 20-10-1991.
6. On 4-11-1991, the Court directed notice of the award having been filed in the Court, to the parties. Shri B. K. Sood, Advocate, on the same day accepted notice on behalf of the plaintiff. Though, notice sent to the defendant by registered post was received back unserved, Shri R. L. Sood, Advocate, the then Additional Central Government Standing counsel put in appearance in court on 9-12-1991 and accepted the notice for and on behalf of the defendant. The case was then directed to be listed after four weeks.
7. Objections under Sections 30/33 of the Act to the award being made the rule of the Court were filed by the plaintiff on 30-12-1991. Such objections came to be registered as OMP No. 9 of 1992. The case was taken up on 8-1-1992. On such date, none was present on behalf of the defendant. The case was adjourned for four weeks to enable the defendant to file reply to the objections preferred by the plaintiff. On 23-3-1992, at the request of the learned Additional Central Government standing counsel, six weeks further time was granted to the defendant to file the reply to the objections prepared by the plaintiff. No reply was filed by the defendant till 5-5-1992. On such date, three months time was granted to the defendant to file objections to the award as prayed for by the Additional Central Government Standing Counsel.
8. Reply to the objections of the plaintiff was filed by the defendant on 27-5-1992. The defendant also preferred objections, under Sections 30/ 33 of the Act, to the award being made the rule of the Court, on 3-8-1992 (being OMP No. 337 of 1992) accompanied by an application, OMP No. 336 of 1992, under Section 5, Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation of the delay in filing the objections to the award. In seeking the condonation of such delay, the defendant has averred in paragraphs 3, 5 and 6 of the application as under:–
“3. That the record of the case shows that notice was issued to the applicant/defendant by this Hon’ble Court on 4-11-1991, but the same was not served upon him and was re-directed to this Hon’ble Court. The record of this Hon’ble Court also reveals that Shri R. L. Sood, Additional Central Government Standing Counsel accepted the service on behalf of the defendant vice Shri M. L. Sharma, the then Central Government Standing Counsel. It is pertinent to mention here that neither Shri R. L. Sood nor Shri M. L. Sharma ever informed the applicant/defendant about the service so accepted by them and about taking further necessary steps, such as, filing of objections etc. etc. The matter was again listed before the Hon’ble Court on 8-1-1992 on which date none appeared on behalf of the applicant/ Defendant. However, this Hon’ble Court was kind enough to give four weeks time to file reply to the objections which were filed by the plaintiff by that time.
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5. That as submitted above in paras supra, Shri R. L. Sood, Advocate, accepted the service on behalf of the applicant/defendant on 9-12-1991 but he did not convey any further action in the matter and moreover the applicant/defendant was also not served as the communications sent by this Hon’ble Court were re-directed. The applicant, however, came to know about these proceedings in this Hon’ble Court through the letter dated 1-4-1992 received from Shri Dharam Chand, Additional Central Government Counsel. Immediately after the receipt of the said letter the applicant/defendant deputed an official to Shimla in order to discuss the matter with the counsel and during discussion the counsel advised the said official to take necessary steps to file the cross-objections to the Award. The counsel further informed the said official that the objections were to be filed within a period of 30 days from the service of the Award.
6. That as submitted above, the defendant applicant only came to know about the proceedings of this case in this Hon’ble Court on the receipt of the letter dated 1-4-1992 vide which the defendant/applicant was informed that six weeks time has been granted by this Hon’ble Court. It is further submitted that further period of three months was granted by this Hon’ble Court for filing the objections on 5-5-1992. hence the cross objections which are now being filed along with this application are within time from the date of the knowledge and in view of the time extended by this Hon’ble Court from time to time. But this application is being filed in this Hon’ble Court as a precautionary measure as huge amount is involved in the matter to which the plaintiff/non-applicant is not legally entitled as explained in detail in the cross-objections and this amount can otherwise be utilised for the security and defence of the country.”
9. The plaintiff, while resisting the application for condonation of the delay averred that no sufficient grounds existed therefor. In any event, the defendant should have filed the objections within 30 days of deriving the knowledge of the award having been filed in Court. Such knowledge, admittedly, was derived by the defendant on 1-4-1992.
10. The learned single Judge, vide the impugned judgment refused to condone the delay and accordingly dismissed the application of the defendants being OMP No. 336 of 1992. Resultantly, the objections preferred by the defendant (OMP No. 337 of 1992) to the award were dismissed as barred by time.
11. The objections preferred by the plaintiff to the award, being OMP No. 9 of 1992, were also dismissed as time barred having been filed after the prescribed period of 30 days of the service of notice.
12. Consequent upon the dismissal of the objections of the parties, the award dated 1-5-1991 of the Arbitrator was made the rule of the Court and a decree in terms thereof came to be passed vide the impugned judgment and decree in favour of the plaintiff.
13. Feeling aggrieved, the defendant has come up before this Court by way of present appeal.
14. It has been contended on behalf of the defendant that the learned single Judge has erred in refusing to condone the delay and in dismissing the objections preferred as barred by time. According to the learned counsel for the defendant, the objections were filed well within the time granted by the Court and as such there was no need for making of the application for condonation of the delay. The learned single Judge in granting time of three months on 5-5-1992 to the defendant to file objections had impliedly extended the time. In support of his contention, the learned counsel placed reliance on the ratio laid down by a learned single Judge of the Orissa High Court in Gangaram Chhapolia v. Chief Engineer (Projects), Orissa and others. AIR 1983 Orissa 262.
15. The learned counsel for the plaintiff, on the other hand, has contended that notice of the award having been filed in court was accepted on behalf of the defendant on 9-12-1991 and as such the objections to the award were required to be filed within the stipulated period of thirty days within the meaning of Article 119 (b), Limitation Act, 1963. Grant of time by the Court beyond such period of thirty days for filing the objections would neither tantamount to extension of period of limitation nor condonation of delay within the ambit of Section 5, Limitation Act, 1963. The objections preferred by the defendant on 3-8-1992, that is, much after the expiry of the period of limitation of thirty days of the acceptance of notice of the award on 9-12-1991, were hopelessly barred by time, and that in the absence of sufficient cause, the delay was rightly not condoned.
16. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record of the case.
17. An Arbitrator under Section 14(2) of the Act is obliged to file the award in court either on the request of any party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming under such party or on the directions of the Court. Once the award is filed, the court is then to give notice to the parties of the filing of the award. All objections to the award, whether they are covered by Section 15 or Section 16 or Section 30 of the Act have to be filed by the aggrieved party under Section 33 of the Act, within the stipulated period of limitation of 30 days from the dale of service of notice of the filing of the award, as prescribed under Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963.
18. Under Article 119 (b), the period of limitation of 30 days will start from the day the notice of the filing of the award is served on the parties. The provisions contained in this Article are similar to the one contained in Article 158, Limitation Act, 1908.
19. The apex Court in Nilkantha Sidramappa Ningashetti v. Kashinath Somanna Ningashetti, AIR 1962 SC 666, had the occasion to consider the scope and meaning of the words “service of notice” appearing in Article 158 of the Limitation Act, 1908. It was held that there was no ground to construe the expression “date of service of notice” to mean only a notice in writing served in a formal manner. When the Legislature used the word “notice”, it must be presumed to have borne in mind that it means not only a formal intimation but also an informal one. Similarly, it must be deemed to have in mind the fact that service of a notice would include constructive or informal notice.
20. In the case before the apex Court, information of the award having been filed in Court was communicated to the counsel for the parties. A question thus arose whether communication of information of the filing of the award to the counsel is sufficient compliance of the requirement of Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act with respect to the giving of notice to the parties of the filing of the award. It was held that the notice, which the Court is to give under Section 14(2) of the Act to the parties of the filing of the award need not be a notice in writing. Such notice can be given orally. No question of the service of notice in the formal way of delivering the notice or tendering it to the party can arise in case a notice is given orally. The communication of the information to the counsel for the party that an award has been filed is sufficient compliance with the requirements of Section 14(2) of the Act with regard to the giving of the notice to the parties concerned about the filing of the award.
21. The aforesaid view was reiterated by the apex Court in Indian Rayon Corpn. Ltd. v. Raunaq and Company Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1988 SC 2054.
22. In the present case, as stated above, though formal notice of the filing of the award sent to the defendant was received back unserved, Shri R. L. Sood, Advocate, the then Additional Central Government Standing counsel, after having put in appearance in Court on 9-12-1991, had accepted notice of filing of the award on behalf of the defendant. Therefore, the period of limitation for filing the objections to the award started running from that date and the defendant was thus required to file the objections within 30 days thereof. Such period of thirty days stood expired on 7-1-1992.
23. The defendant in its application made under Section 5, Limitation Act, 1963, before the learned single Judge vide paragraph 5 has not disputed the fact that notice of filing of the award was accepted on its behalf by Shri R. L. Sood, Advocate. It has been pleaded that the said Advocate had never intimated it about further action in the matter. It has further been pleaded that the defendant came to know about the filing of the award only through letter dated 1-4-1992 received from Shri Dharam Chand, Advocate, the then Additional Central Government Standing Counsel. The date on which such letter dated 1-4-1992 was received by the defendant has not been disclosed. Even if, for the sake of arguments, it is presumed that the limitation of thirty days for filing the objections is to be reckoned from the date the defendant received information as alleged by them, the objections filed on 3-8-1992 on the face of it are barred by time having been filed long after the expiry of the requisite period of thirty day. from the date of knowledge.
24. The next question which arises for determination is whether grant of time by the Court to the defendant on 5-5-1992 to file objections would tantamount to extension of time or condonation of delay within the ambit of Section 5, Limitation Act, 1963.
25. At this stage, it would be pertinent to reproduce the order dated 5-5-1992, recorded by the learned single Judge. It reads :
“Present :– Shri K. D. Sood, Advocate, for the
Plaintiff.
Shri Dharam Chand, Advocate, Ad-
ditional Central Government Stand-
ing Counsel, for the defendant.
Plaintiff has filed the objections to the award. The respondent has not done so although time was allowed on 23-3-1992. Shri Dharam Chand for the defendants prays for time to file the same. Let the objections be filed within three months. List thereafter for framing of issues.”
26. The objections to the award by the defendant, admittedly, were filed on 3-8-1992 within the period allowed vide order dated 5-5-1992, quoted above.
27. In Gangaram Chhapolia’s case (supra), reliance on which was placed by the learned counsel for the defendant, the petitioner therein had notice of the filing of the award in court on 14-4-1977. He was also served with a notice of filing of the award on 15-4-1977 directing the parties to file their objections within a month from the notice, though the case was fixed for 29-4-1977. Since on that day, that is, 29-4-1977 no objections were filed by the parties and the statutory period of thirty days had not expired, the case was adjourned to 20-6-1977 for filing of the objections. The objections to the award were filed by the petitioner on 20-6-1977. A question arose whether such objections were within time. It was held that the objections filed by the petitioner could not be said to be beyond time because by granting time to file objections, the court had impliedly extended the time even without a formal application under Section 5, Limitation Act, 1963, for condonation of the delay.
28. We are unable to agree with the ratio relied upon by the learned counsel for the defendant.
Section 17 of the Act provides :–
“17. Judgment in terms of award.– Where the Court sees no cause to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration for reconsideration or to set aside the award, the Court shall, after the time for making an application to set aside the award has expired, or such application having been made, after refusing it, proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow, and no appeal shall lie from such decree except on the ground that it is in excess of, or not otherwise in accordance with, the award.”
29. A bare perusal of the above provision shows that once the period prescribed for an application to set aside the award has expired or such application having been made is refused, the court is to pass a judgment and decree in terms of the award.
30. There is no denying that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, can be invoked for seeking the condonation of delay in filing the objections to the award.
31. It will not be out of place to quote here the provisions contained in Section 5, Limitation Act, 1963.
“5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.– Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.
Explanation.– The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.”
32. The above provisions provide for extension of time in the case of appeals and applications other man those under Order 21, Code of Civil Procedure, under the circumstances referred to in it, namely, that the appellant or the applicant, as the case may be, satisfies the Court that he had “sufficient cause” for not filing the proceedings within the prescribed period.
33. In Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361, it has been held that the proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court under Section 5, Limitation Act.
34. Therefore, in view of the ratio of the apex Court, if the condition precedent as to existence of sufficient cause is not satisfied, there is no room for the exercise of discretionary power to condone the delay. Resultantly, grant of time by the Court beyond the prescribed period of limitation to file the objections in the absence of sufficient cause would not amount to extension of the period or condonation of delay within the ambit of Section 5, Limitation Act, 1963. The law laid down by the Orissa High Court in Gangaram Chhapolia’s case (supra) in view of the decision of the apex Court in Ramlal’s case (supra) cannot be said to be a good law.
35. In the present case, no sufficient cause was shown by the defendant for not filing the objections within the stipulated period when it was granted three months time to file the objections on 5-5-1992. Therefore, grant of time by the Court would not mean that the court in exercise of its discretionary power under Section 5, Limitation Act, 1963, had extended the period or condoned the delay for filing the objections.
36. A Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Chhotelal v. Jamnadas, AIR 1963 MP 20 has held that the Court has no jurisdiction to fix a date beyond thirty days for filing the objections to the award.
37. In Mohamed Esoof v. V.R. Subramanyam, AIR 1957 Mysore 78 the award was filed in Court on 14-5-1952. Notice of the award having been filed in Court was served on the appellant therein on 27-5-1952. Appearance was put in by the appellant therein through his counsel on 2-6-1952 and the objections were filed on 14-7-1952, that is, forty-eight days after the service of notice. A contention was raised that putting in appearance by the party through counsel and grant of time for filing objection by the court would tentamount to extension of period of limitation.
38. It was held that putting appearance by the counsel and granting of time to file the objections would not save limitation, if the objections are filed beyond time. It is only when the objections are formulated and placed before the Court that the party can be regarded as having applied to the Court.
39. Assimilating the legal thoughts expressed above and applied to the facts afore-stated, it becomes manifest that communication by the Court to the parties concerned or their counsel, of the information that an award has been filed is sufficient compliance with the requirements of Section 14 (2) of the Act and limitation would start running from the date information of the’ award having been filed in Court is communicated to the parties or their counsel for the purpose of filing of the objections, if any, to the award. It is also manifest that grant of time by the Court to the party for filing the award beyond the prescribed period of thirty days either suo motu or on the request of the party would not amount to extension of period of limitation within the meaning of Section 5, Limitation Act, 1963.
40. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, we, therefore, have no hesitation in holding that the defendant was duly served with the notice of the award having been filed in Court on 9-12-1991 on which date the counsel for the defendant had appeared and accepted the notice. We further hold that grant of time by the court on 5-5-1992 to the defendant for filing the objections to the award doe’s not amount to extension of the period of limitation within the meaning of Section 5, Limitation Act, 1963. The objections filed by the defendant to the award on 3-8-1992, therefore, are hopelessly barred by time, having been filed 239 days after service of notice of filing of the award.
41. The question now arising for consideration is whether the defendant has been able to show sufficient cause for condonation of the delay in filing the objections.
42. The delay in filing the objections in the present case is of 209 days, that is, from 8-1-1992 to 3-8-1992. In seeking the condonation of such delay the defendant has averred in para 5 of the application, quoted above, that its counsel Shri R. L. Sood, Advocate, after having accepted the notice of the filing of the award on 9-12-1991, did not inform or convey about any further action to be taken in the matter. That the defendant came to know about the proceedings only through letter dated 1-4-1992 received from Shri Dharam Chand, Additional Central Government Standing Counsel.
43. The date on which letter dated 1-4-1992 was received by the defendant has not been given. However, it can be safely presumed that in the ordinary course the said letter must have been received by the defendant in the first week of April 1992, that is, at the most by 7-4-1992.
44. Assuming that the counsel after having accepted the notice of the filing of the award on 9-12-1991 had failed to inform the defendant and that the defendant came to know about the filing of the award for the first time through letter dated 1-4-1992 and further assuming that negligence and/or failure of the counsel to inform the defendant constitutes a sufficient cause for the condonation of delay, the defendant has been able to show sufficient cause for the delay only till the date of the letter dated 1-4-1992. Insofar as the period subsequent to the receipt of letter dated 1-4-1992 is concerned, there is nothing on the record to show as to why me objections could not be filed immediately thereafter. There has been a delay of about four months in filing the objections even after the receipt of the letter dated 1-4-1992 by the defendant from its counsel. Therefore, we hold that the learned single Judge had rightly exercised the discretion under Section 5, Limitation Act, 1963, against the defendant by declining to condone the delay.
45. Having dismissed the objections to the award as time-barred and finding no cause to remit the award, the learned single Judge has rightly made the same the rule of the Court by passing a decree in terms thereof.
46. Resultantly, the present appeal is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.