JUDGMENT
A.P. Deshpande, J.
1. Heard Counsel for the parties.
2. At the request of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the name of the respondent No. 3 is allowed to be deleted in Writ Petition No. 624/1994.
3. As the issue involved in the Writ Petition and the Civil Revision Application is the same, and in between the same parties, I proceed to decide both the matters by this common judgment.
4. Maharashtra State Electricity Board instituted a Special Civil Suit bearing No. 251/1986 against the Central Railway and Northern Railway, so also, against one private party by name, M/s. Rozi Enterprises Private Ltd., for a money claim in the sum of Rs. 4,37,921.68 Ps. Notices came to be issued in the said suit to the defendants (hereinafter referred to as Railways and the private party). Pending the suit, Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, came to be enacted and it came in force from 23rd December 1987. The said Act constituted Claims Tribunal for adjudication of claims referred to in Section 13(1) and Section 13(1-A) of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987.
5. After the Act came into force, the Civil Suit came to be transferred to the Tribunal constituted under the said Act. The said transfer was without hearing the M.S.E.B./plaintiff and, as such, after the transfer, M.S.E.B. filed an application before the Tribunal and objected to its jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim made in the suit. It was the contention of M.S.E.B. that the Tribunal constituted under Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, is a Tribunal with limited jurisdiction and, as such, only such claims that would fall within the ambit of Section 13(1) and Section 13(1-A) could only be adjudicated by the Claims Tribunal and, if and in case, a claim does not fall within the ambit of Section 13(1) and Section 13(1-A), then the Civil Court would be the only competent forum to adjudicate the same.
6. In reply to the said application, the Railways contended that after the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, came into force, Civil Court ceased to have jurisdiction to decide any claim against the Railways. It was the submission of the Railways that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been ousted by Section 15 of the said Act which contains bar of jurisdiction. Section 15 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, reads as under :–
“On and from the appointed day, no court or other authority shall have, or be entitled to, exercise any jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to the matters referred to in Sub-sections (1) and (1-A) of Section 13.
The Tribunal heard the respective parties and by a reasoned order held that the claim made in the present suit does not fall within the purview of Section 13(1) of the Act and, as such, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to decide the issue involved in the transferred suit and hence ordered re-transfer of the suit from the file of the Tribunal to the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division). It is this order passed by the Tribunal which is challenged in Writ Petition No. 624 of 1994.
7. After the re-transfer of the suit to the Civil Court, the Railways again moved, application contending therein that the jurisdiction to decide the claim in the suit is only with the Railway Claims Tribunal and that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction. The Civil Judge (Senior Division) rejected the said application filed by the Railways as it concurred with the reasoned order passed by the Railway Claims Tribunal. The order passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division) rejecting the application of the Railways contending that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction is challenged in Civil Revision Application No. 187 of 1994.
8. In effect, the only question that needs to be considered and decided in both the matter is as to whether the claim made in the suit falls within the ambit of Sub-sections (1) and (1-A) of Section 13 of the said Act and, as such, could be tried only by the Tribunal to the exclusion of the Civil Court or as to whether the claim falls outside the scope of Sub-sections (1) and (1-A) of the said Act and, as such, it is exclusively triable by the Civil Judge (Senior Division). Before adverting to the said question, it is necessary to refer to the pleadings of the parties as the answer to the said question would depend on the pleadings for determining the real nature of the claim.
9. It is pleaded by the M.S.E.B. / plaintiff in the suit that M.S.E.B. had invited tenders for supply of goods and the defendant No. 3 – a private party being successful tenderer was granted a contract to supply the goods to various store centers of the Railways. It is contended that it was obligatory on the part of the defendant No. 3 (private party) to dispatch the goods duly insured, freight prepaid and at carriers risk to different destinations as mentioned in the purchase order. As per the terms of contract, when the defendant No. 3 (private party) presented the bills accompanied with the original R. R. together with other documents through the Bank, M.S.E.B. honoured the documents negotiated through the Bank and paid the amount claimed. The goods were to be received by the Stores Officer of M.S.E.B. at Ahmednagar for whom the consignment was booked. The original R. R. was presented by the consignee to the Chief Goods Officer, Central Railway where the goods were to be delivered. As the Railway authority at
Ahmednagar informed the consignee that the goods were not received at the destination Railway Station, the plaintiff had no other option but to wait for sufficient time and in spite of repeated enquiry the plaintiff was informed that the goods have not been received. As the goods were not delivered by the Railways to the M.S.E.B., M.S.E.B. lodged a claim with Chief Claims Officer, Central Railway, for non-receipt of goods. The claim made by the M.S.E.B. came to be repudiated by the Chief Claims Officer, Central Railway, Bombay, on the ground that the consignment was involved in fraud at Tughalakabad from where goods were allegedly sent for despatch by Railway.
10. It is then pleaded specifically in para 6 of the plaint by the plaintiff, as follows:–
‘-The plaintiff is not aware as to whether the actual goods were delivered by defendant No. 3 to defendant No. 2 at Tughalakabad or whether they were lost or damaged in transit by defendant No. 1 and 2 or otherwise. If the goods were not delivered by defendant No. 3, then the officers of defendant No. 1, 2 and 3 in collusion prepared the false documents, namely, R. R. No. B-304930, dated 4-5-1984 and deceived the plaintiff for Rs. 3,05,067.31. If R.R. was prepared by the office of defendant No. 2 in collusion with defendant No. 3, then it is submitted that both defendant Nos. 2 and 3 are jointly and severally liable to pay Rs. 3,05,067-38 with interest to the plaintiff. If the goods were actually delivered by the defendant No. 3 to defendant No. 2, and in case goods are lost or otherwise disposed of and misappropriated in transit either by defendants Nos. 1 and 2, then it is submitted that defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are jointly and severally liable to pay Rs. 3,05,067-38 with interest to the plaintiff. The plaintiff submits that defendant No. 3 used the R.R. for getting the payment from plaintiff for the alleged supply of goods mentioned in R.R. and defendant No- 3 received the payment of Rs. 3,05,057-38 from plaintiff through Bank. Thus, defendant NOS. 1 to 3 are jointly and severally liable to pay a sum of Rs. 3,05,067-38 with interest to the plaintiff.”
11. The Railways opposed the claim made by M.S.E.B. by filing . written statement and specifically contended as follows;–
“The said consignment has not been tendered for booking. Mere issue of Railway Receipt does not fasten any liability on the Railway Administration. It is, therefore, for the plaintiffs to prove that goods were tendered for booking, the goods were accepted by Railway staff and Railway Receipt was issued. It is submitted that Railway Receipt has been issued without getting possession of the goods by the Railway staff through genuine mistake. As the facts stand, there were no goods tendered and since Railway Receipt is not a negotiable
instrument no right has accrued to the plaintiffs until plaintiffs prove that goods were handed over to Railway staff. As goods were not tendered for carriage, the question of delivery does not arise.”
12. Perusal of the said pleading gives rise to two important issues, the first being as to whether at all the goods were tendered for carriage to the Railway administration and the second, as to whether the claim of M.S.E.B. is to be granted or not and if it is to be granted, whether against the Railways or the private party or against both jointly and severally. With this factual background, I proceed to consider the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties in view of the provisions of law.
13. Section 13 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, is reproduced below:
“Jurisdiction, powers and authority of Claims Tribunal. — (1) The Claims Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as were exercisable immediately before that day by any Civil Court or a Claims Commissioner appointed under the provisions of the Railways Act, —
(a) relating to the responsibility of the Railway administrations as carriers under Chapter VII of the Railways Act in respect of claims for - (i) compensation for loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or non-delivery of animals or goods entrusted to a Railway administration for carriage by Railway; (ii) compensation payable under Section 82-A of the Railways Act or the rules made thereunder; and (b) in respect of the claims for refund of fares or part thereof or for refund of any freight paid in respect of animals or goods entrusted to a Railway administration to be carried by Railway. (1-A) The Claims Tribunal shall also exercise, on and from the date of commencement of the provisions of Section 124A of the Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989), all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as were exercisable immediately before that date by any Civil Court in respect of claims for compensation now payable by the Railway administration under Section 124A of the said Act or the rules made thereunder. (2) The provisions of the Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989) and the rules made thereunder shall, so far as may be, be applicable to the inquiring into or determining, any claims by the Claims Tribunal under this Act. 14. Section 13 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, is a complete code in regard to the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Claims
Tribunal. A Tribunal is set up by a special statute with limited jurisdiction to deal with only specified claims stated in the opening part of Sub-section (1) of Section 13. The Claims Tribunal has been invested with all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as were exercisable immediately before the appointed day by any Civil Court or a Claims Commissioner appointed under the provisions of the Railways Act. The said powers and jurisdiction is to be exercised in relation to the cases falling under Clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of Section 13 of the said Act. The jurisdiction to be exercised by the Claims Tribunal is only in relation to the responsibility of the Railway Administration as carriers under Chapter VII of the Railways Act.
15. In the present case, there is no dispute that only Clause (a) of Subsection (1) of Section 13 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, requires to be considered as other provisions have no relevance to the issue in dispute. Clause (a) clearly stipulates and limits the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to the extent of the responsibility of the Railway Administration as carriers. A plain reading of Section 13(1)(a) leaves no room of doubt that the Tribunal has limited jurisdiction and in regard to claims having a bearing on responsibility of the Railway Administration as carriers. At this juncture, it will not be out of place to state that it is the case of Railways, as made out in the written statement, that goods were never delivered for carriage and hence there is no question of the said claim or dispute falling within the phraseology used in Clause (a) i.e. “responsibility of the railway administration as carriers”. I have no hesitation to hold that as the issue involved in the present suit does not fall within the ambit of Clause (a), for the reason that it is the claim of the Railways that they had never acted as carriers and, as such, there is no question of adjudicating the responsibility of Railway Administration as carriers which is postulated by Section 13.
16. The learned Counsel for the petitioner then contended that there is clear bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court, under Section 15 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987. On perusal of Section 15, it is evident that the bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court is only in regard to the matters covered by Sub-sections (1) and (1-A) of Section 13. If and in case a claim or a dispute falls outside the scope of Sub-sections (1) and (1-A) of Section 13, then obviously the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction. It was sought to be contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that, as a special forum, is provided by a special statute, the jurisdiction of Civil Court will be barred by implication. It is the submission of the learned Counsel, that the entire jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted in regard to all claims against the Railways.
17. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court, in the case of Union of India v. Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills Ltd., 2001(2) Mh.LJ. 381. The learned Single Judge has held that if suit presented indicates that it is essentially a claim against Railways and involves issues exclusively triable by Claims Tribunal
then jurisdiction of Civil Court would be barred by Section 15 even where other defendants, besides the Railway, are joined in the suit. I have gone through the said judgment delivered by my learned Brother (Shri A. M. Khanwilkar, J.). In the said case, on facts it was found and I reproduce as under:–
“No doubt, the respondent No. 1 has prayed for relief against all the defendants to pay jointly and/or severally and in the alternative to the respondent No. 1 the suit claim of Rs. 1,15,0007- and future interest. But on close examination of the averments in the plaint it would be seen that the said relief is a camouflage to defeat the exclusive jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal which has been constituted under the Act, 1987. On examination of the averments in the plaint it will be seen that allegations have been made “against the Railways; for having failed to deliver the goods; for being indifferent; for having adopted unreasonable attitude; for having diverted the goods etc. entrusted to Railway administration for carriage by Railways, on close scrutiny of the pleadings it would be seen that the gravamen of the allegations is against the Railways and defendants 2 and 3 have been impleaded only to create a camouflage so as to defeat the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal under the Act.
18. As the learned Single Judge held that the said suit was essentially only against the Railways and as the claim fell within purview of Subsection l(a) of Section 13 of the Railway Clams Tribunal Act, 1987, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was ousted. The facts of the case cited by the learned Counsel and referred to hereinabove are altogether different from the facts of the present case. In the case referred to above, the suit was essentially against the Railways and impleading of private parties as defendants was by way of camouflage intended to oust the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Such is not the case in the matter in hand. There is a genuine claim made by M.S.E.B. against the defendant No. 3, the private party, along with the Railways. The present suit was filed after the Act came into force and, as such, there is no question of an intention to avoid the forum set up by the special Act and even otherwise I have no hesitation in holding that the claim in the present suit falls outside the scope of Section 13(1)(a). If and in case, the claim falls outside the scope of Section 13(1)(a), then it is obvious that bar of Section 15 does not operate.
19. The view that I have taken is backed by a judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ratnakar Tanbaji Itankar v. Union of India, . In the said judgment, the Division Bench has categorically held that it is only in regard to such claims which are expressly referred to in Section 13(1) of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, that the jurisdiction of Civil Court is sought to be ousted under Section 15 of the said Act. The Division Bench has categorically held in para 24 of the judgment, thus :–
“in appreciating the submission made on behalf of the appellant regarding the question of exclusive jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal to entertain the claims for compensation, against the Railways, it is necessary to see that the fallacy in the above submission lies in the fact that it is assumed that the remedy provided before the Claims Tribunal is a general remedy. In fact, it is just otherwise. The Claims Tribunal under the Claims Tribunals Act is a Tribunal of limited and specified jurisdiction. It can exercise jurisdiction and power as conferred upon it under the said Act only. It is well settled that the Civil Courts are the Courts of general jurisdiction and unless therefore, the remedy in regard to the enforcement of a particular right is expressly or by necessary implication barred, the people have a right to insist upon free access to the Courts of general jurisdiction of the State to enforce their rights.
The Division Bench has further in unequivocal terms laid down thus:–
“In view of the above principles relating to the ouster of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts, what has to be seen in the instant case is not whether the claim lies before the Civil Court or not, but whether the claim can lie before the Claims Tribunal or not. As hereinbefore pointed out, Section 13(1) of the Claims Tribunal Act provides for jurisdiction, power and authority of the Claims Tribunal and by virtue of the express provisions contained in Section 15 thereof the jurisdiction of the Civil Court or any other authority is barred in regard to the matters specified in the said Section 13(1) of the said Act thus making the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal exclusive upon the said matters under Section 13(1) of the said Act. Therefore, in regard to the matters other than matters covered by Section 13(1) of the said Act, the Civil Court will have jurisdiction to entertain a Civil Suit.”
In view of the interpretation of Section 13 and Section 15 by the Division Bench of this Court, it is no longer res integra that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is specified and limited to the extent of cases falling under Section 13(1) and (1-A) and it cannot extend to claims falling outside the scope of the said provision.
20. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has invited my attention to a judgment “6f Madhya Pradesh High Court, delivered by a learned Single Judge, in the case of M.P. State Co-operative Marketing Federation Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., . In the said case, the appellants had claimed possession for loss on account of non-deli very the claim was made against the Railways, so also, other parties besides the Railways and the learned Single Judge has held that the Civil Court will not be having jurisdiction and the
jurisdiction would vest in Claims Tribunal established under the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987. The said judgment is very cryptic and it hardly deals with the question of jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal under Section 13 of the Act. The learned Counsel for the petitioner tried to submit that the view taken in the said judgment is that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is totally ousted. I am afraid, if that is the view taken in the said judgment, I respectfully disagree with the same. In view of the Division Bench Judgment of this Court, the learned Counsel for the petitioner failed in persuading me to take the view as per the judgment of learned Single Judge of Madhya Pradesh High Court.
21. In the result, the Writ Petition, so also, the revision application fail and the same are dismissed. Having regard to the facts of the present case, there shall be no order as to costs.