JUDGMENT
D.S.R. Varma, J.
1. Heard both sides.
2. Since the issue involved being same and all the Civil Miscellaneous Appeals arise out of a common order and decrees, dated 05.10.1998, passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-cum-District Judge, Guntur (for brevity “the Tribunal”), in M.V.O.P.Nos. 188, 318 and 319 of 1994, respectively, we deem it appropriate to dispose of the same by this common judgment.
3. The United India Insurance Company Limited (for brevity “the insurer”) has filed the appeals C.M.A.Nos. 435, 469 and 556 of 1999, under Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity “the Act”), against the common order and decrees, dated 05.10.1998, passed by the Tribunal, in M.V.O.P.Nos. 318, 188 and 319 of 1994, respectively; while the claimants have filed the appeals C.M.A.Nos. 968 and 974 of 1999, under Section 173(1) of the Act against the common order and decrees, dated 05.10.1998, passed by the Tribunal, in M.V.O.P.Nos. 319 and 318 of 1994, respectively.
4. The factual matrix is as under:
On 24.01.1994 at about 4 a.m., while the claimant in M.V.O.P.No.188 of 1994, one Dhulipala Veeraiah Chowdary (for brevity “the deceased”) in M.V.O.P.No.318 of 1994 and the claimant in M.V.O.P.No.319 of 1994 were returning from Guntur to Chintalapudi in a jeep bearing No. AP.7D-3536, it was hit by the lorry bearing No. ADG-2322, which was coming from opposite direction at high speed, in a rash and negligent manner and contrary to the traffic rules, resulting in the death of the deceased on the spot and the claimants in two other M.V.O.Ps., were grievously injured. To that effect, a report was made to the Police, which was registered as Crime No. 9 of 1994 for the offences punishable under Sections 304-A and 338 I.P.C.
5. The claimants in all the three M.V.O.Ps., have claimed different amounts depending upon either the injuries received by them in the accident or due to the death of the deceased in M.V.O.P.No.318 of 1994.
6. The Tribunal, having considered the entire material, including the evidence, both oral and documentary, available on record, awarded different amounts towards compensation to the claimants in all the three M.V.O.Ps.
7. Feeling aggrieved by the amounts awarded by the Tribunal towards compensation, the appeals C.M.A.Nos. 435, 469 and 556 of 1999 have been filed by the insurer and the appeals C.M.A.Nos. 968 and 974 of 1999 have been filed by the claimants for not granting interest on the amount of compensation.
8. A sum of Rs. 13,000/- was granted by the Tribunal towards compensation to the claimant in M.V.O.P.No.188 of 1994. Since the said amount is very trivial, at the outset, we are not inclined to interfere with the said amount, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case. Hence, the appeal C.M.A.No.469 of 1999 filed by the insurer is liable to be dismissed on the sole ground of triviality and not on any other ground.
9. Coming to the other appeals viz., C.M.A.No.435 of 1999, C.M.A.No.556 of 1998, C.M.A.No.968 of 1999 and C.M.A.No.974 of 1999, there is not much dispute on the merits.
10. In order to substantiate their claims, the claimant in M.V.O.P.No.188 of 1994, the claimant No. 2 in M.V.O.P.No.318 of 1994 and the claimant in M.V.O.P.No.319 of 1994 examined themselves as P.Ws.1, 2 and 4 and five others as P.Ws.3 and 5 to 8 and got marked Exs.A-1 to A-18 on their behalf. On behalf of the insurer, R.Ws.1 to 4 were examined and Exs.B-1 to B-5 were marked. Exs.X-1 and X-2 were also marked by the Tribunal, with consent of both parties.
11. Regarding the manner in which the accident occurred, there is no much controversy. However, from a perusal of the impugned common order of the Tribunal, it is seen that the Tribunal had recorded a finding that the accident had occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the lorry by its driver resulting in the death of the deceased in M.V.O.P.No.318 of 1994 and receiving injuries by the claimants in M.V.O.P.Nos. 188 and 319 of 1994. Further, no evidence was let in, in order to show that there was negligence on the part of the driver of the jeep in which the deceased and the claimants were travelling. Ex.A-1 is the certified copy of F.I.R., from which it can be seen that the lorry hit the jeep since the driver of the lorry was driving negligently. Further, the driver of the lorry was convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 304-A, 338 and 337 I.P.C., and was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year, three months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, respectively, for the said offences.
12. The Tribunal, having considered all the material facts on record, awarded different sums towards compensation to the claimants in all the three M.V.O.Ps. Aggrieved by the said common order, granting compensation, the insurer has filed the appeals C.M.A.Nos. 435, 469 and 556 of 1999 and the claimants have filed the appeals C.M.A.Nos. 968 and 974 of 1999 for not granting any interest on the amount awarded to them towards compensation.
13. The main contention of the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the insurer, while denying compensation to the claimants, is that the driver of the lorry, who hit the ill-fated jeep, was not holding a valid driving licence at the time of accident. It is his further contention that at the time of accident, the driver of the lorry has only Light Motor Vehicle driving licence, which does not authorise him to drive a heavy goods vehicle like a lorry.
14. The said controversy is, in fact, no longer res integra. A three-judge Bench of the apex Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh has elaborately discussed the subject on effective licence in the light of various provisions of the Act. The observations made by Their Lordships of the apex Court in Swaran Singh’s case (supra), at Paragraph No. 82, are thus:
82. … A person possessing a driving licence for ‘motorcycle without gear’, for which he has no licence. Cases may also arise where a holder of driving licence for ‘light motor vehicle’ is found to be driving a ‘maxicab’, ‘motor-cab’ or ‘omnibus’ for which he has no licence. In each case on evidence led before the Claims Tribunal, a decision has to be taken whether the fact of the driver possessing licence for one type of vehicle but found driving another type of vehicle, was the main or contributory cause of accident. If on facts, it is found that accident was caused solely because of some other unforeseen or intervening causes like mechanical failures and similar other causes having no nexus with driver not possessing requisite type of licence, the insurer will not be allowed to avoid its liability merely for technical breach of conditions concerning driving licence.
15. At Paragraph Nos. 83 and 84, Their Lordships of the apex Court went on observing further, as under:
83. We have construed and determined the scope of Sub-clause (ii) of Sub-section (2)(a) of Section 149 of the Act. Minor breaches of licence conditions, such as want of medical fitness certificate, requirement about age of the driver and the like not found to have been the direct cause of the accident, would be treated as minor breaches or inconsequential deviation in the matter of use of vehicles. Such minor and inconsequential deviations with regard to licensing conditions would not constitute sufficient ground to deny the benefit of coverage of insurance to the third parties.
84. On all pleas of breach of licensing conditions taken by the insurer, it would be open to the Tribunal to adjudicate the claim and decide inter se liability of the insurer and insured; although where such adjudication is likely to entail undue delay in decision of the claim of the victim, the Tribunal in its discretion may relegate the insurer to seek its remedy of reimbursement from the insured in the civil court.
16. Their Lordships of the apex Court further discussed in detail the effect of ‘defective licence’ in different manners including the effect of a ‘fake driving licence’, ‘learner’s licence’ etc. However, the observations on those aspects made by the apex Court are not relevant for the present purpose.
17. From the above observations, it is absolutely clear that only in cases where the accident was caused because of some unforeseen reasons like mechanical failure or any other reasons, which do not have direct bearing on the aspect of driver not possessing requisite licence, the insurer shall not be absolved from the liability and that driving a vehicle with no requisite licence is to be considered as a technical breach of conditions so far as the driving licence is concerned; and also that the manner and inconsequential deviations shall not be regarded as vital aspects for the purpose of denying the benefit of coverage of insurance to the third parties.
18. The three-judge Bench of the apex Court in Swaran Singh’s case 2004 ACJ 1 (supra) eventually recorded the findings, at paragraph Nos. 38 and 39, so far as the present issue is concerned, which are thus:
38. The words ‘effective licence’ used in Section 3, therefore, in our opinion cannot be imported for Sub-section (2) of Section 149 of Motor Vehicles Act. We must also notice that the words ‘duly licensed’ used in Sub-section (2) of Section 149 are used in past tense.
39. Thus, a person whose licence is ordinarily renewed in terms of the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules framed thereunder despite the fact that during the interregnum period, namely, when the accident took place and the date of expiry of the licence, he did not have a valid licence, he could during the prescribed period apply for renewal thereof and could obtain the same automatically without undergoing any further test or without having been declared unqualified therefore. Proviso appended to Section 14 in unequivocal term states that the licence remains valid for a period of thirty days from the day of its expiry.
19. The three-judge Bench of the apex Court concluded the judgment, at paragraph Nos. 96 and 97, with the following significant observations:
96. It is, therefore, evident from the discussions made hereinbefore that the liability of the insurance company to satisfy the decree at the first instance and to recover the awarded amount from the owner or driver thereof has been holding the field for a long time.
97. Apart from the reasons stated hereinbefore the doctrine of stare decicis persuades us not to deviate from the said principle.
20. It was further held by Their Lordships of the apex Court that it is well-settled rule of law and should not ordinarily be deviated from. At Paragraph No. 99, Their Lordships of the apex Court in Swaran Singh’s case 2004 ACJ 1 (supra) further observed that:
99. …Tribunal and the court must, however, exercise their jurisdiction to issue such a direction upon consideration of the facts and circumstances of such case and in the event such a direction has been issued despite arriving at a finding of fact to the effect that the insurer has been able to establish that the insured has committed a breach of contract of insurance as envisaged under Sub-clause (ii) of Clause (a) of Sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, the insurance company shall be entitled to realize the awarded amount from the owner or driver of the vehicle, as the case may be, in execution of the same award having regard to the provisions of Sections 165 and 168 of the Act. However, in the event, having regard to the limited scope of inquiry in the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal it had not been able to do so, the insurance company may initiate a separate action therefore against the owner or the driver of the vehicle or both, as the case may be. Those exceptional cases may arise when the evidence becomes available to or comes to the notice of the insurer at a subsequent stage or for one reason or the other, the insurer was not given opportunity to defend at all….
21. From the above, Their Lordships of the apex Court made it further clear that the jurisdiction of the Court to issue a direction to the insurer to satisfy the decree at the first instance and to recover the said amount later from the owner or the driver, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In other words, a duty of redemption can be cast upon the insurer initially with a liberty to recover the same from the insured or the driver, as the case may be, or in some cases where the evidence is so enormous to the extent that the insured alone should be fastened with the liability for any breach wit., either under the statute or under the contract, the Courts are at liberty to fasten the liability on the insured instead of the insurer. But, such a discretionary jurisdiction can be exercised by the Courts only in limited and exceptional circumstances, particularly having regard to the fact that the Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial piece of legislation, and the loss suffered by the injured has to be redeemed first by the insurer, then can be recovered from the insured.
22. At times, it may also happen that if the initial liability is fastened against the insured alone, it would be difficult for the injured to get the compensation in times of need or may get after a prolonged litigation. A tired injured person may not desirably in all cases be asked to initiate further litigation against the insured for compensation.
23. In this context, it is to be seen from the record that the Tribunal had recorded a categorical finding that the driver of the lorry was driving the lorry in a rash and negligent manner and on the wrong side of the road, wherein the jeep carrying the injured and the deceased was proceeding and further that the driver of the said lorry was not having adequate driving licence. Therefore, since the lorry was insured indisputably against the third parties also, the insurer cannot be absolved from its liability to pay the compensation to the claimants.
24. The other significant aspect that was pointed out in Swaran Singh’s case (supra) is that the burden of proving the breach of conditions of policy like and including the disqualification of the driver or invalid driving licence, as mentioned in Section 149 (2) of the Act, is attributable or committed by the insured, vests with the insurer, in order to avoid its liability and such disqualification of the driver cannot by itself a defence available to the insurer either against the insured or the third parties. In other words, a duty is cast upon the insurer to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to take reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the conditions of policy.
25. Coming to the case on hand, no doubt, the main defences of the insurer are – firstly, there was rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the jeep in which the deceased and the injured were travelling and secondly, the driver of the lorry was holding inadequate driving licence at the time of accident i.e., he was holding a driving licence of ‘Light Motor Vehicle’, but not ‘Heavy Motor Vehicle’ authorizing him to driver a heavy vehicle like a lorry and therefore, the liability cannot be fastened against the insurer.
26. The question of fastening the liability on the insurer, as a matter of basic principle of redemption, would arise when initial liability is fastened against the insured. But, in cases like ‘fake driving licence’ or ‘inadequate driving licence’, as already pointed out, a fundamental duty is cast upon the insurer to prove that the insured was negligent in allowing the vehicle to be driven by a person with ‘fake driving licence’ or ‘inadequate driving licence’.
27. In the instant case, insofar as the aspect of rashness and negligence is concerned, the Tribunal had recorded a categorical finding that there was absolutely no rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the jeep; on the contrary, rash and negligent driving was attributed to the driver of the lorry, who caused the accident and, in fact, the driver of the lorry was also convicted in the Criminal Case.
28. Therefore, it can only be said that the insurer could establish only one aspect i.e., the driver of the lorry was holding ‘inadequate driving licence’ and in such a case, what should follow – is the incidental question.
29. This question also had already been answered by the apex Court, through the excerpts of Swaran Singh’s case 2004 ACJ 1 (supra), as already recorded above, that the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liability to pay the compensation, and, on the other hand, is girdled with the initial liability of paying the amount of compensation and recover the same from the insured or the driver, as the case may be.
30. The learned Standing Counsel appearing for the insurer contends that, no doubt, the apex Court in different cases like New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Kamla , United India Insurance Co. Ltd v. Lehru , Swaran Singh’s case (supra), National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur , Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd v. Nanjappan , held that the insurer has to pay the amount of compensation to the injured initially and recover the same from the insured, but, however, in a recent judgment in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Bommithi Subbhayamma a two- judge Bench of the apex Court has deviated from the principle laid down in the earlier cases and observed that the claimants would be entitled to recover the amount of compensation granted by the Tribunal from the owner of the vehicle. Therefore, it is contended by the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the insurer that the insurer cannot be asked to pay the compensation and recover from the insured, as held in the earlier cases, since this is a clear deviation in the view taken by the apex Court.
31. In this regard, it is necessary to notice the facts, in brief, which are relevant, in Bommithi Subbhayamma’s case (supra), which are thus:
The deceased died while travelling in a lorry, which met with an accident. A claim application had been filed and the Tribunal had granted a sum of Rs. 1,30,000/- towards compensation with interest. However, the Tribunal was of the opinion that the insurer was not liable to pay the said amount of compensation as the deceased was travelling in a lorry as a gratuitous passenger, and the same can be recovered from the insured. When the said award came to be questioned before the High Court, the same was reversed basing on the decision of the apex Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Satpal Singh . The insurer had filed a Special Leave Petition before the apex Court, on which a two-judge Bench of the apex Court, while considering the scope of the decision in New India Assurance Co. Ltd v. Asha Rani , whereby the decision in Satpal Singh’s case (supra) was reversed, held that the insurer was not liable to pay any compensation for the death of a gratuitous passenger travelling in a goods vehicle.
32. It is in those set of facts and circumstances, which are different from the present set of facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal in the said case had directed the claimants to claim the amount of compensation from the insured instead of directing the insurer to pay the amount and recover the same from the insured and the apex Court, while setting aside the decision of the High Court, had approved the view taken by the Tribunal.
33. From the above facts and circumstances, it is apparent that it was a case where the deceased was travelling in a vehicle, which met with an accident, as a gratuitous passenger.
34. Further, the prime issue that had fallen for consideration in Satpal Singh’s case (supra), and the principle laid down therein, which was over-ruled by the apex Court in Asha Rani’s case (Supra), was regarding the liability of the insurer to pay the amount of compensation to a ‘gratuitous passenger’. Therefore, the decision of the High Court in Bommithi Subbhayamma’s case (supra) was set aside by the apex Court since was rendered basing on Satpal Singh’s case (supra). Their Lordships of the apex Court, while reiterating and explaining the scope of the decision in Asha Rani’s case (supra), observed thus:
… The premium in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods for his authorized representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.
35. From the above, the subject matter of the controversy appears to be firstly, whether a gratuitous passenger is entitled to claim compensation and secondly, whether the insurer can be asked to pay compensation initially and recover the same from the insured.
36. So far as the first issue is concerned, the law laid down by the apex Court in Asha Rani’s case (supra) covers the field i.e., a gratuitous passenger is not entitled to have any compensation and further that Bommithi Subbhayamma’s case (supra) is in absolute consonance with the decision rendered in Asha Rani’s case (supra) for the simple reason that, in both the cases, the question involved was as to whether the compensation is to be paid for a gratuitous passenger or not and, in both the cases, the deceased were held to be gratuitous passengers. But, however, the apex Court while confirming the award, passed by the Tribunal, directed the claimants to proceed against the insured. In other words, the concept of ‘pay and recover’ was not make available to the claimants both in Asha Rani’s case (supra) and Bommithi Subbhayamma’s case (supra), since both the cases deal with the rights of gratuitous passengers and obligation of insurer.
37. However, so far as the second issue is concerned i.e., who is to be asked to pay the compensation initially – whether the insurer or the insured, it is already noticed that it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case, but in most of the cases, particularly in cases like ‘no driving licence’, ‘fake driving licence’ or ‘inadequate driving licence’, which are violations under Sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, have to be proved as violations attributable to the insured.
38. As already pointed out, there is absolutely nothing on record as regards the failure on the part of the insured in allowing the vehicle to be driven by a person with ‘inadequate driving licence’. Therefore, it is not only improper and also contrary to the very spirit of the enactment to ask the claimants or their legal representatives to proceed against the insured seeking compensation for the injuries or the death, as the case may be, in a road accident.
39. The parameters prescribed in Bommithi Subbhayamma’s case (supra), to direct the claimants to proceed against the insured, cannot be treated as in deviation to the guidelines prescribed in the earlier decisions of the apex Court, since the facts and circumstances in BOMMITHI Bommithi Subbhayamma’s case (supra) and Swaran Singh’s case (supra) are altogether different.
40. In Baljit Kaur’s case (supra) also, a three-judge Bench of the apex Court, while dealing with a case where the High Court fastened the liability on the insurer, basing on the decision in Satpal Singh’s case (supra), has set aside the same following the decision in Asha Rani’s case (supra). It is to be noted that in that case also, the apex Court was dealing with the question as to whether a gratuitous passenger was entitled to redemption from the insurer. While dealing with the said situation, Their Lordships of the apex Court, in Baljit Kaur’s case (supra), at paragraph No. 21, observed thus:
21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh (supra). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani (Supra). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be sub-served if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claim as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner or driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the tribunal in such a proceeding. For the aforementioned reasons, the appeals are partly allowed to the aforementioned extent and subject to the directions aforementioned. But there shall be no order as to costs. Appeals partly allowed.
41. The principle laid down by the apex Court in Asha Rani’s case (supra) was further stretched a little in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Tilak Singh .
42. In Tilak Singh’s case (supra), the observations and conclusions, of the apex Court, at paragraph No. 27, are extracted for ready reference, which are thus:
27. Furthermore, Sub-clauses (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 147 speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place, whereas Sub-clause (ii) thereof deals with liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place.
43. Now, as held in Swaran Singh’s case (supra), the insurer can raise all available defences to avoid its liability, but must also establish ‘breach’ on the part of the insured, and the burden of proof of the same would be on the insurer.
44. As already noticed, in the instant case, even though the insurer has raised the objections/breaches, from a careful perusal of the impugned common order and the evidence on record, obviously the insurer could not establish such breach or breaches that are attributable exclusively to the insured. Furthermore, in Kamla’s case (supra) and Lehru’s case (supra), the apex Court has already held that the initial burden of paying compensation to the claimant or his legal representatives is on the insurer, which is to be recovered from the insured. In Kamla’s case (supra), the apex Court, at paragraph No. 21, held thus:
21. A reading of the proviso to Sub-section (4) as well as the language employed in Sub-section (5) would indicate that they are intended to safeguard the interest of an insurer who otherwise has no liability to pay any amount to the insured but for the provisions contained in Chapter XI of the Act. This means, the insurer has to pay to the third parties only on account of the fact that a policy of insurance has been issued in respect of the vehicle, but the insurer is entitled to recover any such sum from the insured if the insurer were not otherwise liable to pay such sum to the insured by virtue of the conditions of the contract of insurance indicated by the policy.
45. These two decisions have been referred to in Swaran Singh’s case 2004 ACJ 1 (supra), of course, in different contexts. But, however, in the findings, at paragraph Nos. 96 and 97, Their Lordships of the apex Court held that this principle of asking the insurer to pay the compensation first and recover the same from the insured next as a settled proposition and hence amounts to stare decicis. Therefore, the said decision in Swaran Singh’s case 2004 ACJ 1 (supra), which was rendered by a three-judge Bench of the apex Court is binding on this Court. However, we are of the view that the decision in Bommithi Subbhayamma’s case (supra) is not in deviation, as contended by the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the insurer, since the propositions of law laid down in both the cases are on different facts and circumstances. The same is not only reiteration of the principles laid down in Asha Rani’s case (SC) (supra), which dealt with a situation of a gratuitous passenger, the said principle was extended further to gratuitous passengers of other vehicles also.
46. Coming to the aspect of application of multiplier in M.V.O.P.No.318 of 1994, it is to be seen that the deceased was aged about 51 years at the time of accident. The correct and right multiplier applicable to the case on hand is ‘7’ in view of the decision of this Court in Bhagawan Das v. Mohd. Arif. 1989 (2) ALT 179 Therefore, the annual loss of dependency of the claimants would come to Rs. 50,000/- and after applying the multiplier ‘7’, the total loss of dependency would come to Rs. 3,50,000/-. Further, the Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs. 15,000/- towards ‘pain and suffering’ and a sum of Rs. 15,000/- towards ‘loss of consortium’, which, in our considered view, is reasonable.
47. In view of the above, the claimants in M.V.O.P.No.318 of 1994 are entitled to a total sum of Rs. 3,80,000/- (Rs.3,50,000/- + Rs. 15,000/- + Rs. 15,000/-) towards compensation. Therefore, the amount of Rs. 5,30,000/-, awarded by the Tribunal towards compensation to the claimants in M.V.O.P.No.318 of 1994, is liable to be reduced to Rs. 3,80,000/-, and accordingly the same is reduced from Rs. 5,30,000/- to Rs. 3,80,000/-.
48. So far as the quantum of amount awarded by the Tribunal towards compensation to the claimant in M.V.O.P.No.319 of 1994 is concerned, in view of the nature of injuries received by the claimant, who has been examined by P.W.4, we are not inclined to interfere with the said quantum of amount.
49. It is to be noticed that as per the docket proceedings, dated 19.02.1998, interest has been disallowed by the Tribunal to the claimants in M.V.O.P.No.318 and 319 of 1994, while dismissing the O.Ps. It appears that a condition was imposed, to the effect that the claimants are not entitled to interest on the amount to be awarded to them towards compensation, while restoring the said M.V.O.Ps., to file. Since no steps have been taken by the claimants in the said M.V.O.Ps., to challenge the said docket order, dated 19.02.1998, the same has become and hence it is not necessary to interfere with the finding recorded by the Tribunal so far as the aspect of interest, in the said M.V.O.Ps., is concerned.
50. In the result, the appeal C.M.A.No.435 of 1999 is allowed in part, reducing the amount awarded by the Tribunal towards compensation to the claimants from Rs. 5,30,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs Thirty Thousand Only) to Rs. 3,80,000/- (Rupees Three Lakhs Eighty Thousand Only) with liberty to the insurer to recover the same from the insured, as per the guidelines of the apex Court, referred to above. The appeals C.M.A.Nos. 469, 556, 968 and 974 of 1999 are dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.