JUDGMENT
D.K. Seth, J.
1. The petitioner No. 1 claims to be a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and seeks to represent its members. It is alleged that the 13 members named in the writ petition were occupying two room apartments constructed by the State Government for the residents of the industrial workers. According to the petitioners, there are two categories–one is lower income group (L.I.G.) and the other is higher income group (H.I.G.). The rent of L.I.G. was Rs. 16 and that of H.I.G. was Rs. 24.50. It is alleged that the said flats were allotted to some industrial workers who are either dead or have left. The petitioners have not disclosed how, on what condition and in which capacity they have come to occupy the said quarters. It is alleged in the writ petition that they are occupying the said flats for a very long time. In Para 10 of the writ petition. It has been stated that the quarters were initially allotted to other persons who have either left their employment or have retired or have changed their employment. In Para 11, it has been stated that the petitioners are workmen and they were allowed to live in the above premises by the tenants of the said quarters. Nowhere it has been stated that any of the petitioners were allottees of the quarters. By means of the present writ petition, the petitioners have challenged the Government Order, dated 29.11.1990 which is Annexure-6 to the writ petition on the ground of its being discriminatory and unreasonable since it had proposed to raise the rent to Rs. 235 per month while proposing to regularise their case if they satisfy the eligibility criteria from the date of their respective occupation.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously argues that the enhancement is wholly arbitrary and excessive and that it makes a discrimination between a regular allottee and the petitioners as occupiers. It is contended that the petitioners being workers belonging to the weaker section should not have been so discriminated. The rent charged appears to be a commercial rate which cannot be realised from the petitioners belonging to the weaker section of the society since the said buildings were constructed pursuant to a welfare scheme. The enhancement of rent is excessive and violative of natural justice. Because of their long occupation, the petitioners should be
treated as deemed tenant. Therefore, their occupation Is regular. Accordingly, the said order contained in Annexure-6 cannot be applied in their case.
3. We have heard Mr. S. P. Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioners and learned standing counsel at length.
4. Admittedly, the petitioners are not allottees of those quarters. Somehow or other they have entered into the accommodation. They have not disclosed as to in which manner they have come to occupy the said quarters. They have based their claim only on the ground that they are occupying the said quarters for a long time and, therefore, they should be treated as deemed tenant. Admittedly the petitioners are not regular allottees. Therefore, their occupation cannot be said to be authorised occupants. If such occupation is not effected by way of allotment, it cannot be said that there was a privity of contract between the Government and the petitioners. Therefore, the petitioners do form a different class other than the regular allottees. Therefore, It cannot be said that by charging different rate of rent from the petitioners who are not allottees the Government is discriminating between the petitioners and regular allottees.
5. The order dated 29.11.1990 (Annexure-6) came to be considered by this Court in the case of Jag Pal v. State of U. P. and others, 1996(27) ALR 653 : 1996 (2) UPLBEC 1025 : 1996 (1) ARC 238, decided by one of us. The order dated 29.11.1990 which is Annexure-6 to the writ petition was Annexure-4 in the said case. In the said case, it was held as hereinafter.
“5. Admittedly, the petitioners not being allottees their occupation cannot be said to be authorised. Therefore, the petitioners are liable to be evicted under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, Instead of resorting to the process of eviction the Government has sought to charge rent at the rate prescribed. This fact is also required to be noted.
6. The rate of rent, as has been fixed by Annexure-4 to the writ petition, by all reasonable calculations cannot be said to be unreasonable or excessive. Even then the petitioners having not disclosed any ingredient of unreasonableness, they have not made out a case that they have been allotted this quarter on the basis of their pay scale. The petitioners not being allottees and having been in unauthorised occupation, is liable to pay damages. Nothing has been disclosed to show that the rate fixed is arbitrary and excessive.
7. Fixation of rate of rent is not the domain of the Court. The policy of charging different rate for non-allottees cannot be subject-matter with which Court is concerned. Such an action is in the nature of legislation with which Court does not concern itself and rules of natural justice do not run in the sphere of legislation, is the consistent view reflected In various judicial pronouncements. Reference may be made in the case of Union of India and another v. Cynamide India Limited and another, AIR 1937 SC 1302 ; Bates v. Lord Hailsham of Marylohone, 1972(1) WIR 1372. In Cynamide India (supra) the Supreme Court observed :
“The second observation we wish to make is, legislative action, plenary or subordinate is not subject to rules of natural justice.”
In the case of Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Limited v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 460 : (1974) 2 SCC 630 : (1975) 1 SCR 956, the Supreme Court observed:
“Price fixation is more in the nature of legislative measure even though it may be based upon objective criteria found in a report or other material. It could not, therefore, give rise to a complaint that a rule of natural justice has not been followed in fixing the price.”
In Cynamide India (supra) the Supreme Court held :
“Price fixation is neither the function nor the forte of the Court. We concern ourselves neither with the policy nor with the rates.”
It is now well established by reason of various decisions that the principle of equality does not mean that every law must have universal application for all persons who are not by nature, attainment or circumstances in the same position, as the, varying needs of different classes of persons often require separate treatment. The principle does not take away from the State the power of classifying persons for legitimate purposes. Admittedly, even classification is in some degree likely to produce some inequality, and mere production of Inequality is not enough. Differential treatment does not “per se” constitute violation of Article 14. It denies equal protection only when there is no reasonable basis not obnoxious and it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that it has no application to other persons. It is for the Legislature to determine what categories it would embrace within the scope of legislation and merely because certain categories which could stand on the same footing as those which are covered by the legislation are left but would not render the legislation which has been enacted in any manner discriminatory and violative of Article 14. Article 14 prohibits class legislation and not reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. If the Legislature takes care to reasonably classify persons for legislative purposes and if it deals equally with all persons belonging to a “well-defined class”. It is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that the law does not apply to other persons.
8. It is now a settled law that in order to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differential which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group, and (ii) that, that differential must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different basis ; such as, geographical or according to objects or occupation or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. Article 14 does not insist that legislative classification should be scientifically perfect or logically complete. Mere differentiation or Inequality that legislative classification should be scientifically perfect or logically complete. Mere differentiation or inequality of treatment or inequality of burden does not per se amount to discrimination within the inhibition of the equal protection clause. To attract the operation of the clause it is necessary to show that the selection or differentiation is unreasonable or arbitrary that it does not rest on any rational basis having regard to the object which the Legislature has in view.
9. It is by now also well-settled, that the burden of showing that a classification rests upon an arbitrary and not reasonable basis, is upon the person who impeaches the law as a violation of the guarantee of equal protection. Further, if any State of facts can be reasonably conceived that would sustain the classification, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. Allegation must be specific, clear and unambiguous and must give particulars. Throwing out vague hints that there may be other Instances of like nature which the impugned legislation has left out, is not enough ; such instances must be specified and it must be proved that the selection by the Legislature has been arbitrary and has no reasonable relation to the object to be achieved by the statute. It is for the petitioner to show that the persons or objects as between whom the Legislature is alleged to have discriminated, are similarly situated.
10. In the present case the petitioners complained that they are being discriminated with the allottees when they admitted that they are not allottees. “A legislative measure does not concern itself with the facts of an individuals case. It is meant to lay down a general rule applicable to all persons or objects or transactions of a particular kind or class.” Cynamide India Limited (supra)”.
11. In the present case the non-allottees are separate class from the allottees and clearly distinguishable from the allottees. Therefore, it cannot be said that such classification hits Article 14 of the Constitution.
12. Now let us examine the question that the rates are discriminatory and have been fixed arbitrarily. Admittedly the non-allottees namely the petitioners being separate class, therefore, different rates may be fixed for them. The petitioners have not furnished any particular rates or any calculation as to how the rates are arbitrary since non-allottees are of different class. Therefore, fixation of rates cannot be termed as discriminatory. Even If there were material for consideration with regard to fixation of rates even then I am afraid that I cannot go into those questions. In the case of Union of India v. Cynamide India Ltd. (supra), it was observed :
“These are not matters for investigation in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution or under Article 32 of the Constitution. Despite the pressing invitation of Sri Diwan to go into facts and figures and his elaborate submissions based on facts and figures, we have carefully and studiously refrained from making any reference to such facts and figures as we consider it outside our province to do so and we do not want to set any precedent as was supposed to have been done in Premier Automobiles though it was not so done and, therefore, needed explanation in later cases.”
6. After having perused the said observation, we do not find any reason to deviate from the reasoning given in the said judgment which we do approve.
7. In that view of the matter, we are unable to agree with the submission made on behalf of the petitioners for the same reason as given in the said decision. The writ petition, therefore, fails and as such, is dismissed. However, it would be open to the petitioners, if they are so advised, to seek regularisation in terms of the order dated 29.11.1990 on payment of enhanced rent together with interest from the date of their respective occupation subject to the determination and decision of the concerned authorities in accordance with law. However, there will be no order as to cost.
A number of such petitions by different group of persons challenging the same order dated 29.11.1990 are pending. The Registrar is directed to prepare a list of all such cases and list them before this Court within a fortnight in order to pass formal orders in respect of those cases which should be governed by this order and be accordingly dismissed.