ORDER
Manmohan Sarin, J.
1. This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenges the order passed by the learned Rent Control Tribunal, dismissing the petitioner’s appeal against the order passed by the Additional Rent Controller dated 19.9.1994 under Section 15(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’).
2. By the order passed under Section 15(1) of the Act, the petitioner/tenant had been directed to deposit the arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 3,700/ per month for the months of February and August, 1986; January 1987 and with effect from 1st July, 1994. The eviction petition in the instant case is dated 27,4.1987 and has been filed on 1.5.1987 on the grounds specified under Section 14(1) and (j) of the Act.
3. Petitioner’s main contention is that by virtue of the Amendment Act of 1988, which came into effect from 1.12.1988, the Rent Controller ceased to have the jurisdiction in respect of the tenancies with rentals of over Rs.3,500/ per month. Accordingly, it is contended that the impugned order of 15.9.1994 is without jurisdiction. Petitioner further submits that his applications under Sections 6 & 9 of the Act for fixation of the standard rent were pending, besides his application for stay of proceedings and, in these circumstances, the order under Section 15(1) of the Act, should not have been passed.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. The written synopsis filed have also been perused. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to pass any order under the provisions of the Act, including the impugned order, under Section 15(1) of the Act since after 1.12.1988, with the coming into force of the Amendment Act, he ceased to have jurisdiction in respect of tenancies where the rent exceeded Rs.3,500/ per month.
5. This Court had occasion to consider a similar plea raised by the tenant in Daily Bread Bakers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Jagjit Singh Bawa . The tenant’s plea was dismissed after noticing and considering the following judgments:
1. Nirmaljit Arora Vs. Bharat Steel Tubes Ltd. .
2. Sushil Kumar Mehta Vs. Gobind Ram Bohra (dead) through his LRs. .
3. Lakshmi Narayan Guin & Ors. Vs. Niranjan Modak .
4. Dahiben widow of Ranchhodji Jivanji & Ors. Vs. Vasanji Kevalb hai & Ors. (AIR 1995 SC 1215).
5. D.C. Bhatia & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Anr. .
6. M/s. New United Automobiles Vs. Cycle Equipment Pvt. Ltd. (1997 (1) RCR 69) (DB).
Relying on the decision in Nirmaljit Arora Vs. Bharat Steel Tubes Ltd. , it was held that Section 3(c), inserted by the Amendment Act of 1988, was prospective in character and has no retrospective operation and, as such, it would not apply to pending action and proceedings. The pending actions and proceedings would continue to be governed by the Act as if Section 3(c) was not on the Statute. The Bench also noticed that the Apex Court in D.C. Bhatia Vs. Union of India , while upholding the constitutional validity of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1988 noted that the Division Bench had held that the provisions of Section 3(c) would not be applicable to the cases which were pending before the Court. Since no arguments were advanced on this point by any of the parties, it was observed that the Apex Court was not expressing any opinion on this aspect of the controversy. Accordingly, the decision in Nirmaljit Arora Vs. Bharat Steel Tubes Ltd. (Supra) would hold the field.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the decision of the Apex Court in Paripati Chandrasekhar Rao & Sons Vs. Alapati Jalaiah was not cited and considered while deciding the case of Daily
Bread Bakers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Jagjit Singh Bawa (Supra). This case relates to the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. The State Government is stated to have issued a Notification dated 29.12.1983, exempting, with effect from 26.10.1983, from the provisions of the Act, amongst others, buildings whose monthly rent exceeded Rs.1,000/ per month. The premises in question stood exempted from the operation of the Act with effect from 26.10.1983 by virtue of the notification. The tenant had moved applications for fixing of standard rent. The same were dismissed by the Rent Controller, holding that he had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the applications. Appeals were preferred by the tenant to the Subordinate Judge, which were dismissed and the decision of the Rent Controller was upheld. Revision Petitions were filed by the tenant and the High Court allowed the same, holding that the Rent Controller had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the applications since the notification in question did not apply to the pending proceedings. The Apex Court allowed the appeal and held that the High Court was in error and dismissed the applications filed before the Rent Controller. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the applications of the tenant were dismissed since the Court ceased to have jurisdiction in respect of the premises. It was submitted that the position under the Delhi Rent Control Act was similar and, therefore, the impugned orders were without jurisdiction.
7. The above cited case cannot be of any assistance to the petitioners. The said judgment itself recognises and brings out the material difference between the vested rights which a landlord may possess and the protective rights which are given to a tenant and which survive only so long as the legislation operates. It would be worthwhile to reproduce the observations of the Apex Court in paras 12 and 13 of the cited case:
“12. According to us there is a material difference between the rights which accrue to a landlord under the common law and the protection which is afforded to the tenant by such legislation as the Act. In the former case the rights and remedies of the land lord and tenant are governed by the law of contract and the law governing the property relations. These rights and remedies continue to govern their relationship unless they are regulated by such protective legislation as the present Act in which case the said rights and remedies remain suspended till the protective legislation continues in operation. Hence, while it can legiti mately be said that the landlord’s normal rights vested in him by the general law continue to exist till and so long as they are not abridged by a special protective legislation in the case of the tenant, the protective shield extended to him survives only so long as and to the extent the special legislation operates. In the case of the tenant, therefore, the protection does not create any vested right which can operate beyond the period of protec tion or during the period the protection is not in existence. When the protection does not exist, the normal relations of the landlord and tenant come into operation. Hence, the theory of the vested right which may validly by pleaded to support the landlord’s case is not available to the tenant. It is for this reason that the analogy sought to be drawn by Shri Subbarao between the landlord’s and the tenant’s rights relying upon the decision of this Court in Atma Ram Mittal is misplaced. In that case the landlord’s normal right to evict the tenant from the premises was not interfered with for the first ten years of the construction of the premises by an exemption specifically incorporated in the protective rent legislation in question. The normal right was obviously the vested right under the general law and once accrued it continued to operate. The protection given to the tenant by the rent legislation came into operation after the expiry of the period of ten years. Hence, notwithstanding the coming into operation of the protection and in the absence of the provisions to the contrary, the proceedings already commenced on the basis of the vested right could not be defeated by mere passage of time consumed by the said proceedings. It is for this reason that the Court there held that the right which had accrued to the landlord being a vested right could not be denied to him by the efflux of time.
13. This is not the situation in the present case where the tenant who undoubtedly had the rights and remedies under the Act to claim reliefs against the landlord, lost the same the moment the protection was taken away, the rights and remedies being not vested ones.”
It would, therefore, be seen that once the protection afforded to the tenant by the legislation ceases to operate in respect of tenancies which are more than Rs. 3,500/ per month, the tenant cannot claim or seek the enforcement of the protection and benefits that had been provided by the Statute, while the landlord may seek the enforcement of his vested rights.
8. As regards the instant case, as held by the Division Bench of this Court in Nirmaljit Arora Vs. Bharat Steel Tubes Ltd. (Supra) and D.C. Bhatia Vs. Union of India (Supra) as also by this Bench in Daily Bread Bakers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Jagjit Singh Bawa (Supra), the amendment of 1988 was prospective in character and the pending eviction proceedings instituted under the Act prior to the said date were to continue as if Section 3(c) of the Act was not on the Statute Book, with the landlord having the right to avail of the vested rights as per the provisions of the Act in respect of the pending proceedings. The applications on which the impugned order seeking payment of arrears of rent at the admitted rate has been passed are the applications moved by the landlord under the Delhi Rent Control Act. It is not a case where a tenant who has lost the protection of the Act was seeking to claim it. In any case, petitioner’s submission that he could not have been fastened with the liability under Section 15(1) of the Act while his applications for fixation of standard rent were pending, is without merit and deserves to be rejected.
9. In view of the foregoing, the challenge to the impugned order, as being without jurisdiction, is misconceived and deserves to be rejected for the reasons stated above and as also enumerated in Daily Bread Bakers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Jagjit Singh Bawa (Supra).
10. It would be seen that the impugned order, being an interim order passed under Section 15(1) of the Act, seeks to do justice between the parties by at least ensuring the payment of the admitted amount of rent. It is also worth noticing that, in the instant case, the proceedings had been instituted as far back as 1987 and the petitioner/tenant has been successful, by raising one plea or the other, in delaying the adjudication of the matter. The petition has no merit and is dismissed.