PETITIONER: V L PATIL Vs. RESPONDENT: ARJUN HALAPPA NAIKAWADI & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/08/1996 BENCH: PUNCHHI, M.M. BENCH: PUNCHHI, M.M. VENKATASWAMI K. (J) CITATION: 1996 SCALE (5)824 ACT: HEADNOTE: JUDGMENT:
O R D E R
The appellant, the aggrieved party in these two special
appeals, was granted/leave limited to the question as to
whether the learned Single Judge of the High Court was
justified in passing strictures against the appellant. On
merit of the matter, the fate of the cases stands sealed.
The reference to the appellant in the judgment of the
learned Single Judge is in two capacities : (i) as a party-
respondent connected with the merits of the matter; and (ii)
his brooding presence as a Minister of the time to have
influenced the decision-making of the Land Tribunal, it
being a land reforms matter. The learned Single Judge in
paragraph 4 of his judgment observed as follows :
“But, in this case it appears to me
that the regular procedure
prescribed by the Land Reforms Act
for conferring occopation of the
lands immediately prior to 1.8.1974
had been abused by the Chairman and
the members of the Tribunal to
casue wilful loss to the
petitioners and they did not have
the courage of their convictions to
stand up to the machinations of
respondent – 3 (the appellant
herein) who was admittedly a
Minister of the State Government at
the relevant time.” (emphasis
supplied)
On appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court at
the instance of the appellant, the Division Bench in para 31
of its judgment observed as follows :
“As earlier observed, we do not
find any direct evidence to hold
that the impugned order was passed
by the Tribunal at the behest of
the appellant who exercised his
influence on them. But the facts
and circumstances of the case leave
no manner of doubt that after the
passing of a decree in the
partition suit, a determined effort
which was within the knowledge of
the appellant, was made to defeat
the claim of Naikwadi family, which
in our view was wholly
unjustified.”
The Bench further observed in paragraph 37 as follows :
“Having arrived at the aforesaid
conclusion, one question still
remains to be answered i.e.,
whether respondent – 3 (appellant)
exerted his extra constitutional
power and influence on the members
of the Tribunal who yielded – to
such influence. On this aspect, it
was very fairly conceded by Mr.
Bannurmath, learned counsel for the
writ petitioners, that there was
no evidence to prove any direct
link between the appellant and
members of the Tribunal. Even we,
after going through all the
relevant evidence find that there
is no positive direct evidence to
prove the exervising of the extra
constitutional power and influence
on the members of the Tribunal.
That being so, the next question
that arises for consideration
whether there is any circumstantial
evidence on the basis of which such
an inference can be drawn. In our
view on the facts and circumstances
of this case, it would be too much
stretching to hold that to procure
the impugned order such an
influence was exerted by the
appellant (respondent-3) himself.
The facts of the case do reveal the
revival of interest of respondents
– 3 in the land in dispute and the
determined effort of Smt. Aruna
Devi to deny the possession of the
Naikwadi family and defeat their
claim. But these facts plus the
fact that respondent – 3 was a
Minister in the State cabinet by
themselves, in our opinion do not
lead to a positive conclusion that
the impugned order is the outcome
of the exercise of extra-
constitutional power and influence
on the members of the Tribunal, yet
suspicion is left unerased that the
impugned order may have been passed
to please respondent-3 or at his
behest.”
We have been taken through the other relevant portions
of the judgments of the learned Single Judge as well as that
of the Division Bench which reflect on the conduct of the
appellant in his capacity as a litigant, for it was his
lands which were being subjected to the provisions of the
relevant Land Reforms Act. His conduct as a litigant could
definitely be commented upon by the courts and that part of
the order would have to sustain, for expunction of remarks
cannot be sought by a litigant if those were legitimately
made from the conclusions and inferences drawn by a court.
But, here we have his name as a Minister brought in to cast
a shadow on the merits of the matters and this is a pinch
unbearable to the appellant.
It is evident from the afore=extracted passage from the
judgment of the learned Single Judge that the spelled out a
direct nexus between the conduct of the members of the
Tribunal and the appellant being a Minister at the relevant
time. The Division Bench however could not sustain that view
of the Single Bench as is evident from the two afore-
extracted passages from its judgment. It has been viewed
that there was neither direct nor circumstantial evidence to
prove any nexus between the appellant and the members of the
tribunal, The finding was dressed down to be described as an
‘usnerased suspicion’ that the impugned order may have been
passed to please respondent No.3 (the appellant) or at his
behest. On such infirm and shaky finding, we are not
prepared to sustain the remarks passed by the High Court
against the appellant as a Minister. In our view, the High
Court at both the stages was in error in linking or dragging
the appellant’s name as a Minister with the deliberations of
the Tribunal. The tribunal may have gone wrong or right on
the merit of the matters but the presence of the appellant
as being a Minister at the relevant time could not be linked
in any manner with the legal proceedings. The remarks which
reflect the conduct of the appellant as a Minister are
hereby expunged from the judgments at all places wherever
figuring but the remarks confined to his conduct as an
individual litigant shall sustain.
The appeals are partially allowed to the afore extent.
No costs.