JUDGMENT
Devinder Gupta, J.
1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred against the judgment of learned Single Judge dated 15.3.2000 dismissing the appellant’s writ petition whereby the appellant had sought quashing of the order dated 21.8.1997 (annexure A) of removal from service dated 21.8.1997 and the order dated 3.7.1998 (annexure B) of rejection of his appeal.
2. It was urged on behalf of the appellant that the impugned judgment of learned Single Judge is vitiated in as much as it has wrongly been recorded in the judgment by the learned Single Judge that the appellant did not raise the issue of non supply of documents, either in his representation/objection dated 15.1.1996 to the inquiry report or made such a submission in his appeal to the appellate authority and that the grievance about non supply of documents had been made for the first time in the writ petition. Another point urged was that after the order of remand was made by Lt. Governor, Delhi on 18.12.1996 with direction to pass fresh orders after giving the appellant a personal hearing and considering the appellant’s defense, the disciplinary authority had failed to consider the defense of the appellant.
3. We need not again reiterate the facts which have elaborately been mentioned by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment. However, in nutshell few facts are being stated which are relevant. On 7.12.1989 charge sheet was served upon the petitioner. Inquiry officer on 28.4.1995 completed his inquiry and submitted his report. It was forwarded to the Central Vigilance Commissioner. On receipt of the report and the recommendation of the Chief Vigilance Commissioner a copy was supplied to the petitioner on 1.12.1995, who filed his reply and on 9.12.1996 an order of dismissal from service was passed. An appeal against the said order was preferred by the appellant. On 18.12.1996 the appellate authority allowed the appeal and set aside the order of dismissal from service and remanded the case with direction to the respondent Council to pass fresh orders after affording the appellant a personal hearing and considering his defense. On 21.8.1997 fresh order imposing penalty of removal from service was passed. Appeal against the said order was dismissed by the appellate authority on 3.7.1998 and on 25.5.1999 writ petition was filed. Learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment considering the pleas which were raised before him held that on the basis of the material placed on record it cannot be said that the conclusions arrived at by the disciplinary authority or for that matter by the appellate authority are based on surmises and conjunctures. It was held that inquiry officer/disciplinary authority/appellate authority came to definite findings, on the basis of material on record, which conclusions are plausible ones. In view of the limited scope of judicial review, learned Single Judge declined to interfere wit the findings of the inquiry officer and ultimately declined to quash and set aside the impugned orders.
4. No doubt the learned Single Judge in the course of his judgment did observe that if the inquiry officer had by his order dated 3.1.1991 rejected appellant’s prayer for supply of 12 documents after directing the respondents to supply five documents as were prayed by the appellant in his letter dated 26.11.1990 on the ground that the same were not relevant to the charge in question, the appellant did not pursue the matter further and did not make any submission that the documents were relevant and such a point was taken up only in the writ petition. Irrespective of these observations learned Single Judge even proceeded to examine the question that whether the said documents as had been sought for by the appellant and were not supplied to him were relevant at all to deal with the charges levelled against the appellant. Learned Single Judge concluded that the documents were not at all relevant in as much as the charge against the appellant was that he had demanded and accepted illegal gratification to show favor to Surinder Kumar, the contractor. Documents sought for by him that the said contractor had been shown favor by the department in some other transactions were neither relevant for the charge, nor non supply of the same had caused any prejudice to the appellant.
5. Our attention was drawn to the record. It is a fact that the appellant had in his objection to the inquiry report as also in the memorandum of of appeal presented before the appellate authority raised objection as regards non-supply of documents. As such observations of the learned Single Judge to that extent are not born on record. Irrespective of this, as noticed by us above, the learned Single Judge did proceed to examine the relevance of the documents and concluded against the appellant. In any case we have also examined the nature of documents which the appellant had sought through his letter dated 26.11.1990 (annexure C). Inquiry officer did allow five documents but rejected the appellant’s prayer for the remaining 12 documents and in our view rightly so. Learned Single Judge was also justified in concluding that the same were not at all relevant for the purpose of the charge against the appellant. It was also not shown to us that they had to do anything with the transaction in question or with the charges against the appellant and as such there is no force in the first point raised on behalf of the appellant.
6. Even on the second point we do not find any force in the submission made on behalf of the appellant that after remand the disciplinary authority failed to consider the appellant’s defense or that the order of disciplinary authority was in any manner influenced by the advice of CVC.
7. We have gone through the order of disciplinary authority. After narrating the history of the case vividly as also the defense of the appellant, it is stated that the appellant was afforded personal hearing by the council in its meeting held on 16.6.1997, on which date after hearing the appellant, written submissions of the appellant were also received. Council thereafter decided to consider the matter in its next meeting which was fixed for 26.6.1997. Council deliberated on the submissions of the appellant and then proceeded to pass the impugned order. We do not find any force in the submission made that there is any violation of the principles of natural justice or that the appellant’s defense was not taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority. We have ourselves satisfied on going through the material on record, particularly the report of the inquiry officer, his analysis of evidence vis a vis the charges levelled against the appellant and are of the view that the findings of the inquiry officer in the light of defense taken by the appellant, the orders of disciplinary authority and of the appellate authority are not liable to be interfered wit. The view taken is not only plausible one but is the only possible view which can be taken of the material on record. Appeal is thus liable to be dismissed.
8. Dismissed.