ORDER
H. Rangavittalacha, J.
1. Since in all these Writ Petitions the orders impugned are the same and a common questions of law and facts are involved, all of them are heard together and disposed of by this common order.
2. The admitted facts in all these writ petitions are as follows:
The land bearing Survey No. 1 measuring in all 3 Acres situate in Jarakabande Kaval, Bangalore North Taluk was granted to one Venkata Bovi under a grant certificate issued by the Tahsildar, Bangalore North Taluk vide No. D.D.3/56-57 dated 1.6.1957. On 1.6.1967 the said Venkata Bovi sold 1 Acre 20 Guntas of land out of 3 Acres to one V.R. Gnanaprakasham and another 1 Acre 20 Guntas to one V.R. Anthoniswamy. On coming into force of the Karnataka Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribe (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act (‘the Act for short) one V. Venkataswamy S/o the grantee Venkatabovi made an application before the Assistant Commissioner, Bangalore Sub-Division Bangalore under Rule 3(2) of the Act for restoration of possession. He had impleaded V.R. Ganaprakash and V.R. Anthoniswamy the purchasers of the property from his father and one Gurusiddappa-petitioner in W.P.17119/90 and Marakka-petitioner in W.P.17120/90 as respondents.
3. The application was enquired into by the Assistant Commissioner in accordance with law after notifying the respondents therein. The respondents before the Assistant Commissioner contended interalia that the grantee Venkata Bovi did not belong to Schedule Tribe that one of the respondent Marakka had perfected her title by adverse possession. That during the relevant time when the land was granted that is on 1.6.57 the land was subject to the rules under the Land Revenue Code and under Rule 43 (6)(a)(ii) the prescribed period of non-alienation was 10 years from the date of the grant and the grant being made on 1.6.57 the sale having taken place on 1.6.67 it was beyond the period of 10 years. Therefore the sale was valid.
4. The Assistant Commissioner rejected all the contentions.
5. In so far as the first objection that Venkata Bovi was not a member of Schedule Tribe is concerned the Assistant Commissioner has held that the sale was not tenable in view of non-production of any material by the objectors in support of their contentions. In so far as the contention that the sale made by Venkata Bovi was beyond 10 years, the Assistant Commissioner relying on Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act read with Section 9(4) of the General clauses Act has held that the date of the grant that is 1.6.1957 has to be excluded and the period for computing the 10 years would start from 2.6.1957 and therefore the sale was within the prohibited period. He therefore declared the sale made by Venkata Bovi as void and ordered restoration of possession.
6. Aggrieved by the order of the Assistant Commissioner all the respondents except one K.N. Sreenivasaiah individually preferred appeals before the Special Deputy Commissioner Rural Bangalore in SC, ST, Appeal No. 6,7,9/89-90. The Deputy Commissioner by a considered order dated 27.7.90 dismissed the appeals. Aggrieved by the orders of the Deputy Commissioner the above three Writ Petitions are filed.
7. During the pendency of the Writ Petitions the applicant before the Assistant Commissioner Venkataswamy died on 2.12.90 and his legal representatives were brought on record and are represented.
8. Writ Petition No. 17082/1990 is filed by V.R. Gnanaprakasham who has purchased 1 Acre 20 Guntas of land from Venkata Bovi under a registered sale deed dated 1.6.1967.
9. Writ Petition No. 17119 of 1990 is filed by G.S. Gurusiddappa respondent before the Assistant Commissioner. The contention of the petitioner in this petition is Gnanaprakash had sold the land which he had purchased in favour of a society and the same has been challenged. He has purchased the land from the society and he is in possession of the same.
10. Writ Petition No. 17120/1990 is filed by Marakka objector before the Assistant Commissioner, She claims to have been in possession of the property. According to her she has constructed a few houses and has let out them for rent.
11. Respondent No. 1 in all the cases has filed the statement of objections and supported the orders. The only contention of the petitioner in all these Writ Petitions is that the grant was made on 1.6.57 to Venkata Bovi. The said Venkata Bovi by means of two sale deeds dated 1.6.67 has sold 1 Acre 20 Guntas each to Gnanaprakash and Anthony. The rules that prevailed governing the transaction was Rule 43(6)(a)(ii) of the rules framed under the Land Revenue Code under which the period of non-alienation prescribed was 10 years from the date of grant, the sale having taken place on 1.6,67 was beyond the period of the said 10 years. Therefore the sale was valid and the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner were not right in excluding the first day of the grant that is 1.6.57 for the purpose of computing the 10 years period relying on the provisions of the Limitation Act and the General Clauses Act. Therefore the orders are liable to be set aside.
12. The Learned Counsel appearing for the first respondent Sri T.S. Ramachandra and the learned High Court Government Pleader contended that having regard to the provisions of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act and Section 12 of the Limitation Act both the authorities were right in excluding the first day of the grant that is 1.6.57 for the purpose of reckoning the 10 years period and hence the sale made on 1.6.67 was within the period of 10 years. He therefore submitted that the authorities below were right in passing the impugned order and prayed for the dismissal of the Writ Petitions.
13. The learned Counsel for the first respondent also relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in RAMCHANDRA GOVIND v. LAXMAN SAVLERAM.
14. In view of the rival contentions raised the question that arises for consideration is whether having regard to the language of Rule 43(6)(a) (ii) for reckoning the period of 10 years mentioned in the rules whether the date of the grant has to be excluded or included?
15. Whether the sale made by the grantee in favour of the purchaser Gnanaprakash on 1.6.67 is liable to be declared as void under the provisions of Section 4 and 5 of the Karnataka Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribe (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act or valid conferring valid title on the purchaser.
The relevant rule applicable to the transaction is extracted herein:-”
“Rule 43(6)(a)
Every grant of land under Sub-rule (i) shall be subject to the conditions:
(i) Where the grant is made free of cost that the land granted shall not be alienated for a period of 15 years from the date of grant;
(ii) where the grant is made for an upset price or for reduced upset price, the land granted shall not be alienated for a period of 10 years from the date of grant.”
16. The relevant clause applicable to the facts of this case is Sub-rule (2). The answer to the above formulated question depends upon the meaning that is to be given to the phrase “period of 10 years from the date of grant”. By using the word ‘from whether the date on which the grant is made has to be excluded or included depends upon the function of the word in the context. The word ‘from’ in a sentence is used as a functions word to indicate a starting point of time. The context determines whether the day or date immediately following the word from in the rule has to be included or excluded. The word ‘from’ may be inclusive or exclusive according to the context. See Shrouds Judicial Dictionery 3rd edition page 1182. Normally where an Interest’ has to pass from a given day, the day or date is included for purposes of reckoning the time or duration. The question whether a given day has to be included or excluded for reckoning the duration of time came for consideration in the case of ACKLAND v. LUTLEY. Briefly stated the facts in the said case are:
“One James Traoke leased his premises for a period of 21 years from 25th March 1809 to one Pring and put him in possession. After the death of the said James Traoke the devisee John Blackmore sold the premises to Richard Ackland. One of the trustees of James Traoke, Robert Blackmore received the rents by his Will made Edward Lutley as his executor. On 25th March 1830 at about 12 ‘O’ clock at noon the purchaser of the premises that is Ackland went to take possession of the premises, it was prevented by the executor Lutley. Then a suit was instituted by the said Ackland for possession against the executor Lutley. One of the questions that came for consideration was whether at 12 ‘O’ clock noon 25th March 1830 who has the right to be in possession at that time the tenant executed of will or purchaser and whether the lease period had expired. It was held relying on HATTER v. ASH (1 Lad. Ray.84) that “where an interest is to pass from a given day there according to the general result of the authorities the day is included. It was also held relying on the decision in PUGH v. DUKE OF LEEDS, that the general understanding is the terms for the years last during the whole anniversary of the day from which they are granted.
17. In these petitions admittedly when the grant is made by the State Government, an interest (though restrictive) in land passes from the grantor to the grantee. In the context the word ‘from’ according to me should be held as to include the date of the grant. The associated word occurring in the said rule namely “for 10 years”, also supports this meaning.
18. “Year” is defined in the Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, Third Edition as a time wherein the sun goes around his compass through 12 signs that is 365 days and about six hours”, and a year is held to mean in the said Dictionary as consisting of 12 calendar months. In the Karnataka General Clauses Act, ‘Year’ is held to mean a ‘Year’ reckoned according to British calender and a ‘Month’ again reckoned according to British Calendar. Even according to British Calendar a year consists, of 12 calendar months. Thus the 10 years in the rule means each year to be of 12 calendar months. Looked from that angle the ending of the 12th calendar month of the 10th year starting from 1.6.57 would be midnight of 31st May 1967.
19. Therefore in my view the period of 10 years has to be reckoned including the day of the grant and not excluding the said date. If so reckoned the 10 years from the date of the grant that is 1.6.57 would be completed on the mid night of 31st May 1957. The sale that is made on 1.6.67 has to be held being made after the period of 10 years.
20. The contention of the learned Counsel Sri Ramachandra Rao is, by a reading of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, which is extracted herein for ready reference:-
“Section 9:- It shall be sufficient for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time to use the word from”
It is clear that the first of the day of the grant that is 1.6.57 has to be excluded in computing the period of ten years. It has to be noticed that the above section does not determine the meaning of the word ‘From’ and the expression is used only in a generic and not in a rigid or exclusive sense, and the meaning attributed by this section may have to be departed from, if the context of the order to be construed so requires. In this case the context in which the word ‘From’ is used is in relation to the passing of property, and the associated words ‘within 10 years’ also makes it clear the intention is to include the date on which the grant is made.
21. In the decisions referred to by the Learned Counsel in RAMACHANDRA GOVIND v. LAXMAN SALVERAM, the question arose “when a Judgment Debtor was asked to deposit money within 15 days from 23.1.1936 by an order of the court, but he deposited on 7.2.1936”. In the context the court held relying on Section 9 of the General Clauses Act that time begins to run from 24.1.1936 and not from 23.1.1936. In the said case no interest in the property were to pass as in the case on hand, therefore the same is distinguishable, as has been held by the Lahore High Court in PURAN CHAND v. HOHD.DIN accepting the Madras High Court view; the relevant portion is extracted herein:
“We are in respectful agreement with the Judge of the Madras High Court in holding that the General Clauses Act embodies a principle of equity which should be applied to decrees apart from statutes. As the date from which one reckons may be either inclusive or exclusive”.
Section 9 of the General Clauses Act embodies a principle of equity, wherever equity demands the same principle be extended to court orders.
22. The Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner have relied on the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act in trying to exclude the first day of the grant that is first June 1957 for reckoning. It has to be held Section 12 applies for computation of period of limitation for purposes of Limitation Act. The said concept cannot be imported to the transactions like the one.
23. For the reasons stated above I answer Point No. 1 formulated above as follows:
Namely that the “land shall not be alienated for a period of 10 years from the date of grant” should be held to mean 10 years including the date on which the grant is made.
The sale made in favour of Gnanaprakash on 1.6.67 has to be held to be valid being made beyond the prohibited period of alienation not attracting the provision of the Karnataka Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribe (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act.
24. For the reasons stated above these Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders of the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner in so far as it relates to the petitioners are set aside. However that part of the order declaring the sale made by Venkata Bovi in favour of Anthony Swamy being not questioned in these writ petitions is confirmed. Rule made absolute. In the circumstances of the case there is no order as to costs.