ORDER
Motilal B. Naik, J.
1. As the issues raised in these two appeals are inter-related, these appeals are being disposed of by this common order.
2. Respondent No. 1 in these two appeals who is the father of the second respondent has instituted the suit, O.S.No. 295 of 2000 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Vijayawada for a declaration that the registered sale deed executed by himself and his son (2nd respondent herein) on 10-7-2000 in favour of the appellant in these appeals to sell the suit property bearing No. 48-9-5, Vishnunagar, Gunadala village of Vijayawada, is void and vitiated by fraud and misrepresentation and also for a consequential injunction restraining the third respondent herein from approving the lay out plan submitted by the appellant. Along with the suit the first respondent has also filed two interlocutory applications under Order 39 Rules 1, 2, 7 and Sections 94 and 151 of CPC, one in I.A. No. 704 of 2000 seeking to restrain the respondents/ defendants 1 to 5 therein from altering the physical features of the plaint schedule property, and the other in I.A. No. 705 of 2000 seeking to restrain the 6th respondent therein – Vijayawada-Guntur-Tenali Urban Development Authority, Vijayawada represented by its Vice-Chairman, Vijayawada from approving any lay out plan which includes the plaint schedule property. When the two I.As. came up for consideration before the lower Court on 24-7-2000, the lower Court made the following order, viz;
“Heard the learned Counsel for petitioner and perused the documents filed with plaint and with memo.
Issue urgent notices to the respondents and in the meanwhile, status quo to be maintained by the respondents. Post on 8-8-2000.”
3. Aggrieved by the above order made by the Court below, the appellant who is the second defendant in the suit O.S. No. 295 of 2000 and who purchased the suit schedule property has approached this Court by filing these two appeals.
4. The one and the only submission made by the learned Counsel for the appellant – Sri Vedula Venkataramana, is that when an ex parte interim order is passed on a petition filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, as required under Rule 3 of Order 39 CPC, the Court has to issue notice to the other side. However, if in a given set of circumstances, the Court is of the opinion that if the respondents are not restrained by an urgent order, the petitioner would suffer irreparable injury, the requirement of notice under Rule 3 of Order 39 CPC can be dispensed with, provided the Court shall record the reasons for doing so. Counsel submitted that a reading of the impugned order under appeals made by the Court below would disclose that no reasons are recorded by the Court below though it dispensed with the requirement of issuing notice under Rule 3 of Order 39 CPC to the appellant while granting the impugned ex parte status quo order. Counsel, therefore, submits that on this ground alone the impugned orders under the appeals are unsustainable and are liable to be set aside without going into the other aspects of the case.
5. On the contrary, Sri M.V. Suresh, learned Counsel for the contesting respondents submitted that the proposition as advanced on behalf of the appellant is no more held to be good in view of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in A. Venkatasubbaiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan, . According to the learned Counsel, when an ex parte interim injunction order is made by the trial Court dispensing with the requirement of Rule 3 of Order 39 CPC and the said petition is not finally decided within 30 days, then only the aggrieved party is entitled to file an appeal but not otherwise. Counsel, therefore, stated that in the light of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court, the appeals filed by the appellant-2nd defendant cannot be entertained.
6. In the light of the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the appellant as well as the contesting respondents, we are called upon to examine whether the submission made by the learned Counsel for the respondents is sustainable as to hold that the Supreme Court visualized a situation when an ex parte interim order is made under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC dispensing with the requirement of Rule 3 of Order 39 CPC and the said application is not decided within 30 days, then only the aggrieved party is entitled to file an appeal?
7. The ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in A. Venkatasubbaiah’s case (cited supra) relates to an issue arising out of an ex parte interim injunction granted by the trial Court for two months in favour of the plaintiff. The aggrieved party questioned the said order before the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and the High Court set aside the ex parte interim injunction order and directed the trial Court to take up the interlocutory application and to pass final order on merits. Under those circumstances, the Supreme Court clarified the position arising out of Rule 3 of Order 39 CPC. It was not the case before the Supreme Court that when an application is filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC seeking ex parte ad interim injunction and the trial Court dispensing with the notice as required under Rule 3 of Order 39 CPC has granted ex parte ad interim injunction without recording its reasons. The ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said decision, in our view, is not applicable to the present case which arises out of non-recording of reasons by the trial Court as required under Rule 3 of Order 39 CPC while granting ex parte status quo order.
8. It is now well settled by a series of pronouncements of the Supreme Court as well as various High Courts that when a Court grants an ex parte ad interim injunction dispensing with the requirement of notice under Rule 3 of Order 39 CPC, the Court granting such injunction order has to record its reasons for dispensing with the notice and if no reasons are recorded, such an order is unsustainable.
9. Coming to the facts of the instant case, a reading of the impugned order under appeals, as extracted above, discloses that the Court below has not recorded any reasons for dispensing with the requirement provided under Rule 3 of Order 39 CPC, but has only directed urgent notice to the respondents and in the meanwhile granted status quo to be maintained with regard to the suit properties. As discussed above, the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court cited supra, which is relied upon by the Counsel for the respondent cannot be read to hold that the Supreme Court intended that if an ex parte interim order is granted on a petition filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC is not decided finally within 30 days, then only the aggrieved party is entitled to prefer an appeal against such order before the appellate forum. We are of the further view, if the contention of the Counsel for the respondent in this regard is accepted, it would result in misinterpreting the true meaning of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the said decision. We, therefore, reject the contention of the Counsel for the respondents.
10. The appellant has purchased the suit schedule property, subject matter of litigation on 10-7-2000 under a registered sale deed for a valid consideration from the respondents 1 and 2 herein. After purchasing the suit property, the appellant-2nd defendant desired to develop the same and prepared a lay out plan and submitted before the third respondent herein for its approval. At that stage, the respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) filed the suit for a declaration that the registered sale deed executed by himself and his son on 10-7-2000 in favour of this appellant in respect of the suit schedule property is void and vitiated by fraud and a consequential relief is also sought restraining the appropriate authority – third respondent herein from approving the plan submitted by the appellant in respect of the suit schedule property.
11. Learned Counsel for the appellant pleaded before us that had notice been ordered by the Court below as required under Rule 3 of Order 39 CPC before granting the impugned ex parte status quo order, the appellant appeared before the Court below and would have placed all the relevant facts and thereupon, the Court would have been in a better position to appreciate the stand of the appellant and appropriate order would have been passed. However, by virtue of the impugned status quo order, the appellant is suffering irreparable hardship as the entire developmental activities of the appellant in respect of the suit schedule property have come to a standstill and the appellant even after investing huge amounts and purchasing the property is not able to reap the benefit from the suit schedule property.
12. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are convinced that in the absence of any reasons recorded by the Court below for dispensing with the notice as required under Rule 3 of Order 39 CPC while granting the impugned order under appeals, the impugned orders are liable to be set aside on this ground alone. Accordingly, the orders dated 24-7-2000 passed by the Court below in I.A. Nos. 704 and 705 of 2000 in O.S. No. 295 of 2000 are set aside. Consequently, the matter is remitted to the Court below and the Court below shall pass appropriate orders in I.A. Nos. 704 and 705 of 2000 on merits, after hearing the contesting respondents.
13. In the result, both these appeals are allowed. However, no costs.